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In the wake of the fundamental geopolitical change caused by the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, numerous interrogations questioning the shape of the post Cold-
War European security complex have emerged. The waning of the bipolar world 
order led the way for a lot of uncertainties concerning the role and interests of the 
actors of the European security system. Both the states and international 
institutions endeavoured to adapt to the new geopolitical context. Some 
institutions tried to find a new legitimation, some other to grasp the change for 
further developments. As for the states, they keep on defending their own 
interests. Some are seeking to keep their influence, other to find new possibilities. 
Yet, a series of questions remain: How are these diverse actors, whether it be 
states or international institutions, defining their preferences in the evolving 
European geopolitical context? What is the role of the major European states in 
the European security architecture? What is the role of Russia and of the United 
States, generally considered as the genuine victor of the Cold War and as the 
unique superpower in the post-Cold War era? How are the European states 
weighting up the options so as to have a more secure Europe in which their 
national interests are acknowledged? In this context, which role can be assigned 
to the common European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP] developed inside 
the European Union [EU]?  
 
Given the achievement of the Economic and Monetary Union [EMU], the 
fascinating topic in Europe in the next decades concerns certainly the European 
integration in the areas of security and defence. While aiming at tackling the 
above-mentioned interrogations, this thesis has as a purpose to provide a better 
understanding of how national security concerns affect the formation of spheres 
of influence (or geopolitical areas)1 in the optic of an enlarged European Union 
(or unified Europe)2. The hypothesis we are willing to confirm is the following 
one: in the unifying post-Cold War Europe, security and defence concerns 
continue to induce the states, especially the great powers, to form spheres of 
influence. Notwithstanding and to some extent even via international 
organizations, the states are aiming – by seeking to defend their national interest – 
to assert their respective geopolitical area. In this context, the likely formation 
inside the EU of a genuine capacity in the defence and security field lends further 
weight to the assumption of an EU acting as an authentic player with its own 
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sphere of influence. Therefore, the role and implication of the European Union as 
a potential “non-state” great power will also be addressed. 
 
The thesis will attempt to confirm its hypothesis by basing its analysis on 
the defensive variant of neo-realism. By doing so, the paper will focus on 
traditional neo-realist assumptions, notably on its emphasis on state as the key 
actor, while also dealing with the possibilities of cooperation. The theoretical 
approach will by and large be addressed in the following part and only slightly at 
this point. 
 
On the one hand, the thesis’ hypothesis is opposing the traditional 
hypothesis, asserting that the EU member states do not have any sphere of 
influence since the EU has absorbed them into its own sphere of influence. On the 
other hand, the hypothesis of the thesis is also contradicting traditional realist and 
neo-realist’s assumptions, which seem to be unable to account for cooperation 
between the EU member states and the impact of the EU institutions upon them. 
This explains why the use of neo-realism to understand the current security 
architecture in Europe is largely rejected. The aim of the thesis is precisely to 
apply neo-realism, in taking its defensive variant, to try to comprehend that 
spheres of influence exist for both the states in Europe – most particularly the 
three big EU member states, which are France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, but also Russia and Turkey – and at an EU level. By backing its 
analysis on the defensive variant of neo-realism, the thesis seeks notably to 
corroborate the assertion that the major EU member states, while pushing for 
more integration within the EU, are at the same time maintaining their sphere of 
influence. To that end, these states tend to use the EU and other international 
institutions as a means to increase their influence. But, on the other hand, given 
the fact that EU’s great powers are gradually underpinning EU’s status as an 
international actor in its own right, the thesis will analyse under which 
circumstances the European Union can effectively be considered a genuine 
international actor having its own sphere of influence. 
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Let us now address some methodological issues. As the thesis will analyse 
the European security system and its repercussions upon spheres of influence, one 
should begin by defining the key concepts involved. 
 
The thesis entails two ambiguities as regards the political object examined. 
When speaking about the European security system, one questions what object is 
really meant to be analysed. Europe is a complex political object. So, which 
Europe do we mean? In other words, which Europe is referred to when one speaks 
about the “European security system”? 
 
The first distinction to be made concerns the different appreciations of 
Europe. Geographically and seen as a continent, Europe’s generally accepted 
eastern limits are the Urals and the Bosporus. Yet, Europe is in fact at least as 
much a political and cultural concept as a geographical one. So, for a better 
understanding, we will distinguish four “Europes” in security terms, as identified 
by the Danish researcher Ole Wæver. The first one is the Europe of the European 
Union, the second one is the non-superpower Europe spreading from Portugal to 
Estonia or Romania, the third one is the “geographical” Europe reaching from the 
Atlantic to the Ural Mountains – also sometimes called the Gaullist Europe or 
Gorbachev’s Common European House – and finally the fourth one, the most 
inclusive, is the OSCE Europe stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Besides 
those four Europe, one can also add the Atlanticist Europe, regrouping the NATO 
countries. (Mortimer, 1992: 5-6; Booth and Wheeler, 1992: 4-5; Buzan, Kelstrup 
and Lemaitre, 1990: 45-49) 
 
The second distinction to be made relates to the European Union and its 
member states. It is sometimes not very obvious if the political object considered 
is the EU in its own right or only some (or even one) of its member states. For 
instance, in the case of the Franco-German tandem, when France and Germany 
decide something, there is often some confusion as to know if it encompasses the 
whole EU or only the two countries  
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Besides, one should specify that in the EU’s Europe, different sub-groups 
of states forming some entities, which are in a way or another more integrated in 
terms of security, can also be identify. 
 
To sum up, one distinguishes a double ambiguity when it comes to the 
political object examined. The first one takes into account the different kinds of 
Europe, while the second one refers to the ambiguity between the European 
Union and its member states. 
 
Initially, the thesis will focus more particularly on the states of the old 
continent, with an emphasis put on the three major EU member states (namely 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom), and their respective spheres of 
influence. One should bear in mind that the thesis will obviously predominantly 
refer to these states as member states of the EU. In that optic, the development of 
the EU integration process is of great importance. One should stress, on the other 
hand, that the behaviour, interests and preferences of these states will also be 
analysed within the broader European order. When addressing the EU’s external 
identity and the question of an EU acting as an authentic player with its own 
sphere of influence, one logically focuses principally on the EU and the role 
played by its EU member states; but on placing the analysis also in the broader 
European security system. So, in its analysis, the thesis will also question to 
which extent one can speak, in the case of the EU, of a kind of multilevel 
governance, where power and influence are shared among different levels of 
decision-making; each level having its own sphere of influence.  
 
Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that this paper will be considered in a 
multidimensional way, which means that the subject of the thesis will not be 
analysed under a single aspect, but many aspects will be taken into consideration, 
such as the security, political, historical, economic and cultural aspects. The 
emphasis will nonetheless be put on the security and political aspects. In this 
respect, it seems appropriate to define some concepts, such as “hard power”, “soft 
power”, “civilian power” and “military power”. Hard power is a concept which 
refers to national power that comes from military and economic means. It is used 
in contrast to the concept of soft power, which refers to power that comes from 
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diplomacy, culture and history. In this sense, economic power is assimilated to the 
concept of hard power, since economic means can be used to influence and 
coerce. As for the difference between civilian and military power, most observers 
seem to agree that civilian means non-military, thus including economic, 
diplomatic and cultural policy instruments, while military power involves the use 
of armed forces. (K. Smith, 2004: 1) In order to avoid imprecision, the thesis 
maintains a meticulous distinction, as does it Karen E. Smith, «between civilian 
power strictly speaking, and anything that involves the use of the military. 
[Accordingly, for instance,] peacekeepers may or may not be armed, but they are 
still troops who are trained also to kill.» (K. Smith, 2004: 1-2) Although neo-
realism tends to focus on high politics and hard security (Andreatta, 2005: 20, 23-
24), the thesis regards the security, political, historical, economic and cultural 
aspects as interconnected. All these aspects are entailed in the geopolitical interest 
of the different actors with the security aspect being however the most important 
in the formulation of that interest. The thesis will thus take into account all these 
aspects, with the priority logically being given to the security and political 
aspects. 
 
As far as the empirical approach of the thesis is concerned, it will consist 
of a contemporary debate, as opposed to a historical or futuristic debate. 
Accordingly, the thesis will be based on the current international situation (i.e. in 
terms of the current power struggle) between states and international institutions. 
 
As for the literature used in the thesis, a broad number of data and 
documents have been utilized. Very many documents describing the last 
developments of the European security architecture exist. As far as primary 
sources – including official documents – are concerned, many of them emanate 
directly from the different security institutions, be it the different EU institutions, 
NATO or the OSCE. Most of these data are even directly available over the 
Internet. Besides the sources, the thesis based its research on many secondary 
works. The paper also relied greatly on books as well as on many articles focusing 
on recent security issues and which could serve to confirm the hypothesis of my 
thesis. As far as the theoretical sources are concerned, the thesis backed its 
analysis on the works of neo-realists, most particularly of defensive neo-realists, 
 13
such as Charles Glaser, Robert Jervis (and occasionally) Kenneth Waltz. 
Concerning the EU and other international organizations, preferences was given 
to primary sources, but concerning the policy and interests of the different nation 
states, the thesis relied primarily on works and articles written by different 
authors. More generally, articles and works of analysts have broadly been used. A 
particular focus has certainly been given to documents of analysts who are 
generally recognized as having a realist or neo-realist view of international 
relations. Amongst them, one can notably point out Zbigniew Brzezinski3, with 
his 1997 The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic 
Imperatives and his 2004 The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, 
or Robert Kagan4. Furthermore, a paramount book on geopolitics, written by 
Aymeric Chauprade and reedited in 2003, Géopolitique, constantes et 
changements dans l’histoire, was a great help to understand the geopolitic 
characteristics of international relations and has thus largely been used, especially 
in the third part of the thesis. Concerning more particularly the EU’s status in 
international relations, the thesis has largely based its research on works of 
renowned specialists. Several books and articles of specialists – such as Filippo 
Andreatta, André Dumoulin, Geoffrey Edwards, Nicole Gnesotto, Christopher 
Hill, Jolyon Howórth, Antonio Missiroli, Elfriede Regelsberger, Karen E. Smith 
and Michael E. Smith – have indeed broadly been used. Besides, one has to note 
that the research of some details of historical events have essentially been based 
on encyclopaedias. 
 
Having presented the hypothesis as well as some methodological issues, 
we will now describe how the topic of the thesis will be dealt with. In doing so, 
we will address the scope and limits of the thesis. In order to be able to confirm 
the hypothesis brought up, we will firstly consider the European security 
architecture, entailing the debate about the relations between the diverse security 
institutions on the old continent. In analysing the contacts in Europe between 
these various institutions – most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
[NATO] and the security foundations of the European Union (as the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP], the European Security and Defence Policy 
[ESDP] and the Western European Union [WEU]), but also the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] –, we expect to obtain the first 
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elements permitting us to confirm our hypothesis. Then, we will more specifically 
focus on the crucial issue of the dynamics of the changing geopolitical face of 
Europe and the evolving transatlantic relations, following the end of the Cold War 
and the connected eastwards enlargements of both NATO and the EU. This brings 
us to consider the positions and motivations of the European states towards the 
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Western institutions. It also 
leads us to analyse more broadly the dynamics stemming from these changes and 
generating evolving geopolitical and security interests in Europe for the states and 
institutions. Challenging, understandably, the geopolitical realities of the former 
Eastern countries, but also of the countries in the former West (especially with 
regard to Germany and France and to a lesser extent to the United Kingdom) and 
of countries getting a renewed geostrategic importance, as Turkey and Ukraine, 
the analysis of the post-Cold War geopolitical dynamics will equip us with a well-
rounded outlook that will permit us to confirm our hypothesis, asserting that in the 
unifying post-Cold War Europe security and defence concerns continue to induce 
the states, especially the great powers, to form their own geopolitical areas (or 
spheres of influence). From that angle, the way the different European states 
envisage the European security architecture as well as the different geopolitical 
areas will be analysed, with particular consideration being given to the three 
principal actors within the EU, that are, especially France and Germany but also 
to a lesser extent the United Kingdom. Deeming the unlikely importance and 
characteristics of their geopolitical areas as well as analysing their interests and 
preferences, we will take into consideration the dynamics of their interactions, so 
as to apprehend the potential coalitions emerging or likely to appear between 
states in Europe. In that context, the role and function of other key countries         
– besides the three above-mentioned – will also have to be considered; one thinks 
especially about Russia, but also about states of geopolitical great importance like 
Turkey and Ukraine. Obviously, the role and purpose of the United States – often 
regarded as the hegemon in the international system – have also to be taken into 
account, although it is geographically an extra-European state. Simultaneously 
through the analysis of these questions, a major issue that the EU encounters in 
the fields of defence and security will be tackled. It is the question of the approach 
of the Union in order to maximise its interests as a whole and of its single member 
states while taking into account the US leadership, that is to say the difficulty of 
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maximising the European interests knowing that a security framework already 
exists within the context of the transatlantic relations and NATO. Rather than 
making a normative analysis with a focus on the desirability to have a European 
Union politically and militarily freed from NATO and the USA, the paper will 
make an analysis based on assumptions of defensive neo-realism, with the 
emphasis laid on the hindrances and possibilities to have such an EU.  
 
The important role of the United States in the European security 
architecture will be addressed throughout the thesis. Yet, this issue as well as the 
question of the alleged US hegemony will not be tackled as issues on their own 
and will only be addressed in relation to the subject of the thesis, because a 
thorough and extensive analysis of these issues might well go beyond the bounds 
of this paper.5 
 
Let us now address the structure of the thesis. Thus, before tackling the 
heart of the thesis, this paper begins with an examination of the theoretical 
approach and remaining methodological issues. Subsequently, it concentrates on a 
study of the European security complex, illustrating the evolution as well as the 
parameters of the European security system, attempting to define the meaning of 
the concept of security and noting the challenges to stability in Europe. It then 
turns to the security institutions as actors, beginning with an examination of the 
security institutions lying within the framework of the European Union, before 
analysing those lying outside it. Turning next to the institutional question, it 
analyses the permanently evolving European security architecture, noting the 
institutional complexity of the system. This analysis will conclude the first part of 
the paper. The first part having set the scene, the second part examines the 
geopolitical changes of the post-Berlin Wall Europe, focusing especially on the 
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Western alliances. It begins 
thus with a detailed discussion about the eastern enlargement of the Western 
alliances – especially the EU and NATO – and its consequences on a security 
level. It then considers the attitude of the European Union member states towards 
these enlargements, before addressing in that context the sensitive Turkish 
question. In its third part, the paper attempts to apprehend the existence of 
different geopolitical areas in this unifying post-Cold War Europe. Therefore, the 
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third part first analyses the difference of positions of the diverse European States 
– with special attention given to Germany, France and the United Kingdom – 
towards the European security architecture, before considering the geopolitical 
areas of the two key European geostrategic players, Germany and France. Then, it 
focuses on the significance of the Franco-German engine, its potential extension 
to other states and the role of Russia which has its own sphere of influence based 
on its doctrine of the “near abroad”. Finally, this paper ends – before concluding – 
with an analysis of the EU as a potentially great power in its own right.  
 
 
 17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
At this point, we have to address the theoretical approach that would guide 
us through the analysis of the European security system and of the existing and 
evolving geopolitical areas on the old continent. One should note that the 
literature on European security concentrates for the most part on the EU, be it on 
its evolution as a unique type of body acting on the international arena or on the 
role it plays in the broader European order. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 4-5) Although 
there has been a sustained and substantial growth of attention in the 1990s and 
2000s to the increasing influence the EU has on security issues, most of the 
literature on EU security remains purely descriptive, focusing particularly on the 
evolution of the EU institutions, on the changes realised by the EU treaties and on 
the transatlantic relationship. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 4-5; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and 
White, 2004) Much of it is of normative nature, since it concentrates on the 
desirability or not to have the European Union developing a security and defence 
element. As for this paper, it is fairly descriptive, but also has a theoretical 
dimension. It addresses the aforementioned topic by primarily relying on realist 
approaches, as the issues raised above will principally be examined from a 
defensive neo-realist angle. One should already specify that since one objective of 
the thesis is to not be a pure theoretical paper, the discussed theories will 
essentially be used as a means helping us to answer the questions raised and to 
corroborate the hypothesis put forward. Furthermore, one should add that the 
paper does not seek to be normative. 
 
One could broach the topic of the European security system and its 
influence upon geopolitical areas in Europe with several approaches. The 
theoretical literature on the European system is rather scarce and it focuses 
generally – as noted above – on the security system of the EU. And most of that 
theoretical literature on EU security stems from the liberal school of thought. 
Liberalism and its variants are generally deemed as generating most of the 
insights when it comes to the EU’s external relations. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 388-
393) An analysis backed on neo-liberal theories would have led us to focus on the 
promotion of Western democratic values, security guarantees and capitalism as 
well as cooperation between states supported notably by international institutions. 
An analysis through a merely neo-liberal prism would thus have induced us to 
concentrate on the role of institutions as well as on complex interdependence 
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between a series of actors, including not only states, but also other kinds of actors 
such as international institutions or domestic players. In doing so, we would have 
examined the outcome of such cooperation upon the geopolitical areas in Europe, 
with a predisposition to consider Europe as a unique geopolitical, economic and 
jurisdictional area, where transnational interdependence, regimes6 and common 
values would eventually guarantee its security, welfare becoming the principal 
concern of the states. Conscious of the importance of cooperation between states 
and international institutions, the paper occasionally approaches some neo-liberal7 
assumptions. As it analyses deeply the diverse international organizations, the 
thesis agrees in part with the assumption of institutional liberalists – a strand of 
neo-liberalism8 – that international institutions, whether they be in the form of 
international organizations or of mere international regimes9, can promote 
rapprochement and cooperation between states. Institutional liberals argue that a 
high level of institutionalisation considerably reduces the destabilising effects of 
the anarchy that neo-realists – such as John Mearsheimer – identify in a 
multipolar world order. Providing a flow of information and fora for negotiations 
between states, institutions compensate for the lack of trust between states, thus 
fostering cooperation between states for their mutual advantage. This in turn 
provides continuity and stability. In addition, institutions are deemed by 
institutional liberals to act as buffers helping to absorb shocks caused by 
fundamental international changes, as for instance those caused by the changes to 
the political world order in the post-Cold War era. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 
119-122) The international institutions are however considered in the thesis as not 
truly independent from the states, especially the strong ones, which they serve 
rather as handmaidens; this assumption brings us close to the neo-realists. 
 
The neo-realists are indeed critical of the important role liberals attach to 
international institutions, because they believe that even though states cooperate 
through those institutions, they still do it solely on the basis of self-interest. 
According to neo-realists, there are however some possibilities for states to 
cooperate. The aim of the paper is to figure out current and further developments 
in the European security system by relying essentially on neo-realist assumptions. 
Willing to understand the post-Cold war developments by backing our analysis 
with neo-realist assumptions, preferences in the thesis will thus be given to the 
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principal assumptions of neo-realism. Hence, we will examine the key 
assumptions of neo-realism and then focus on the two variants (offensive vs. 
defensive) of neo-realism in order to observe the differences of opinion within 
neo-realism regarding in particular the prospect of cooperation between states 
(most notably within the EU).  
 
The neo-realist assumptions upon which the thesis bases its developments 
are the following. The international system is considered to be a system with no 
overarching authority, i.e. an international anarchy. This means that a self-help 
system exists, within which states have to rely upon their own means to protect 
their interests. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 52, 128-129) Rather than being led 
by ethics, states defend their interests, with security and power being their key 
objectives. (Schwok, 2005: 75) States focus on security and power, because the 
realisation of their interests, aims and values depends on security and power to get 
other actors to bend to the state’s will. While traditional realists and offensive 
neo-realists put the emphasis on power, defensive neo-realists (as will be analysed 
slightly further ahead) identify the security and survival of the state, and not 
power per se, as the prevailing aim of state action. (Kolodziej, 2005: 137) Nation-
states are the pre-eminent actors, the basic units of the world system. (Brzezinski, 
1997: 37) Realists and neo-realists identify the state as the key actor in 
international relations for several reasons. Not only did it become over several 
centuries the principal unit of political organization (prevailing over all other 
forms of political organization, be it city-states, empires or feudal principalities), 
but the state also enjoys a monopoly of legitimate violence and has been 
recognized by international law as having the legal and moral authority to perform 
its internal and external security functions. Moreover, their mutual recognition of 
sovereignty over territory and population emphasizes the role of the states as the 
fundamental actor in international relations. (Kolodziej, 2005: 128) 
Correspondingly, the paper primarily analyses the states, with a focus on the great 
powers. Neo-realists consider a great power as one whose relations determine the 
most important outcomes of international politics. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 
88, 104) The other actors are principally the international organizations 
(supranational and intergovernmental), which only some defensive neo-realists 
grant certain significance. In line with neo-realist assumptions, the states will be 
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considered as unitary entities, without thoroughly taking into account the 
interplay of the political forces (parties, public opinion...) nor the economic ones 
(lobbies, economic actors…).10 Evolving in an anarchic international system, the 
states are further considered as being rational actors with consistent and ordered 
preferences calculating «the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order 
to maximize their utility in light of both those preferences and of their perceptions 
of the nature of reality.» (Keohane, 1986: 11) Another key assumption of neo-
realism is the focus of the states on relative gains, that is, the worry and 
apprehension of a state that other states gain more from cooperation than it does. 
(Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 130-131; David et Roche, 2005: 90-92; Kolodziej, 
2005: 127-139) 
 
Analysing in its first part the security complex in Europe and focusing on 
the institutional actors, the paper concentrates on the cooperation between states, 
which has notably led to international organizations such as the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO] and recently to the promising development of a security 
and defence policy inside the EU. Undoubtedly, globalisation and the increasing 
importance in number and quality of institutional regimes seem to somehow 
challenge neo-realist assumptions. The multipolar world order of the post-Cold 
War era is considered by offensive neo-realists such as John Mearsheimer to be 
less stable and less peaceful, as the post-Cold War wars in the former Yugoslavia 
and in the former Soviet Union demonstrate. Yet, it appears as though neo-
realism’s theory about bipolarism versus multipolarism seems unable to 
comprehend some post-Cold War developments as the success of the European 
Union, particular its Franco-German core and its recent evolution in the field of 
security and defence. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 91-92) 
 
According to traditional realists and neo-realists, cooperation is not a usual 
occurrence, though it does happen under certain circumstances. So, they concede 
that states can attempt to increase power on their own efforts but also through 
alliances. Also do they deem cooperation between opponents most probable if 
their vital interests and very survival are at risk unless cooperation limits their 
automatic recourse to force to resolve their differences. (Kolodziej, 2005: 145) 
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Yet, those realist and neo-realist assertions seem to insufficiently explain on their 
own the continued existence – and even success – of numerous post-Cold War 
alliances, especially if one thinks at the increasing integration of the EU since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of the bipolar world. 
Christopher Hill and Michael E. Smith consider the realism and neo-realism 
approaches to be the least promising ones when it comes to study the EU’s 
external behaviour. Because of their emphasis on the unitary nature of the state 
and on international anarchy, these approaches are regarded by the two authors as 
inappropriate for the analysis of the EU, which is seen as not being a unitary state 
and transcending anarchy. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 389) Christopher Hill and 
Michael E. Smith particularly consider neo-realism as inappropriate in this 
endeavour, because of its highly systemic perspective and stress on the balance of 
power. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 390) 
 
As a result, neo-realism nowadays seems to be a neglected paradigm in 
international security studies. As a matter of fact, although being one of the 
dominant paradigms in this field of studies, the use of neo-realism to understand 
the current security architecture in Europe is largely rejected because of the 
widespread belief that it is unable to account for cooperation between the EU 
member states and the impact of the EU institutions upon them. Nevertheless, 
there is more to neo-realism than the assumption of John Mearsheimer. 
 
There is in particular the attempt of Joseph M. Grieco to explain the 
deepening of European integration since the 1980s with its “amended neo-
realism”. According to Joseph M. Grieco, the relaunching of European integration 
during the 1980s is notably explained by the willingness of the European 
Community to balance against the emerging economic threat from the United 
States and Japan, while the insistence upon economic and monetary union by 
France and Italy in the 1990s appears as bandwagoning with a potential 
hegemonic Germany. In this view, European integration throughout the 1990s and 
2000s may to a great extent be the result of other member states (especially the 
weaker but still influential partners) «to constrain Germany, especially after it has 
emerged potentially stronger after unification.» (Andreatta, 2005: 27) In this way, 
the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules 
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constituting a collaborative arrangement «will provide sufficient opportunities for 
them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least 
ameliorate their domination by stronger partners.» (Grieco, January 1995: 34) 
(See also Andreatta, 2005: 27; Schwok, 2005: 77; Pollack, 2000: 2-4) More 
recently, another scholar, Michael Mosser has built on Joseph M. Grieco’s work. 
Focusing on the Benelux countries’ influence on the EU institutions11, he 
examined the ways «in which small and weak states “engineer influence” through 
international institutions.» (Pollack, 2000: 3) The work of Joseph M. Grieco and 
Michael Mosser draw our attention on the way small and weak states participate 
in the creation and modification of international institutions «so as to provide 
themselves with opportunities for voice while at the same time binding large 
states into institutional rules and norms that limit their ability to exploit material 
power resources.» (Pollack, 2000: 3) However, one should note that some 
theorists do not regard Joseph M, Grieco’s (and Michael Mosser’s) approach as 
deserving the designation of a “realist theory”. They consider their work to be 
rather consistent with neo-liberal institutionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. 
(Schwok, 2005: 77; Legro and Moravcsik, Fall 1999: 41-43; Pollack, 2000: 3-4) 
 
But, more generally, one has to distinguish, within the neo-realist theory, 
two variants or strands: the offensive neo-realists on the one hand and the 
defensive neo-realists on the other hand. (Gibbs, September 2000: 10-12) The 
latter, who see the world in a less competitive and less pessimistic light than the 
former, are able to account for cooperation between the EU member states and the 
impact of the EU institutions upon them. 
 
The “older” and somehow “purer” variant is the so-called offensive neo-
realism, with John Mearsheimer as its principal advocate. Offensive neo-realists 
see the international system as an international anarchy, where security is scarce, 
thus making international competition intense, conflict recurrent and war likely. 
Because the increase of power reduces the likelihood of being overcome by other 
states, power is the most important factor in international relations, thus often 
compelling states to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security. 
Consequently, offensive neo-realists are very pessimistic about cooperation 
between states. They do not exclude cooperation straight away, but – because of 
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the lack of confidence in a self-help international system – they regard it as likely 
to be temporary. According to offensive neo-realists, cooperation is linked and 
restricted by consideration about relative gains and by concerns about cheating. In 
an anarchic system without ultimate authority, there will always be a possibility 
of cheating. There is no doubt that these two factors render cooperation difficult. 
The leading offensive neo-realist, John Mearsheimer, reasserted in 1995 (in his 
article The False Promise of International Institutions) that institutions not only 
matter very little, but also have close to no influence on state behaviour, since 
they merely reflect state calculations of self-interest. (Mearsheimer, Winter 1994-
1995: 13) In the spectrum of thinking about the role of state cooperation and 
institutions, one consequently can place offensive neo-realism at the opposite end 
of the one occupied by institutional liberalism, while defensive neo-realism is 
placed somewhere in between. 
 
Amongst defensive neo-realist theorists, one finds Stephen Walt, Charles 
Glaser, Robert Jervis and occasionally Kenneth Waltz (who exposes 
characteristics of both variants of neo-realism). Defensive neo-realists suppose 
that states can learn to cooperate as an outcome, paradoxically, of their self-
regarding pursuits. Contrary to offensive neo-realists, defensive neo-realists 
emphasize the state’s search for security rather than concentrate on the state’s 
search for power. Security is the highest goal – and number one preference – of 
states. Defensive neo-realists do not perceive the relationship between power and 
security as automatic as do the offensive neo-realists. Focusing on defensive 
strategies, they argue that two potential competitors would be happy with the 
status quo of mutual security. Cooperation is thus likely to occur. Competition is 
not an inevitable consequence of neo-realism’s basic assumptions; security being 
the highest goal of states and cooperation often the best way to achieve security, 
one can even directly deduct cooperation from neo-realist assumptions. (Glaser, 
Winter 1994-1995: 51) Certainly, conflict is not completely absent, since some 
states continue sometimes to act aggressively. Yet, cooperation is possible where 
powers facing each other in a security dilemma are status quo oriented powers. 
Whereas cooperation is not possible when a revisionist state is included (in this 
case only temporary and “insincere” cooperation as depicted by offensive neo-
realists would be possible), several conditions enhance the likelihood of 
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cooperation between status quo oriented powers. Those conditions are the 
followings: the transparency is high; the gains from cheating and the costs from 
being cheated are low; mutual cooperation is more beneficial than defection; and 
a strategy of reciprocity is adopted by each side. (Jervis, Summer 1999: 52) Under 
such circumstances, the actors clearly and increasingly realise that their mutual 
gains maximize their individual gains through cooperation. There is however 
divergence within the defensive neo-realist component about the impact of 
institutions. While Robert Jervis argues that institutions can play a significant role 
by affecting actor’s preferences, others like Charles Glaser consider the 
international institutions – fairly like John Mearsheimer does – to act essentially 
dependent upon state preferences. (Glaser, Winter 1994-1995: 84) Yet, defensive 
neo-realists generally agree that even though institutions are the outcomes of 
member states’ interests, they also provide an important forum for extensive 
cooperation12. Thus, unlike John Mearsheimer, defensive neo-realists broadly 
regard institutions as significant, though generally dependent upon states’ 
preferences. (Kolodziej, 2005: 144-150) 
 
In line with the defensive neo-realists, the thesis takes into consideration 
the possibilities for states to cooperate and focus on international institutions, but 
with the assumption that these are evolving according to the interests of the states. 
Consistent with neo-realist assumptions, the cooperating states are considered to 
remain self-interested and to keep an eye on relative gains. (Jackson and 
Sørensen, 1999: 52, 128-129) The basic neo-realist assumptions will become 
more apparent in the second and third parts of the thesis, when the emphasis will 
be laid on the interests of the European states, especially the great powers, and the 
existence of geopolitical areas in post-Cold War Europe. Yet, one will keep in 
mind the characteristics of the defensive variant of neo-realism, especially when it 
comes to the analysis of cooperation, whether it be between France and Germany 
or at the larger EU level. In putting the emphasis on the assumptions of defensive 
neo-realism, we hope to be able to bypass traditional neo-realism’s failure to 
explain the EU’s place in the world and the post-Cold war successes of EU’s 
CFSP/ESDP. 
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Similar criticism is addressed to defensive neo-realism as that which is 
directed to Joseph M. Grieco’s and Michael Mosser’s work. Some theorists 
criticize that defensive neo-realism comes so close to neo-liberal institutionalism 
that one should rather speak about a form of neo-liberal institutionalism taking 
some neo-realist paradigms. Despite these criticisms, this thesis will keep this 
designation and accordingly back its analysis with the above-mentioned 
assumptions of defensive neo-realism. 
 
One has to add that, when addressing in its first part the concept of 
security and the challenges to the stability in Europe, the paper relies largely on 
another approach, that is, the English School of International Relations13; an 
approach which distinguishes a rationalist tradition (Grotian tradition) beside the 
realist tradition (Hobbesian tradition)14 on the one hand, and the revolutionary 
tradition (Kantian tradition)15 on the other hand. The International Society theory 
is an approach of a world of sovereign states where many features are present. 
First, power and national interests matter, as states have a national responsibility 
to their own nation and to its citizens. Second, common norms and institutions 
matter also, as the states have an international responsibility to respect and 
comply with international rules and procedures, thus also respecting the rights of 
the other states. Third, the states have a humanitarian responsibility to defend 
human rights all over the world, as world politics is a world of states but also of 
individuals. Therefore, the International Society approach exploits classical realist 
and liberal elements, combining and expanding them so as to provide an 
alternative to both16. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 55-56, 158-165; Williams, 
Wright and Evans, 1995: 260-273) Accordingly, one would certainly place the 
International Society approach not far away from the defensive neo-realist 
thinking. 
 
The decision to back the exposition of the thesis mainly with the neo-
realist approach with particular attention given to its defensive variant, while 
confronting it to other theories when appropriated, is rather a personal choice. 
Yet, the choice of the neo-realist theoretical approach seems relevant and 
appropriate for several reasons. First, the thesis’ accent on spheres of influence, 
laying emphasis on the particular interests of the states, pushes us somehow 
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naturally to rely on neo-realist assumptions. Second, since most of the theoretical 
literature on EU security has so far neglected the neo-realist school of thought, the 
use of neo-realism to analyse not only the potential geopolitical areas in Europe, 
but also the degree and possible evolution of EU cooperation in the fields of 
security and defence, is an opportunity to contribute to the revival of neo-realism 
as a means to study post-Cold War security issues in Europe. Our ambition is to 
use neo-realism assumptions in this thesis, although some scholars put forward 
that the sui generis nature of the EU is a reason to deem the use of traditional 
theories as obsolete when considering issues involving a closer analysis of the 
development of the EU. Third, defensive neo-realism seems to be the most 
appropriate theoretical approach to analyse the fundamental interests and 
preferences of the states in Europe, while simultaneously taking into 
consideration state cooperation within the diverse security institutions, most 
notably the CFSP/ESDP but also NATO and the OSCE. 
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PART I: 
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM 
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The last years the European security system (or complex) has undergone 
many changes. With the end of the Cold War, the international world order – with 
Europe at its heart – faced a complete new geopolitic situation. Especially the 
European security complex had to adapt itself to this new situation, in which 
globalisation plays an ever increasing role and which brings with it new kinds of 
threats – among which one finds the international terrorism – caused not only by 
the traditional actors, but also by new kinds of ones.  
 
The European security complex is different from other power complexes 
in that its main dynamic is integration, which influences all other issues, notably 
the way the actors are adapting and transforming the European security system. 
One of the principal security issues of Europe is to transform a multipolar Europe 
into a more homogenous unit.  
 
This has in particular been the EU’s main security task. One of the 
outcomes of European integration is indeed to spread conciliation between 
Europe’s regional actors. The EU functions in that sense as a security system, 
defined as a firmly connected security community, with internal but also external 
security functions. Therefore, the EU, with its efforts to push forward the 
integration process, has to be considered as a very important desecuritizing actor 
in a European security complex, still rather heterogeneous and where diffuse 
threats other than the military one have increased in importance. 
 
Apart from the EU, and although it is the most important actor 
contributing to transform Europe into a more homogenous unit, other security 
institutions are also playing a role in Europe’s evolving security complex in trying 
to render – in a way or another – Europe more homogeneous in terms of security. 
As European security is now increasingly sought through multilateral institutions, 
one can observe an increasing institutionalisation of relations between European 
states. (Sjursen, 2004: 16-18) 
 
The purpose of this part is to define the characteristics and set up the main 
features of the European security system. In doing so, the discussion in this first 
part of the paper addresses two important elements of current international 
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concern, namely the evolution of the European security system in connection with 
the different actors playing a role in it and how these actors cope to provide an 
institutionalisation of security, given the new geopolitical challenges and the new 
security agenda. 
 
This part focuses thus on the evolution, the parameters and the main actors 
of the security complex in Europe. Therefore, this part analyses at first the 
evolution of the European security system to date. Then, it considers its 
parameters; in doing so, it will highlight the main challenges the European 
security system is facing and focus on the controversial concept of security with 
the aim of understanding the idea behind this concept and its latest developments. 
After that, this part examines the main institutional actors of the security complex 
in Europe, beginning with the security institutions lying within the framework of 
the European Union, before analysing those lying outside it. Finally, the analysis 
of the continually evolving European security architecture will conclude this first 
part.  
 
This part sets the scene for a discussion about the integration of Central 
and Eastern Europe into the Western alliances as well as the structure of zones of 
influence in that unifying Europe – which are the central themes of respectively 
the second and final part. 
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1) THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM 
 
The European security development has occupied a central position in the 
history of the international system for a very long time. Up until the end of the 
Second World War, the close interrelation of amities, enmities and balance of 
power had defined the European security system. During the seventeenth century 
already, these interactions had worked out in a single security framework. (Bull 
and Watson, 1984: 64) Certainly, diverse sub-structures existed within it, such as 
the ones existing among the Nordic states or amid the Balkan states. Nevertheless, 
the European system was united as a whole, which means that the different sub-
systems and the security of the single countries were built in a broader European 
pattern. With the process of colonisation this system controlled eventually even 
the entire international security system. 
 
Hereupon, we should examine the shifts and changes of the European 
security system throughout its history. The latter will relate particularly to 
Europe’s historic centrality in the global system. 
 
Thus, this chapter sets out the evolution of the European security system, 
to begin with the period going until the end of the Cold War before concentrating 
on the post-Cold War era with an analysis of the development of the European 
security system since the collapse of Soviet communism.  
 
 
a. The Evolution of the European Security System until the End of the 
Cold War 
 
From about the sixteenth century on, the international system was in many 
respects defined by the European system which had vigorous internal dynamics. 
The creation and development of the sovereign state17 in Europe contributed 
radically in shaping a new international structure out of what had previously been 
a collection of relatively insulated human centres. During that period until the end 
of the Second World War, a specific characteristic of the European security 
system was the existence of many great powers in such a limited geographical 
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area. At different moments in time, never fewer than five varying great powers 
shared this status. France, Britain, Germany or Russia certainly enjoyed this 
status, but for some time also Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and 
Sweden, not to be mention Spain Italy and Portugal. 
 
At that time, territory was closely associated with power18. As a matter of 
fact, in order to control territory, a myriad of wars took place in Europe. Yet, the 
balance of power was the normal situation within the system: no one power was 
dominant enough to subjugate all the others. However some attempts were made 
to put an end to this situation of balance of power. The making and resisting of 
these attempts has indeed a long and central role in European security. The 
Ottomans made such an attempt in the fifteenth to seventeenth century. They 
came from outside Europe. They were the only ones who have tried to dominate 
Europe from outside the system in the modern period19. As the ones who will 
follow, they failed in their efforts. Two other attempts to dominate Europe were 
made later respectively by France with Napoleon in the lead and by Germany 
with Adolf Hitler. They were the two attempts – trying to achieve the stunning 
success accomplished by the Roman Empire to unify Europe20 – which were the 
most completed. Indeed, revolutionary and Napoleonic France as well as Hitler’s 
Third Reich later almost succeeded in unifying the continent under their rules and 
supremacy, but eventually failed.  
 
Besides, one has to add that «the intense military and economic 
competition of life in the European anarchy produced a set of great powers whose 
surplus energies and expanding capabilities enabled them to pursue their rivalries 
not only within Europe, but increasingly on a global scale.» (Buzan, Kelstrup and 
Lemaitre, 1990: 32) The outward thrust of the European powers took some 
pressure off the local security system. In expanding outside Europe, the European 
states avoided to threaten directly the core interests of their neighbours. Thus, the 
great European states increasingly continued in expanding their influence and 
power, initially in Europe and then outside the old continent21. But, on the other 
hand, such outward expansion also increased the power of the successful 
imperialists, thus threatening the European security system with its balance of 
power. Hence, to maintain this structure, the European powers had to quickly 
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adapt to the increasing power of their rivals. The conflicts going along with the 
periodic attempts for dominance were parts of the process by which the European 
powers became so disproportionately powerful in relation to the rest of the world. 
 
Nevertheless, these conflicts had also an unpleasant side, not only for 
Europe but for the whole world. In the end, it was the various attempts for 
dominance – the last being those of Germany in the twentieth century – which led 
to the annihilation of both Europe’s global ascendancy and the autonomous 
character of Europe’s security system. Indeed, the threat triggered by the rise of 
Germany in the context of the industrial revolution during the middle of the 
nineteenth century created a real danger that one European state could put an end 
to the European balance of power. In the first years of the twentieth century, the 
European security system based on the balance of power was in real jeopardy first 
and foremost because of the German rise in power. Yet, besides the German 
problem, another threat loomed at the same time. A potential Russian attempt to 
overthrow Europe’s security system existed really. The fear that Russia could 
become by far the biggest power on the continent, if it industrializes efficiently, 
remained present at that time. Thus, the German problem, with the Russian 
problem looming in his back and «preparations for what was to be the last great 
military contest for control of Europe (…) already well under way22» (Buzan, 
Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1990: 33) shed serious doubts on the viability of the 
European security complex. 
 
As we already noticed, Germany’s attempt to dominate Europe came very 
close to success, especially during the Second World War. In both wars the 
intervention of a non-European state was decisive, namely the intervention of the 
United States. In the First World War, this intervention seemed to maintain the 
predominant role of Europe in the international system, particularly so because of 
the successive refuge into isolationism by the United States. One can say that after 
the First World War and despite the danger Europe’s security system faced, the 
international system remained in many respects defined by the European one. 
With the great European states having expanded their influence and power in and 
outside Europe, they had managed to control most of the planet. Besides the 
European powers, only two non-European powers were able to grow into the 
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status of a great power: the United States of America, which is indeed a derivative 
of European colonisation, and Japan, which imitated quickly and efficiently 
enough the imperialism of the European powers to not be immersed by it. 
Nevertheless, the illusion that Europe still had the central role in the international 
system after the First World War was shattered by the Second World War. The 
US intervention in the latest World War indicated the rise of non-European 
powers into world roles and the ending of Europe’s global primacy. Moreover, 
Europe lost the control and autonomy over its own security relations. As a matter 
of fact, one can assert that «in reality, the rescue of the old world by the new was 
both the herald of, and the vehicle for, Europe’s transition from being a dominant 
to a subordinate security complex.» (Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1990: 34) 
The two world wars marked thus not only the collapse of the old balance of power 
system, but put first and foremost an end to the long period of convergence 
between the European and the international security system.  
 
So, the collapse of many great powers was a consequence of the two world 
wars. The Western European powers and Japan broke down indeed as great 
powers. Since the great powers which collapsed included all of the major holders 
of overseas empires, the post-war period led logically to decolonisation; all the 
more that the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union –, that 
emerged out of the world wars, were both anti-colonial, though for different 
ideological motives. But both thought that the withdrawal of European powers 
would create opportunities for them. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise 
that the process of decolonisation began almost immediately after the war and was 
for the major part completed within two decades.  
 
The collapse of Western European and Japanese power had another effect. 
It fostered greatly the elevation of the Soviet Union in the superpower status at the 
end of the war. The fact that the Soviet Union was surrounded with power 
vacuums where before there had been major centres of power explains it for a 
good part23. Indeed, Europe’s continental heartland was particularly weakened: 
the power of Germany had been decisively devastated; France, the other main 
continental great power, was strongly enfeebled; Great Britain, albeit victorious, 
was also badly weakened; and the old regimes in Central and Eastern Europe had 
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collapsed. As a result of war and of this power vacuum, the Soviet power arose 
considerably in terms of military and political power. Most of Eastern Europe was 
under the possession of the Soviet Union. One can thus notice that the security 
problem posed by Germany was thus simply replaced by another one posed by the 
Soviet Union.  
 
But the rise of Soviet power resulted in taking the Soviet Union out of 
Europe and to putting it on to the international arena as a superpower. Even if 
there have always be doubts about to consider Russia whether as a part of Europe 
or as a separate entity, one can undoubtedly assert that Russia was de facto part of 
Europe as long as the latter dominated the world power structure. But as Europe 
slipped into subordination, the Soviet Union became a genuine world power for 
which Europe was only a – yet very important – frontier. Like the United States of 
America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] became thus an extra-
European superpower.  
 
The rise of the extra-European powers certainly hindered – and it will 
surely hinder forever – Europe going back to the European security complex as it 
existed before 1945. Indeed, the main condition to obtain this system that thrust 
Europe into global dominance – which is the huge disproportion in power at its 
benefit – is no longer present.  
 
All these events demonstrate – as we already emphasized – that the 
dynamics of European security no longer ran independently and no longer 
dominated the international security system as a whole. Europe was still central in 
the question of global security, but in a different way. Indeed, while it was central 
as the centre of world power before, now it was central only as the principal 
object of larger rivalries. Hence, «with overlay from 1945 to 1989, the European 
security complex virtually ceased to exist as an entity defined by its own 
interactions. It became instead the nut in the nutcracker of a global rivalry 
dominated by two superpowers.» (Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1990: 31) 
 
The post-war security system was thus based on a new set of political and 
economic relationships and involved not only different protagonists, but also 
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different institutional arrangements. Therefore, as the East-West conflict unfolded 
and as the new European security system took shape, the principal protagonists 
had to develop new ‘rules of the game’. 
 
The broad outlines of post-war Europe was wrought at the wartime 
summit meetings between the ‘Big three’ at Teheran (held in November 1943), 
Yalta (held in February 1945) and Potsdam (held in July-August 1945). Yet, 
contrary to the myth, the Yalta Conference was not a meeting in which they 
divided Europe amongst themselves24. The partition arose rather from the military 
disposition of the victor’s forces at the end of the war. (Mihalka, Autumn 2001: 2-
3) 
 
As a result, the new bipolar power structure unfolded quickly. On the one 
side, there was the United States. Having ended its isolationism, it played a 
decisive role in shaping the key institutions of the Western world, including the 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund], the World Bank and the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. 
The Americans were keen to establish an open economic system. Although 
initially expressing large sympathy towards anti-colonial movements in the 
overseas empires and – as we already mentioned – seeking an end to European 
colonialism, the United States of America [USA] believed in the same time in the 
worldwide applicability of their values. Thus, the Americans tended to «believe 
that an international system founded on Wilsonian principles and incorporating an 
open economy and the international rule of law would be good for America, and 
at the same time, good for the world. Many Americans therefore believed that, in 
contrast to the hegemonies of the past, that of the USA would be in the interests 
of all peoples and nations, in that it would produce a peaceful and prosperous 
world, founded on free trade, open markets and political democracy. (…) When in 
the late 1940s the Americans began to perceive a growing Soviet threat to the 
European equilibrium, however, they quietly dropped the anti-colonial elements 
of their policy, and rallied to the defence of what they chose to describe as the 
‘free world’» (Hyde-Price, 1991: 26) The American policy-makers saw the 
communist system indeed as a challenge to peace, stability and prosperity.  
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On the other side, there was the Soviet Union. Its security interests in 
Central and Eastern Europe – as seen by Stalin – directed the Soviet policy 
towards post-war Europe. One has to notice that thanks to the thrust and victory 
of the Red Army at the end of the war, the Soviet power expanded henceforth into 
Central and Eastern Europe, a region previously dominated by German influence. 
In order to ensure that his country would never again have to face the horrors of a 
war triggered by the West, Stalin worked to obtain a drastic decay and 
containment of German power as well as a collective security arrangement in 
Europe in which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would play an influence 
role. Stalin was also eager to establish a kind of hegemony and control over 
Central and Eastern Europe, so as not only to monitor the forces of dissension in 
these countries which had so often threatened Soviet’s (and before Russian’s) 
security interests, but particularly to have a protective bulwark against the West.25  
 
Like the Soviet Union, the USA considered that the Second World War 
proved the need for them for a forward defence policy. Hence, the United States 
did not take long to establish its own glacis in Western Europe, in merging the 
NATO commitment into its own security desire for a forward defence.  
 
One has to add, that, despite the fact that the two superpowers both played 
a dominant role in the post-war era, some other key countries, especially France 
and the United Kingdom were also active in forming the new security system. As 
far as France is concerned, the French under De Gaulle pursued their own 
interests, in focusing in particular on the issue of the future role of Germany. 
Their programme for the future of Germany diverged on several points from that 
of the Anglo-Saxon powers. As for the United Kingdom, the British made every 
endeavour to secure an American commitment to Europe in order to counter what 
London perceived as a growing threat to the European balance of power. 
(Wheeler, Winter 1985-1986: 71-86) 
 
Yet, a series of events established then the main edge of confrontation 
down the middle of the old continent. The Truman Doctrine in March 194726 was 
followed by the Marshall Aid in 1947. Then the Berlin blockade occurred and 
lasted almost a year, from June 1948 to May 1949. This episode27 – triggered by 
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Stalin’s clumsy attempt to force the Allied powers into abandoning their plans to 
establish a separate West German State – had as a result to accelerate the 
integration of German power into the West European and Atlantic Alliance 
structures. Besides, this was an overwhelming priority of Western policy – and it 
became even more after the Berlin Blockade. Moreover, the founding of the 
COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] in 1949 on the one side 
and of NATO the same year on the other drew the confrontation further and 
deeper. The establishment of two separate German states – in May (for the 
Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]) and October 1949 (for the German 
Democratic Republic [GDR]) – completed the initial period of the superpower 
bloc-building. Europe was thus definitely cut in two by the Iron Curtain, both 
rival superpower blocs at one side of it.28 By the end of the decade the key 
structures of the post-war bipolar European security system had been laid. 
Furthermore, the communist victory in China in 1949, the successful Soviet 
explosion of an atomic bomb29 and the Korean War in 1950-1953 all contributed 
to reinforce the East-West confrontation. A dramatic arms race which followed 
brought the miniaturization of the Cold War, as both sides prepared for 
conventional and even nuclear war.  
 
In spite of the slackening in the East-West relations that took place after 
1953 – following the death of Stalin, the Korean armistice and the ending of 
McCarthyism in the USA –, the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted to 
NATO in 195530 and consequently rearmed, to which the socialist bloc responded 
in creating the Warsaw Pact in May 1955. Nevertheless, in this relatively relaxed 
period, the two superpowers could settle some issues at the summit of Geneva 
held in July 1955: the signing of the Austrian State Treaty – which created a 
neutral and independent state – and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
occupied Finnish territory. 
 
Also, the Suez Crisis in 1956 – where the United States clearly humiliated 
France and the United Kingdom – demonstrated evidently the limits of 
independent European power in international affairs. Furthermore, the failure of 
the European Defence Community [EDC]31 gave evidence two years earlier that 
security – and especially defence – would certainly not be considered within any 
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independent European framework for the duration of the Cold War. The signing 
of the Treaty of Rome – which established the European Economic Community 
[EEC] –, in 1957, proved however that the process of West European integration 
could and would develop under the protective shield of NATO and the nuclear 
guarantee of the USA. 
 
The period of the late 1950s and early 1960s was, therefore, a period of 
transition in the European security system. The Cold War lost some of its bitter 
intensity. The security relationships and alliance structures that were to 
distinguish the European security system were in place by 1955, thus giving the 
post-war order on the European continent a growing sense of stability and 
predictability. (Hyde-Price, 1991: 32; Bowker and Williams, 1988: 17) 
 
Nonetheless, two events in the late 1950s and early 1960s – which 
constituted a turning point in the development of the East-West relationship – 
were to have a profound impact on the European security system. These two 
events were the Berlin crises – which led to the erection, on 13 August 1961, of 
the Berlin Wall in August 1961 – and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. 
The building of the Anti-fascist Defence Wall – as it was called by the East-
German policy makers – contributed in a way to the formation of a new approach 
to the East-West relations on both sides of the Wall. In West Germany itself it 
illustrated the limits of Konrad Adenauer’s policy of strength and fostered at the 
same time the development of a new approach to the communist world. The latter 
eventually led to the rejection of the Hallstein doctrine and the adoption of Willy 
Brandt32’s Ostpolitik33. The Berlin Wall itself - despite the fact that it gave a 
physical evidence of the division of Europe – symbolized the failure of the 
communist system in the East. As for the Cuban Missile Crisis, it contributes also 
to the new approach to East-West relations. The Soviet-American confrontation 
over planned Soviet Missile deployments in Cuba – the most dangerous crisis the 
world has ever seen, according to the then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk34 - 
revealed to the world the implication of the existential threat caused by nuclear 
weapons. It indeed demonstrated the danger the nuclear age was posing for 
international security, particularly in Europe. As a result, a new climate came out 
of the resolution of the US-Soviet confrontation at the Bay of Pigs. «Henceforth, 
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in Europe more measured reactions to crisis were evident and it seemed clear that 
both security systems were developing codes of behaviour and reaction to 
minimise friction and to defuse dangerous situations.» (Richard Vine (ed.), 1987: 
17) The new climate included several treaties between the two superpowers, 
notably the ‘hot-line’ agreement of 1963. The ‘Cold Peace’ – as some analysts 
described this fairly peaceful period starting in the early 1960s – brought a 
somewhat stable security system and eventually led to the search for a long-
lasting détente between the two superpower blocs. 
 
Hence, by and large, the bipolar system was based at that time on two 
stable military, political and even economic alliances facing each other with an 
intense ideological rivalry. Between the blocs dominated by the two superpowers, 
there was just enough space for the neutral and non-aligned states. The nuclear 
deterrence definitely added force to the whole system. Besides the European 
integration which moved forward fairly swiftly, France and Germany signed in 
1963 the Elysée Treaty, detailing a regularly get-together, thus denoting the new 
spirit of trust and friendship between these two long-standing enemies. (Hyde-
Price, 1991: 34) 
 
«On the basis of the relative stability and growing confidence in East and 
West, there was a new willingness to achieve some sort of rapprochement and 
understanding between the two alliance structures in Europe. From 1966 the 
Americans reversed their view that German reunification must be the point of 
departure for the resolution of the East-West conflict and began arguing that 
gradual change in East-West relations would have to precede the resolution of the 
German problem.» (Hyde-Price, 1991: 34) 35 In the late 1960s, many American 
analysts – believing that American power has passed its height – considered that 
the US-Soviet relationship had to be developed increasingly upon a cooperative 
basis in order to establish a better balance in a world becoming more and more 
polycentric and prone to conflicts. It was at that time that many realist analysts     
– with Hans Morgenthau36 in particular – thought it was time to move ‘beyond the 
Cold War’. With the Federal Republic of Germany being deeply linked into the 
West as well as the Franco-German reconciliation, the coming into power of the 
social-liberal coalition government of Willy Brandt in 1966 led to the steady 
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implementation of the already-mentioned Ostpolitik. The commitment of West 
Germany to Ostpolitik as well as the American one to developing a superpower 
détente
37 with the Soviet Union – under President Richard Nixon and his National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger38 – reinforced indeed the constant movement 
towards a decrease in East-West tension and an increasing willingness to reach a 
peaceful live-together with the other. Neither the events of Prague in 196839         
– with the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact into the Czechoslovakian 
Capital to put an end to the Prague Spring – nor the rising American involvement 
in Vietnam slowed down the pace towards détente between the two blocs. Hence, 
at that time, stability within the two politico-military alliances had become a 
condition to stability between them. However, the fact that East-West disputes 
went on prevented the resolution of Europe’s fundamental security problems.  
 
The new and less adversarial relationship between East and West 
coincided with the development of new regional centres of power, as the 
disintegration of the bipolar system order went on. Especially Western Europe 
was beginning to emerge as an international actor. From a realist and neo-realist 
point of view, one can assert that «given the drastic changes in Europe’s 
international position after the Second World War, and in particular the realisation 
that continental anarchy could have near suicidal consequences and that European 
states had no longer the critical mass to compete with the superpowers decision 
[in Western Europe] to begin integration become logical.» (Andreatta, 2005: 27) 
Particularly, the European Policy Cooperation [EPC] was elaborated informally in 
1970 among the foreign ministries in Western countries.40 Encouraged by the 
blossoming of détente, further developments in Europe occurred. The FRG signed 
a series of treaties – called Ostverträge – with the Eastern European countries: 
Bonn signed indeed treaties with the USSR in August 1970, Poland in December 
1970, the GDR in May 1972 and Czechoslovakia in December 1973.  
 
The détente was also patent in the relation between the USA and the 
USSR. A succession of bilateral agreements were signed between the two 
superpowers: one has to mention the Moscow Basic Principles Agreement of 
1972, the SALT41 1 Treaty, the ABM42 Treaty, the Agreement on the Prevention 
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of Nuclear War in June 1973 as well as the Vladivostok understanding on limiting 
the number of strategic nuclear weapons.  
 
The process of détente – which therefore took place not only on the 
European level, but also between the two main international actors – found an 
attainment in 1973 with the opening of both the Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reduction negotiations in Vienna and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] in Helsinki. Yet, the genuine climax of the détente 
process was the signing in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act, which concluded the 
35-member CSCE. Indeed, this Act – although not having binding force in 
international law – was a document with huge political importance and served in 
reality as a peace treaty. Its content – including principally economic cooperation 
as well as security and humanitarian issues – gave satisfaction to both blocs. On 
the one hand, the fact that the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in Europe43 
was included in the document gratified the socialist camp. On the other hand, the 
large number of principles on human rights44 incorporated satisfied the West, as it 
gave them a vigorous point of reference for pressing improvements in these fields 
in the Eastern European countries. One can specify at this point that the listing of 
those principles will indirectly contribute to eventually cause the collapse of the 
socialist bloc, by permitting the formation of contestation groups, as for instance 
the Solidarność of Lech Wałęsa. In any case, the CSCE process has provided an 
institutional forum for regular dialogue and consultation between the two 
superpower blocs. 
 
Yet, the accurate sense of détente – which had its high point with the 
Helsinki process and its follow-up conferences – was differently interpreted. 
There were indeed three main visions of détente. There was first the American 
concept of détente with Henry Kissinger. For them, détente was basically meant 
as a convenient method of regulating the Cold War conflict, by carrying out some 
cooperation with new codes of conduct. As for the ‘peaceful coexistence’ 
developed by the Soviet Union, it was seen as both competing and cooperative 
modes of behaviour, which would create the best conditions leading eventually to 
the victory of socialism on a global scale. As to the German Chancellor of that 
time Willy Brandt, he saw the détente as a dynamic process within existing 
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structures leading to a europäische Friedensordnung45 – through further 
cooperation between the two blocs – capable of resolving the German problem. 
As a consequence of these divergent concepts of détente – which reflected after 
all their different interests and concerns –, there was no consensus over the real 
meaning of détente and over the new codes of conduct it implicated. This was one 
of the main reasons that a renewed tension took place in the second half of the 
1970s. 
 
Therefore, this period saw a strong increase in Soviet conventional and 
nuclear military strength. As far as the West is concerned, NATO – and the USA 
in particular – took great care in keeping a qualitative advantage in the arms race 
over the socialist camp. Moreover, the East was concerned with limiting its 
cooperation in the political and cultural areas with the West. The USSR even 
refused to recognize the EEC. Thus, the success of the Helsinki process with its 
follow-up meetings was not enough to prevent a steady deterioration in the East-
West relations by the end of the end of the 1970s. The first reason of this 
worsening was the superpower involvement in Third World conflicts, where they 
had important rivalries. Indeed, these rivalries existed as well in Afghanistan, 
Iran, Indonesia, Central America, Southern Africa, as in the Horn of Africa. It was 
in these parts of the world that a number of national liberation movements and 
insurrectional struggles appeared; consequently, the Soviet Union and its allies of 
the Warsaw Pact sought to grasp the opportunity to expand their political and 
military influence in the Third World. Leonid Brezhnev46’s foreign policy, 
indeed, supported in particular Marxist revolutionary governments in Vietnam, 
Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Nicaragua, and South Yemen. 
The USA – still somewhat traumatized by its defeat in Vietnam and the domestic 
Watergate scandal – found itself on the defensive and blamed the USSR for its 
set-backs. This led to further tension and suspicion between East and West. In 
1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan47. The United States’ response 
to the invasion was swift: the US Senate refused to ratify the second SALT 
agreement; the American government also suspended grain shipments and led a 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games48. Furthermore, «NATO decided to 
deploy (…) [INF] missiles [(Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces)] in Europe if the 
Soviets refused to negotiate withdrawal of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe.» 
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(The Center for War, Peace and News Media at New York University, 12 March 
1999: 4) Thus, the US and European governments, despite domestic opposition, 
placed new intermediate range Pershing II missiles in Europe in 1979-1980. In 
addition to all this, the Polish crisis only added even more tension: the Polish 
Solidarity Union [Solidarność] – formed in September 1980 and led by Lech 
Wałęsa – soon posed a threat not only to Poland’s Communist government by its 
sponsorship of labour strikes and other forms of public protest, but also to the 
whole socialist camp. The ailing Soviet leadership began also to fail, as the Soviet 
economy began to show deficiencies and as Brezhnev grew ill. His declining 
health had as a consequence to slow the Soviet response to the challenge posed by 
Poland's Solidarność. Simultaneously, the new elected President Reagan49 
launched his militantly anti-communist campaign against the ‘Evil Empire’ 
(Talbot, 1984: 117-118), to what the aging Soviet leadership responded by 
intensifying the arms race. «By 1983-1984, East-West relations had reached their 
nadir, and there was a growing fear of the possibility of war.» (Hyde-Price, 1991: 
39) 
 
As a result, the political environment in Europe got affected. But, many 
Europeans – appreciating the benefits to be gained from détente – had developed 
a fervent interest in its continuation. Indeed, «amongst many of the superpowers’ 
European allies (…), there was a strong interest in the preservation of as many of 
the fruits of detente as possible, and a desire partially to insulate East-West 
relations in Europe from the chill winds of US-Soviet confrontation.» (Hyde-
Price, 1991: 39) This, in turn, contributed to growing tensions within the alliances 
themselves. It was certainly the most apparent in the two Germanys: both the 
FRG and the GDR – nonetheless the latter always had suspicious about Bonn’s 
behaviour – made great efforts to maintain good relations, even if it led now and 
then to critical situations with their respective allied superpower. One has to 
observe that the divergences between the superpowers and their European allies 
came mainly from their different geostrategic interests. On the one hand, «the 
USA and the USSR were superpowers with global concerns, and their antagonism 
was reinforced to some extent by the nature of the bipolar world order which had 
helped shape their evolving post-war relationship. The European states, on the 
other side, were primarily regional powers, with more limited and specific 
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concerns» (Hyde-Price, 1991: 39); also, «if the superpowers were natural 
adversaries in a bipolar system, Europe was a continent which had been 
artificially and arbitrarily divided.» (Bowker and Williams: 86) This signified that 
the process of détente had developed a dynamics of its own and that – despite the 
deterioration of the superpower relationship – this process involved «countries 
and people more than political acts and institutions.» (Garthoff, 1985: 122) 
Therefore, the détente in Europe was stronger and far less vulnerable to extern 
regional conflicts than was the US-Soviet relationship. (Adrian Hyde-Price, 1991: 
39) 
 
In any case, intra-alliance tensions existed on both sides of the Wall. In the 
West camp, the disputes concerned above all ‘outdoor’ conflicts and US policy in 
the Third World, East-West relations and Western security policy. In the socialist 
camp, there were acrimonious quarrels in particular about the necessity for further 
missile deployments and over the role of small and medium-sized states in 
upholding an East-West dialogue at a time of superpower confrontation. (Hyde-
Price, 1991: 40) 
 
Besides triggering disputes between the superpowers and their allies, the 
re-emergence of East-West hostility also generated tensions and conflicts within 
the Western European states themselves. The fact that these countries had to pass 
at the same period through an economic depression and social unrest led to «a 
polarization of left and right throughout much of Europe, and, given the growing 
fear of war, this had a powerful impact on the defence and foreign policy debates 
in a number of European states. The growth in support for peace movements 
throughout much of Europe led to certain ‘democratization’ of the security debate 
in many countries. At the same time, the elite consensus on security issues in 
many European countries began to disintegrate. In this highly charged situation, 
many of the basic post-war assumptions of defence policy in Western Europe 
(particularly nuclear deterrence and the American role in Europe) were no longer 
taken as axiomatic by significant parts of the population.» (Hyde-Price, 1991: 40) 
 
Nonetheless, by 1985-1986, a series of events unleashed a decrease of the 
East-West tension. First, Mikhail Gorbachev50 was elected General Secretary of 
 46
the Soviet Communist Party on 11 March 1985. Second, US President Ronald 
Reagan was less dogmatically anti-communist in his second term than he was in 
his first one. Third, there was the determined and increasing pressure from 
Western Europe. These positive developments led eventually to a number of 
meetings and agreements: the Stockholm CSBM51 Agreement of September 1986, 
the Reykjavik summit between Gorbachev and Reagan in October-November of 
the same year, and the signing of the INF52 Treaty in December 1987. One could 
then speak from a new spirit in East-West relations. In the last years of the 1980s, 
there was indeed a widespread feeling that the era of the Cold War would 
eventually come to an end. 
 
However, it was only the opening up of the Berlin Wall, and the following 
collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, which signalled the 
end of the Cold War. It follows that the meeting held on 2 and 3 December 1989 
between US President Bush and his Soviet counterpart Gorbachev in Malta 
symbolized the end of the period of the Cold War, which could be named the 
period going ‘from Yalta to Malta’, as it was somewhat initialised at the time of 
the Yalta summit in 1945. The Malta summit demonstrated at the same time the 
extent to which Europe and its security patterns had changed since the end of the 
Second World War: although the changes that occurred in Europe had been 
mainly brought about by reforms launched in the USSR, it now began to be 
evident that the upper hand in European affairs was increasingly the prerogative 
of the European States themselves, rather than the two superpowers, as it used to 
be the case in the period going ‘from Yalta to Malta’. 
 
Thus, one can say that from 1945 to 1989, the European security system 
was defined primarily by what the two superpowers imposed on it. One has to 
underline that the two blocs eventually held firm for more than four decades. 
«The military dependence of Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Japan on their 
respective superpower allies constituted something of a mirror image, the big 
difference being that only in Eastern Europe did the stability of the subordinate 
political regimes also continued to depend on the superpower military presence.» 
(Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1990: 38) As for the economic linkage, it was 
strong on both sides of the Iron Curtain; however, in the West it evolved 
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eventually into interdependence and competition and it was evident by the 1980s 
that the overall economic functioning in Western Europe was superior to the one 
in Eastern Europe. As far as the political relation within the blocs is concerned, it 
was also strong in both sides; yet, again in the West and contrary to the East, this 
led to internally stable political regimes in nearly all of the individual countries. 
 
As already mentioned, the two blocs held firm for more than four decades. 
One of its consequences was that Europe saw a suspension of the indigenous 
security dynamics on its continent for this period, with a few exceptions such as 
the open rivalry between Greece and Turkey, as well as the ambiguous 
independence of France on the Western side and of Yugoslavia and Albania on 
the Eastern side. 
 
During this long period of calm and stability, one could assist within 
Western Europe in the creation of a new political order, which emerged directly 
from the lessons of the two world wars. These lessons were threefold: firstly, 
from now on warfare would not be an acceptable method of settling disputes 
within Europe; secondly, the economic interdependence among European 
countries is so strong that institutionalised economic cooperation is necessary; and 
finally, despite their societal divergences, the European states share a common 
civilization and increasingly a common fate which distinguishes them collectively 
from the others, including the Americans and the Russians. Indeed, the common 
fate the European states had to face in security terms during the decades of the 
Cold War – that the prime military threat for nearly all the European countries 
(Greece and Turkey excepted) was a war between the two superpowers – inspired 
the powerful European consensus in favour of war-avoidance. Nonetheless, this 
consensus was still too weak to activate a general agreement on defence 
cooperation. Even within the Western states, the defence policy already caused 
deep divisions. Yet, the European Community [EC] was at that time creating a 
common peaceful future for Europe. Indeed, «in Western Europe, and haltingly 
though increasingly in Europe as a whole, the balance of power system has been 
replaced by a security community, within which none of the states now expects or 
prepares for a military attack by any of the others. In Western Europe, this 
security community has grown up within the common military structure of 
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NATO, but is politically and societally distinct from it. (…) The new order (…) 
[has a very] dense layer of overlapping organizations and institutions. (…) Some 
of these organizations, particularly the European Community, have begun to 
erode the basic sovereignty of the Western European States. (…) Partly, this 
change results from the reality of interdependence within Europe, and partly it 
results from the pressure of international anarchy: the anarchy around Europe 
creating pressure towards the formation of a European actor.» (Buzan, Kelstrup 
and Lemaitre, 1990: 40) 
 
Therefore, one can say that Europe recovered its central political role in 
the international system, on the one side through the developments adopted by the 
EC and on the other through the opening up of the Berlin Wall. After that, the 
question was how to deal with the security consequences of the events of 
1989/1990. This, however, implied many adjustments to be made in the decision-
makers’ perception of the security issue in Europe.  
 
 
b. The European Security System in the post-Cold War Era 
 
«With the Europe of Yalta gone, it is essential that there be no reversion to 
the Europe of Versailles. The end of the division of Europe should be the point of 
departure for shaping a larger and increasingly integrated Europe, reinforced by a 
widened NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and rendered even more 
secure by a constructive security relationship with Russia.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 86) 
That is how Zbigniew Brzezinski evaluated in 1997 – in his book The Grand 
Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives – the preferable 
evolution of the European Security System. This was about seven years after the 
end of the bipolar world order – which fashioned the old continent for almost half 
a century – and at this time, the evolution of the security system in Europe was 
still questionable, as it is to most extent still today. 
 
Especially in the beginning of the 1990s, shortly after the end of the Cold 
War, it was not clear at all which shape the security system would take on the old 
continent. The end of the Cold War radically changed the security framework in 
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Europe. And, as is often the case after wars53, there was the question – after the 
Cold War – of a re-examination of security in all its aspects across all of Europe 
and even beyond. 
 
In fact, throughout its history, one could consider that the European 
security system was absolutely central in the global system. However, in the wake 
of the changes that occurred in 1989/1990, one could observe that Europe’s 
centrality was at last about to fade. «Over the next few decades, Europe will 
almost certainly become just another region in a truly global multipolar 
international system. This loss of centrality marks a profound change in the 
conditions of European security and a major opportunity, indeed necessity, for 
new thinking and new policies.» (Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1990: 32) 
 
Therefore, assessments of the most important security challenges for 
Europe were gradually redefined: the likelihood of European - in particular West 
European - states needing to turn to military power to defend their territories 
appeared as minimal or quasi inexistent. The focus was moved to more diffuse 
security challenges, such as social and economic inequalities, terrorism, spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, environmental problems, humanitarian crises, 
ethnic conflicts and international crime. «In parallel, a debate developed in 
Europe about the legitimacy of using military power in other contexts or for other 
purposes than to defend national territory. In this context, the EU emerged as a 
natural security actor in particular in situations where collective solutions were 
sought as well as in situations where there was a need for political and economic 
instruments and not military force. In a sense the EU can be seen as the 
embodiment of the cooperative approach to security encouraged by the ‘new’ 
European security agenda. In key respects it has successfully ‘domesticated’ 
security amongst its own member states. NATO, on the other hand, which was 
built on a traditional perspective on security and defence, was expected to have 
outlived its role.» (Sjursen, 1999: 3) 
 
However, there was a misplaced European optimism of the moment. The 
Europeans actually thought that they could effectively manage security on the 
continent themselves54, given the rapidity and positivism of the early post-war 
 50
developments. As we have indeed emphasized in the previous section, the post-
war order in Europe has developed with an astonishing momentum. In fact, the 
conclusion of security treaties – such as the Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe [CFE] Treaty – with the Soviet Union, the mutual acceptance of the 
principle of asymmetrical arms reductions, as well as the dismantling of the 
Warsaw Pact in July 1991 after the revolutions in the Eastern European 
communist States have intensely reduced the military threat to Western Europe 
from the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Russia – having taken over the great power 
role of the Soviet Union after its dissolution in 1991 – still takes into account the 
need for an expansive requirement of its own security; therefore it continues        
– like the USA – to see Europe as central to its own security calculations. 
Furthermore, the process of European political and economic integration 
continued in the early 1990s to gather momentum, with the success of the Single 
European Act, the setting up of monetary and political union, and the further 
enlargement, mainly north- and eastwards (as Sweden, Finland and Austria joined 
the EU in 1995). Nevertheless, although Western Europe created an autonomous 
body in many areas during all the Cold War years, it did not constitute any real 
defence structure of its own. «La plupart des pays européens de l’Ouest et de l’Est 
[ont, en effet,] (…) – contraints ou volontaires – (…) renoncé depuis quarante ans 
à produire les concepts ou les lignes d’une défense indépendante.» (David, 1992: 
15) In the case of Western Europe, this was due in particular to its dependence to 
the Western security system, dominated by the Americans. (David, 1992: 5-10) 
But, with the diminishing of the Russian threat to its East, the following questions 
were posed henceforth: against whom would an autonomous Western European 
defence structure be set up? Would it still be Russia? Who would be part of such a 
defence structure? 
 
Moreover, another event added to the uniqueness of the situation. Indeed, 
the unification of Germany – officially achieved on 3 October 1990 – created a 
completely new situation, with a kind of revival of the German problem. The role 
the restored great power Germany was required to play in Europe – and in the 
world – gave way to some anxiety in Germany as well as among its neighbours. 
But soon a national and international consensus was to take place that approved of 
an irreversible German involvement in an integrated European security system. 
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The waning of the bipolar world order had thus created a completely new 
situation. The continuing withdrawal of the majority of US and Soviet forces from 
Europe had only magnified the novelty of the situation. Although this situation 
was seen as a chance for Europe in terms of security, it brought as well its share 
of uncertainties and apprehensions.  
 
It was not only the German question that was source of some worries in 
Europe, but the disappearing of the bipolar security system resulted also in 
Eastern Europe being a source of local security problems. In addition to minority 
problems in some Central and Eastern European Countries [CEECs] – especially 
in Slovakia, Romania and Latvia –, tensions between neighbouring states and 
within states themselves upheld a precarious environment which easily led to 
disintegration and even to civil war, as in the case of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia was done following a civil war – which in reality 
transformed itself afterwards into a series of regional wars –, whereas the Soviet 
Union in 1991 and Czechoslovakia in 1993 gave birth to their successor countries 
rather peacefully. 
 
The handling of the Yugoslavian crisis was quite revealing of the state of 
the situation in terms of security and defence in Europe in the post-Cold War 
years. The EC got involved in Yugoslavia for several reasons. However, the main 
reason for its involvement was that other actors were either distracted or 
uninterested. The Soviet Union – and then Russia – «had a long-standing interest 
in the Balkans but the Soviet Union had already entered its death throes, the last 
gasp occurring with the August 1991 coup.» (Mihalka, Autumn 2001: 7) As for 
the United States, it yielded the area to the Europeans, arguing that no US national 
interest was at stake and that none of its interests could be served by its 
involvement. Since Washington was not interested, neither was NATO. All this 
gave way to a European intervention, in the case the Europeans wanted to get 
involved. Certainly, they wanted an involvement in the Balkans for several 
reasons. One of these reasons was that they wanted to do better in Yugoslavia 
than their inadequate performance in the Gulf War in 1990-1991. But the main 
reason was that the EC was in the midst of negotiating the Maastricht Treaty 
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while the Yugoslav crisis broke out. The Maastricht Treaty would give, at least in 
the treaties55, a greater role to a European and defence identity.56 «At a difference 
from the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty went further than to just 
write existing practice into the Treaty, and actually laid out new patterns for 
development in foreign and security policy.» (Sjursen, 1999: 4) France had been 
urging for more independent European action for a long time. The crisis in 
Yugoslavia provided such an opportunity. Furthermore, there was a general belief 
that the economic and political power of the EC was better suited to dealing with 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia than military power. The European problem was 
without a doubt one of organization and leadership. The Europeans – having no 
‘natural leader’ – lacked an organizational infrastructure adequate to direct 
European forces. Europe has always had the interests and the means, but has 
consistently lacked the will and the organization. Additionally, as a follow-up to 
the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union [WEU] started in 1991 to 
strengthen its own institutions and develop military capabilities.57 The so-called 
‘Petersberg declaration’ – which defined the WEU’s security tasks to include 
humanitarian and rescue operations, conventional peacekeeping as well as the 
operation of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking 58– was 
issued after a meeting in Petersberg in June 1992. Nonetheless, the European 
Community, which became the European Union [EU] after the entry into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, failed to develop such forces in the 
1990s59. All the more so since «institutional adaptation to external change did not 
take place with the expected, or desired, efficiency.» (Sjursen, 1999: 4) Hence, 
the failure of the EU in its initial attempt to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia 
was not a real surprise to many. Yet, the EU continued its efforts to bring security 
to the Balkans. Besides taking over the administration of the city of Mostar, 
providing a strong economic aid to the region and working closely with the 
United Nations [UN] through the International Conference on the former 
Yugoslavia, the West Europeans states sent numerous troops to UN missions to 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Mihalka, Autumn 2001: 7-10) 
 
As far as the United States is concerned, many Europeans – especially the 
French – thought that it would recover its old isolationism as the Soviet threat 
waned. The beginning of the Yugoslavian crisis seemed to confirm this 
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assumption. But, within some years and by means of a change of administration 
in the White House, the approach of the United States to European security was 
completely reoriented from a neo-realist one – focusing on spheres of influence – 
to a cooperative security one, emphasizing on liberalism. The Bill Clinton 
administration – which came into office on 1 January 1993 – differed drastically 
in its ideological orientation from that of George Bush senior. The administration 
of the latter was principally neo-realist – considering states as the prime actor in 
international politics and power, especially military power, as the argument in 
international relations - whereas the Bill Clinton administration was 
predominantly Wilsonian, thus advocating the spread of democracy as the best 
means to ensure US security. The neo-Wilsonian approach of the Clinton 
administration thus explains that the USA became increasingly involved in South-
Eastern Europe in the 1990s, while the Bush senior administration maintained a 
policy of laissez-faire towards the Balkan crisis, believing that the former 
Yugoslavia was an area for which the Europeans should take responsibility. The 
American government under Clinton became more and more interested in the 
events occurring in the Balkans. While considering the plan put together by the 
US American Cyrus Vance and EU negotiator David Owen to settle the Bosnian 
conflict, Washington – contrary to Brussels – was in favour of air strikes in order 
to support the beleaguered Bosnian Muslims if they continued to be pressed by 
Bosnian Serbs. Further American involvement can be seen in the conclusion of 
the Washington Agreement in March 1994. This agreement to end Muslim-Croat 
hostilities was achieved under the aegis of Washington and laid the groundwork 
for a Muslim-Croat federation. The US support of the Croats and the Bosnian 
Muslims began to produce results some time later. Indeed, while the UN situation 
was looking increasingly insecure – with UN peacekeepers being held hostage by 
the Bosnian Serbs –, the situation evolved on the ground. Croatia took Western 
Slavonia in May 1995, the Krajina two months later. The successes of the Croat 
and Bosnian Muslim offensive on the ground combined with NATO air strikes 
brought the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate. The Dayton Accords were eventually 
concluded in December 1995, under the aegis of the USA. (Mihalka, Autumn 
2001: 9-14) 
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The settlement of the conflict in Bosnia was dominated by the United 
States. This indicates the return to the old strategy and the opening of the period 
of a re-strengthening of NATO as the framework for military and political 
integration of Europe, thus sending the European Union back to the mere 
economic affairs. The process of a political integration of the EU is therefore 
again completely slowed down. «Après 1996, les Etats-Unis ont, à travers 
l’OTAN, spectaculairement rétabli leur hégémonie politique sur l’Europe et 
renvoyé à plus tard l’accomplissement de cette Europe politique auquel ils avaient 
semblé pendant un temps accepter de contribuer.» (Dehove, 1999: 71) 
 
The war in former Yugoslavia – especially the Bosnia War – also affected 
the development of a foreign and security policy of the EU. The Union’s 
treatment of the Bosnia War was heavily criticized, with its failure to negotiate 
peace. The conflict in Bosnia «exposed to the full the lack of military muscle 
behind the EU’s position. (M. Smith, 2006: 300) (See also Nuttall, August 1994: 
11-25) It was the USA and NATO that were seen to have found a solution to the 
conflict. As a result, expectations about EU capabilities in foreign and security 
policy aroused by the promising Maastricht Treaty were more and more 
frequently described as unrealistic. (Treacher, Spring 2004: 55) The ‘new NATO’ 
was perceived as an institution which was far better suited to tackle the challenges 
that Europe was facing since the end of the Cold War than the EU. 
 
Furthermore, inside the EU, attempts to follow up the ambitions of the 
Maastricht Treaty moved slowly. The Intergovernmental Conference [IGC] of 
1996/1997, which resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty, was expected to make some 
progress.60 Nonetheless, the Amsterdam Treaty – which entered into force on 1 
May 1999 – was seen as a victory for the Atlanticists. (Sjursen, 1999: 6) The first 
assessments of the Amsterdam Treaty were fairly negative. Indeed, as the 
Maastricht Treaty, it was considered as giving only a secondary importance to the 
issue of defence. However, «à la lumière des initiatives ultérieures, le potentiel 
des Traités se dessine beaucoup plus clairement. En fait, l’adoption des missions 
de Petersberg61, le projet d’intégrer l’UEO (alliance militaire contraignante) dans 
l’UE et la volonté de promouvoir la coopération européenne en matière 
d’armement donnent au TUE [Traité sur l’Union européenne] d’Amsterdam des 
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possibilités que ses auteurs n’avaient pas forcément à l’esprit.» (Heisbourg et al., 
Septembre 2000: 4) 
 
In July 1998, the United Kingdom – under Prime Minister Tony Blair – 
undertook a ‘Strategic Defence Review’ in which it emphasized the importance of 
a Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. London’s resolution to take 
European defence seriously was absolutely crucial for further developments. The 
change in the British approach62 led to the Franco-British St.Malo declaration of 4 
of December 199863. As it emphasizes – among other things – the role of the EU 
in defence as well as its paramount need to improve force projection capabilities, 
the link between the improvement of defence capabilities and the role of the 
Union in the world and the relevance of NATO, (Heisbourg et al., Septembre 
2000: 8) the St.Malo declaration is broadly considered as the onset of the 
European defence project. The new opportunity presented by St.Malo was very 
rapidly followed up by systematic discussion amongst the EU member states on 
the practical shaping of cooperation in security and defence.  
 
The European Council of Cologne in June 1999 went on with the idea 
developed in St.Malo, this time the fifteen member states being side by side. The 
Cologne summit conclusions stressed that the EU must develop the necessary 
capabilities to fulfil the objective of a common security and defence policy, and 
that it «must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces.» (Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999a: Annex III §1) 
Thus, in Cologne, the EU conferred upon itself the institutional framework 
necessary to take political decisions concerning security and defence matters, and 
at the Helsinki European Council of 10 and 11 December 1999 it took the entire 
process even further. Indeed, besides launching the new and permanent set of 
security and defence institutions set out in St.Malo and Cologne, the EU Council 
meeting in Helsinki established the target of the creation of a European armed 
force capable to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks.  
 
As for the Treaty of Nice, adopted after the Nice European Council held 
in December 2000, it effectively sanctions the build-up of the common European 
Security and Defence Policy [ESDP].With the Treaty of Nice, the EU included 
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thus in its legitimate competencies an ESDP and acquired a strategic 
responsibility in post-Cold War crisis management. (Rutten, May 2001: vii) 
 
«The success of the EU project has made it increasingly necessary for a 
Europe that is integrated in so many areas, and plays an increasingly important 
role globally, to have a political voice as well and the capabilities to back up 
policy with action in foreign affairs, security, and defence.» (Rutten, May 2001: 
ix) The Kosovo War of 1999, however, demonstrated the extent to which such a 
voice and means were still lacking. During this war, the Europeans – left to 
themselves – were unlikely to intervene without a UN Security Council 
resolution. Yet, Washington – under the Clinton administration with its neo-
Wilsonian approach – considered that an intervention was legitimised by the need 
to protect humanitarian values, notwithstanding this conflict seemed to give little 
neo-realist strategic benefit for the USA. After the failure of some diplomatic 
efforts – like the meeting in Rambouillet in February 1999, where the Kosovar 
Albanians agreed to the terms of the settlement and the Serbs did not –, the United 
States forces NATO to intervene in Serbia and Kosovo in March 1999 to prevent 
Serb human rights abuses against Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians.64 The military 
operation of NATO lasted until early June. (Mihalka, Autumn 2001: 12-14) «The 
Kosovo war produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of 
the war than unease at America’s apparent omnipotence.» (Kagan, June/July 
2002: 6-7) Hence, illustrating the degree to which the political voice and means of 
the EU were still missing, the lesson of Kosovo strengthened the «developments 
that were triggered in autumn 1998 by the British government’s U-turn that led to 
St-Malo and - via Cologne (…) and Helsinki (…) - culminated in Nice (…).» 
(Rutten, May 2001: ix) 
 
A new phase in European security seemed thus to begin as the EU was 
seen as being ready to take over its own destiny with the signing of the Nice 
Treaty – including the setting up of a European military force – and with the 
complete realisation of the Euro area. Yet, other events had contributed to the 
prospect of a new phase in European security, as the replacement of the neo-
Wilsonian Clinton administration by the neo-realist Bush Junior administration in 
January 2001, as well as the replacement of Boris Yeltsin by Vladimir Putin who 
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won the Presidential election in March 2000. Indeed, the arrival of George Walker 
Bush in the White House «clearly marks the end of the Clintonite aggressive 
liberal leadership of Europe. Thus the US is less likely to intervene unless clear 
strategic interests are engaged (…). The new Bush administration will also accord 
less importance to European and more importance to Asian security.» (Mihalka, 
Autumn 2001: 14) This seemed to be confirmed as the EU – besides the move 
towards a European military force and the completion of the Euro area – is at the 
brink to be endowed with a “European Constitution”, which was adopted by the 
European Council in June 2004, essentially accordingly to its elaboration by the 
Convention on the Future of Europe after more than one year of labour.65 
Furthermore, the EU has several projects in progress for further stability in South-
Eastern Europe, like the Stability Pact66 and major involvement in the Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Macedonia peacekeeping operations. On 1 January 2003, the first 
operational mission of the European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP] began 
its work as the European Police Mission [EUPM] in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on 
15 December 2003 a civil EU police mission code-named Proxima started in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] for one year.  
 
In this part of the world in particular, the United States has adapted its 
policy to interact with these new EU institutions. While Europe has entered a new 
area of security politics, the Bush Junior administration – taking a much more 
interest-based approach to policy than the principles-based one of the Clinton 
administration – sees essential American interests elsewhere than in Europe. 
(Mihalka, Autumn 2001: 14-16) Though, «jusqu’au 11 septembre, Bush peine à 
obtenir ce qu’il souhaite en politique étrangère. A la suite des attentats du 11 
septembre, en revanche, un consensus bipartisan se dessine en politique étrangère 
et permet une réponse unie du Congrès sur l’Afghanistan, la législation 
antiterroriste et l’Irak. Les républicains reprennent de justesse le contrôle du 
Congrès aux élections de mi-mandat de novembre 2002, ce qui permet à George 
W. Bush d’avancer son programme de politique étrangère avec une relative 
aisance.» (David, Balthazar et Vaïsse, 2003: 283) 
 
As for Europe, the atrocious events of 11 September 2001 have caused an 
immediate reaction from the EU as well as from the single member states. The 
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fight against terrorism was indeed promptly included in several policies of the 
EU, as well as of the member states. Furthermore, another consequence is that the 
Europeans are increasingly taking over more responsibilities in the Balkans, and 
at some point they will certainly remain alone to control the region. The US 
Americans give the priority to the ‘war against terrorism’ in Central Asia and the 
Middle East, thus undoubtedly getting American troops out of the Balkans in the 
future67. 
 
Nevertheless, although the building of an international anti-terrorism 
coalition and the following military campaign in Afghanistan at the end of 2002 
received a large support of the EU and its member states, the US-led intervention 
in Iraq has put EU’s unity under major pressure. The contributions by some EU 
member states to the US campaign increased the struggle within the EU between 
those willing to participate in a military action against Iraq and those rejecting this 
idea.  
 
Although the move towards further developments in the fields of security 
and foreign affairs – that was slowly developing in Europe – is hard to achieve 
under such circumstances, some rapid progresses were completed in the end of 
2003 and in the beginning of 200468. The danger of EU political apathy is 
however still possible, since different European countries are often being opposed 
when it comes to the sensitive issue of security and defence. 
 
 
 
2) THE PARMETERS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM 
 
Having analysed the developments of the European security system in the 
1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is now appropriate to 
concentrate on the parameters of the European security system. To this end, this 
chapter analyses first the implication of the moot concept of security, in 
considering the developments of different concepts and ideas one has elaborated 
upon the issue of security in Europe. Then, it considers the challenges the 
European security and defence policy has to face.  
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a. The Concept of Security 
 
At this point, it is important to focus on the concept of security in order to 
understand the idea behind this concept and its latest developments. This 
reasoning is also essential to identify its links and nuances with the concept of 
defence. 
 
First of all, one should define the concept of security, or at least delimit it. 
This step is not easy at all, since the very concept of security is disputed. One 
could define the concept of security, generally, as such: «Security (…) may (…) 
be understood as the protection of a people from external threats, and includes 
arrangements for defence and deterrence.» (Gambles, November 1991: 2) Yet, the 
standard and classical definition dates from 1962 and is given by Arnold Wolfers: 
«Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired 
values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be 
attacked.» (Wolfers, 1962: 150) Developing this, David A. Baldwin considers 
security to be «a situation in which there is a low probability of damage to 
acquired values» (Baldwin, January 1997: 13). Such definitions are however only 
a beginning, as further specifications are needed in order to better understand the 
concept. 
 
Therefore, one should now focus at the development of the concept of 
security. Most analysts of world politics since 1945 broadly had the same 
perception of the concept of security, although a generally accepted definition 
could not be reached. (Buzan, 1991) The concepts of security and defence were 
practically tantamount during the Cold War period. Accordingly, security implied 
some or all of the following: «that a state is free from the threat of war; that a state 
is able to pursue its ‘national interests’ and preserve its ‘core values’; and that it 
feels safe against potential aggressors (that is, war is believed to be unlikely, but 
should one occur, the state in question does not expect defeat). These traditional 
ideas about security were based upon three assumptions: the belief that security is 
centred upon states, that security policy seeks to preserve the status quo, and that 
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military threats and the need for effective military defence are the primary 
concerns.» (Booth and Wheeler, 1992: 4) As a result, security policy has been 
primarily related to the military power of individual states and to the general order 
in the states’ system.69 During the Cold War the security and defence policies of 
West European states were to a large extent formulated according to the logic of 
the Westphalian model70. It is in this sense that the concept of collective security 
had to be understood. Collective security is generally defined as «a system for 
international peace» and was more precisely understood as such: «the proposition 
that aggressive and unlawful use of force by one nation against another will be 
met by the combined strength of all other nations. All will co-operate in 
controlling a disturber of the peace. They will act as one for all and all for one. 
Their combined strength will serve as a guarantee for the security of each.» (Al 
Imran, 16 November 2003: 1)  
 
Yet, during the 1980s there was growing dissatisfaction with this 
traditional notion of security, which privileged the state and military power. 
(Buzan, 1990) Repeated requests – emphasizing the fact that security was not 
anymore, if it ever was, merely a military question – for an updating or 
broadening of the concept became louder. Consequently, observers of 
international politics increasingly recognized the necessity for a more holistic and 
dynamic concept. Thus, the concept of security was adjusted. This entailed the 
following: «first, a concept of security which focuses not just on the state, but 
which includes individuals and the world community as a whole; second, a 
concept which is not status quo oriented, but which is future oriented and seeks 
progressive change; and third, a concept which encompasses a broad agenda of 
threats (economic, environmental and human rights for example) which prevent 
people and groups living full and free lives.» (Booth and Wheeler, 1992: 4) This 
new concept of security of the 1980s referred to the security not only of the state, 
but also of individuals and humanity as a whole. 
 
Particularly in the field of security, the collapse of the bipolar world has 
stigmatised the rethinking of the concept. Compared to the earlier East-West 
conflict most of the changes were considered as being positive from the Western 
point of view. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the alleged threat on 
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which much of West European security and defence policies had been built since 
the end of the Second World War disappeared promptly. The Soviet threat was 
gone, the West was able to decrease its military readiness, decrease the numbers 
of its troops and arms and reduce to some extent the associated financial burdens. 
Yet, the fundamental character of international politics has not changed. Military 
power continues to play a role on the old continent, as the conflicts in the Balkans 
– involving the extensive use of military force – have clearly demonstrated. At the 
same time, the geographical position of Russia has not changed, nor did its 
potential weight vanish; and nuclear weapons still exist. «But while military 
power may in some complicated way contribute to the weight of states even in 
their relations with each other in Western Europe, military power in a direct sense 
plays no role in these relations. This is the real security regime in Western 
Europe.» (Mahncke, September 1993: 3-4) 
 
Therefore, from the 1980s on – and increasingly so since the collapse of 
Soviet communism –71, alternative understandings of security in international 
relations have gained ground. It is increasingly argued and accepted that security 
is something else than, or something in addition to, military force. Thus, moving 
away from the emphasis of defending the territory of the nation-state from an 
external military threat, discussions on security and defence policy increasingly 
began to focus on so-called non-territorial threats and to refer to an enlarged 
security concept. Building on the idea that the security concept should be 
enlarged, concepts such as ‘comprehensive security’, ‘human security’, 
‘desecuritization’, ‘soft power’ and ‘soft security’ flourish in the study of both 
European and international security. These non-territorial threats – thus 
constituting central threats to European security to the same extent as military 
threats from territorial states – have to do with a number of very diverse issues. 
These range from social and economic inequalities to terrorism, the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, environmental problems, humanitarian disasters, 
ethnic conflicts, international crime or even migration. Often defined as security 
issues of equal importance to military issues, these non-territorial threats were as 
important or perhaps even more important security risks than the threat of external 
military invasion.72 Thus, the new political situation has indeed broadened the 
debate, contributing to the conceptual ambiguity of the notion of security and to 
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the rapid change of its definition. (Sjursen, 2004: 1-2, 15-16; Sjursen, 2001: 4-5; 
Wæver, 1998: 96-97) In addition, one should specify that the concept of collective 
security evolved alongside the concept of security to meet a broader scope of 
threats. 
 
One should add that the changes to the understanding of what constitutes 
central threats to security occurred not only in Europe, but happened – with slight 
differences – in the whole international system. Moreover, the observers of 
international politics, from different theoretical approaches, largely confirmed 
these allegations of change of the concept of security. In particular, Barry Buzan, 
Ole Wæver73 and some colleagues – from the English School of International 
Relations Theory – have developed in a series of post-Cold War publications, an 
innovative and quite influential approach in security studies: the so-called 
‘Copenhagen school’. 
 
Before focusing on the approach of the ‘Copenhagen school’, we should 
give some attention to the English School of International Relations Theory. 
Before focusing on the approach of the ‘Copenhagen school’, we should give 
again some attention to the Theory of the English School of International 
Relations (or International Society). As we have already emphasized, the 
International Society theorists distinguish a rationalist tradition (Grotian tradition) 
beside the realist tradition (Hobbesian tradition) on the one hand and the 
revolutionary tradition (Kantian tradition) on the other.74 Academically, the 
rationalist tradition of the English School of International Relations represents 
indeed the Grotian tradition75. For the International Society scholars – to which 
belong especially Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson –, international 
relations are primarily an international exchange between sovereign states striking 
up institutionalised, continuous and organized diplomatic and commercial 
relations. It is within this rational tradition – being somehow situated between 
realist pluralism and universal solidarism – that the Internationalists have 
developed their own analysis, around the notion of ‘international society’. «A 
society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious 
of certain common interests and values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules of their relations with 
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one another, and share in the working of common institutions.» (Bull, 1995: 13), 
as defined by Hedley Bull. Thus, although recognizing the importance of power, 
the Grotian approach asserts that «order – and therefore security – can be 
achieved not simply through the manipulation of power but through the growth of 
a society of states. Order therefore consists of a situation in which the goals of the 
actors are predictably maintained through shared norms and values.» (McInnes, 
1992: 7) 
 
So, having given some details on the Grotian approach and on the 
Internationalists, we should now focus on the approach in security studies 
developed by the ‘Copenhagen school’. This approach is – as we have already 
mentioned – innovative and quite influential in recent times. So, according to it, 
two views of security are available in the relevant literature: the old military and 
state-centred approach and the new approach that raises reservations about the 
primacy of the military as well as the state in conceptualisations of security. As 
described by the ‘Copenhagen school’ and corresponding to the new approach, 
one should «conceptualize threats and vulnerabilities as they arise in numerous 
areas, both military and non-military. They suggest that security must be studied 
as a discourse in which certain issues are ‘securitized’ (in other words, become 
security issues) or ‘desecuritized’.» (Sjursen, 2004: 4) As a result, Barry Buzan, 
Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde define security as «the move that takes politics 
beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special 
kind of politics or above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more 
extreme version of politization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the 
spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (...) through politicized (...) to securitized 
(meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency 
measures and justifying actions outside the bounds of political procedure.» 
(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 23-24). Re-examining the typology 
established by Buzan in his publication of 1991 - People, States and Fear: 
Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era –, they 
suggest a multisectoral approach to the study of security. The five security sectors 
identified by Buzan were the following: the military, the political, the economic, 
the environmental, and the societal sector. The latter was particularly explored by 
the ‘Copenhagen school’. Each of the mentioned sectors may be ‘securitized’, but 
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they function distinctly. Indeed, although societal security is closely linked to 
political security, existential threats are usually defined in terms of the state not 
only in the military but also in the political sectors, in contrast to the societal 
sector of which the referent object is the identity, or «more specifically, it is about 
the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional 
patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and 
custom.» (Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1993: 23) State frontiers and 
societal frontiers thus coincide rarely. Societal insecurity is seen to exist when 
«communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to 
their survival as a community» (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 119). The 
innovation of the ‘Copenhagen school’ laid certainly in the fact that the ‘society’ 
has been granted the status of an independent referent object of security. (Wæver, 
1998: 97) This approach widens the security agenda but also emphasizes that the 
distinction between the domestic territory of a state and what is outside it – that is, 
the international sphere – is not always vitally important when it comes to the 
issue of security policy. One can also distinguish state security from societal 
security, by means of the notion of security. Indeed, the concept of security has to 
do with the notion of survival, in the sense that survival brings up security, when 
something at stake is considered as vital, thus urging one to resort to exceptional 
measures. Given that, one can distinguish the two aspects of security, asserting 
that sovereignty constitutes the ultimate criterion of the state, whereas the sense of 
identity gives the cohesion to the society. In other words, sovereignty is the way 
of survival for the states, while survival is a question of identity for the societies. 
(Wæver, 1998: 98-100) Therefore, «the study of security is relieved of the ties 
that by definition bind it to the state as a referent object of security as well as to 
state sovereignty as the value to be protected. It is possible with this framework to 
show that the referent object is rearticulated to focus on other actors and other 
values.» (Sjursen, 2004: 4-5) The pertinence of such an approach appears with 
regards to the study of the European security system in the post-Cold War area. 
Concerning the relation between security and identity, Barry Buzan and Ole 
Wæver state that European security «is difficult to grasp if seen simply as a 
constellation of nation states. Much more of the dynamics can be brought out by a 
constellation made up of at least three kinds of (non-like) units: states, nations and 
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the EU. Here, societal identity can become a referent object for security action.» 
(Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 249)  
 
The concept of societal security has created a debate, some even raising a 
few criticisms on the approach. As the Norwegian researcher Helen Sjursen 
observed, «the potential existence of and respect for rules and norms that define 
the purpose and legitimacy of security policy, is left unexplored and unexplained 
in the overall framework proposed by the Copenhagen school (…).This 
framework is (…) unable to account for a possible change in normative standards 
for conflict resolution and the strengthening of legally binding agreements. In 
other words, the possibility that security policy is, or can be, transformed into an 
instrument to uphold a global legal order that strengthens the rights of the 
individual, rather than being an instrument with which the interest of the most 
powerful is protected, is not investigated. (…) Hence, [in the Copenhagen 
approach] security policy will either be governed by the most powerful, or it will 
be taken into the hands of particular groups in response to perceived threats to 
their survival. Part of the reason might be that although the Copenhagen school 
challenges much of the conventional wisdom in ‘security studies’, it does at the 
same time maintain core realist assumptions and starts from a ‘conflict’ model of 
politics. A second weakness with this approach is the ambiguity about whether or 
not it also makes a normative claim. Some examples seem to indicate that the 
authors rely on some implicit ideas of what security policy ought to be about, thus 
suggesting a normative claim. (…) However, in order to make such claims about 
the need to securitize or desecuritize it would be useful to have categories for 
distinguishing ‘real’ threats and risks that legitimately call for action, from those 
that are simply ‘constructed’ for other purposes. (…) However, the normative 
standards used for such considerations are not made explicit. On what basis, with 
reference to what kind of norm do we decide when securitization is a good thing, 
and with regard to what kind of referent object is securitization acceptable?» 
(Sjursen, 2004: 5-7)  
 
Undoubtedly, one has to admit that security has to a large extent a 
normative implication. It is thus not surprising that security is a concept which is 
very controversial when it comes to its meaning and its scope. Similar to the 
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conceptual problematic in defining security, a precise definition of collective 
security remains also controversial. 
 
 
b. The Challenges to the Stability of Europe 
 
Having examined the implication of the controversial concept of security, 
it makes sense at present to consider the challenges to the stability in Europe.  
 
At first, one has to note that – in its conceptualisation of security – the new 
approach developed by the ‘Copenhagen school’ raises reservations about the 
primacy of the military and challenges the state as the referent object of security. 
Indeed, the focus of the state as the referent object of security is what characterized, 
especially during the era of almost unchallenged dominance of the realist theory, the 
traditional International Relations approach to security. The realist theory was 
actually referring to the security of the territorial state76, with the state being 
indeed the central actor of their state-oriented conception. Certainly, the important 
modification of the international system has challenged the privileged status of 
the state. With these challenges to the state the very basis upon which security 
policy has been built is thus questioned. Helen Sjursen notes three circumstances 
that illustrate the internal and external challenges to the state. Firstly, one can 
observe that it looks as if the traditional hierarchy of policy issues – giving 
priority to security and defence – is given up. The second circumstance is the 
appearance of new actors besides the state. At the European level, one can indeed 
observe the emergence of new transnational, supranational, economic, as well as 
political and security actors in addition to the state. The similarity these different 
actors have is that they do not have a territorial basis and that they do not act with 
reference to precise national interests. As a result of this change, the state has 
more difficulties in controlling economic and political activities beyond and 
across national borders. A problem for the state is indeed that numerous groups 
may – to varying extents – seek to protect their interest through European 
institutions outside the nation state. Finally, the third circumstance is the 
strengthening of a normative and legal dimension in the international system. In 
an international system characterized by its complexity, notably on account of its 
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interdependence, international order is maintained through a network of 
agreements and international institutions and not exclusively by way of a balance 
of power. This network of agreements and international institutions cover a wide 
spectrum of subject matters from human rights issues and environmental 
preservation to defence and security issues. Therefore, decisions on international 
issues are no longer left entirely at the goodwill of national governments. 
International law – with its set of norms and rules - does increasingly influence 
state behaviour and set standards and principles for appropriate behaviour both 
between states and within states. (Sjursen, 2001: 5-6) Certainly, given that 
humanitarian interventions can be legitimised as promoting security, the referent 
object of security is no longer the state, but is some other entity. The state having 
been – until recently – almost automatically considered as the referent object of 
security in international relations, the fact that the security issues have a normative 
dimension has often been neglected77. But, nowadays, the position of the state as 
the referent object of security is questioned. 
 
Since the sense of security or insecurity is subjective to a large extent, the 
questioning of the relevant formulation of security policy becomes important. As 
security policy should not longer be exclusively based on national security, the 
question of the basis on which European security policy should be developed       
– most notably the question of the interests, values and norms which should be 
promoted and protected – comes to the fore. To sum up, one can say that security 
policy in Europe seems to hold three dimensions at the present. «The first 
dimension is the traditional conception of security and defence policy where the 
purpose is to defend the territory of a nation state or a group of states from a 
clearly identified external military threat. The second dimension considers the 
idea of mutual interdependence between states. Thus national security is seen to 
depend on overall international stability and respect for international norms. With 
this dimension the focus in security and defence policy thus shifts towards non-
territorial security threats. Sources of insecurity are often not considered linked to 
other states but to issues such as ethnic conflicts, international crime and 
terrorism. In turn this leads to a discussion of the legitimacy of use of military 
means in situations which are not concerned with defending national territory. 
The third dimension points to social and economic imbalances, humanitarian 
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crises, and environmental disasters as larger security challenges than military 
threats. The tendency in the European security agenda has been to move away 
from the first dimension of territorial defence and towards the third dimension of 
an enlarged security concept.» (Sjursen, 2001: 6) 
 
Within these three dimensions, one should identify the different sources of 
insecurity in Europe. The first dimension – which is the traditional conception of 
security and defence policy - concerns the deliberate use of force by one state 
against another. This classical threat – that one state or nation would become so 
potent in Europe so as to dominate all the others – has been the traditional 
concern of the European head of state in recent European history. Every time such 
a potential hegemon has emerged throughout Europe’s history, the other 
European countries have come together in order to resist it. Now that the Soviet 
supremacy in Central and Eastern Europe has gone, one could expect the 
European states to unite against the ‘victor’ of the Cold War, namely the United 
States of America. However, the Europeans do not see USA and its military 
power as potentially threatening or hostile. For the reason that both the USA and 
the European states have shared values and practices of liberal democracy, the 
transatlantic alliance has been based upon countries that are sufficiently stable and 
sufficiently transparent to each other, so that one could not easily convince their 
populations that the other is causing a threat to oneself.78 Despite the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the fact that Russia has become a relatively democratic and 
pluralist country, it is still Russia – at least in the early post-Cold War years – that 
is rather seen to continue to cast a long geopolitical shadow across the continent. 
(Hyde-Price, 1991: 56-57) Russia remains not only the largest country, but also 
the largest military power as well as the largest population in Europe. Moreover, 
even if it is weaker than the former Soviet Union, Russia is also somewhat less 
predictable. Therefore, most of European states considered – and some of them 
still do consider – Russia as the greatest threat to their security. However, due to 
the enormous evolutions within the Russian political system and within the EU, 
the likelihood of seeing Russian domination over Central and Eastern Europe 
have drastically been reduced. Hence, since the changes of 1989/1991, Russian 
power has increasingly become much less of an immediate challenge to both 
Central and Eastern Europe as well as to Western Europe. As for Germany, some 
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European states feared the re-emergence of a hegemonic Germany – empowered 
by its economic strength and geographical centrality – in the wake of its 
reunification. Nevertheless, this historic fear of an over-powerful Germany did 
not last for long. Indeed, not only the democratic and quasi-pacifist culture of 
contemporary Germany, but also its anchorage amongst the supranational 
Western institutions – in particular its defence having been organized in large 
extent within the framework of NATO – have rapidly convinced that German 
economic and military strength had to be seen as a source of increased security 
rather than insecurity for Germany’s neighbours. More generally, as most of the 
European states belong to the supranational Western structures, it is practically 
impossible for European states to go to war with each other. (Mortimer, 1992: 6-
10) Besides these worries about a bid for hegemony inside Europe, the question 
could be raised whether the European states might be threatened by the ambitions 
of external powers. This seems rather implausible. Indeed, Japan – which might 
exercise a possible economical domination over Europe – seems very unlikely to 
represent a potential military threat. A more popular conception is the idea that 
Europe could be indirectly threaten by a state – a so called ‘rogue state’79 – 
through its sponsoring of terrorism80. One has to add the danger of a peripheral 
state being in the position to threaten Europe with long-range missiles, since a 
state from the former Soviet Union, North African or from the Middle-East could 
threaten South European states. In this optic, the spread of ballistic missile 
technology as well as the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons technologies pose indeed a potential dangerous threat to the security of 
Europe. (Hyde-Price, 1991: 58; Mortimer, 1992: 10-11, 14) To the first 
dimension, one could add another security challenge arising on Europe’s 
periphery and which are caused by events that are genuinely ‘out of area’, in the 
sense that they are not direct attacks on European territory. It has to do with the 
access of European states to natural resources and markets, since the ability of 
industrial countries to ensure regular supplies of raw materials and mineral 
resources essential to the functioning of modern, developed societies is a major 
concern to them. For that reason, not only oil and gas, but also other metallic 
minerals are of strategic importance. The interruption of the supplies of such vital 
natural resources by war, revolutionary chaos, ‘anti-imperialist blockades’ or 
outbreaks of ‘economic nationalism’ (Gutteridge, 1989: 18-25) could thus 
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threaten Europe. (Hyde-Price, 1991: 59) This is a reason why Europe has a 
particular interest in preventing the raise of a power that would recourse to such 
attacks or threats, and a more general interest in the preservation of international 
law and order. (Mortimer, 1992: 11) 
 
The second dimension – concerning the security policy – focuses on non-
territorial security threats. Within this dimension, national security is – as we have 
already noticed – seen to depend on overall international stability and respect for 
international norms rather than on the classical security and defence conception. 
As a result, the threats – which would belong to this dimension – are more 
commonly associated with a lack or breakdown of state authority rather than with 
an excess of it. The typical intimidations and threats used by non-state actors is 
the resort to terrorism in all its diverse forms. Thus a threat which gained in 
intensity in the last decades – and menacing also Europe – is international 
terrorism. Europe has certainly its own home-grown terrorist groups, as national 
and separatist groups especially in Spain, in the British Isles and in Turkey as well 
as the nowadays almost insignificant ‘class warriors’ notably in Germany or Italy 
(Assembly of Western European Union, June 2001: 11). But the problem of 
international terrorism, as a source of insecurity, is a phenomenon that is often 
seen as the new enemy for the democratic states – especially the Western 
countries – and largely felt as such by its population since the events of 11 
September 2001 in the USA, in the heart of the Western World. This feeling was 
then exacerbated in Europe by the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, 
thus demonstrating that neither Europe was spared. An important element of this 
problem is undoubtedly the resurgence of fundamentalism, especially Islamic 
fundamentalism. A popular conception – which gained a certain reputation with 
the idea developed by Samuel P. Huntington in the mid-1990s81 – is thus the idea 
that Europe could be threaten by an entity called ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamic 
fundamentalism’. Yet, it seems rather unlikely that this phenomenon could take 
the form of a single nation-state or an alliance of several nation-state of the Arab 
world having concentrated sufficient military power to threaten Europe with 
invasion. Nevertheless, the fundamentalists have no shame to resort to terrorism 
to express their vision of the world. (Mortimer, 1992: 10-12) Given technological 
advances and more open national frontiers in Europe, international terrorism is all 
 71
the more an important concern for the security on the old continent. (Hyde-Price, 
1991: 58-59) A further dimension of this problem is the issue of the rogue states, 
which we already mentioned. While examining – after the end of the Cold War – 
the new security challenges which might appear to the interests of the United 
States and its allies, Washington developed the trivial term ‘rogue state’, a term 
which really emerged during the Clinton administration. The focus on the so-
called rogue states is taken seriously in Europe, but principally in the United 
States. The rogue states could be defined as «usually developing countries, 
essentially hostile to the United States, which were suspected of pursuing 
weapons of mass destruction and missile programmes, and probably also of 
sponsoring terrorism, and which did not subscribe to what Washington regarded 
as the norms of international behaviour.» (Childs, December 2001: 1) In 
Washington's view, the core rogue states since 11 September 2001 have always 
been Afghanistan (until the overthrow of the Taliban regime), Iraq (until the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime), Iran, North Korea, Libya and to a lesser 
extent Syria and Sudan.82 The ‘axis of evil’83, as defined by US President George 
W. Bush in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, is a term quite 
tantamount to the term ‘rogue state’. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the 
term ‘axis of evil’ is however no longer used. One has to add that the term ‘rogue 
state’ has caused friction across the Atlantic. While the main aim of the US 
approach was to isolate and contain the rogue states, key allies in Europe (in 
particular France and Germany) preferred policies of what became known as 
‘critical engagement’. (Childs, December 2001: 2) In addition, one should add 
other security challenges within the second dimension of security and defence 
policy. There is firstly the problem of international organized crime. Frequently 
linked to the problem of international terrorism, international crime is most 
commonly related to drug-trafficking and people-smuggling and is often source of 
transnational violence. The problem of ethnic conflicts and nationalist clashes is 
another source of insecurity within this dimension. These ethnical and nationalist 
disputes are frequent causes not only of transnational violence but also of a 
breakdown in civil order. They have threatened and threaten to some extent still 
nowadays the Eastern and Central part of Europe as well as the Balkans. Being 
riddled with ancient ethnic tensions and nationalist quarrels, these regions did not 
have them resolved under the ‘brotherhood camaraderie’ of the socialist 
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community, which simply suppressed them. With the collapse of the socialist 
camp and the difficult economic changes in the region, the danger of resurgent 
nationalism became real in these parts of Europe. (Brzezinski, Winter 1989/1990: 
1-25) This danger having two aspects – namely the question of national minorities 
and that of borders –, «the fear is that nationalist conflicts could become a 
challenge to the territorial or political status quo in the region.» (Hyde-Price, 
1991: 57) Nevertheless, one has to add that the adhesion of many Central and 
Eastern European countries into the EU have certainly brought stability in these 
countries, as for instance Slovakia and Latvia which have been confronted with 
minorities’ issues in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The prospect of 
adhesion seems also to bring some stability concerning the question of national 
minorities and of borders in Bulgaria, Romania and even in Croatia. Concerns of 
this type do however still exist in Europe with regards to countries which either 
do not really have a clear prospect of adhesion – as Serbia-Montenegro (notably 
with the issue of Kosovo), Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and even Turkey – and those seeming to fall clearly 
outside the scope of the EU, as the ‘European states’ of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States [CIS]84 (with the notable exception of Ukraine and maybe 
Moldova). 
 
Finally, the third dimension – to which the European security agenda is 
tending to, as already noticed - is an even more enlarged security concept than the 
second dimension. It points to security challenges that a larger than military 
threats and go also beyond simple non-territorial security threats. This dimension 
refers to security challenges that affect the humanity as a whole. Within this 
dimension, threats to European security spread thus from social, economic and 
financial imbalances to demographic problems, environmental degradation, 
protection of human rights as well as humanitarian crises. (Sjursen, 2004: 1-3, 16; 
Sjursen, 2001: 6; Assembly of Western European Union, June 2001: 10-11; 
Nicholson, 1993: 107-110; Mortimer, 1992: 12-17; Hyde-Price, 1991: 58-60) As 
far as the social, economic and financial imbalances are concerned, it is obvious 
that – in an increasingly interdependent world – the problems of 
underdevelopment, poverty and indebtedness in the Third World are not only 
threatening the latter, but are also potentially threatening to the financial and 
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economic stability of the global economy, thus affecting the developed world. 
(Hyde-Price, 1991: 58) As for the demographic problems, although «many 
economists argue that Western Europe – with its ageing population and falling 
birth rate – should welcome rather than fear the injection of able-bodied and 
relatively cheap labour offered by immigrants from less prosperous (…) 
countries» (Mortimer, 1992: 14), one reckons that mass immigration will have 
dangerous social and political consequences. As regards the security challenges to 
the humanity as a whole caused by – voluntary or involuntary – humanitarian 
crises and environmental degradation, humanitarian interventions as well as 
interventions preventing or limiting environmental disasters can be legitimised as 
promoting security. 
 
In summary, the tendency in the European security agenda has been 
indeed to move away from the dimension of territorial defence and towards the 
dimension of an enlarged security concept. (Sjursen, 2001: 6) As a diffuse 
multitude of risks exists in post-Cold War Europe – in contrast with the 
unambiguous threat perceptions of the bipolar world order –, there is clearly a 
change in the understanding of what constitute central security challenges to 
Europe. This changed understanding is well illustrated by «the following quote 
from a speech [in 1996] by Danish foreign minister Niels Helveg Pedersen: 
‘...preoccupation with the so-called soft security issues are increasingly the centre 
of attention: political and economic instability, ethnic conflict, minority problems, 
border conflicts, refugees, transitional environmental issues and organised 
crime’.» (Sjursen, 2004: 16) The Petersberg declaration of the West European 
Union in 1992 – later incorporated in the European Union’s definition of its 
responsibilities in security and defence – is a further example of the new 
formulation of security policy in Europe, as it takes into account the new security 
agenda. ‘Soft security’ – which is defined in terms of social and economic 
inequality, environmental risks and crime – is pointed out by the declaration as an 
important security task in addition to military matters. These risks and challenges 
are identified as the new security issues that the European Union – along with its 
member states – has to face in the post-Cold War world. (Sjursen, 2004: 16) The 
document of the Assembly of the WEU of June 2001, entitled Revising the 
European security concept - responding to new risks, the one from December 
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2003 as well as the European Security Strategy85 of December 2003 did merely 
confirm the direction the ‘new European security agenda’ was taking. (Assembly 
of Western European Union, June 2001; Assembly of Western European Union, 
December 2003; Council of the European Union, 12 December 2003) Thus, the 
European Security Strategy, which has been adopted by the Brussels European 
Council on 12 December 2003, identifies five key threats: terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction, failed states, organized crime and regional conflict. (Howórth, 
2005: 195) 
 
As far as the geographical point of view is concerned, one can sum up in 
asserting that the main challenges to European security are, actually or 
potentially, concentrated in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and Eurasia. 
(Assembly of Western European Union, June 2001: 9-10; Ghebali and Sauerwein, 
1995: 121) 
 
 
 
3) THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
 
European integration began with defence. The Treaty of Defensive 
Alliance of Dunkirk signed on March 1947, which was an Anglo-French alliance, 
and especially the Brussels Treaty – signed in March 1948 by France, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – were principally adapted 
to create a security community which would expel any further risk of war in 
Europe. But anxieties of a loss of sovereignty and the complexity of European 
security problems – including early German rearmament and the need for a 
transatlantic alliance – brought down the first efforts of defence integration, with 
the European Defence Community [EDC] being abandoned in 1954. From then 
on – until some time after the end of the Cold War –, defence was an 
unmentionable subject within a purely European context. (Howórth, November 
2000: 1) 
 
However, efforts for security and defence integration have developed in 
Europe since that time. But, although European security and defence integration 
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has made progress within the last years, some security institutions created in the 
Cold War period survived this period and still have their importance. 
Consequently, security matters in Europe are shaped by several organizations, 
each of which represents a rather different perspective on the nature of Europe’s 
security problems and on the framework for handling them. Although new 
organizational forms could be created in the future, one has to face today a 
complex institutionalisation which seems to meet the interest and expectations of 
the different governments.  
 
Besides the institutions, the actors are also the states. One has to remind 
that according to neo-realist assumptions, the paper considers the states – with a 
focus on the great powers – as the pre-eminent actors of the world system. The 
number of states in Europe has significantly increased since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall due to the disintegration of the former Communist federations, namely the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. As all of them are included in the 
European security system (including most of the former Soviet Republics), the 
number of actors involved in European security has considerably grown. 
Moreover, one has not to forget the important role played in this security system 
by two if not extra-European at least extra-EU actors, namely the United States of 
America and Russia. 
 
Thus, many different actors – in form of state or institution – play a role in 
the formation of the European security complex. The scope of this chapter will be 
the identification of the actors acting as institutions. The positions of the different 
European states towards the European security architecture will be examined in 
the third part of the paper, with special attention given to Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom and with a try to split them into two groups, the Atlanticists 
and the Europeanists. As for this chapter, it will focus on the principal 
institutional actors of that complex. In doing so, attention will first be given to the 
security institutions lying within the framework of the European Union. The 
chapter will then consider the other security institutions – which are mainly 
NATO and the OSCE – before analysing the institutional complexity of the 
system.  
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a. The Security Institutions within the Framework of the European 
Union 
 
The process of European political integration – with the development of a 
common political policy-making process in the particular domains of foreign 
affairs, security and defence issues – has always been difficult, especially with 
respect to the very successful aspects of economic and monetary cooperation. Due 
principally to the unwillingness of the EU member states to establish 
supranational power in these very sensitive fields, the European Union failed so 
far to heighten its power in the fields of foreign policy and defence, either to the 
level of its economic strength or to the level of its position in the international 
affairs. However, one has to observe that important progress has been made since 
the early 1990s. 
 
Hence, this section will examine the concrete process taken by the EU in 
order to face this challenge. Thus, it firstly sets out the development and features 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP], with special attention to the 
European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP]. Then, it considers the Western 
European Union [WEU], which was created with the idea of dealing with the 
issues of defence and security. Due to the developments of the last years, the 
future of the WEU is, as we will analyse, rather uncertain. 
 
§1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy/ The European Security and 
Defence Policy 
 
The original perception of the European Community was strongly 
influenced by security considerations: coal and steel were chosen as the first 
subject for integration because of their importance in sustaining a national war 
effort. The issue of security, however, did not become the main subject of 
European integration, the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954 
having a considerable ‘depressing’ impact on the process of European security 
integration within the European Community. Consequently, security was firmly 
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set and left at the bottom of the agenda of European integration for more than 
three decades. 
 
From 1970 on, the EC member states cooperated informally within the 
European political cooperation [EPC]. Within this framework, consultations 
between the member states took place in foreign policy matters at 
intergovernmental level. The European political cooperation was formalised in 
1986 by the Single European Act, which did not alter its intergovernmental nature 
or its methods of operation. Although the Single European Act was a major step 
towards further integration in many areas, it remained exceptionally cautious in 
the subject of security, noting down only the parties’ readiness «to coordinate 
their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security». 
(The Single European Act, 17 February 1986: Title III Art.30 §6(a)) 86 In fact, the 
Single European Act [SEA] «meant nothing more than the formalization of what 
existed already in the EPC practice plus an EPC Secretariat.» (Van Staden, 1994: 
141) Thus, EPC concerned only the political and economic aspects of security, 
while the military aspect was completely absent. The common idea was that 
territorial defence functions were to be carried out by NATO and the national 
forces. 
 
Although the general assumption was still to consider that the NATO had 
to remain the main security institution after the collapse of Soviet communism, 
efforts were made at the same time in Europe to tackle the problem of security 
and defence on a regional level, that is to say, on a European level. These efforts 
became more intense as the uncertainties and concerns in terms of security grew 
higher in Europe. Besides the German question which gave way to some anxiety , 
the disappearing of the bipolar security system resulted – as we have already 
emphasized – in Eastern Europe being a source of local security problems, as the 
minority problems in some Central and Eastern European Countries and tensions 
between neighbouring states and within states themselves. For the latter the case 
of Yugoslavia is certainly an unpleasant but highly appropriated example.  
 
Thus, the European initiatives for strengthening their security and defence 
activities were quite important since 1990. In spite of American worries to see the 
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development of a Europe defence of its own, Italy proposed in September 1990 to 
integrate the defence activities of the Western European Union into the European 
Community. But, the ‘pro-atlantics’ Netherlands and United Kingdom – fearing 
that this could hamper the good functioning of the transatlantic relation and of 
NATO – suggested that the Western European Union [WEU] should become the 
European pillar of NATO, according to US wishes. France and Germany              
– arguing that the completion of the Single Market and the drive towards the 
Economic and Monetary Union [EMU] necessitated corresponding moves 
towards political union, of which a common foreign and security policy was a 
central element – wanted to go further. Berlin and Paris desired indeed that all the 
security and defence issues should be covered by a common European foreign and 
security policy and that the WEU should proceed according to the directives of 
the EU. The summit in Rome in November 1991 conciliated the two positions. 
Albeit NATO remained the main authority as far as security and defence is 
concerned, the ‘new strategic concept’ of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
mentioned that Europe would develop its own security and defence identity. One 
has to add that the First Gulf War and the Yugoslavian crisis have at that time 
emphasized the need for a European defence and security identity. (Cameron, 
1999: 23-32) 
 
Consequently, a major step for the EU’s foreign and security policy was 
made in Maastricht. With ratification and entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
on 1 November 1993, the newly established European Union gave itself a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP], which was implemented as ‘the 
second pillar’ of the Union87 and replaced at the same time the more modest EPC. 
The Treaty provided for a policy «covering all areas of foreign and security 
policy» (Treaty on European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 July 1992: 
Title V Art.J1 §1; today, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 
[as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title V Art.11 §1) and 
supported «actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity» 
(Treaty on European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 July 1992: Title V 
Art.J1 §4; today, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as 
amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title V Art.11 §2) by its 
member states. Security and defence were also explicitly included in the CFSP. 
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With the Maastricht Treaty, defence was indeed for the first time officially 
introduced into an official document of the EC. The article B of Title I88 held that 
the European Union – its name from then on – shall set itself as an objective «to 
assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence» (Treaty on European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 July 1992: 
Art.B; today, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended 
by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title I Art.2) Moreover, in its Title V 
(Provisions on a Common Foreign an Security Policy), the Maastricht Treaty 
developed the concept of joint action, which goes beyond mere political 
cooperation. Nonetheless, the incorporation of the defence into the CSFP – the 
second pillar of the EU – «et la formulation retenue d’unanimité pour le processus 
de décision traduisent bien la volonté qui a prévalu de ne pas porter atteinte à la 
souveraineté nationale.» (Colson, 1995: 120; Collet, 1993: 225) Furthermore, still 
according to the Maastricht Treaty, the Union requests another organization, 
namely the Western European Union (WEU), «to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.» (Treaty on 
European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 July 1992: Title V Art.J.4 §2; 
Text repealed today and thus not present anymore in the Consolidated version of 
the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 
2001) It was also specified that «the policy of the Union in accordance with this 
Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy 
of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member 
States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common 
security and defence policy established within that framework.» (Treaty on 
European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 July 1992: Title V Art.J.4 §4; 
today, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the 
Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title V Art.17 §189) The text of the Maastricht 
Treaty was thus vague enough to satisfy all the EU member states, including the 
most ‘audacious’, such as France, which wanted a further integrated security and 
defence, and the most modest, especially the United Kingdom, which wanted as 
far as possible maintain a status quo. It was in particular due to the insistence of 
London that the Maastricht Treaty also stressed that the development of a 
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common European security policy should not in any way prejudice or challenge 
Atlantic security cooperation. Moreover, one has to add that «the question of 
whether or not the EU could give direct instructions to the WEU was particularly 
unclear.» (Sjursen, 1999: 4-5) 
 
The discussion on reforming the CFSP came quite soon after its birth. 
Indeed, already after three years of operation, there was a broad accord that the 
CFSP was not equal to the expectations, particularly regarding its failure in 
bringing an early end to the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. (Cameron, 1999: 
60) The Treaty of Amsterdam – which was signed on 2 October 1997 and came 
into force on 1 May 1999 – was the third large treaty amendment and was meant 
to clarify the scope and the nature of the CFSP. Therefore, the provisions on the 
CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty: The articles 11 to 2890 of the Treaty 
on European Union [TEU] are now devoted specifically to the CFSP. 
Nonetheless, despite a simplification of the articles and slight amendments, it did 
not manage to resolve fundamental problems related to the functioning of the 
CFSP, as for instance the decision-making in the latter did not change 
fundamentally. Seen as a victory for the Atlanticists, the independence of the 
WEU being maintained (Sjursen, 1999: 6), the Treaty of Amsterdam left the 
underlying intergovernmental principles of the second pillar untouched. (Eliassen, 
1998: 219-220) As we already underlined in the first chapter, it was generally 
agreed that the adjustments made were only minimal, so «that the principal 
weaknesses in the CFSP framework were still there.» (Sjursen, 1999: 8) 
Nevertheless, the main improvements to the CFSP included the willingness to 
promote European cooperation as regards armament and provision for the Council 
and Commission to exercise greater coherence and consistency, especially 
through the definition of common strategies by the Council. The Treaty provided 
also an expanding qualified majority voting in the second pillar.91 Furthermore, 
although the principle of flexibility – allowing already a limited number of 
member states to obtain further integration in some policies – was not extended to 
the CFSP, a possibility of ‘constructive abstention’ was introduced in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. This ‘constructive abstention’92 «does in practice allow a 
limited number of states to take initiatives in foreign policy without the full 
participation of all member states.» (Sjursen, 1999: 6) Moreover, even though the 
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attempt to gradually integrate the WEU into the EU failed, a certain coming 
together occurred as the perspective of effectively incorporate the WEU 
organization into the Union’s structures was brought up. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam also tackled the problem of enhancing the cohesion and consistency 
of the CFSP pillar. Given the difficulties to ensure consistency in the EU's 
external representation with leadership rotating every six months (even more in 
the optic of enlargement), an effort was made to strengthen the cohesion in the 
EU’s external representation and to give the Union a single visible voice in the 
international system. The fifteen member states thus decided to equip the CFSP 
with a ‘High Representative’, also know as Mr. (or Ms.) CFSP, who represents 
the CFSP at the international level and since its creation in 1999 also the 
European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP]93. This reform is generally 
considered to be one of the most important changes brought to the CFSP by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. It is Javier Solana Madariaga94 – former Secretary General of 
NATO – who was nominated, on 18 October 1999 for a period of five years, to be 
the first High Representative for the CFSP. He is assisted by the new Planning 
Unit which was meant to lead to a greater conceptual capacity and to further 
expertise capacity of the EU. Composed of representatives from the Commission, 
the West European Union [WEU] and the member states and placed under the 
High Representative of the EU, it is indeed intended to help provide the EU with a 
long-term perspective in foreign policy. (Sjursen, 1999: 6-7; Cameron, 1999: 67-
68) One of the other major changes brought to the CFSP by the Amsterdam 
Treaty is without no doubt the inclusion of the Petersberg missions – named after 
the place where the WEU Ministerial Council that formulated them was held in 
June 1992 – into the Treaty (we have already mentioned previously). (Heisbourg 
et al., Septembre 2000: 4) It means that the Union «now takes on responsibility 
for all ‘Petersberg’ security tasks, that is, virtually all tasks except territorial 
defence.» (Cameron, 1999: 68)  
 
Although the evaluation of the outcomes of the Treaty of Amsterdam        
– regarding security and defence issues – were quite unenthusiastic95, given that it 
could not properly solve the question of whether to include hard security issues    
– as defence – into the EU institutions, this dilemma was overcome by the 
Franco-British summit of St.Malo between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac in 
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December 1998, with its Declaration which was released in the midst of the 
1998/1999 Kosovo crisis. It was a breakthrough in the sense that France and 
United Kingdom, representing the two opposing sides of the dilemma, agreed to 
develop the idea of a European Security and Defence Policy. (Ulusoy, December 
2002-February 2003: 183) Due mainly to a change in the British approach96, the 
Franco-British St.Malo declaration of 4 December 1998 could be adopted. The 
St.Malo declaration stated that «(…) the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to 
use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.» 
(Rutten, May 2001: 8) Besides emphasizing this role of the EU in defence as well 
as its paramount need to improve force projection capabilities, the St.Malo 
declaration also stressed – among other things – the link between the 
improvement of defence capabilities and the role of the Union in the world97 and 
the relevance of NATO98. (Heisbourg et al., Septembre 2000: 8) For all these 
reasons, the St.Malo declaration is widely considered as the start of the European 
defence project. Hence, London – with its Prime Minister Tony Blair – somewhat 
suddenly abandoned its position as opponent of a more independent security role 
for the EU. Although such commitment would not put into question either NATO 
or other national defence arrangements in the sense that the EU would «approve 
military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged (…) [and] without 
unnecessary duplication» (Rutten, May 2001: 18), the British U-turn was 
significant. (Missiroli, Février 2004: 2) As a result of the change in the British 
position, one of the most important obstacles to the strengthening of the CFSP 
was overcome. It is no surprise that the new opportunity presented by St.Malo 
was very rapidly followed up by a multitude of farther-reaching declarations and 
proposals. The St.Malo declaration was indeed followed by systematic discussion 
amongst the member states of the EU on the practical shaping of cooperation in 
security and defence. The European Council of Vienna in December 1998 came 
to approve the St.Malo declaration.  
 
At the European Council of Cologne in June 1999, which was held 
immediately after the Kosovo War, the fifteen EU member states went on with the 
idea developed in St.Malo. The Cologne summit marked the beginning of the 
European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP]99. Indeed, it placed the Petersberg 
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tasks100 at the core of the process of the ESDP, with the objective that this policy 
be carried out primarily fulfilling the so-called Petersberg tasks. Actually, such 
‘Petersberg tasks’ cover a wide range of potential missions, from low to high 
intensity, from chapter VI to chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, «thus 
meeting the still quite differing expectations of the 15 Member States.» (Missiroli, 
Winter 2003: 494) Thus, with the aim to strengthen the CFSP by the development 
of a common European policy on security and defence, it became clear that the 
EU must have «the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.» 
(Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999a: Annex III §1); this requires also 
an «appropriate decision making bodies.» (Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 
June 1999a: Annex III 2.Guiding Principles) The European Security and Defence 
Policy – which was created with the idea to strengthen and complement the 
existing CFSP – was thus launched as an integral but distinctive part of the CFSP. 
With the ESDP, the EU is therefore hence capable of a wide variety of peace 
missions both of a civil and of a military nature. 
 
The European Council also confirmed in Cologne that all EU members 
«can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations (…) [;] 
arrangements (…) [allowing] non-EU European allies and partners to take part to 
the fullest possible extent in this endeavour» are also worked out.» (Cologne 
European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999a: Annex III §3) It further agreed to enhance 
the capacity of European multinational and national forces, such as the 
Eurocorps101, to respond to crises situations, in redefining them into a European 
crisis reaction corps directly connected to the CFSP/ESDP.102  
 
Since Cologne, the implementation of the ESDP has been developed 
following two main patterns. Firstly, the EU set itself the objective of the 
‘Headline Goal’ of military and police forces. The European Council of Feira in 
June 2000 adopted the objective of the Headline Goal of police forces: by the year 
2003, the EU member states will be able to deploy a contingent of 5’000 
policemen within two months, which would be sustainable for at least one year. 
As for the Headline Goal of military forces, it was the EU Council meeting – held 
 84
in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999 – which established the target of the 
Headline Goal of military forces: by the year 2003, cooperating together 
voluntarily, the EU member states will be able to deploy within sixty days and 
then sustain for at least one year forces [– the so-called Rapid Reaction Force 
[RRF] –] capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 
brigades or 50 000-60 000 persons). 103 This involves «the creation of a European 
armed force capable of significant peacekeeping, humanitarian or crisis-
management operations» (Howórth, November 2000: 20), in order to carry out the 
full range of Petersberg tasks. In other words, there were the first steps of setting 
up a joint European army which were taken. (Ulusoy, December 2002-February 
2003: 183) Some ‘guideline’ elements were also adopted, mainly operational 
scenarios as well as planning assumptions.104 (Missiroli, Winter 2003: 494) While 
a few analysts considered the Headline Goal as accomplished by the Union by 
May 2003 with the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF], most analysts 
argue that the Helsinki Headline Goal still has not been met, due to a lack of 
details for the purposes of military planning (notably the question of where, with 
whom and how often the EU-led forces might be expected to operate). (Gnesotto, 
2004; Trybus, 2005: 97-98) Even the High Representative for the CFSP/ESDP 
Javier Solana implied that the Helsinki Headline Goal is likely to be met only in 
2010. 
 
With the intention to resolve some weaknesses of the Helsinki Headline 
Goal and to improve its capacity to sustain the UN and NATO in crisis 
management operations, the new ‘Headline Goal 2010’ was endorsed by the 
European Council in Brussels on 17 June 2004. Building on the Helsinki Headline 
Goal, the Headline Goal 2010 commits the Union «to be able by 2010 to respond 
to a crisis with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the 
whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the 
European Union.» (Howórth, 2005: 192) Accordingly, the EU has defined several 
milestones that must be achieved within the 2010 horizon, notably «the ability by 
2007 to deploy force packages at high readiness broadly based on the EU ‘battle 
groups’ concept.» (Howórth, 2005: 192) The idea of the battle groups has been 
proposed together by France, Germany and the UK. These battle groups are units 
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of 1’500 troops ready to be deployable for an autonomous operation within 15 
days and sustainable in the field for up to 30 days. (Howórth, 2005: 191-192, 203; 
Yakemtchouk, 2005: 137; Benoit, Mars 2005: 160-161) The Headline Goal 2010 
represents certainly a more modest approach than the Helsinki Headline Goal. 
The former does not have replaced the latter. One may deem that, rather 
paradoxically, the Headline Goal 2010 may just be a step towards the Helsinki 
Headline Goal. (Trybus, 2005: 97-98; Gnesotto, 2004 ) 
 
Secondly, the EU was active in developed an institutional framework for 
the ESDP. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 decided the 
establishment of a set of interim security and defence institutions set out in 
St.Malo and Cologne and designed to manage the ESDP. These new institutions  
– which were ready to function in March 2000 and meant to become permanent 
quickly – are the Political and Security Committee [PSC] and the EU Military 
Committee [EUMC], supported by the EU Military Staff [EUMS]. According to 
article 25 of the Nice Treaty signed on 26 February 2001, the PSC «shall monitor 
the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and 
security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions 
to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative.» 
(Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the 
Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title V Art.25) Furthermore, it «shall 
exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic 
direction of crisis management operations.» (Consolidated version of the Treaty 
on European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title 
V Art.25) The PSC was thus incorporated in the Nice Treaty and replaced not 
only the interim committee [iPSC] decided at the European Council in Helsinki 
and which was established on 1 March 2000, but also the previous Political 
Committee established by the Treaty of Amsterdam. As for the EUMC and the 
EUMS, they «provide the necessary structures for situation assessment and the 
military direction of the EU’s crisis management operations. Collectively, they 
also provide the link to the national force packages assembled under the aegis of 
the Helsinki ‘Headline Goal’ as well as the parallel structures for NATO military 
and civil officials to liaise with.» (Duke, Summer 2001: 160) The PSC, the 
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EUMC and EUMS were all three established as permanent bodies by Council 
decisions on 22 January 2001. 105 
 
Hence, the TEU as amended by the Treaty of Nice – which was the fourth 
large treaty amendment and was adopted at the Nice European Council held in 
December 2000 – contains new CFSP provisions. Entered into force on 1 
February 2003, it effectively sanctions – as we have observed – the build-up of 
the European Security and Defence Policy, by formalizing the series of proposals 
and initiatives launched particularly in Cologne and Helsinki. The critical 
outcomes of the Nice summit had thus a notable exception, as it is generally 
agreed that a significant step forward had been achieved in the ESDP.106 Yet, in 
terms of the CFSP provisions in the TEU, the Treaty of Nice did not change 
much. Besides the amendment of the article 25 of the Treaty on European Union, 
the other main amendment concerned the article 17 of the Treaty on European 
Union. The removal in this article of the reference to the WEU and its role in 
supporting «the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and 
security policy» (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as 
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam], 2 October 1997: Art.17) clearly implies 
that it is now the job of the EU, with its ESDP, to do so. 
 
«De Saint-Malo à Nice, l’UE a [ainsi] élaboré un cadre institutionnel 
complet et bien huilé afin de mettre en oeuvre sa politique de défense. 
Simultanément, pour soutenir cette politique, elle a défini un Headline Goal ainsi 
que des objectifs en matière de capacités et de police censés la doter de différents 
instruments, d’un réservoir de forces notamment.» (Rutten, Février 2002: 1) With 
the Treaty of Nice, the EU included in its legitimate competencies a common 
security and defence policy. Although much remains to be done to complete the 
Union’s credibility as an international actor, the EU acquired a strategic 
responsibility in post-Cold War crisis management. (Rutten, May 2001: vii) 
 
«Put into perspective, the development of a common EU security and 
defence policy between December 1998 [(St.Malo)] and December 2000 [(Nice)] 
was almost revolutionary compared with the slow progress made during the 
preceding half century, at least in terms of political commitments and policy 
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guidelines.» (Rutten, May 2001: ix) The progress made so far would have been 
unthinkable a few years before. The breakthrough in the debate occurred because 
of the coincidence of a number of elements. First, there was the experience of 
CFSP’s weakness not only in the Bosnian but especially in the Kosovo crisis, 
which made all the governments convinced of the need to develop an EU crisis 
management capacity.107 Secondly, there was the fundamental change of British 
policy. Thirdly, there was also the supportive attitude of the United States, which 
considered that the impetus given by the strengthening of the ESDP would 
contribute to a stronger European role in the areas of security and defence, which 
would in turn contribute to the vitality of NATO. (Cameron, 1999: 80) Finally, 
the success of the EU – that is all the time more integrated in so many areas and 
plays also an ever more important international role – made it increasingly 
necessary for Europe to have an ESDP to back up policies with action in foreign 
affairs, security, and defence. (Rutten, May 2001: ix) 
 
However, after the somewhat positive recent developments of the ESDP, 
one has to wonder how the ESDP did develop in the wake of the events of 11 
September 2001. In Europe, the atrocious events of 11 September 2001 have 
triggered a prompt response in the field of internal security, «while the military 
reaction has been either channelled through NATO or the UN or managed 
individually (and bilaterally with the United States) by both member and 
applicant states.» (Missiroli, June 2002: 11) The 11 September changed somewhat 
the projects of the EDSP, mainly as regards to its strategy and objectives. One of 
the first outcomes was that «les relations extérieures de l’Union, qui comprennent 
la politique commerciale commune, la coopération au développement, les 
politiques liées à l’élargissement ainsi que la PESC, ont fort logiquement intégré 
la lutte contre le terrorisme.» (Benoit, Novembre 2002: 1) The building of an 
international anti-terrorism coalition and the following military campaign in 
Afghanistan at the end of 2002 were backed by the EU and its member states. 
However, as after the coalition’s victory over the Talibans in Afghanistan, the 
George W. Bush administration pointed out the next objective, namely Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq, the EU consensus over the international anti-terrorism coalition 
came to an end. The US willingness to intervene in Iraq put EU’s unity under 
major pressure, jeopardizing even for some time the acquis of the CFSP and the 
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ESDP. (Rutten, Février 2002: 1) The contributions by some EU member states to 
the US campaign increased the struggle within the EU between those willing to 
participate in a military action against Iraq and those rejecting this idea. This, in 
turn, worked against the research for the pragmatic leadership that was slowly 
developing in Europe in the fields of security and foreign affairs.  
 
However, some rapid progress was completed at the end of 2003 and in 
2004. Primarily, the EU started to put the ESDP into practice. The EU has several 
projects in progress for further stability in South-Eastern Europe, like the Stability 
Pact108 and major involvement in the Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 
peacekeeping operations. On 1 January 2003, the first operational mission of the 
European Security and Defence Policy began its work as the European Police 
Mission [EUPM] in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on 15 December 2003 a civil EU 
police mission code-named Proxima started in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia for one year. As for the process which permitted the EU to take over 
the NATO operation in Bosnia in December 2004, one should note the following. 
It was in summer 2003 that Britain and France had called for the European Union 
to assume the Bosnia peacekeeping mission in early 2004. However, US officials 
at NATO headquarters stated it was premature to consider this option, effectively 
postponing the transition for some time. Reasons provided for this position were 
continuing problems in apprehending war criminals and unspecified security 
issues. It was finally decided between NATO and the EU that the latter would 
take over peacekeeping duties in Bosnia by the end of the year 2004. Thus, the 
Stabilisation Force [SFOR] of NATO was replaced in December 2004 by the 
follow-on EUFOR-Althea mission of the EU. But, NATO remains in charge of 
capturing suspected war criminals. «En réalité, cela ne veut pas dire que les 
Européens abandonnent totalement cette charge à l'OTAN, comme le demandent 
les Américains. “L’Union, a corrigé la porte-parole de M. Solana, s’occupera de 
l’application des accords de paix de Dayton; la capture des criminels de guerre en 
faisant partie, l’UE s’occupera des criminels de guerre.” Lorsqu’ils prendront la 
succession de l’Alliance atlantique, les Européens devraient mettre en ligne un 
nombre équivalent de soldats, soit environ 7’000 hommes. L’OTAN conservera 
un quartier général d’environ 200 hommes à Sarajevo, qui sera chargé, outre de la 
lutte antiterroriste, de la réforme de l’armée bosniaque. “Avec seulement 200 
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hommes, l’Alliance ne pourra pas assumer en plus la traque des criminels de 
guerre, il s’agira donc d’une responsabilité partagée”, ajoute-t-on de même 
source.» (Zecchini, 08.04.2004). In addition, for three months in summer 2003 the 
EU military mission called Artemis carried out security and stabilisation missions 
in the Congolese town of Bunia; and, from 1 April until 15 December 2003, a 
military mission code-named Concordia had been carrying out peace-support 
tasks in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
 
Another progress for the EU in general, but also in particular for the 
CFSP/ESDP, is the fact that the Union could be endowed with a “European 
Constitution” within a near future, as one was adopted by the European Council in 
Brussels on 18 June 2004. The European Constitution is meant to bring together 
the many treaties and agreements on which the EU is based, thus simplifying its 
legislative architecture. The ‘European Union’ and the ‘European Communities’ 
will be replaced by only one European Union; even though special procedures in 
the fields of foreign policy, security and defence are maintained, the three pillars 
will be merged into only one; the EU and EC Treaties, as well as the treaties 
amending and supplementing them will be replaced by the ‘Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’. (European Union, 28 June 2004: 2) The latter defines 
and clarifies the role of the EU and of its member states.109 To achieve a 
compromise on the European Constitution, the governments of the member states 
consented to adopt some changes to the draft ‘Constitutional Treaty’ submitted by 
the European Convention, which concluded its work in July 2003110. As far as the 
CFSP/ESDP is concerned, the European Constitution – which has now to be 
ratified by the twenty-five member states – maintains the acquis of Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice in this area. The Constitution seems to add very little to the 
current CFSP set-up, except the creation of the post of EU Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, which is the main institutional innovation. The EU Minister for Foreign 
Affairs will be responsible for the representation of the Union in world affairs. 
This function will merge the present tasks of the High Representative for the 
CFSP and ESDP with those of the Commissioner for external relations.111 
Although the provisions regarding the Union’s external relations – including the 
provisions of the CFSP – have been re-written, the aspects and the functioning of 
the CFSP remain, in essence, untouched. However, the creation of the post of EU 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs strengthens the Union’s role on the international 
scene in all areas, most notably in the CFSP. Furthermore, the European 
Constitution includes the definition of the scope of the ESDP, thus extending its 
tasks from the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’ to also include «joint disarmament 
operations, (…) military advice and assistance tasks, (…) post-conflict 
stabilisation [and contributions] (…) to the fight against terrorism.» (Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.III-309) Nevertheless, 
the articles on decision-making still include all the blockades that have so far 
slowed down and weakened the Common Foreign Security Policy. Thus, the 
intergovernmental mode of governance continues to apply for the CFSP/ESDP, 
«reflecting the persistent influence of member state preferences and their 
reluctance to relinquish control of areas seen as central to the national interest.» 
(Vanhoonacker, 2005: 84) The article III-300 provides that «the European 
decisions referred to in this Chapter [i.e. CFSP] shall be adopted by the Council 
acting unanimously. (…)» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 
2004: Art.III-300 (1)) Contrary to domains which are primarily about legislation – 
for which majority voting is indispensable –, in the domain of CFSP consensus 
increases legitimacy and action can not be imposed on reluctant member states. 
(Missiroli, Winter 2003: 495) The strict unanimity rule is however further 
somewhat broken.112 Even in the area of defence, which has long been an absolute 
taboo area, the European Constitution breaks partially the rigorous unanimity rule. 
Indeed, besides the ‘constructive abstention’ adopted at Amsterdam (which is 
found in the article III-300 (1) of the Constitution, and take up the article 23 §1 
TEU) and unlike the article 27 TEU which excludes (since the Treaty of Nice) 
«matters having military or defence implications» (Consolidated version of the 
Treaty on European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: 
Title V Art.27b), the Constitution provides the possibility of more ways for the 
member states to cooperate more closely in the field of ESDP. The provisions of 
the Constitution entail five policy arrangements for closer cooperation in the 
ESDP domain, including not all but only some member states. (Missiroli, Winter 
2003: 496) Firstly, there is the introduction of the notion of ‘permanent structured 
cooperation’ in security and defence113. (Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-41 (6)) This would allow a few ‘willing’ member 
states which ‘fulfil the criteria’114 to form new mechanisms of cooperation in the 
 91
security and defence fields, thus moving further and getting more integrated in 
these fields than the other ‘unwilling’ states or those ‘not fulfilling the criteria’. 
(Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.III-312) 
Besides, one has to note that, accordingly to the article III-312 (3), only those 
countries that are members of such a structured cooperation would have the power 
to allow other member states to join in, at a later stage. Anyway, no member state 
will be forced to do anything, but «the potential to act – in the name and under the 
flag of the EU – is considerable.» (Howórth, 2005: 197) While the ‘permanent 
structured cooperation’ provides an opportunity for the EU to act even if all the 
member states are wholly in agreement, it can also be perceived as a danger when 
it is taken in relation with the declared aim of the EU to develop «mutual political 
solidarity among Member States (…) and the achievement of an ever-increasing 
degree of convergence of Member States’ actions.» (Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-40 (1)) (See also Edwards, 2005: 61) 
Secondly, there is the possibility that ‘ad-hoc coalitions’ of member states can act 
on behalf of the EU in the security field. The article I-41 and the article III-310115 
both give ad-hoc coalitions of willing and capable states the power to act on 
behalf of the whole EU Council. Thirdly, the introduction – in article I-41 (7) – of 
a ‘mutual defence clause’116 gives the Union an equivalent mandate than the 
article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This mechanism involves all the EU 
member states – even the neutral States – and not only those participating in a 
structured cooperation. However, the direct link between EU and NATO is 
maintained, as article I-41 (7) further lays down that the Atlantic Alliance remains 
– for its member states – the foundation of their collective defence and the very 
authority of its implementation. (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 
June 2004: Art.I-41 (7)) Fourthly, there is the introduction of a ‘solidarity 
clause’117 with the objective to assist a member state, should it be «the object of a 
terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.» (Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-43 (1)) In this case, at 
the request of its political authorities, «the Union shall mobilise all the 
instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the 
Member States». (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: 
Art.I-43 (1)) Fifthly, there is the creation of a European Armaments, Research and 
Military Capabilities Agency, commonly known as the European Defence Agency 
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[EDA]. Open to all member states wishing to be part of it, its role is «to identify 
operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to 
contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure 
needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to 
participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist 
the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.» (Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-41 (3)) The Agency – 
acting on an intergovernmental basis118 – is currently directed by the High 
Representative for the CFSP and ESDP and will be then managed by the EU 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, assisted by a board where the EU defence ministers 
will sit. Nonetheless, it will not undermine the competencies of the single EU 
member states as regards defence.119 Increasingly acknowledging that national 
defence markets in Europe are too small to sustain a viable defence industry and 
that there is a need in European defence markets for more transparency and intra-
European competition, the basic idea behind the creation of this Agency is to 
oppose a sole and competitive European defence equipments market to the US 
Americans. (Howórth, 2005: 198-199; Andreatta, 2005: 34) The EDA was to be 
created immediately, without waiting for the European Constitution to enter into 
force. (Howórth, 2005: 198-199) The EDA is thus operable since end 2004. 
(Dumoulin, Mars 2005:165) 
 
The decision of the creation of the EDA came along with another 
important step forward, namely the set up of independent European military 
headquarters. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg came up with this 
proposal on 29 April 2003, suggesting to create the headquarters in the Brussels 
suburb of Tervuren. Torn between its will on the one hand to preserve its “special 
relationship” with the USA and on the other to make progresses on European 
defence, the United Kingdom is often in a difficult position. Yet, at the EU 
Foreign ministers’ summit in Naples in November 2003, London gave its go-
ahead to the creation of this institution, but after having agreed on a compromise 
with France and Germany. Firstly, in order to calm down the US threats, the 
British government suggested changing the appellation “European military 
headquarters” into “joint capacity to plan and conduct operations”, what has been 
accepted. Secondly, as the Tervuren separate Headquarters were seen by the 
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United Kingdom as an unacceptable symbol of European independence from the 
United States but as, at the same time, Tony Blair agreed on the necessity that the 
EU should be able to plan and execute European Union operations independently 
of NATO, London agreed with Paris and Berlin on the following structural 
modifications. The EU will transform the temporary planning cell SHAPE 
[Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] – which is NATO’s military 
headquarters near Mons in Belgium – into a permanent one, for operations 
conducted with the recourse to NATO’s resources and capabilities. The 
agreement also sees the strengthening of the EU’s operational strategic planning 
unit at Cortenberg in Brussels. Indeed, the staff headquarters the EU has already 
at its disposal for strategic planning in Cortenberg will be extended and acquire an 
operational dimension.120 The idea behind the creation of this independent 
European military structure is to give the Europeans the possibility to dispose of 
such headquarters when they would like to conduct autonomous military actions 
with an independent planning capacity, that is, without having recourse to 
NATO’s resources and capabilities. One has to add that «afin de dissimuler 
diplomatiquement le concept de “quartier général européen”, cette structure 
s’occupera non seulement des opérations militaires européennes autonomes (sans 
les moyens de l’OTAN), mais aussi les gestions de crises. L’éventail des missions 
dont elle aura la charge s’étendra des opérations de protection civile (les secours 
en cas d’inondations, par exemple) à des missions de police (comme celle 
actuellement en cours en Bosnie), jusqu’à des opérations purement militaires (à 
l’instar de l’opération Artémis à Bunia, au Congo, de l’opération Concordia en 
Macédoine ou encore de la mission Proxima en Bosnie).» (Liponska-Hottiaux, 
2004: 27) One will have recourse to this European structure especially when both 
a civilian and military response is required and when no national military 
headquarters have been identified. «Le centre gérera [ainsi] essentiellement des 
crises de faible intensité, avec une forte implication civile, c’est-à-dire 
humanitaire et policière. Les opérations militaires plus sérieuses resteront confiées 
à des états-majors relevant de l’OTAN ou des États européens.» (Liponska-
Hottiaux, 2004: 27) (See also Howórth, 2005: 199-200) 
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§2. The Western European Union 
 
After having studied in details the CFSP and ESDP, we should have a 
glance at the Western European Union [WEU]. Its origins are found in the Treaty 
of Defensive Alliance of Dunkirk signed on March 1947. It was an Anglo-French 
alliance, where the two sides agreed to give mutual support to each other should 
the event of renewed German aggression reappear121. The Treaty of Dunkirk was 
improved only one year later with the signing of the Brussels Treaty. On 17 
March 1948, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty, which was a “Treaty of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence”122. This new and 
enhanced Treaty of Dunkirk was to be given the name of the Brussels Treaty 
Organization [B.T.O.]. The B.T.O., which was based on a treaty of mutual 
assistance and defence, was also called Western Union and was the forerunner of 
the present-day WEU. Its purpose was to coordinate the member states’ policies 
on economic, social, cultural and defence issues. It was less directed at a renewal 
of German aggression than a signal of Western European determination to stand 
up to Soviet aggression. With the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, 
the B.T.O. powers decided to merge – in December 1950 – their military 
organization into NATO, which had become the central element in the West 
European and North Atlantic security system. 
 
Meanwhile, the Western Union States sought a solution to integrate the 
Federal Republic of Germany as well as Italy into the emerging security 
structures, thus being able to control their former enemies. This encouraged 
France – in October 1950 – to propose the creation of a European Army, which 
led to the signature, in May 1952, of the Treaty setting up a European Defence 
Community [EDC] in which besides France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, the FRG and Italy were due to participate. However, in August 1954 
the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty. 
 
In great part as a response to the failure of the EDC Treaty, the Western 
European Union was then established under the Paris Agreements, which was 
signed in October 1954, modified the Brussels Treaty and adjoined to it four 
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additional protocols. The Modified Brussels Treaty was thus extended to the FRG 
and Italy under the Paris Agreements which came into force on 6 May 1955 and 
renamed the Organization the Western European Union. The WEU seemed to 
have been created to enable the FRG to join NATO. (Ulusoy, December 2002-
February 2003: 171) Since this was achieved one year later, in 1955, the WEU 
became dormant for decades.123 Due to the Cold War and to the ideological 
opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the WEU will have 
been undermined – politically and especially military – by NATO from its very 
beginning. Security concerns of the Western European countries were supervised 
by NATO. «It was clear that Western Europeans took collective security matters 
outside the European integration, as NATO was the perfect choice (…) with the 
strong presence and commitment of one of the Super Powers, the USA.» (Ulusoy, 
December 2002-February 2003: 171) The WEU’s military function was someway 
made irrelevant by the formation of NATO. 
 
Nonetheless, the WEU has not been dismantled. Some argue that it was 
due to the article V of its “constitution” (the so-called “Modified Brussels 
Treaty”), which states: «If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the 
object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their 
power.» (Modified Brussels Treaty, 23 October 1954: Art.V) One believed indeed 
that it could be useful in the future, as the European Union does not have a clause 
of mutual defence for its member states. (Geneva Centre for Security Policy 
GCSP, 2003: 1)124 
 
Although many of WEU’s tasks have been taken over by NATO, the 
European institution had enjoyed some revival in the midst 1980s. From 1983 on, 
the Western Europeans began to fear that an individual US defence system           
– within the context of the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], 
which was a multibillion dollar research project for a missile defence system for 
the United States – could lead to a separate agreement between the USA and the 
Soviet Union.125 Therefore, the WEU’s Council adopted a declaration in Rome in 
1984, which marked WEU’s reactivation. It stressed the need for a better 
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utilization of WEU to enhance the security of Western Europe and the Atlantic 
Alliance. The United Kingdom, France and West Germany also supported the 
strengthening of the WEU with regular twice-yearly joint meetings of defence and 
foreign ministers (an institutional reform which was provided for in a document 
of the Rome declaration). The negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on the withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces underlined the 
need for even closer European consultation on defence. In October 1987, the 
WEU Ministerial Council adopted a “Platform on European Security Interests”. It 
set out general guidelines for WEU’s future programme of work: to give a 
security dimension to European integration; to reaffirm and reinforce the 
solidarity of the Alliance by strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. The 
meeting decided also to open negotiations with Portugal and Spain regarding their 
accession to the Modified Brussels Treaty.126 The prospect of WEU membership 
expanding to nine was seen in Washington as a new ‘strengthening’ of the WEU, 
leading them to issue a warning which stressed that Atlantic cooperation must 
take priority over developments among West Europeans themselves. Yet, the 
following year, two other member countries of NATO expressed their wish to join 
the Organization, namely Turkey127 and Greece128. 
 
The collapse of Soviet communism finally allowed the WEU to emerge 
somewhat from NATO’s obscurity. Since the end of the bipolar world order and 
the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the operational role and capabilities 
of the WEU have indeed considerably been developed. In the Maastricht Treaty, 
the recently invigorated WEU was distinguished as the «defence component of 
the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance.» (Treaty on European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 
July 1992, Declaration on Western European Union, Introduction §2) The Union 
requests indeed the Western European Union «to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.» (Treaty on 
European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 July 1992: Title V Art.J.4 §2; 
Text repealed today and thus not present anymore in the Consolidated version of 
the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 
2001) Furthermore, at Maastricht, the WEU member states adopted a declaration 
on Western European Union annexed on the Treaty on European Union. 
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According to it, the WEU member states agreed on «the need to develop a 
genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European 
responsibility on defence matters (...) [and] to strengthen the role of WEU, in the 
longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union 
which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the 
Atlantic Alliance129.» (Treaty on European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 
July 1992, Declaration on Western European Union, Introduction §1) Thus, the 
WEU member states decided to develop the organization «as the defence 
component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European 
defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further 
development of its own operational role.» (Treaty on European Union [The Treaty 
of Maastricht], 29 July 1992, Declaration on Western European Union, 
Introduction §2) Thus, on can admit that the WEU «tiendra compte des 
“décisions” du Conseil européen pour les questions politiques et des “positions” 
de l’Alliance atlantique pour les questions opérationnelles.» (Colson, 1995: 121)  
 
Yet – since the opening up of the Berlin Wall – the WEU took many 
decisions in order to also increase its operational role. As a follow-up to the 
Maastricht Treaty, the WEU started to strengthen its own institutions and develop 
military capabilities. Therefore, in the Petersberg Declaration, in June 1992, the 
WEU Council of Ministers, on the basis of Maastricht, set out the guidelines for 
the organization’s future development: the Petersberg declaration defined the 
WEU’s security tasks to include – as we have already underlined – humanitarian 
and rescue operations, conventional peacekeeping as well as the operation of 
combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking. To this end, the 
WEU member states declared their preparedness to make available military units 
from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks 
under the authority of the WEU, namely for the Petersberg tasks. In addition, the 
Petersberg declaration provided for – among other things – the creation of a WEU 
Planning Cell, closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance, 
military units answerable to WEU, meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff, the 
creation in April 1993 of a Satellite Centre in Torrejón and enhanced cooperation 
in the field of armaments. (Jopp, July 1994: 27-29) However, the WEU made 
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particularly progress in defining military units for itself, such as the Eurocorps 
which is fully operational since 1995.130 The widening of the Franco-German 
brigade into a European corps was certainly the most spectacular decision made 
by the WEU to increase its operational role. This decision disturbed in particular 
the Anglo-Saxons, who saw it as a threat to NATO by ‘rebel’ allies. «Très 
satisfaite de diriger la nouvelle Force de réaction rapide [au sein de l’OTAN], [la 
Grande Bretagne] envisageait avec horreur une nouvelle alliance militaire qui, si 
les Américains réduisaient leur présence, pourrait être dominée par le nouveau 
corps franco-allemand. (…) Dans les diverses réactions face à l’Eurocorps s’est 
dessinée, une fois de plus, la ligne de fracture entre les maritimes et les 
continentaux. La Belgique, L’Espagne et le Luxembourg ont réagi positivement, 
les Anglais et les Hollandais négativement.» (Colson, 1995: 122)  
 
Yet, due to the inefficient cooperation and solidarity in the WEU in 
responding to the local conflicts particularly in the former Yugoslavia, there was a 
growing understanding to incorporate the WEU in the EU structures. It became 
indeed more and more obvious for the EU countries that even the WEU «did not 
help balance the US dominance in the Alliance and that when the US was not 
willing it was impossible to take actions in the Alliance to intervene in such 
conflicts affecting the European security.» (Ulusoy, December 2002-February 
2003: 182) The continued relevance of the Atlantic Alliance to European security 
was strengthened at the NATO summit in Berlin in June 1996, where it was 
decided that a European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI] should be 
developed inside the framework of NATO. In an attempt to boost the ESDI within 
NATO, they agreed thus to make NATO assets and capabilities available to 
WEU-led operations. The creation of mobile forces – the so-called Combined 
Joint Task Forces [CJTF] – constitutes a central element in this strategy. It was 
agreed that the WEU would have the possibility to use these forces for European 
operations, in situations where the USA itself would not wish to participate. In 
contrary to the Europeanists, the Atlanticists seemed pleased about that decision, 
as it increased the influence of the Atlantic Alliance, as regards the developments 
of security structures in Europe. Any use of NATO forces by the WEU was 
dependent on approval from the Atlantic Council, and a fortiori from the United 
States, regardless of the US participation or not to the operation. Thus, it looked 
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as if the WEU would still principally be connected to NATO rather than become 
the defence arm of the EU.131 (Sjursen, 1999: 5; Bryant, Autumn 2000: 29) In this 
manner, the WEU became however a kind of bridge between NATO and the EU. 
Yet, the relationship between the WEU and EU was still rather vague. The 
Amsterdam Treaty was expected to clarify some of the uncertainty about this 
relationship. But, the outcome was perceived by the Europeanists ‘again’ as a 
relatively disappointing outcome. The independence of the WEU was maintained 
and the organization seemed to be considered more and more as a protection 
against a too independent security role for the EU rather than as a defence arm 
directly subordinated to the EU. (Sjursen, 1999: 6) The article 17 (ex-article J.7) 
of the Amsterdam Treaty132 however states that the WEU «is an integral part of 
the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational 
capability (…). It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the 
common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article.» (Consolidated 
version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam], 2 October 1997: Art.17 §1; Text repealed today and thus not present 
anymore in the article 17 §1 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001) Hence, 
the institutional link between the EU and WEU was established within the TEU, 
the Petersberg missions being in particular included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
The Amsterdam Treaty added that «the Union shall accordingly foster closer 
institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the 
integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.» 
(Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam], 2 October 1997: Art.17 §1; Text repealed today and thus 
not present anymore in the article 17 §1 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty 
on European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001) 
Despite the fact that the European Council did not take this decision at 
Amsterdam, the British U-turn in 1998 – resulting in the French-British 
declaration of St.Malo – represented a green light for the absorption of the WEU 
into the EU. As the Fifteen «accordingly made formal decisions at Cologne and 
Helsinki in 1999 to set up a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 
parallel with the CFSP, to take over most of the WEU’s functions in due course 
and – most spectacularly – to provide the EU with a rapid Reaction Force of 
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60,000 men133» (Hill, Autumn 2001: 319-320) and as the Cologne Council set the 
objective that the ESDP would be carried out primarily fulfilling the so-called 
Petersberg tasks, the EU and the WEU made up «a loose kind of foreign policy 
system, in that their policy-making capacity and their operational mechanisms 
were linked but hardly compatible, given different histories, functions and 
memberships.» (Hill, Autumn 2001: 320) Furthermore, the EU member sates took 
the decision at the Helsinki Summit to incorporate the WEU in the Union, thereby 
transferring – thus assuming – the tasks of the Western European Union. This 
decision also meant that the role of European pillar of the WEU would be now 
carried out by the EU in the Alliance. (Ulusoy, December 2002-February 2003: 
183) Therefore, the Nice Treaty, although not modifying the references to defence 
in relation to the Amsterdam Treaty - removed the reference to the WEU and its 
role in ‘framing the defence aspects’. It removed in fact all the references to 
WEU, except one134, thus clearly implying that it was hence the responsibility of 
the EU to frame the ‘defence aspects’, through its CFSP/ESDP. (Duke, Summer 
2001: 156-159) 
 
Accordingly, the WEU Council of Ministers in Marseille of 13 November 
2000 decided to stop most activities of the WEU. Moreover, the Petersberg tasks 
were definitely attributed to the European Union. Western European Union’s 
subsidiary bodies, as the Torrejón’s based Satellite Centre and the Paris Institute 
for Security Studies, were later also transferred to the EU on 1 January 2002, thus 
leaving the framework of the Organization to become EU agencies. There is still a 
Council which can meet if and when necessary at the level of Heads (or Deputy 
Heads) of delegations to WEU, but no Ministerial Councils have been convened 
since Marseille. Furthermore, the Secretariat-General135 has only residual 
functions: indeed, it only has functions that are other than related to crisis 
management which now is the responsibility of the EU. (Geneva Centre for 
Security Policy GCSP, 2003: 2) The WEU – deprived of all its operational 
capacity – maintains links with the Parliamentary Assembly. As for the Western 
European Armaments Group [WEAG] and the Western European Armaments 
Organization [WEAO] which were subsidiary bodies of the WEU specialised in 
armaments cooperation, they are gradually disappearing in order to be supplanted 
by the EDA. (Dumoulin, Mars 2005: 165) The EDA is to completely take over the 
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activities of the two bodies in the course of 2006. To put it briefly, only the 
necessary WEU functions and structures are maintained in place to enable the 
member states to fulfil the commitments arising from the modified Brussels 
Treaty, particularly the mutual defence commitment included in the article V. 
 
In conclusion, one can assume that, although the WEU will certainly not 
be officially dismantled as long as the European Union is unable to develop its 
own common territorial defence, the Western European Union has no future and, 
without no doubt, it will not be revitalized. It is just kept alive in order to maintain 
article V of the modified Brussels Treaty until the establishment by the EU of its 
own proper system for territorial defence with an automatic mechanism for 
reciprocal aid. (Geneva Centre for Security Policy GCSP, 2003: 2; Dumoulin, 
Mars 2005: 166-168) So, it is not a surprise that, while the Nice Treaty 
maintained a last reference to WEU in the TEU, the ‘Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’ cancelled even this last reference to WEU. 
 
 
b. The Other Security Institutions 
 
The previous section having analysed the security institutions lying within 
the framework of the European Union, this section lingers over the security 
institutions playing a role in Europe, although not directly lying within the scope 
of the process of European integration. As the issue of European security has long 
been dominated by the Cold War, the two other security institutions which we 
will examine in this section are institutions whose creation and history were 
closely linked to the Cold War. 
 
Thus, the two institutions in question are essentially the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, but also the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Therefore, this section – before taking a glimpse of the OSCE – first 
analyses NATO. 
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§1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
The immediate origins of NATO date back to the consequences of the 
Second World War. By this time, the League of Nations and the concept of 
collective security had been thoroughly discredited by the events of the 1930s end 
its end result, namely the Second World War. Although the wartime ‘Grand 
Alliance’ between the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union approached 
collective defence, each state identifying the Third Reich as a threat to its 
survival, this collaboration of convenience evaporated very quickly following the 
end of hostilities. A series of events occurred indeed in the wake of the War, 
notably the Berlin blockade started by the Soviet Union136, which cemented 
hostile relations between East and West. While most of the American troops 
returned home with only 200’000 remaining on duty in Europe by 1948, Soviet 
forces did considerably outnumber those of the Western countries. A US military 
document predicted that the Red Army could most likely quickly overwhelm 
Western forces in Europe, bringing as a result the loss of Western Europe and a 
total evacuation of US troops. Although this assessment and others of similar 
scenarios are today often criticized as too pessimistic, the US policymakers shared 
the view that a Soviet dominance in Western Europe would threaten US vital 
interests and national security. 
 
Reflecting on the interwar period and the eventual failure of collective 
defence, as well as on the two World Wars, the NATO architects recognized that 
«the glue holding any alliance together came in the form of a shared and specific 
threat.» (Rupp, 2001: 160) After several months of negotiations – opened on 10 
September 1948137 –, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington D.C. 
by the United States, Canada and ten Western European countries, namely 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom. In signing the NATO Charter, the North 
American and West European governments committed themselves to function 
according to the concept of collective defence. Although they did not give up the 
way and manner in which they define and protect their national interests, the 
NATO member states agreed that, with regard to the threat of Soviet communism, 
their interests coincided and agreed thus to establish a joint mechanism to prevent 
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Soviet hegemony over Western Europe. From its beginning on 24 August 1949, 
when the North Atlantic Treaty entered into force (after ratification by the above 
twelve countries), the purpose of NATO was indeed to counter the Soviet threat. 
Territorial and political demands directed by Moscow at Norway, Greece and 
Turkey had brought this threat to the fore. So, according to the expression the first 
– British – Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance Lord Ismay is reported to 
have made in 1948, the purpose of NATO was basically “to keep the Russians 
out, the Americans in and the Germans down” (in Europe). 
 
The essential articles of the North Atlantic Treaty are articles 4 to 6138. 
Article 4 provides for allies to «consult together whenever, in the opinion of any 
of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of 
[them](…) is threatened.» (The North Atlantic Treaty, 04 April 1949: Art.4) As 
for article 5, certainly the most significant, it certainly spoke directly of the Soviet 
threat, even if the Soviet Union was not mentioned at all in the Treaty. In fact, 
article 5 states: «The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations139, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, 
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (…)» (The North Atlantic Treaty, 
04 April 1949: Art.5) Although characterizing any armed attack on one ally as an 
attack against them all, article 5 does not commit the allies to an automatic 
military response or any other compulsory response. As to article 6, it extends an 
ally’s territory to include territorial holdings or interests. (Sandler and Hartley, 
1999: 25-26) 
 
One has to add that by deciding to be bound together by collective security 
arrangements, the five Western Union states (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) made the Atlantic Alliance possible, as 
well as a continued American presence in Europe. In so doing, they devolved part 
of their sovereignty to intergovernmental structures. However, NATO has a loose 
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structure in which the sovereign member states preserve both political 
independence and discretionary power over military expenditures. As any action 
is taken unanimously by the North Atlantic Council [NAC], the member states do 
not have to go along with a decision they do not agree with. As for the 
expenditures, while the principle of common funding exists, the NATO member 
states decide the overwhelming portion of their defence expenses independently.  
 
NATO’s civil structure consists of three main bodies140. The North 
Atlantic Council is the supreme political authority in terms of decision-making 
power. It is there that the permanent representatives meet, at ambassadorial level 
or at higher levels, to discuss and approve NATO policy. The Defence Planning 
Committee tackles most of the issues concerning collective defence matters, 
whereas the Nuclear Planning Group handles nuclear forces issues. These three 
bodies are placed under the chairmanship of the Secretary General141, who is a 
senior international statesman nominated by the member governments and act 
also as the spokesperson for NATO. Subordinated to the three main bodies are the 
Military Committee, whose task is to advise the political authorities of the 
Atlantic Alliance on military matters, and a whole string of other committees, 
whose concerns include among other things weapons standardization, NATO 
budgets, NATO infrastructure and treaty verification. The structure described 
above is known as NATO’s civil structure. (NATO, 2005: 217-235; Sandler and 
Hartley, 1999: 242-248) As for NATO’s military structure, it consists of the 
above mentioned Military Committee, meeting at the level of Chiefs of 
Defence142. It is the highest military authority in NATO and works, as we just 
emphasized, under the overall political authority of the North Atlantic Council, 
the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. The Military 
Committee is responsible for recommending to NATO’s political authorities those 
measures considered necessary for the common defence of the Atlantic Alliance 
area. Its principal task is thus to provide command and advice on military policy 
and strategy. It oversees an integrated command structure, composed of two 
military commands143 – the Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR] and 
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic [SACLANT] – and the Canada-US 
Regional Planning Group, which provides for the defence of Canada and the 
USA. As far as SACEUR and SACLANT are concerned, being in charge of 
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determining force requirements, defence planning, defence exercises and force 
deployment in their respective areas, they are responsible for preserving peace 
respectively in Europe and in the North Atlantic144. From 1994 on, SACEUR 
assumes also the responsibility for out-of-area crisis management, peacekeeping 
and humanitarian aid projects. The military headquarters of the Allied Command 
Europe is the already mentioned SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe], located in Casteau, near the Belgian city of Mons. (NATO, 2005: 257-
269; Sandler and Hartley, 1999: 28-29) It means that a military operation – due to 
take place in Europe or in an out-of-area site – would be commanded by SHAPE. 
 
As for the military doctrines of NATO, one can spread those over four 
successive phases (Sandler and Hartley, 1999: 37-41). The first phase, being the 
one going from NATO’s origins to the mid-1960s, is named the phase of Mutual 
Assured Destruction [MAD]. During this period, NATO relied on US strategic 
force superiority to deter the use by the Soviet Union of its conventional force 
superiority in Western Europe. Although the Atlantic Alliance became outstripped 
by Soviet conventional forces145, the threat of Soviet westwards expansion was, in 
that period, held in check by NATO’s attachment to a deterrence strategy of 
Mutual Assured Destruction. According to this strategy, any attempt of Soviet 
territorial expansion towards NATO member states would be countered with a 
devastating nuclear attack. This retaliatory threat – making a Soviet attack merely 
unthinkable due to the atrocity of NATO’s promised counterattack – was credible 
up until the mid-1960s, because of Soviet nuclear forces’ vulnerability to such a 
defensive strike. The US threat to retaliate automatically was made for itself and 
also for all its European NATO allies, which could thus free ride on US 
deterrence. As a consequence, security concerns of Western European countries   
– not only European NATO member states, but also the other Western European 
countries remaining outside the Atlantic Alliance structure – were taken care of in 
NATO. The latter was an outstanding solution at that time for the Western 
Europeans, as they were sustained within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance 
by the commitment of one of the Superpowers, namely the United States. It is 
thus not a surprise that the Western European states took collective security 
matters outside of European integration. The MAD era going from 1949 to the 
mid-1960s was however marked by several East-West confrontations – as the 
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Korean War in 1950-1953, the invasion of Hungary by troops of the Warsaw Pact 
in 1956, the building up of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 
1962146 – often provoked by the socialist camp and seriously considered by 
NATO. In all these international crises, Western Europe had no other choice than 
NATO for its own security and defence. (Ulusoy, December 2002-February 2003: 
171) It is within that first phase that NATO’s first expansions took place, as 
Greece and Turkey joined on 18 February 1952 whereas the Federal Republic of 
Germany was admitted to NATO on 6 May 1955, a ‘provocation’ to which the 
socialist bloc responded some days later with the creation of the Warsaw Pact. 
One has to add that this period saw in 1966 the withdrawal of France from the 
integrated military structure by French President de Gaulle147. 
 
The second phase of the military doctrine of NATO, going from about 
1967 to 1984, is the one during which the United States proposed NATO to adopt 
the strategic policy of ‘flexible response’. This NATO doctrine was caused by a 
change in US military doctrine. As the USA began in the early 1960s urging for 
the new doctrine of flexible response, NATO had no other real choice than to go 
along with the new doctrine, given its intense military reliance on US forces and 
nuclear deterrence. The doctrine of flexible response was an attempt to limit 
escalation towards a nuclear altercation. The USA, especially at Robert 
McNamara148’s instigation, believed that they «should never initiate a strategic 
nuclear exchange in response to a Soviet conventional invasion of Western 
Europe (…) [as they] maintained that such a reaction would not only be 
grievously disproportionate but would also unnecessarily imperil the lives of 
millions of American citizens in the likely event that the Soviet Union decided to 
return fire.» (Wilson, 2002: 137) Under the doctrine of flexible response, an 
aggression would be countered with a response based on the nature of the 
violence. This permitted NATO to respond in various ways to a Warsaw Pact 
confrontation, nuclear weapons being used in the most extreme cases, thus 
strengthening NATO’s nuclear deterrent by making the first-use of nuclear 
weapons more credible. Under the new doctrine, the European NATO member 
states could not rely solely anymore on the nuclear deterrent umbrella for their 
external security. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had built up its strategic nuclear 
arsenal by the end of the 1960s, thus getting rid of any US first strike advantage 
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and wearing down the credibility of the US guarantee to retaliate on behalf of its 
European allies. The latter therefore had to increase their military activities to 
prevent an aggression from the Warsaw Pact. However, some developments in the 
1980s influenced NATO’s burden sharing. There was first the build-up of US 
forces decided by the 1980-elected US President Ronald Reagan. This build-up 
gave some of the free ride back to the European NATO allies, to which one had to 
include Spain since it joined NATO on 30 May 1982 being the sixteenth member 
state of the organization. But, on the other hand, the development of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative [SDI] – the famous research project for a missile defence 
system for the United States proposed by US President Reagan in 1983 – was 
having the opposite influence eon NATO’s burden sharing, since the SDI plan 
was to guarantee only a limited defence for their Western European allies149 
which would have again to increase their military activities to protect themselves 
effectively. Yet another development occurred in the 1980s which influenced 
NATO’s burden sharing. The modernisation of the French and British strategic 
forces permitted the non-nuclear European NATO allies to rely to some extent on 
France and the United Kingdom for their security, thus free riding on these two 
European countries. Thus, NATO’s burden sharing did not change fundamentally 
during this period as it was still the USA which supported most of the defence 
burden. One has to add that this second period witnessed the temporary 
withdrawal of Greece from the integrated military structure from 1974 to 1980. 
 
The third phase is the phase of ‘forward-defence strategy’, also called 
‘deep strike’. The forward-defence strategy provided for «(…) [shifting] the 
fighting focus away from NATO’s eastern front by relying on precision-guided 
munitions to target and destroy the Warsaw Pact’s rear-echelon forces before they 
could be brought up to reinforce the front.» (Sandler and Hartley, 1999: 40) This 
strategy – adopted in 1984 – was rather an upgrade of the former doctrine, the 
flexible response. This new doctrine was very close to its precedent doctrine, as it 
also stressed the importance of conventional forces and maintained the same 
burden sharing behaviour. One has to add that numerous promises by the 
European NATO member states – from the 1950s to the end of the Cold War – to 
bear a greater share of the defence burden went ultimately unfulfilled. (Tonelson, 
2001: 29-58) 
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With the end of the Cold War, NATO obviously had to find a new 
doctrine, many of the post-Cold War challenges for NATO differing 
fundamentally from the face-off between the East and the West during the Cold 
War. A new phase – the post-Cold War era – began thus with the collapse of the 
socialist camp. Ending the Cold War conflict was of course in the West’s interest, 
as it enhanced Western power and influence. However, the future of NATO was 
reconsidered: «il est possible de justifier deux démarches opposées: mettre fin à 
l’Alliance [atlantique] faute d’objectif ou, au contraire, perpétuer cette expérience 
au nom, précisément, de sa réussite.» (Colson, 1995: 109) The American 
standpoint – backed by some European political personalities – was to consider 
that NATO had to remain the main security institution. As former US President 
George Herbert Bush declared in 1990, «la présence des Etats-Unis en Europe 
sera toujours perçue comme un facteur de stabilité et (…) l’OTAN est la mieux à 
même d’apporter cette stabilité.» (Colson, 1995: 110) Hence, in order to prevent 
the organization to become obsolete and to give it the means to adapt to the new 
situation, the NATO leaders met in London in July 1990 and charged their 
governments to undertake a fundamental review of the organization’s future 
purpose and goals. (Rupp, 2001: 161) NATO member states thus began setting up 
a new strategic concept, as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991 and 
that of the Soviet Union on 20 December 1991 marked the disappearing of its 
principal raison d’être. However, expectations about the disintegration of NATO 
after the ‘loss’ of its enemy did not come true. In fact, NATO – under General 
Secretary Manfred Wörner150 – turned out to be far more efficient in redefining its 
role and its organizational structure in the early post-Cold War years than the EU.  
 
After the entry of the unified Germany into NATO on 3 October 1990151, 
one of the first adaptations of the Atlantic Alliance to the new situation was the 
decision to downsize its military forces. As the governments of NATO member 
states intended to undertake a fundamental review of the organization’s future 
purposes and goals, the sixteen NATO allies agreed upon a new strategic concept 
at the Rome summit in November 1991 and reinforced at the Washington summit 
in April 1999. Recommitting the NATO allies on the one hand to collective 
defence, the new strategic concept stated on the other hand that the new 
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international environment offered the opportunity for NATO to enlarge the scope 
of its strategy to new kinds of security issues. (Colson, 1995, 116-117) NATO 
policymakers began thus considering new missions and purposes. The Atlantic 
Alliance’s new strategy referred notably to instabilities in Central and Eastern 
Europe [CEECs] that could spill over into NATO countries. (Rupp, 2001: 161-
162) As a consequence, NATO – moving ‘out-of-area’ – assumed responsibility 
for ensuring Europe’s safety from threats both within and beyond NATO 
boundaries. «In the future, NATO would be less concerned with guarding its 
perimeter than with addressing exigencies that adversely affect European 
economic and military security.» (Sandler and Hartley, 1999: 41). This new 
defence doctrine of crisis-management was further motivated by the First Gulf 
War in 1991. At the Oslo summit in June 1992, the NATO member states agreed 
to include peacekeeping in the official NATO missions. Therefore, from being a 
traditional military alliance whose purpose it was to protect the territory of its 
member states against an external threat, the Atlantic Alliance developed a more 
flexible strategy, which amongst other things would allow it to conduct crisis-
management operations outside NATO territory. To facilitate those out-of-area 
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations a well as humanitarian missions152, 
NATO allies founded – at the Brussels summit in January 1994 and following a 
US-led initiative – the Combined Joint Task Forces [CJTF]. Those CJTF              
– multilateral forces including air, land and maritime capabilities – are intended to 
be used for rapid deployment to undertake crisis-management operations 
wherever needed. The forces required would vary according to the circumstances 
and would need to be generated rapidly and at short notice. The CJTF will always 
be set beneath the regional subcommands of SACEUR and SACLANT. These 
NATO forces were also meant to be available to the WEU, the UN and the OSCE. 
As it would allow WEU-led operations to be provided with NATO support, the 
practical implication of the creation of the CJTF was notably to allow the 
European members of the alliance to carry out operations without having large 
United States involvement. NATO began the full implementation of the CJTF 
concept in 1999. Although the CJTF have only had limited use since their 
creation, their development continued the process of linking permanent NATO 
member states to the concerns of non-NATO states. Moreover, at the Prague 
summit in November 2002, NATO member states agreed upon the creation of the 
 110
rapid reaction NATO Response Force [NRF] following the example of the 
creation of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] within the EU153. Being comprised of 
national force contributions, the NRF is an entirely new concept for NATO which 
has traditionally used its resources independently from one another. Two phases 
for the reaching of the operational capability of the NRF were provided: an initial 
operational capability for the NRF has been reached in October 2003 with about 
9’000 soldiers. The reaching of the final operating capability (called Full 
Operational Capability [FOC]) is meant to be reached by the fall of 2006 with the 
NRF troop size at 21’000 soldiers. The NRF – notably intended to fulfil a key role 
in the US-led war on terror and to respond to threats from weapons of mass 
destruction – are ready to deploy within five days and will be able to sustain itself 
for thirty days. The role of the NRF is to provide an integrated and fully 
interoperable sea, land and air capability for the full spectrum of NATO missions, 
including peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as well as humanitarian 
missions taken within the scope of UN or NATO missions. (NATO, August 2004: 
1-2) 
 
As for the challenge posed by the European integration to NATO, the 
continued relevance of NATO to European security was strengthened at the 
NATO summit in Berlin in June 1996, where – as we have already stressed – it 
was decided that a European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI] should be 
developed inside the framework of NATO. The ESDI was intended to strengthen 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and bridge the growing gap between 
US and European military capabilities for a better balance of burden sharing in 
the security of Europe154. (Toje, Summer 2003: 64-65; Ulusoy, December 2002-
February 2003: 182) Therefore, they agreed to make NATO assets and 
capabilities available to WEU-led operations in a bid to boost the ESDI within 
NATO. The CJTF represent an essential factor in the ESDI, since coalitions of 
willing European NATO states could mount operations with or without the North 
American allies. (Hodge, 2002: 109) However, the disagreements between the 
USA and its European NATO allies over the ESDI became rather repetitive. 
Although this issue will be discussed further155, we should emphasize at this point 
the complaint of US officials about the enormously disproportionate share of the 
military burden during the Kosovo air campaign against Serbia in 1999156, where 
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the US air force accomplished far and away the major part of the air strikes157. US 
military leaders warn indeed that «the gap in capabilities between the American 
military and its NATO counterparts is growing so large that coordination for 
major operations in the future will become difficult, if not problematic.» 
(Carpenter, 2001: 2) The underwhelming success of NATO in Kosovo indeed 
highlighted the limited progress made by the ESDI within NATO. Many 
observers of international politics think that the ESDI has to be overtaken by the 
ESDP, which is a near identical initiative – though with a more ambiguous 
transatlantic link – launched inside the framework of the EU. 
 
One has to add at this point that NATO’s adaptation to regional crisis 
management in Europe’s periphery, especially its experience in the Balkans, was 
in many respects more trying to its unity and credibility than the four decades of 
containment of Soviet power. Its vocation to preserve peace, by making and 
keeping it, happens to be more of a transformed experience than was or is 
nowadays its readiness for a hypothetic war. (Hodge, 2002: 151) Especially as far 
as NATO’s experience in the Balkans is concerned, the Atlantic Alliance 
members drifted first individually – with the initial stages of Yugoslavia’s 
territorial disintegration – towards a mission of nation-building by recognizing 
very rapidly the sovereignty of the secessionist republics of Croatia and 
Slovenia158. Then, they became involved collectively, leading ultimately to 
NATO’s trusteeship for the political future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the 
Kosovo province of Serbia. Indeed, NATO’s trusteeship came in 1995 in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, after the air campaign bombardments “Deliberate Force” led to the 
Dayton Accords which concluded the Bosnia War in December 1995, while it 
arose in 1999 in the Serbian province of Kosovo, following the Atlantic 
Alliance’s 1999 war against the Serb state of Yugoslavia settled in a seventy-eight 
days of bombing. In effect, the collective actions of NATO put military force 
behind the self-determination claims of the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians and 
Kosovars against the Yugoslavian state of Serbia. The Balkan experience has in 
turn contributed greatly to NATO’s functional transformation in the Post-Cold 
War era. (Hodge, 2002: 97-98) As a matter of fact, NATO’s member states are 
still and for yet some time in the business of peacekeeping and trusteeship in the 
Balkans. They were indeed active in Bosnia with NATO’s Stabilisation Force 
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[SFOR] which succeeded to the Alliance’s Implementation Force [IFOR] set up 
following the end of the Bosnia Wars. As mentioned further above, the SFOR was 
replaced in December 2004 by the follow-on EUFOR-Althea mission of the 
EU159. They are also active in Kosovo with NATO’s peacekeeping force KFOR 
[Kosovo Force] established in the wake of the end of the Kosovo War in 1999. As 
for NATO’s peacekeeping mission – Operation Allied Harmony – in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it was formally handed over to the European 
Union on 31 March 2004. As NATO’s Balkan venture should be appreciated in 
the broader context of its expansion eastwards on the territory of the former 
Warsaw Pact, we will come back to the Atlantic Alliance’s experience in the 
Balkan – notably its de facto similarity with an expansion of the organization – 
further in this paper. Furthermore, one has to add, that through its leadership of 
the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF], NATO is also present in 
Afghanistan since August 2003 with the task of helping to establish the conditions 
in which Afghanistan can enjoy a representative government and self-sustaining 
peace and security. This is the first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area in 
NATO’s history. (NATO, September 2004: 1) 
 
In this context of being driven into the domain of soft security, the first-
ever invocation of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – after the events of 
September 11 – can be seen as a response to NATO’s self-preservation challenge. 
Although terrorism was recognized as a risk in the Alliance’s strategic concept, it 
was absolutely not obvious that a terrorist attack might be sufficient to trigger the 
collective defence article. Most NATO allies of the USA being unable to 
contribute to military out-of-area operations in any essential way, the invocation 
of article 5 was rather portrayed as a political statement of sympathy and support 
by allied friends. The US government was to ignore that gesture which was 
lacking any real military essence. The USA chose instead to build a coalition of 
selected partners for the subsequent operations in the war against terror, first in 
Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Even though NATO member states did contribute in 
a relatively important way to these operations, they did not do it in their capacity 
as NATO member states. While the argument of a defensive alliance could still be 
applied in the 1991 Gulf War, it already had much more relevance in the crisis-
management operations in the Balkans and does not fit at all for the ‘war against 
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terror’ defined by the USA and led by the ‘coalition against terror’ formed by the 
US Americans (Toje, Summer 2003: 71-72) 
 
However, NATO – besides the new missions and purposes it entrusted 
itself – also recommitted itself to collective defence both in its 1991 and 1999 
strategic concepts. It was indeed clear in the opinions of the NATO policymakers 
that although the Soviet Union collapsed, the main reason for NATO’s original 
creation was still present – though less strong – and will always be present, 
namely the potential threat posed by a large, aggressive Eurasian power. (Rupp, 
2001: 172) Many International Relations theorists – in particular US Americans – 
argue that, like the US engagement in Europe to confront Germany during the two 
World Wars and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the USA should remain 
in post-Cold War Europe to contain any potential future threat to European and 
US security interests. This is a view which is shared by the International Society 
theorists as well as the realist and neo-realist theorists. Accordingly, in his 1982 
book In defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American 
Foreign policy, Hans Morgenthau stated the following: the United States has 
«always striven to prevent the development of conditions in Europe which would 
be conductive to a European nation’s interfering in the affairs of the Western 
Hemisphere or contemplating a direct attack upon the United States. These 
conditions would be most likely to arise if a European nation, its predominance 
unchallenged within Europe, could look across the sea for conquest without fear 
of being menaced at the center of its power; that is, in Europe itself.» 
(Morgenthau, 1982: 5) In the opinion of the neo-realists and the International 
Society scholars, the USA – in accordance with their NATO allies – might have 
chosen to maintain the alliance, yet, in the absence of any serious threat on the 
horizon, at a considerably reduced level. Hence, the United States reduced 
substantially the US personnel commitments to NATO to a force of 
approximately 100’000 in Europe, while its number reached over 300’000 during 
the Cold War. Accordingly, the neo-realist and International Society scholars saw 
different paths to address the security issues of post-Cold War Europe. The path 
of giving considerable attention and resources to the OSCE160 would have been 
the most convincing. With its membership covering almost all of the European 
continent and its commitment to peacekeeping and other related operations, this 
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organization could have carried out the goals of the strategic concept formulated 
at the 1991 Atlantic Alliance summit in Rome without needing substantial 
internal reform at NATO. In line with that option, a downsized and rationalized 
NATO would have been closed to new membership and would have had the 
function to keep an eye on major changes and events in Europe and to operate as a 
credible check and balance on any state or states, seeking to decisively alter the 
balance of power in Eurasia. (Gardner, 2002: 41; Rupp, 2001: 172-173) However, 
NATO and the USA did obviously not choose that path, as NATO has decided to 
extend its security guarantees to some of the former Soviet satellite states161. The 
Atlantic Alliance is in the early 2000s an organization very different from that of 
1991. Through its structure and strategic reforms adopted since 1991, including 
especially the new strategic concept and the extension of membership, NATO has 
been transformed to confront menaces arising from a potential threatening country 
but more especially threats arising from a range of developments including 
nationalism, refugee flows and economic upheavals. As a consequence, NATO is 
being gradually transformed from a collective defence organization into a 
collective security organization. (Rupp, 2001: 161) However, the traditional 
NATO still serves useful purposes. It serves – as we have emphasized above – as 
an insurance policy against a Russia bent on revenge, as a reassurance to the 
smaller and medium-sized countries against either a hegemonic Germany or a 
continent dominated by major EU powers and as a system to preserve the 
transatlantic security link. The new NATO – with its out-of-area operations 
(notably its venture into the Balkans) and its expansion to most of the CEECs – 
also serves useful purposes in maintaining security in post-Cold War Europe, but 
some fear that the new NATO might ultimately destroy the cohesion necessary to 
preserve the traditional NATO. 
 
Finally, one has to add that many observers of international politics           
– especially those who claim belonging to the neo-realist approach – agree with 
Kenneth Waltz when he predicted in the early 1990s that NATO was 
disappearing, the only real question being how long it would remain a significant 
institution. (Waltz, Fall 1993: 76; Andreatta, 2005: 26; Toje, Summer 2003: 71-
72) 
 
 115
§2. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 
Having analysed the most important security institutions playing a role in 
Europe, we should take a glance at the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe [OSCE]. 
 
Besides the periodical summits of OSCE Heads of States or government 
where priorities are set and orientation provided at the highest political level, the 
Organization has several decision-making bodies. These are the following: the 
main regular decision-making body is the Permanent Council of representatives of 
the participating states which meets on a weekly basis in Vienna to debate issues, 
discuss current developments and build a consensus for action162; the Ministerial 
Council163, consisting of OSCE Ministers for Foreign Affairs, meets annually      
– except in years where a summit meeting of the Heads of State or Government 
takes place – to review major OSCE initiatives and activities and to provide 
guidance for future directions; the Forum for Security Cooperation convenes 
weekly in Vienna to discuss and make decisions regarding military aspects of 
security in the OSCE area, with particular emphasis on confidence- and security-
building measures; finally the Senior Council (or Economic Forum) meets once a 
year in Prague to focus on economic and environmental factors that affect security 
in the OSCE area. The OSCE internal arrangement is completed by several other 
structures, including notably: the Chairman-in-Office, consisted usually of a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of an OSCE participating state, holds the position on 
a rotating basis for one year and bears overall responsibility for executive action 
on behalf of the Organization, after close consultation with participating states164; 
the Parliamentary Assembly, comprised of representatives from OSCE 
participating states and meeting twice yearly, serves to promote parliamentary 
involvement in the activities of the Organization and can issue recommendations 
for the OSCE Permanent Council to consider; the Secretariat – under the direction 
of the Secretary General – provides operational support to the Organization, 
notably in supporting OSCE field activities, maintaining contacts with 
international and non-governmental organizations and coordinating OSCE 
economic and environmental activities as well as activities in the politico-military 
field. The OSCE has also developed several mechanisms for peacefully settling 
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disputes and has established a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in Geneva. In 
addition, the Organization has developed three institutions that are used to follow 
up on the political decisions agreed to by participating states. The first one is the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, located in Warsaw; it is the 
principal institution responsible for the promotion of human rights and democracy 
in the OSCE area. The second one is the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, based in The Hague; its task is to respond, at the earliest possible 
stage, to ethnic tensions that have the potential to develop into a conflict within 
the region. Finally, the third is the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the 
Media and was created in Vienna in 1997, making it the youngest OSCE 
institution today. Its aim is to observe developments in the media of the 
participating states and to provide a rapid response in serious cases of non-
compliance with OSCE principles and commitments relating to freedom of 
expression and of the media. (OSCE Secretariat, September 2003: 2, 4; The 
United States Mission to the OSCE, April 2004: 1-2, 4) 
 
The Organization finds its origins in the early détente period of the early 
1970s, more precisely in 1973, when it was established as the Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]. The Cold War prevented, already 
from the late 1940s on and for a long time afterwards, any substantial progress 
about talks on any – even loose – European security grouping. Yet, eventually in 
November 1972, the talks began in Helsinki and recommended a conference to 
launch what became to be called the Helsinki or CSCE process. Accordingly, the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe opened on 3 July 1973 with 
35 states sending representatives. The result of the CSCE – meeting in Helsinki 
and Geneva – was the signing in the Finish capital two years later of the Helsinki 
Final Act, which was signed on 30 July 1975 by the 35 participating states. 
Although not having binding force in international law, this Helsinki Final Act     
– agreeing in particular that each nation would respect each other’s sovereignty 
and borders, and agreeing on numerous principles of human rights – served in 
reality, as we have already noticed, as a peace treaty. Since the concept of 
improving relations and implementing the Act were developed over a succession 
of follow-up meetings, especially in Belgrade (from October 1977 to March 
1978), Madrid (from November 1980 to September 1983) and Vienna (from 
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November 1986 to January 1989), the CSCE was established during the Cold War 
as a neutral forum for dialogue and consultation on European security matters 
between the two superpower blocs. It was also involved in backing up major 
disarmament treaties during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Like NATO, the collapse of Communism also required a change of role 
for the CSCE. The Paris Charter for a New Europe – which was signed on 21 
November 1990 at the summit in the French capital – set the CSCE a new course, 
thus marking the beginning of the change supposed giving the CSCE the means to 
respond to the new challenges of the post-Cold War period. Aimed at defining the 
identity of the CSCE in a new international environment, the Charter included the 
establishment of standing institutions like the Conflict Prevention Centre in 
Vienna, the Secretariat in Prague165 and the Office for Free Elections – now 
known as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – in Warsaw. 
The Charter also established three political consultation and decision-making 
bodies, namely the Ministerial Council, its assisting Committee of Senior 
Officials as well as regular summit meetings of heads of state or government. 
Most significantly, the participating states have bound themselves by the 1990 
Charter of Paris to conduct their domestic affairs according to accepted standards 
of human rights and democratic governance. Besides declaring the CSCE a 
regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the 
Helsinki Document of July 1992 strengthened subsequently the contribution of 
the CSCE to the protection of human rights and to the management of security in 
post-Cold War Europe. Furthermore, it called for an ambitious role for the CSCE 
in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in areas of potential 
or actual conflicts within the OSCE region. Of special importance in the field of 
early warning and conflict was the creation at the Helsinki summit of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, since its task is – as we have just stressed – 
to find early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or 
friendly relations between OSCE participating states.166 In 1994, at the following 
summit in Budapest, the participating states of the CSCE recognized that the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe was no longer simply a 
continued conference, thus changing its name into the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. This became effective on 1 January 1995 and 
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marked the transition for the OSCE from its role as a forum for negotiation and 
dialogue to an active operational structure. The change was also a reflection of its 
institutional development since the end of the Cold War and gave the 
Organization a new political impetus. The subsequent Lisbon summit of 1996      
– further elaborating OSCE’s key role in fostering security and stability in  
Europe – stimulated the development of an OSCE Charter for European Security, 
representing a kind of “model of security”. The latter – which was to be adopted 
at the Istanbul summit of 1999 – aims at improving the operational capabilities of 
the Organization and at reinforcing cooperation with its partners. (Kämaräinen, 
Automne 1999: 160-161) 
 
All these facilities permit the OSCE to have a considerable operational 
presence in the field. These OSCE field activities include today missions in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Moldova and Georgia. 
 
One has to add that several important military treaties were also concluded 
within the framework of the CSCE/OSCE. Thus, the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] – which is a major arms control agreement – was 
notably concluded on the margins of the 1990 Paris summit. A revised and 
adapted CFE Treaty was signed later, at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, by 
thirty of its participating states. Moreover, the Treaty on open Skies in 1992 and a 
key Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2000 form today, besides 
other arms control agreements, the OSCE politico-military dimension acquis. 
(OSCE Secretariat, September 2003: 1) 
 
Today, the OSCE is the largest regional security organization in the world 
with fifty-five participating states from North America, Central Asia and 
Europe167, thus spanning the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
All the member states of NATO, the EU and the WEU appear amongst the 
participating states of the OSCE. It is moreover the only existing pan-European 
institution in the world. Like the UN, the OSCE is inclusive in that it is open to all 
European states, which have recognized and declared adherence to its catalogue 
of common standards and principles. As the former Soviet Republics of Central 
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Asia have remained within the framework of the OSCE in becoming participating 
states of the organization after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one should not 
exclude the fact that in the longer run, the OSCE space could be extended to other 
parts of the world, for example in the Mediterranean area or even in Asia. 
 
Since its origins date back only as far as 1973, it is also the youngest 
security institution tackling security issues in Europe. The main tasks of the 
Organization are its role in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management 
and post-conflict rehabilitation, as emphasized in the 1999 Charter for European 
Security. Yet, the range of security-related issues the OSCE is dealing with is 
broad and generally classified in three dimensions. The first one is the security 
dimension in its politico-military sense (including preventive diplomacy, arms 
control, confidence and security-building measures), the second dimension 
concerns human rights (including promotion of respect for basic human rights, 
inter-ethnic tolerance, democratisation and development of civil institutions, 
election monitoring, freedom of the media, rule of law, and related issues) and the 
third one – known as the economic dimension – involves economic and 
environmental security issues (including promotion of good governance, liberal 
economies and proper environmental stewardship as well as monitoring economic 
and environmental issues in order to ensure that the latter do not become threats to 
security). The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and cooperative. It is 
comprehensive in that it deals with a wide range of security-related issues, 
comprising all the issues included within OSCE’s three dimensions, namely the 
politico-military, the human and the economic/environmental one. (OSCE 
Secretariat, September 2003: 1) The OSCE is moreover cooperative in the sense 
that all its participating states have equal status and decisions are taken by 
consensus168 on a politically, but not legally binding basis. And, in contrast to the 
European Union which can be describe as a real collective peace order, the OSCE 
can best be portrayed as a cooperative security order. The major difference which 
exists between the two concepts is the following: while a “peace order” is the 
result of a process of gradually stronger and deeper growing closer ties of the 
societies, a “security order” can merely be established and formally agreed upon 
by a group of states. As for the OSCE, one can assert that it will certainly not be 
transformed into a system of collective security. (Giessmann, December 2000: 40) 
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The OSCE has certainly both weaknesses and strengths. Let us first 
consider its principal limitations. Due to the fact that the OSCE has a non-binding 
legal character, its principles and resolutions agreed upon cannot be enforced 
legally. The operational strength of the Organization depends on political 
consensus by all participating states. Its complicated mechanisms in case of 
human and minority rights violations and the weak leadership structure of the 
Organization are surely a weakness. Furthermore, some participating states lend 
more importance to other regional security arrangements. The different 
affiliations of the participating states pose a problem anyway, as well as their 
different security policies, some being neutral and others not. Another weakness 
is the poor financial resource the Organization has at its disposal. Finally, a weak 
parliamentary legitimacy and a modest public awareness of the OSCE within the 
societies of the participating states add to the weakness of the Organization. As 
for the strengths of the OSCE, let us pick out the most significant ones. The very 
fact that fifty-five nations, including the United States of America and Canada, 
belong to the Organization is undoubtedly one of its most important strengths. 
The overall positive record during the Cold War, especially for the societies in the 
former communist states that were strongly captivated by the principles of 
freedom, liberal society, democracy and free market referred to by the CSCE, 
speaks also in favour of the OSCE. The Organization could adapt itself to the end 
of the Cold War, at least in the early post-Cold War years. Furthermore, the 
OSCE principles have set a high political standard, thus contributing in 
socializing the behaviour of governments, both internally and in the field of 
international politics. Finally, as the Organization’s focus is not only directed to 
international security, but also to inner-state conflict resolution, democracy 
building and maintaining the rule of law within all participating states, one can 
assume that the OSCE can monitor security issues more easily than other security 
institutions when it comes to areas being in its boundaries but outside the 
boundaries of the other security institutions. The fact that the OSCE is based on 
the principle of one state could be considered both as an advantage and a 
limitation. On the one hand, this rule prevent the Organization from becoming an 
instrument of the most powerful states, but on the other hand any action taken by 
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the OSCE has to be a result of general consent and is thus exposed by a veto from 
any unwilling participating state. (Booth and Wheeler, 1992: 17-18) 
 
Although the OSCE has never been really in a position to create strong 
impulsions and motivations like for instance the EU and NATO, it does however 
provide intrusive conflict prevention measures within the boundaries of its 
participating states. Due to the fact that conflicts within state boundaries have 
shown to have become an important source of regional instability since the end of 
the Cold War, one can assess that the operational significance of the OSCE and its 
mechanisms - particularly its field missions – will inevitably be of great 
importance in post-Cold War Europe. One can however also consider that the 
function of the OSCE will principally remain limited to the formal and moral 
recognition of human and minority rights and to the respect of the OSCE norms 
and principles, thus never really growing beyond it. Moreover, it is clear that 
today the lack of institutional power has to a large extent become a hindrance, 
even if ironically one attributes largely to this main weakness the strength of the 
CSCE during the Cold War169. If the OSCE is considered as a waste of time and 
money due to its operational inefficiency, the participating states will hardly be 
ready to further finance its activities. Furthermore, NATO and the EU being 
considered as better opportunities, especially in the new NATO members, further 
interest in a prominent role of the OSCE has almost disappeared, particularly in 
these countries. As for the Western European countries, interest in a prominent 
role of the OSCE could also drastically decrease. Indeed, since for them the 
OSCE has always been primarily a tool for making political changes in the 
Central and Eastern European countries, one might expect that their progressively 
admission in the Western institutions will increasingly marginalize the OSCE. 
«Eventually, its only function might be creating a formal link between Russia and 
the rest of Europe.» (Giessmann, December 2000: 49-50) 
 
 
c. The Institutional Question 
 
The two previous sections have analysed the most important security 
institutions of the European security system. They play the most important role in 
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this security system, alongside the European countries – especially the ‘big three’ 
European countries Germany, France and the United Kingdom – and great extra-
European powers, especially the United States, but also Russia. One should 
nevertheless not forget the United Nations, which is also present in this complex 
European security architecture although playing a less important role. Therefore, 
this section considers the institutional question of the European security system, 
in analysing the linkages between the different institutions and the conceptual 
composition of this system.  
 
Thus, this section first explores the institutional arrangement and linkages 
between NATO, the EU – with its CFSP/ESDP and WEU –, the OSCE and the 
UN, before establishing conceptual and strategic distinctions for a better 
understanding. 
 
§1. The Complex European Security Architecture 
 
Today, almost two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall and although 
most of the institutions involved in European security were being called into 
question since the early 1990s, the same institutions created during the Cold War 
are still at the basis of the post-Cold War Europe and compete with each other. 
The nature of the conflicts is quite different than during the Cold War. The 
security threat in Europe was clearly defined during the Cold War, namely an 
attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union and/or the Warsaw Pact. Today, 
due to considerable change in the strategic, political, military, economic and 
social landscape of post-Cold War Europe, threats to security are far more diffuse 
and unpredictable. The rise of intrastate conflict – as a number of ethnic conflicts 
in the Balkans and instability on other parts of the EU’s periphery demonstrate – 
and the fact that ‘soft security’ issues became as important as ‘hard security’ 
issues meant that the security organizations had to rethink their strategies to meet 
the security needs of the new world order. They had to adapt themselves to the 
new situation. As we have stressed in the previous sections, NATO, the EU and 
the OSCE did it with varying fortunes, but all these institutions outlived the end 
of the Cold War. Thus, the collapse of Soviet Communism has certainly brought a 
significant improvement in terms of European security, but diverse security 
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threats – notably new ones – have still to be contained. Given the very different 
nature of these threats, it makes sense for the many institutions involved with 
European security issues to engage in the closest possible cooperation. 
 
A significant difference between Cold War Europe and post-Cold War 
Europe is that in the latter, security is centred on cooperation without 
confrontation or division into blocs. The security institutions are no longer 
working in mutual ignorance «on the basis of clear-cut and unchallenged 
mandates.» (Ghebali and Sauerwein, 1995: 216) These security networks «help to 
avoid a ‘we’ and ’they’ syndrome which could be both divisive and dangerous.» 
(Cameron, 1999: 73) Yet, the other side of the coin is that they are now even 
overlapping and competing.  
 
All these institutions form a very complex institutional configuration of 
European security. Europe’s security rests indeed on multiple and overlapping     
– not only European but also international – organizations. The institutions we 
have analysed – namely the EU, NATO and the OSCE – provide, though in 
different ways and with different effects, much stability for post-Cold War 
Europe. But the UN should also be included in this multitude of institutions 
playing a role in Europe’s security complex (Yesson, Summer 2001: 197) One 
has to add that even less important institutions, when it comes to the issue of 
security, could also be added in this dense European security framework, as for 
instance the Council of Europe, the G7/G8 or the Contact Group. 
 
Each of these institutions contributes something distinctive and useful to 
the overall security in Europe and «there are substantial synergistic benefits from 
cooperation between them.» (Cameron, 1999: 71) Yet, some observers of 
international politics «warn that a preoccupation with – or overabundance of – 
international institutions creates unnecessary complexity and can frustrate security 
building. An ‘alphabet soup’ of security institutions does present complications.» 
(Yesson, Summer 2001: 197) 
 
Thus, all these different institutions often appearing to be competing over 
the same tasks in the post-Cold War era, the 1990s were dominated by intense 
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discussion about alternative security architectures in Europe. (Sjursen, 1999: 4) 
Hence, a big debate about the institutional framework of the European and 
transatlantic security system was initiated in the early 1990s. This institutional 
debate is still animated at present. The complexity of the European security 
architecture is illustrated by the diverse expression often used to define it, it is 
‘alphabet soup’ of security institutions, labyrinth of security institutions, security 
institutional maze or European security riddle. 
 
As a result, «chez les Occidentaux, l’essentiel du débat semble occupé par 
une compétition courtoise mais acharnée entre différentes institutions qui 
prétendent chacune répondre aux nouveaux besoins de sécurité et de défense en 
Europe. (…) Les multiples réunions [des différentes institutions] débouchent sur 
des communiqués finals qui donnent l’impression que la division des tâches a 
enfin été décidée, généralement à l’avantage de l’institution où s’est tenue la 
conférence.» (Colson, 1995: 110) This competition is certainly triggered by the 
interest of the states tending more for one or another institution. For instance, US 
President George Bush senior – with his neo-realist approach to international 
politics – apprehended the depreciation of military power in international 
relations. He feared that the CSCE could increase in power and change into a pan-
European system of collective security and thus become a challenger to NATO. 
The European initiatives for strengthening their security and defence activities     
– quite important since 1990 and even more intense as the uncertainties and 
concerns about insecurity increased in Europe – add to US worries: the 
development of an autonomous European defence could also challenge NATO 
and at the same time call into question US dominance, in terms of security, over 
the old continent.  
 
Overlapping competencies and competition is thus most of all due to the 
inability of the different governments to redefine in a clear and accurate manner 
the role and the scope of the institutions involved in post-Cold War Europe.170 
The European security complex is thus rooted in a conceptually counterproductive 
relationship among states, multilateral actors and supranational actors. The EU    
– with its CFSP/ESDP and WEU –, NATO and the OSCE (as we have analysed), 
but also the UN are still in the process of redefining and delimitating their role 
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and missions in the transformed European security system. (Seidelmann, 2002: 
62) 
 
On top of this complex institutional architecture, one does indeed not have 
to forget the system of collective security of the United Nations, which heads up 
in theory the entire security system. The enforcement of a collective security 
action under the Charter of the United Nations can take two forms. The first one is 
regulated by article 41 of the UN Charter which provides for «measures not 
involving the use of armed force» (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: 
Art.41), such as different boycotts and embargos. As for the second form, it is 
regulated by article 42 which provides for the Security Council to take military 
action «by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.» (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: 
Art.42) In this case, article 43 provides for the UN member states to «undertake to 
make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security.» (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: Art.42) In 
addition, article 47 provides for the establishment of «a Military Staff Committee 
to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security 
Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. (…)» (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: Art.47 §1) But, due 
to perpetual disagreements between the five Permanent member states171 of the 
Security Council – the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and 
China –, no special agreement has ever been made under article 43 nor any 
Military Staff Committee ever been established under article 47. Consequently, in 
practice, the Security Council has authorized – by using different powers and by 
following different procedures – the use of force against a state as a means to 
restore international peace and security, as was the case for instance against 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, where military action 
was supervised by US command on behalf of the Security Council. Article 53 §1 
of the UN Charter also gives the ability to the Security Council to utilize 
«regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.» 
(Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: Art.53 §1) Article 53 §1 provides 
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furthermore that «no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
Council». (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: Art.53 §1) This, 
however, creates problems in practice. Some criticize that the mechanism of the 
relationship and hierarchy between the Security Council and regional bodies are 
not explicitly defined in the UN Charter. Thus, in practice, powerful regional 
bodies may use force despite a missing authorization by the Security Council       
– which is the supreme body to maintain or restore international peace and 
security – to do so. This scenario happened with NATO’s action in Serbia and 
Kosovo in 1999. In the Second Gulf War, which broke out in March 2003, the 
United States and the United Kingdom have used military force against Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq, putting forward the existing threat Iraq posed to international 
peace and security but without the Security Council’s authorisation. By ignoring 
international law, this action raised numerous questions about the efficiency of the 
collective security system of the United Nations. 
 
Yet, one has to admit that – in spite of these questions and despite the fact 
that the theoretical concept of the UN Charter has never been followed (i.e. 
neither any special agreement has ever been made under article 43 nor any 
Military Staff Committee ever been established under article 47172) – the UN 
collective security system is more effective in the post-Cold War era than it has 
been during the confrontation between the two blocs. The Security Council can 
make use of its power under Chapter VII in case of a «breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression» (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: Art.39), but also      
– by means of a broad interpretation of the term «existence of any threat to the 
peace» (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: Art.39) – for very various 
purposes as notably humanitarian reasons, peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding missions173. (Al Imran, 16 November 2003: 1-3) It is thus not 
surprising that, while the UN had no role in Europe during the period of the Cold 
War, it has had a certain revival since the end of the bipolar world. One the one 
hand, the role of the UN could be positive in the sense that European states might 
well be more assenting towards NATO or EU out-of-area activities implying the 
use of force, if there were UN-mandated. But on the other hand, some European 
states – in the West as well as in the East – would be very reluctant to have 
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important issues determined by the Security Council, that is, first and foremost by 
the five Permanent member states. (Ghebali and Sauerwein, 1995: 174; Booth and 
Wheeler, 1992: 18) One has to note that both organizations – NATO and the EU 
with its ESDP/WEU – could in principle provide military forces for UN 
operations as long as the UN lacks its own military forces. One can assume that 
the UN might select EU forces for civil wars in Europe and its immediate 
periphery, while it might require the deployment of US-led NATO forces for 
conflicts in other areas. In addition, some UN operations might comprise an 
international coalition based on a core of NATO forces formed from the countries 
most likely to benefit from peace in the affected region. The alternative long-term 
solution for the UN is certainly to develop its own military forces. (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1999: 220-221)  
 
Although it appears that perspectives for an ordered European security 
architecture or regime – as it is often called by the Anglo-Saxons – seem rather 
remote, the network of institutions will yield a more durable peace for Europe if 
one compares it to regions where similar institutions are lacking in number and 
quality. (Yesson, 2001: 197) The institutional resources available for watching 
over Europe’s security are abundant, be it in terms of mechanism, mandate or 
procedure. Those resources are rather adequate to meet the threats and challenges 
facing Europe, but the missing point is actually the political will to make 
appropriate use of them. (Ghebali and Sauerwein, 1995: 217) 
 
§2. Conceptual and Strategic Distinctions 
 
Today, the European security system is – as we have just noticed – still in 
a state of flux following the end of the Cold War. In this evolving European 
security architecture, we should establish three conceptual distinctions for a better 
understanding. (Colard, 1996: 130-133)  
 
The first distinction involves the concepts “Europe’s defence” and 
“European defence”. The first concept implies the existence of a European 
security system to protect Europe (or Western Europe) but not necessarily 
managed by the Europeans. This concept applies to NATO. On the contrary, the 
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second concept entails the idea that the Europeans themselves take care of the 
defence of their own vital interests. This “Europe’s defence by Europeans” 
concept does not yet really exist, but its premises lie in European Union’s 
CFSP/ESDP. 
 
The second distinction is between the concepts “European defence 
security” and “European collective security”. (Colard, 1996: 130-133; Ghebali 
and Sauerwein, 1995: 216-217) The first notion is the designation of a military-
political alliance. It normally implies the existence of a high degree of 
homogeneity, indeed even integration, among allies eager to ensure their mutual 
security against any potential (often well-known) external aggressor. This applies 
to the EU and especially to the core of its member states willing and able to go 
deeper into military-political integration. As for the notion “European collective 
security”, it is global and involves the whole European continent. It excludes by 
definition homogeneity. Moreover, security is directed against any potential 
aggressor whether the aggressor is outside the system or whether inside it. The 
establishment of a pan-European collective security system – organized for 
instance within the framework of the OSCE – has been advocated by some since 
the end of the Cold War, especially in Moscow. In July 1994, the then Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev – calling the CSCE, as it was then 
called, the great winner of the post-Cold War security system – even formally 
proposed that the CSCE should assume the role of an umbrella organization with 
overall responsibility for coordinating security in Europe, in cooperation with 
NATO, the WEU, and the Council of Europe. On the contrary, the Western 
European states – backed by the United States – have always refused such a 
perspective and still refuse it today. One of the problems is that the concept of 
collective security is a “pre-nuclear concept” based upon some codes of 
behaviour, which historically turned out to be extremely difficult to maintain for 
every participating state. Moreover, concerning the EU member states, they do 
not have any sincere incentive to replace their existent working and effective 
regime adapted to their specific security needs with «a wider and unproven 
regime, which, in any event, would not add much to the UN Charter of collective 
security provisions.» (Ghebali and Sauerwein, 1995: 216)  
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The dilemma is often described as follows. The EU is striving to provide a 
collective defence through its ESDP, while the OSCE could be the organization 
managing a collective security for a “whole and free Europe”. However, the EU 
has to face the reluctance of some of its member states as well as the ambiguity of 
the United States which seems only to favour any European collective defence as 
long as it works within the framework of the NATO Alliance and remains 
subordinate to it. As for the OSCE, although it has a potential assignment, it lacks 
– as we have noticed earlier – not only the means174 to efficiently fulfil it, but also 
the political will of most of its participating states. NATO and the EU being seen 
as better opportunities, the OSCE suffers indeed from the competition with those 
two institutions. (Giessmann, December 2000: 48-51) There is no doubt that the 
countries which are member of the EU and/or NATO prefer to “invest” in these 
institutions rather than in the OSCE. However, since the latter – which has been 
defined, in contrast to NATO, as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of 
the United Nations Charter – has a restricted geographical scope and given that its 
participating states have a cultural affinity, some still argue that the OSCE could 
provide better opportunities for a regional organization compared to the UN. One 
can thus imagine that the OSCE could come close to a state of collective security 
like that created in the UN Charter. (Giessmann, December 2000: 50) 
 
The third distinction has to do with the relation between NATO and the 
EU, notably around the concepts of ESDI and ESDP. It seems indeed important to 
distinguish what is to be worked out within the framework of NATO and what is 
to be elaborated outside it.  
 
One has to note at this point that the disagreements between the USA and 
its European NATO allies over the ESDI came repeatedly after its creation at the 
NATO summit in Berlin in June 1996. These disagreements became rather acute. 
Washington criticizes the Europeans and their rhetorical commitments to a strong 
European pillar in NATO, while invariably failing to create the substance – in 
form of further military expenses – needed for such a pillar. The Europeans, on 
the other hand, reprove Washington’s own ambivalence about the prospect of a 
strong European defence capability. The US inconsistency is revealed by a 
repeated habit of sending mixed messages, as the US statement of an «ESDI that 
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is separable but not separate from NATO.» (Cohen, 6 December 1999: 27) (See 
also Gardner, 2002: 41) Washington appearing to express new caveats every time 
the European states move closer to making ESDI a reality, it seems to some 
European capitals that US policy is designed to perpetuate US dominance of the 
transatlantic relationship at all costs. (Carpenter, 2001: 3) Moreover, the 
Europeans are aware that a major portion of the US policy elite was sceptic about 
the ESDI, fearing that it would inevitably become a competitor to NATO and 
weaken Washington’s influence in the overall transatlantic relationship. 
(Carpenter, 2001: 19-21) The lack of enthusiasm of the Europeans to increase 
their military budgets – what was planned by the ESDI in order to bridge the 
growing gap between their military capabilities and those of the USA – amid the 
calm following the end of the Cold War was without no doubt reinforced by the 
fact that «greater burden sharing was not linked to a corresponding vision of 
greater power sharing within the alliance.» (Toje, Summer 2003: 65) In addition, 
some of the EU member states are very hopeful that the ESDP would go beyond 
the ESDI, thus leaving the latter behind. This poses nonetheless the question of 
the relation between the ESDP and the ESDI and more generally between the EU 
and NATO. As the decision was made to incorporate the WEU in the European 
Union, meaning that the role of European pillar of the WEU would now be 
carried out by the EU in the Atlantic Alliance, close coordination between 
NATO’s ESDI and EU’s ESDP is required. This poses in turn the more general 
question of the relation between the EU and NATO. The assimilation of the WEU 
in the EU as well as the connection between ESDI and ESDP created significant 
problems in the relations between the EU and NATO. (Ulusoy, December 2002-
February 2003: 183-184) ESDP’s link to NATO was considered a missing link of 
importance for political and operational reasons, thus illustrating the importance 
in having good coordination between NATO and the EU. Yet, the “Berlin Plus 
arrangement” provided that the EU can have recourse to NATO assets and 
capabilities also for its operations conducted within the framework of the ESDP. 
The NATO summit in Washington in April 1999175 then approved the “Berlin 
Plus arrangement”. Tortuous negotiations with Turkey176 – a NATO non-EU 
member state – over the “Berlin Plus arrangement” complicated however for 
some time NATO-EU relations. Within the context of EU’s commitment to take 
over NATO’s force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in October 
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2002177, the EU had to reach an agreement with NATO on sharing its military and 
planning assets for this EU operation. Yet, a dispute between Greece and Turkey 
blew up over EU access to NATO military assets and planning procedures. The 
main argument concerned appropriate provisions for the participation and 
consideration of the security interests of NATO non EU-member states in the case 
of autonomous EU-led operations, that is, EU-led operations without recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities. The long-standing disagreement was finally settled 
in mid-December 2002, after some concessions from the two sides and in the 
wake of the radical political change that occurred in Turkey, where the Justice and 
Development Party [Adalet Ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP] – a party with an Islamist 
pedigree – came to power the month before178. This settlement led eventually to 
the finalization of the “Berlin Plus arrangement” in December 2002. As a result, 
the EU «has gained access to NATO planning capabilities and it can work on the 
assumption that it has access to the NATO capabilities it requires, even when the 
formal decision will be taken on a case-by-case basis. However partial, the deal 
has somewhat ‘freed’ the ESDP of an important constraint and it has at last made 
the ‘devolution’ of some NATO activities to the EU possible.» (Missiroli, Winter 
2003: 495) (See also Howórth, 2005: 185-186; Cornish, April 2003: 5) 
 
However, the questions raised in December 1998 by Madeleine Albright’s 
‘three D’s’ have not been resolved and remain a major issue. At a NATO meeting 
in Brussels, the former Secretary of State – under the Clinton Administration – 
warned at that time the European leaders from the potential damage the ESDP 
could do to NATO. The ‘three D’s’ to avoid are the wasteful and divisive 
Duplication of NATO assets, the Discrimination against non-EU NATO member 
states and the Decoupling of the United States from European security. (Toje, 
Summer 2003: 69; Edwards, 2005: 49; Edwards, 2000: 9; Kugel, December 2003: 
80; Hulsman, December 2003: 1-2) Moreover, the differences within NATO over 
the US-led intervention in Iraq which appeared in March-April 2003 still have to 
fade away. During the height of European opposition to the US stance on Iraq, 
some European NATO allies – in particular France, Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg – showed a renewed interest in pursuing new efforts in an exclusive 
EU European Security and Defence Policy. Thus, on 29 April 2003, the four 
European countries we have just mentioned advocated the establishment of an 
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independent European military headquarters in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren, 
with an independent planning capacity. Despite reasserting the vital importance of 
the transatlantic relationship to progress in developing NATO-EU joint 
capabilities, they reopened the question, calling in effect the “Berlin Plus 
arrangement” into doubt. After having agreed to a compromise with Paris and 
Berlin, even London gave its go-ahead to the creation of this institution. The 
compromise was basically an attempt to save the “Berlin Plus arrangement” and 
to spare the transatlantic relation. The compromise thus provided for the 
following: the temporary planning cell SHAPE will be transformed into a 
permanent one for operations conducted with the recourse to NATO’s resources 
and capabilities; EU’s operational strategic planning unit at Cortenberg in 
Brussels will be strengthened to acquire an operational dimension for autonomous 
military actions, that is, without having recourse to NATO’s resources and 
capabilities179.  
 
As far as the relation between EU’s and NATO’s rapid reaction forces is 
concerned, it turned out that they seem to be fairly complementary. The European 
states were first anxious when the US Defence Minister came up with the US 
proposition to create the NATO Response Force [NRF] intended to fulfil a key 
role in the US-led war on terror and to respond to threats from weapons of mass 
destruction. The European governments feared that the NATO armed force would 
edge out the EU plans for their Rapid Reaction Force [RRF]. Yet, about six 
months after the creation of the RRF, the European NATO member states 
approved with their North American NATO allies – at NATO’s Prague Summit in 
November 2002 – the creation of the NRF, which they described as «mutually 
reinforcing (…) [with] the related work of the EU (…) while respecting the 
autonomy of both organisations.» (NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, 21 
November 2002, Point 4.a.) What brought up this change of mind in the European 
capitals? Certainly the understanding that the NRF was neither an alternative nor 
a rivalry to the RRF and even rounded fairly out the activities of the EU’s rapid 
reaction force. In view of the difficulties to achieve political consensus in the 
Union, one generally assumed that the probable operations of the RRF – capable 
of the full range of Petersberg tasks – would be those of low or middle intensity 
with clear legal or moral mandates. As for the tasks of the NRF, they would 
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typically be hard and short in time, as for instance the first intervention in a crisis 
region or the establishment of strongholds for a follow-up operation of longer 
duration and lower intensity. One could thus conceive a partition of roles between 
EU’s and NATO’s rapid reaction forces. Accordingly, the NRF – or a limited 
coalition conducted by the USA – would be used for missions, which would be 
politically too demanding and too dangerous for the EU, in the initial phase of an 
intervention, while the European RRF would follow later to complete the 
Petersberg tasks, notably the conventional peacekeeping of rather long duration 
and often of low to medium intensity. (Bailes, Januar 2003: 49-52) 
 
After having established the three conceptual distinctions, one should – for 
getting an even better picture of the evolving European security architecture – 
also distinguish three strategic security areas or spheres. Strategically, one can 
assert that the European security area is organized around three principal spheres. 
The first one is the “pan-European” security sphere covering the entire European 
continent and even a bit beyond. This security sphere is managed principally by 
the OSCE but also by the Council of Europe180. The second sphere is the “Euro-
Atlantic” or “Transatlantic Europe” security sphere and lies exclusively under the 
protection of NATO. As for the third sphere, it concerns what one calls the 
“Western European”, or more accurately the “EU-European” security sphere. It is 
managed by the EU with its security institutions, namely the WEU and especially 
the CFSP/ESDP, with the ESDP taking more and more the principal role, as it 
took over most of the functions once dedicated to the WEU. (Seidelmann, 2002: 
62-63; Colard, 1996: 130-133) 
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«There are unavoidable moments of truth for institutions, as there are for 
all major collective projects. For the European Union, concerning in particular the 
deepening of its common security and defence policy, enlargement is at a historic 
turning point: depending on whether it is well or badly handled, it could lead 
either to a breakthrough in terms of the Union’s ability to assert itself on the 
world stage or to a state of disintegration and paralysis such that it has no hope of 
influencing the rest of the world.» (Nicole Gnesotto in: Missiroli (ed.), June 2002: 
5) 
 
Europe’s security rests on numerous and overlapping international 
institutions, all of which lend much stability to Europe over the last sixty years, in 
different ways and with different effects. Amongst them, one has – as noticed in 
the precedent part – to point out the role of the two core institutions of the Cold 
War, i.e. the EU and NATO. It appeared thus fairly logical to extend these 
Western institutions that helped secure peace, prosperity and democracy over the 
last fifty years to Central and Eastern Europe as soon as the geopolitical context 
permitted it. These enlargement processes of both the EU and NATO reflect the 
magnetism these institutions exerted in Central and Eastern Europe. They can also 
be read as «the final mastery of the West over the organisations in the Soviet 
hemisphere.» (Lippert, 2002: 28) 
 
In having already become, or on the brink of becoming, member of the 
EU/NATO, the CEECs seek notably to fit irreversibly into the Western structures. 
These countries try indeed to find an assurance against Russian external policy, 
which could happen again to be imperialistic. They see their introduction in the 
Western structures as a complement to their own democratisation. 
 
As for Turkey, which is a member state of NATO since 1952 already, its 
future role and orientation do not seem to be yet clearly defined. However, 
everything leads us to believe that the country wants to turn strongly towards 
Europe, as its recent EU bid illustrate. 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc and decline of Russian power, the 
enlargement of NATO and the EU was in effect actively sought by Central and 
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Eastern Europeans governments, but was also officially in the strategic interest of 
their member states. (Seidelmann, 2002: 55) From a geopolitical point of view, 
after each EU/NATO expansion, the East recedes and the West expands, thus 
moving the dangers of a geopolitical no-man’s-land simply eastwards. (Brzezinski 
2004: 97) Nonetheless, the attitudes of some EU members – in particular France – 
towards the two eastwards enlargement processes appear to be somewhat 
ambiguous. Similar attitudes are also observed towards Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
Anyway, the unifying Europe which is emerging in a new European 
security architecture is of great importance for the evolution of zones of influence 
in Europe, which will be the main focus of the last part. 
 
Thus, this part focuses on the integration of Central and Eastern Europe 
into the Western alliances. It will start with an analysis of the enlargement process 
of the EU and NATO as they both have important security implications. This will 
set the stage for the following discussion about the interests and attitudes of the 
European states towards these enlargements. Special attention will be given to the 
principal three actors within the EU, namely the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. Finally, the Turkish question will be addressed.; the question of the 
potential EU membership of Turkey, situated geographically and geostrategically 
in an ambiguous but key position, is in that context indeed of crucial importance. 
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1) THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION AND EXPANDED NORTH 
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 
 
The link between European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been 
obvious and natural to all of the candidate countries from the CEECs. After the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, their primary political goal of joining the EU was indeed 
always linked with the other goal of joining NATO. Even if the admission 
procedures differ, NATO and EU membership were considered as interconnected 
processes. As an example, former Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bronisław 
Geremek181, declared in November 1997 that «though membership in the 
European Union (…) is a goal in itself, it is one which must be closely linked to 
the vigorous pursuit of the fastest and most effective manner of formal integration 
with NATO. The speed of advancement on these twin fronts may (and no doubt 
will) differ, but NATO and Union membership are interlocking vessels.» 
(Góralczyk, 1998: 57-58) 
 
To anticipate, one should note that it can be assumed that the process of 
both enlargements will not reduce the importance of the OSCE as a cooperative 
security arrangement, since neither of these organizations seems to aspire to 
encompass all of Europe. (Giessmann, December 2000: 39) 
 
Hence, this chapter will examine both of the enlargement processes. First, 
it will analyse the process of eastwards enlargement of the European Union, by 
focusing on its main internal implications. Then, its external implications and 
dynamics will be put into perspective with NATO’s expansion towards the East. 
 
 
a. The Process of Enlargement of the European Union 
 
The union of Europe is a dream - in the process of becoming reality - that 
dates back a long time. Up till now, already many projects of European 
construction – even of European federations – were promoted. Most of the 
projects of a unified Europe always discussed Europe as a whole, and not only 
Western Europe. Indeed, not only Victor Hugo in the middle of the 18th century, 
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but as well Coudenhove-Kalergi with its Paneurope in the years 1920-1930182, 
Winston Churchill with his proposal in 1946 of a United States of Europe – which 
was meant to be shaped on the pattern of the United States of America – and the 
Hague Congress in 1948 discussed a cooperation between all the countries of the 
European continent. Even with the launching of the Marshall Plan in 1947, the 
United States clearly expressed that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
were also invited to join the programme. In the Treaties establishing in 1951 the 
European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] and in the Treaties of Rome, which 
established in 1957 the European Economic Community [EEC] and the European 
Atomic Energy Community [Euratom], it was written as well that all the willing 
European countries would be included in these Treaties; even if at this time such a 
probability was rather unrealistic and appeared to have potentially no 
consequences. This did not eventually prevent Robert Schuman183 to include the 
fate of the Eastern countries within the objective of the European Community 
[EC] at its creation: «Nous devons faire l’Europe non seulement dans l’intérêt des 
peuples libres, mais pouvoir y recueillir les peuples de l’Est qui, délivrés des 
sujétions qu’ils ont subies jusqu’à présent, nous demanderaient leur adhésion et 
notre appui moral.» (Fries, 1995: 467) The projects of European union drafted 
during the Second World War and in the early post-war years all underlined the 
continental dimension of Europe. 
 
The changes (“die Wende”) of 1989/1990 gain all their importance within 
this scope of analysis. Indeed, whereas the different perspectives of the 
construction of Europe as a whole – i.e. including all the countries of the 
continent – have so far seemed to be a utopianism, suddenly they became topical 
and even represented a real challenge for the Western European states and 
institutions pushing for more integration. As far as the Central and Eastern 
European countries are concerned, the European idea was perceived with 
gratitude as a new course to follow. Nevertheless, this new order represented a 
challenge for them as well. Individuals like Václav Havel or Lech Wałęsa, who 
were considered widely as models, talked then about a “homecoming in Europe”, 
seen also as resuming in their countries with the pre-Soviet democratic 
experience. The EC, and later the EU, was perceived as the symbol of this 
Europe. As a consequence, the CEECs were attracted by the EC, then the EU, 
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which was renowned – despite its reckoned problems and inadequacies – as an 
economic, political and democratic community. Therefore, it was not a surprise 
that these countries claimed their entrance in the EU. Hungary and Poland were 
the two first countries which – with their application for membership in March-
April 1994 – launched a wave of application for membership amongst the Central 
and Eastern European countries. Thus, one can say that Schuman was right when 
he asserted that «les pays de l’Est (...) délivrés des sujétions qu’ils ont subies 
jusqu’à présent, nous demanderaient leur adhésion et notre appui moral.» (Fries, 
1995: 467) 
 
The reaction from these countries is historically completely logical. 
Moreover, for the founders and the constructors of “Europe”, the idea was also 
that these countries join the European Union to ensure peace and security on the 
continent. The end of the Cold War, in changing radically the security framework 
in Europe, brought such an opportunity. «From being potential enemies, the 
previous Warsaw Pact states became potential partners both to the EU and to 
NATO.» (Sjursen, 1999: 3-4) 
 
The enlargement of the EC and then of the EU has been and still is an 
exemplary security policy. On the one hand, it is a security policy by other means, 
via the extension of the EU’s norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to the 
applicants, which has made and will make instability and conflict in the wider 
region much less likely. On the other hand, it is also a security policy in its own 
right, since the new member states have brought and will bring in interests and 
skills that broaden the scope of the common external policies. This was the case 
with the first enlargement of the EC in 1973 incorporating the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark, the following enlargement of the 1980s to include post-authoritarian 
southern democracies and the first EU enlargement in 1995 incorporating 
Sweden, Finland and Austria.184 (Missiroli, March 2003: 1-2)  
 
As for the current enlargement process, it is fundamentally different from 
the previous ones185. Eight Central and Eastern countries – namely Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – 
plus the two Mediterranean countries, Cyprus and Malta, joined officially the EU 
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on 1 May 2004. However, this enlargement has to be taken into the entire current 
enlargement process, which includes also the eastwards enlargement still to come 
and meant to include Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and not to mention Turkey or 
other Balkan countries. After the 2004 enlargement, the EU contains so far almost 
all the Western European countries and already the eight mentioned former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe; the admission of two other 
CEECs – namely Bulgaria and Romania – is envisaged for 2007 and Croatia has 
started accession negotiations186 on 3 October 2005187. As for the other western 
Balkan states – namely the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
[FYROM]188, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro and Albania189 –, they are 
identified as potential candidate states. But neither Russia nor the former Soviet 
republics – with the exception of the Baltic states – did apply for membership in 
the EU.190  
 
The current enlargement process is fundamentally different from the 
previous ones as it differs profoundly in size, scope and character. The 2004 
enlargement is the most important in terms of number of states, with ten new 
member states (thus representing an increase of 67%) and of population (a relative 
increase of 20%), but corresponds only to a very little increase in GDP [Gross 
Domestic Product] of 5%.  
 
The present enlargement process has thus internal and external 
implications. As far as the internal implications are concerned, one can note that 
the 2004 enlargement brought two fundamental changes.  
 
The first one is the increase of the number of member states, and 
especially of “small” member states. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 281-285; Missiroli, 
March 2003: 2) The latter augment from the current ten (the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain representing the “large” member states) to nineteen, as 
only Poland is amongst the new members regarded as a “large” state. One has 
nevertheless to indicate that Spain and Poland are considered rather as “middle-
sized” states. Therefore, whereas the Europe of the six founding States contained 
three large and three small states, the Europe of the Twenty-Five contains six 
large states (considering Spain and Poland with approximately 40 million 
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inhabitants as large states) and nineteen small ones (all of them populated with 
less than 11 million, apart from the Netherlands with almost 16 million 
inhabitants). The loss of balance between large and small members is not new, but 
it became far more acute with the 2004 enlargement.  
 
This increase of small member states has enhanced feelings of 
exasperation amongst the big states. Small states have often taken advantage of 
their EU Presidency to increase their influence, most notably by using the CFSP 
as a way of exercising at least some restraint on the big states. This, consequently, 
regularly irritates the large states, especially France and the UK, given that both 
have tended to regard the CFSP as an instrument of their own national foreign 
policies. (Edwards, 2005: 59) 
 
Moreover, the increase of the number of member states brought up the 
question of the institutional capacity of the European Union in welcoming the 
applicant countries and at the same time (due to the large amount of small states) 
of the appropriate balance between large and small states. In other words, how 
must the long-term institutional question linked to the enlargement of the EU be 
resolved?  
 
The creation of most of the institutions of the EU goes back to the 
establishment of the European Communities, and especially of the European 
Economic Community in 1956-1957. As the European Community had only six 
members at that time, the institutions were only designed for these six members 
(three large and three small countries). But today, the European Union has 
twenty-five member states, which could soon become twenty-seven or even 
more191. As the composition of the institutions as well as the decision-making 
process within these institutions already posed a recurring problem in an EU with 
fifteen members, it was important to reform the functioning of the institutions in 
order to avoid their paralysis in an EU of twenty-five member states. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam was supposed to bring such reforms in 1997. But, though the 
slogan of the Amsterdam summit was “Ready for Enlargement”, the Amsterdam 
Treaty remained silent about the necessary institutional reforms.192 One had to 
await the European Council of Cologne – on 3 and 4 June 1999 – to confirm the 
 142
setting up of an Intergovernmental Conference [ICG] at the beginning of the year 
2000 with the aim to solve the institutional problems which had to be resolved 
before the enlargement and which were not resolved in Amsterdam. These are the 
famous so-called Amsterdam left-overs, namely a reform of the composition of 
the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and the extension of 
qualified majority to other decisions. The two first issues relate directly to the 
question of finding the appropriate balance between large and small states. The 
ICG gave its conclusions to the European Council which took place in Nice from 
7 to 10 December 2000. After bitter arguments, the 15 member states finally 
agreed on the following institutional reforms. Concerning the composition of the 
Commission, they decided that there would be only one commissioner per 
member state from 2005 onwards. Moreover, they decided that once the EU has 
27 members, the Council must agree on the composition of the Commission (in 
deciding the exact number of Commissioners and the arrangements for a fair 
system of rotation). As far as the weighting of votes in the Council is concerned, 
it was decided – besides increasing the number of votes – that three conditions 
should be fulfilled to have a qualified majority. A qualified majority will firstly 
require 73,4% of these votes193, secondly a majority of member states and thirdly 
62% of the population of the enlarged EU. With regard to the extension of the 
qualified majority voting to other decisions, the Council decided to extend the 
qualified majority in particular to decisions in the Structural Funds, but only from 
2007 onwards. Even though Romano Prodi – the then President of the European 
Commission – expressed disappointment that the reforms had not been more 
sweeping, though a consensus was hard to find and though one can consider that 
the reforms were not satisfactory194, the main objective – which was to prepare 
the EU for the enlargement – was fulfilled. The minimum goal, which was to 
reform the functioning of the institutions in order to avoid their paralysis once the 
enlargement completed, was thus achieved. These decisions are part of the Treaty 
of Nice which entered into force on 1 February 2003. Despite the critics, one has 
to agree with Günter Verheugen195 - the then European Commissioner in charge 
of the enlargement – when he noted that the European Council of Nice honoured 
«l’engagement qu’il avait pris à Helsinki en décembre 1999 [à savoir] s’assurer 
que l’Union européenne (UE) serait prête à accueillir de nouveaux Etats-membres 
dès la fin de l’an 2002, aussitôt que ceux-ci auront satisfait aux critères 
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d’adhésion.» (Verheugen, Avril-Juin 2001: 301) The European Council of Nice 
has indeed defined the framework for the institutional reform necessary for 
enlargement.  
 
As for the ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ – which has still 
to be ratified, thus certainly not entering into force and replacing the Nice Treaty 
before 2009 –, it tackled again this issues in reconsidering some points, notably 
the weighting of votes, deemed to have disproportionately advantaged the two 
middle-sized countries Spain and Poland. With regard to the Commission, it states 
that «the first Commission appointed under the provisions of the Constitution 
shall consist of one national from each Member State, [after what it will be 
slimmed down to] a number of members (…) corresponding to two thirds of the 
number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, 
decides to alter this number.» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 
June 2004: Art.I-26 (5-6)) As far as the weighting of votes in the Council is 
concerned, the Constitution for Europe asserts that «a qualified majority196 shall 
be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least 
fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the 
population of the Union. A blocking minority must include at least four Council 
members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.» (Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-25 (1)) 197 This system 
is meant to replace the one decided at Nice under which countries got a specific 
number of votes. There were objections that Spain and Poland had obtained too 
many votes under the Nice Treaty, while one considers generally the method 
provided for in the Constitution as a fairer balance between large, middle-sized 
and small countries. Concerning the voting by qualified majority, its principle will 
be generally applied to prevent inaction from occurring when 25 member states 
search for an agreement. A veto will however still exist for the member states in 
the areas of foreign policy, defence and taxation. In addition, a so-called 
“emergency brake” will allow a country outvoted on an issue to take its case to 
the European Council, where could nonetheless still be outvoted. Further, another 
matter directly concerning the question of the balance between large and small 
states is the composition of the European Parliament, upon what again both the 
Nice Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty decided. The European Constitution 
 144
lays down that the maximum number of seats is 750, thus increasing the number 
laid down in the Treaty of Nice by eighteen. While it sets the minimum number of 
seats per member state at six, so that all the major shades of political opinion of 
the small states are represented in the institution, the maximum number of seats is 
set at 96 (a reduction of three seats in comparison with the 99 the Treaty of Nice 
allocates to Germany). In addition, the Constitution breaks with the tradition of 
noting down in the treaties the detailed number of seats going to the different 
member states, in stating instead that «representation of citizens shall be 
degressively proportional.» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 
June 2004: Art.I-20 (2)) Amply in advance of the European Parliamentary 
elections in 2009, «the European Council shall adopt by unanimity, on the 
initiative of the European Parliament and with its consent, a European decision 
establishing the composition of the European Parliament, respecting the principles 
[mentioned above] (…)» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 
2004: Art.I-20 (2)) For the 2004-2009 legislature, the distribution of seats has 
been established in line with the rules of the Treaty of Nice. 
 
The second internal change is the increase of “poor” member states, 
causing a solidarity challenge within the Union. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 285-289; 
Missiroli, March 2003: 2) This poses the question of the resolution in the long-
term of the budgetary question linked to the “huge” eastwards enlargement(s). 
The admission of the ten new member states – especially the eight CEECs – 
caused an impoverishment impact inside the EU, which the following 
enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania will only intensify. 
 
In order to reduce at a maximum the negative impacts of the eastwards 
enlargement, the European Council of Copenhagen of 21 and 22 June 1993 drew 
up the conditions the applicant countries would have to fulfil. During this 
European Council, the conditions of admission that the applicant countries would 
have to fulfil were formulated as follows: «L’adhésion requiert de la part du pays 
candidat qu’il ait des institutions stables garantissant la démocratie, la primauté du 
droit, les droits de l’homme, le respect des minorités et leur protection, l’existence 
d’une économie de marché viable ainsi que la capacité de faire face à la pression 
concurrentielle et aux forces du marché à l’intérieur de l’Union. L’adhésion 
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présuppose la capacité du pays candidat à en assumer les obligations, et 
notamment à souscrire aux objectifs de l’union politique, économique et 
monétaire. La capacité de l’Union à assimiler de nouveaux membres tout en 
maintenant l’élan de l’intégration européenne constitue également un élément 
important répondant à l’intérêt général, aussi bien de l’Union que des pays 
candidats.» (Conseil européen de Copenhague, 1993, point 1.13) The applicant 
countries have therefore to fulfil the conditions provided for in the TEU198, as 
well as the conditions formulated during the Copenhagen European Council. 
These “Copenhagen criteria” hold that the applicant members have to meet a 
certain political and economic development in order to be able to become member 
of the EU. In December 1997, the European Council of Luxembourg mandated 
the European Commission to establish an annual report on the progresses in the 
political and economic reforms as well as in the adaptation of the acquis 
communautaire done by the applicant countries. The ten new member states 
seemed fairly prepared, since they had transcribed the very large majority of the 
acquis communautaire at their admission in May 2004. There have been major 
defaults for only 3% of the communitarian legislation. As for the Copenhagen 
criteria, it was also fulfilled satisfactorily. With the exception of the Sudeten 
conflict199 between the Czech Republic and Germany – as well as Austria to some 
extent –, an adequate solution has even been found for the difficult question of 
minorities in the new member states200. One has to add that Germany and Austria 
– fearful of a flood of lowly paid workers in potentially new member countries 
crossing their borders and driving down wage levels – obtained satisfaction on 
their request to ban Eastern European workers from EU labour markets for up to 
seven years.201 
 
On the one hand, the impoverishment impact inside the EU – caused by 
the 2004 enlargement – provokes a reduction of the average wealth per capita of 
12,5% in nominal value and of 8% in purchasing power parity, in comparison to 
the average of the EU Fifteen. The GDP per capita in the ten new members 
calculated in purchasing power standards lies slightly below 50% of the level of 
the EU Fifteen. On the other hand, the eastwards enlargement represents the 
possibility for the new member states for a swift catching up, which would lead in 
turn to a boost to the economy on the entire continent. One hopes that the new 
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member states will repeat the catching up scenario of the so-called “cohesion 
countries” (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) once these entered the EU and 
not the arduous scenario of the new German Bundesländer. The latter had been 
thrown directly into the EMU without having had the possibility to restructure 
their industries, damaging thus – despite the substantial financial assistance 
coming from the old Bundesländer – the competitiveness of their industries so 
that their economy still did not recover the level of employment and of 
productivity preceding the opening up of the Berlin Wall. Contrary to the new 
Bundesländer, the CEECs had benefited from a very long transition period (up to 
twenty years if one considers the extension for the setting up of the free 
movement of persons), they had the time to progressively carry out restructuring 
and privatisation schemes, and a renewal of the national elites took place rather 
than a “colonisation” by Western elites. This thrust impels one to compare the 
new member states to the situation experienced by Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, whose GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) has extraordinarily 
increased since their entry into the EC, especially in the last two decades202. 
Currently, the most “wealthy” of the ten new member states are the very small 
states, like Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia (with a GDP per capita situated 
respectively at 85%, 76% and 76% of the average of the EU Twenty-Five in 
purchasing power parity). The least wealthy are other very small states, namely 
the three Baltic states (below the 50% mark), but also Hungary (with 54%) and 
particularly Poland, whose GDP per capita is also situated below the 50% mark of 
the EU Twenty-Five. Yet, the rhythm of catching up can vary from one country to 
another. For instance, the Baltic states can take advantage of their small size, the 
reforming of a completely new and modern administration as well as their open 
relationship with the outside world. Conversely, Poland seems to be the worst off, 
since it has serious structural handicaps; the agriculture represents a heavy weight 
with an approximate 20% of the working population and the unemployment rate 
is the highest of the new members (about 19%). Yet, in sum, one expects that the 
economies of the CEECs plus Malta and Cyprus will eventually catch up, even if 
this process will be slow – particularly for some countries, notably Poland. The 
economic growth in the CEECs will in turn boost the exports of the fifteen old 
members, as it is partly already the case (with the balance of trade largely positive 
in the old member states). The enlargement should hence represent an economic 
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benefit for all the European countries, even though some uncertainties still exist. 
One notably wonders if the economic growth will last in the so-called “cohesion 
countries”, once the financial aids to these countries end, and if former communist 
countries will be able to experience the same successful scenario as those 
countries. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 286-288) 
 
The success of the “cohesion countries” has been made possible largely 
thanks to the European budget, via the structural and cohesion funds but also via 
the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP]. Through these redistributive policies      
– allowing basically a financial transfer from the net contributors to the net 
beneficiaries –, the European budget has the function of preserving the social 
cohesion between the states and regions of the EU. The EU budget is financed by 
four sources of revenue. The first is the customs duties which are taken at the 
external borders of the EU. The second are the agricultural levies that are imposed 
on trade with non-member countries. The revenue from VAT [Value Added Tax], 
which is collected in the member states, is the third source of revenue of the EU. 
By far the largest proportion of the Union’s revenue comes from its share of 
member states’ VAT receipts. The fourth and last source of the EU budget are the 
direct contributions done by the member states; these are based on the total GNP 
[Gross National Product] of all member states at market prices, calculated from a 
uniform base. The fourth source of revenue – that was introduced by the Single 
European Act in 1986 – is called in as an additional resource only where the 
Union’s financial requirements cannot be covered by the three original resources. 
Since the new member states all contribute only for a little amount to the budget 
of the Union (as will do Bulgaria and Romania when they enter, probably in 
2007) and since the amount of farmers will more than double in an EU Twenty-
Seven, the communitarian policies could not have been applied to the new 
members as they have been until the EU Fifteen; all the more that discussions 
about certain sources of Community financing, especially the direct contributions 
of the member states203, come up regularly the last years. In order to prevent the 
communitarian expenditures from exploding, the net contributors – in particular 
Germany, but also the Netherlands and Sweden – were pushing for a budgetary 
reform that would, if not diminish their contribution, at least not enhance it 
because of the enlargement. The question of the budgetary reform being linked to 
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the reform of costly EU policies, especially the Common Agricultural Policy 
[CAP] and the regional policy, this reform was not easy to attain and needed the 
backing on the one hand of France – that is attached to the CAP – and on the other 
hand of Spain and other cohesion member states which feared a diminishing of 
their benefits received from the regional policy. Therefore, and somewhat 
unexpectedly, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Chirac  
– meeting before the European Council of Brussels of 24 and 25 October 2002 – 
agreed on a financing plan for the CAP through to 2013.204 The agreement was 
then endorsed by the European Council. This was regarded as a clear signal that 
the Franco-German alliance was still the pivotal axis around which EU 
agreements are spun. According to the Franco-German agreement, the European 
Council decided to reform the CAP not before 2006, when the financial 
perspectives – agreed at the European Council in Berlin in March 1999205 – run 
out. It even decided to keep the CAP basically unchanged until 2013, but with 
reduced German contributions. Accordingly, farm spending will be capped 
starting in 2007 and will not increase beyond the rate of inflation up to 2013.206 
For that reason, it was agreed that the new member states would receive the direct 
aids – which represent about two-thirds (hectare payments, livestock payments, 
production aid) of CAP’s spending – very progressively, from 25% of the Union’s 
average in 2004 to 100% in 2013, at the expense of the farmers of the old member 
states, which will see their aids decrease considerably.207 Despite these advances, 
the reform of the CAP needs to be worked out further, notably in connection with 
the trade negotiations taking place within the WTO. (Brussels European Council, 
24 and 25 October 2002: 4-7) As for the regional policy, the Copenhagen 
European Council of 12 and 13 December 2002 – which officially agreed to 
enlarge the EU on 1 May 2004 to ten new members – decided to limit at first the 
regional aids to the new member states over the period 2004 to 2006. 
Accordingly, the ten new member states will get 15% of EU’s structural and 
cohesion funds over this period. (Copenhagen European Council, 12 And 13 
December 2002: 11-12; Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 288) After tough negotiations, the 
Twenty-Five have eventually agreed at the Brussels European Council of 
December 2005 on how the regional policy will be distributed among them in the 
post-2006 era.  
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The admissions of Bulgaria and Romania – planned for 2007 – will further 
increase the necessary spending used for the agricultural and regional policies. 
The negotiations for EU’s next long-term budget planning for the period from 
2007 to 2013 – or Agenda 2007 – held at Twenty-Five have been very arduous, as 
one had to bring together the interests of the net contributors with that of the net 
beneficiaries. But, due to its rejection by the European Parliament in January 2006 
and to European Commission’s reservations, the budget is not yet officially 
adopted.208  
 
As far as the external implications of the current enlargement process are 
concerned, there are primarily the increase of the EU’s global weight and 
expansion of its international interests. (K. Smith, 2005: 271) Furthermore, one 
can mention that the enlarged EU has now a significantly higher population than 
the USA or Japan, thus further increasing its status as the largest trading group in 
the world. (Cameron, 1999: 103) One can also mention the progressive extension 
of Schengen rules to the new EU member states, which, in creating a ‘hard’ 
border, could impede some cross-border economic integration with regions 
remaining beyond the Schengen border. (K. Smith, 2005: 286) Yet, one can note 
that the external implications of the EU enlargement are not yet completely 
perceptible. The question of which common foreign, security and defence policy 
the enlarged EU will end up with must still be raised. Rather than giving an 
accurate answer to this question, it would be more sensible to address at this point 
what preferences as well as specific and general interests the ten new member 
states – not to forget the applicant countries deemed to join soon – brought and 
will bring into the EU. One has to add that the research has so far not really 
focused on the possible interplay between the two processes and dynamics, 
namely the EU enlargement and EU’s CFSP/ESDP. (Missiroli, March 2003: 2) 
 
One can also anyway mention a potential hazardous consequences of EU 
enlargement, in case the latter is not cleverly managed. If it involves too much 
expansion too quickly, EU enlargement «might lead the EU to become more like 
the OSCE than its former self, more a framework than an ‘action organisation’.» 
(Hill and Smith, 2005:400) 
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But, in order to better understand the further external implications and 
dynamics of the current enlargement process of the EU, one will put it – in the 
following section – within the perspective of NATO’s expansion towards the 
East.  
 
 
b. The Dynamics of the Two Enlargements 
 
The CFSP/ESDP constituting a part of the acquis communautaire, the ten 
new member states as well as the applicant states had (or still have) to incorporate 
into their national laws prior to EU accession the European legislation concerning 
the CFSP/ESDP provisions. The negotiations over the CFSP relevant chapters of 
the acquis reached an end fairly quickly in late 2000 for all candidate countries at 
that time. A minor problem concerned the bilateral arrangements and sub-regional 
economic integration that proved effective in improving relations and security at 
all levels, as the Višegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia), the Nordic-Baltic area or the more recent arrangements in South-
Eastern Europe, since the candidate countries were afraid to dismantle them. The 
EU resolved the problem in gradually absorbing these sub-regional bi- and 
multilateral structures in its policies. As for still pending bilateral border issues    
– as between Russia and Estonia, Latvia and Belarus as well as Slovenia and 
Croatia –, though there have not played a significant role in the enlargement 
process, they have still to be dealt with in a broader EU framework. Yet, generally 
speaking, enlarging the CFSP acquis to the CEECs did not cause any noteworthy 
problem, «particularly as a result of its declaratory nature, the limited domestic 
adjustments it has required, and the substantial lack of budgetary burdens for 
either side.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 3) One has to add, however, that the launch 
of the ESDP in 1999 triggered defensive reactions amongst the CEECs. Having 
found strong US support to help guarantee their security and preferring thus 
NATO protection, the CEECs feared that the ESDP could undermine NATO’s 
internal cohesion. Some of them even suspected it to be a sort of consolation prize 
for not being admitted into the Atlantic Alliance. As for the three CEECs already 
NATO members at that time, i.e. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, they 
judged an ESDP tolerable only as an ESDI within – or at least under the 
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supervision of – NATO. Additionally, the fact that most of the CEECs share the 
historical experience in betrayal by France and domination by Germany adds to 
the explanation why the CEECs in general do not see the CFSP/ESDP as a 
realistic alternative to NATO in terms of defence. (Edwards, 2005: 60; 
Zaborowski, January 2005: 61-65; Missiroli, March 2003: 6-8; Heisberg, 1998: 
192) But, fearing potentially even higher obstacles to overcome on their road to 
EU admission, they eventually accepted the ESDP as finally set out in the Nice 
Treaty. As the eight CEECs new member states plus Bulgaria and Romania have 
been increasingly engaged in peace support operations, thus proving their 
willingness and ability to participate and perform peace support operations, one 
can consider that they are entirely capable of participating in the operations 
provided for by the ESDP. The CEECs want to be considered as fully equal 
members to the old ones, but face at the same time a certain dichotomy, also 
observed in some of the old members. In fact, on the one hand, they are reluctant 
to majority voting and enhanced cooperation in the CFSP/ESDP, as both may 
rather render them more marginal in decision-making. On the other hand, they are 
quite in favour of the use of constructive abstention209 – permitting a country to 
abstain without blocking the adoption of a decision – which would keep them 
away from confronting them with responsibilities that may challenge their 
resources or internal cohesion.210 As for the scope of the CFSP/ESDP, one can 
assert that the last enlargement (and the forthcoming to the other CEECs) has not 
significantly widened the horizons of the EU’s external policies, as none of the 
CEECs nor the two Mediterranean islands have significant overseas interests or 
extensions211. Yet, these CEECs – especially the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Romania whose Eastern borders will with great probability (after 
Romania would have joined) become the ultimate limes of the EU – will certainly 
put immense importance on the safety of EU’s Eastern borders and all common 
direct neighbourhood policies, i.e. Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and of course 
Russia. These questions will most probably shape their behaviour on CFSP/ESDP 
and other issues212. (Sjursen, 1998: 7-8) Thus, one can assert that the CEECs 
impact on CFSP and ESDP will be «geographically limited but intensely 
focused.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 8) Moreover, one has to add that it can be 
expected that the new EU member states will, at least initially, have a rather 
passive attitude about CFSP/ESDP issues, «unless they feel that their immediate 
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interests are involved or that they can increase their negotiating power inside the 
Union.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 8)  
 
Even if NATO and EU membership were considered as interconnected 
processes, the CEECs advocate a clear discernment between NATO and the EU. 
In fact, they did not want to be forced to choose between the United States and the 
Union on security matters. In the wake of the opening up of the Berlin Wall, 
membership in the Western international organization quickly became the central 
foreign policy goal of the new governments of the CEECs. Their approach 
entailed the objective of EU membership for economic matters, and NATO 
membership for security issues, but with the latter set up as the main concern. 
NATO membership, indeed, seemed to have always been the number one priority 
for the former European communist states, as only NATO could provide the 
internal and external security they were seeking. Due mainly to pressure from the 
US government but also from the German one which wished to engage NATO in 
a strategic dialogue with the former member states of the Warsaw Pact, the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC] – which changed its name some years later 
into Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC] – was created in December 1991 
with the objective to provide a formal but limited link between the NATO 
members and the new government of the CEECs. The NACC’s mandate was to 
initiate regular consultations over a wide range of areas, including traditional 
human rights concerns, economic transitions, as well as security and related 
issues. As the NACC could not sufficiently satisfy the needs and demands of the 
CEECs, since it was considered together with the CSCE and even the EU as a 
middle station on the way to full NATO membership, the question of NATO 
expansion found itself debated within the Clinton administration. As most of the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe favoured immediate expansion while 
most in the West were rather reluctant about such an outcome, the US government 
eventually chose a compromise, a kind of middle road which took the shape of the 
Partnership for Peace [PfP]. The PfP was formally established at NATO’s summit 
meeting in January 1994. Like the NACC, NATO’s PfP included almost all of the 
Central and East European states as well as the former republics of the Soviet 
Union. The PfP protocols did not provide Article 5 protection s, but allowed 
participation in NATO operations. Consequently, many PfP states participated in 
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NATO’s IFOR and SFOR operations. (Hodge, 2002: 105; Sandler and Hartley, 
1999: 202-203) «It is unlikely that the primary motivation for participation was 
concern about the Bosnia situation per se; it was part of their concerted 
campaigns to move beyond membership in PfP. Their goals were (…) full NATO 
membership with Article 5 security assurances.» (Rupp, 2001: 164-165) 
 
It was certainly the Clinton administration which was leading the train of 
PfP towards full NATO membership. It is thus no surprise that US President 
Clinton called on NATO in autumn 1996 to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic as full members in spring 1999. In July 1997, at its Madrid summit, 
NATO formally invited these three once-Warsaw Pact members to join the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization by April 1999, given they fulfil the organization’s 
accession requirements. As they thoroughly worked on meeting NATO’s 
prerequisites in the two following years, the three former Soviet satellites (Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic) formally joined NATO on 12 March 1999, at 
the Washington summit coincidently also celebrating the organization’s 50th 
anniversary celebrations. Moscow did not agree about this NATO expansion, 
provoking a freeze of Russian-Western relations for up to three years, despite 
NATO’s PfP with Russia of June 1994 and the Founding Act establishing in May 
1997 the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council213. Moreover, Russia has even 
contributed forces to NATO’s IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia. Yet, 
Russia’s opposition did neither hamper the following NATO expansion, which 
occurred officially on 29 March 2004 with the admission of the three remaining 
former Soviet satellites (Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania), three former Soviet 
Republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) as well as a former socialist Republic 
of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia). Albeit Russian President Vladimir Putin 
asserted that NATO-Russia relations were developing positively, Moscow 
showed particular anger at the inclusion in NATO of the Baltic states, being all 
former Soviet Republics. Yet, Russia’s opposition to this enlargement was far less 
caustic than to the 1999 one. This can be explained by the fact that Russia-NATO 
relations have developed for the better in the last years. Russia is certainly glad 
that NATO – being engaged in Afghanistan and involved in Iraq – casts its eyes 
not solely on the East, but on other parts of the planet. Moscow is also pleased 
that NATO forces in Europe are weaker than ever and will undoubtedly be further 
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downsized. One has to add that the changes of Presidents on both sides of the 
Bering Sea have certainly also had an influence on the smoothing of the Russia-
NATO relations.214 In addition, Russia’s more intense opposition to the 1999 
enlargement is also partly explained by the fact that it occurred during the run-up 
to the Kosovo War. During a two month period, Russia had to contemplate the 
three most militarily powerful of its former satellites joining the opposing military 
alliance, while one of its most loyal European allies – namely Serbia – suffered an 
air bombing campaign by the same military alliance. Russia felt thus betrayed, all 
the more that one of the deals made by the administration of former US President 
George H. Bush in the last days of the Cold War was the promise not to expand 
NATO eastwards in compensation of a reunited Germany as a full member of 
NATO. (Global Policy Forum, 2004: 1-4; Rupp, 2001: 164-168) 
 
Anyhow, with the two post-Cold War expansions, ten new NATO 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe – most of them have been part of the 
now extinct Warsaw Pact – are now full and permanent members of NATO, thus 
enjoying the full security guarantees found in Article 5 of the founding 
Washington Treaty. Throughout its expansion process, NATO – notably in order 
to better face terrorist threats and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – 
has been transformed «from a collective defence organisation into an organisation 
that, at least on paper, more closely resembles a collective security organisation.» 
(Rupp, 2001: 172) In fact, NATO started in the early 1990s a process which 
transforms it progressively from a defence pact into a political organization. 
(Fouskas, Autumn 2001: 54) 
 
As for possible further enlargements, one can expect them to be less 
problematic than the two previous enlargements. In fact, the next NATO 
expansion – likely to take in the Balkan states of Croatia and Macedonia and 
maybe also Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina – all fall behind NATO’s new 
Eastern limes and would thus not threaten Russia at all. An expansion to 
Finland215 – which considered submitting an application in the late 1990s – would 
be the only one in the near future that might irritate Moscow, though it would 
certainly not be as traumatic for the latter as the admissions of the Baltic states. In 
a more remote future, one will possibly discuss further NATO expansion to 
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former Soviet Republics such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan or even 
Armenia. (Brzezinski, 2004: 100) These potential expansions beyond the current 
NATO’s Eastern limes will certainly have as a consequence to once more 
infuriate Moscow, since once more NATO’s expansion to former Soviet territory 
will be at stake. As for the possibility that Russia might one day request 
membership, it seems rather unrealistic today, but is advocated by some – such as 
James Addison Baker the former Secretary of State under the administration of 
President George Herbert Bush – and should thus not be completely excluded. 216 
 
Furthermore, one has to note that the vigorous intervention of NATO in 
the former Yugoslavia involves military deployments in response to “actual” 
security crises, in opposition to NATO’s enlargement to the CEECs entailing 
official commitments to new member states for “plausible” security threats. The 
former implies the de facto and ad hoc absorption of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Serb province of Kosovo into NATO. (Hodge, 2002: 152-153) Besides, one can 
surely state that the Balkan experience has in many ways «done more to transform 
NATO functionally than a decade’s worth of official declarations on expansion or 
visionary documents on new strategic concepts.» (Hodge, 2002: 97)  
 
As the shaping of the new European security system is being drawn 
largely in line with preferences of the United States – together with its NATO 
allies –, we should at present examine the US interests in the expansion of NATO, 
given that the USA is certainly the country influencing most this issue.217 One has 
to note that due to Russia’s current political, economic and military weakness, 
Russian preferences have very little influence on the outcome of daily 
developments in European security, thus leaving a clear field to Washington and 
its NATO allies. (Sloan, January 2003: 1-2) Consequently, to better illustrate the 
US attitude towards NATO enlargement, one should at present analyse the 
conceptual approaches to NATO’s expansion, in referring to the approaches         
– mainly based on the US interests at stake – arguing for and against NATO 
enlargement. This should help us to find part of the answer to the following 
question: does opening up NATO to the East enhance the security of Central and 
Eastern Europe, or does it occur on the contrary at the expense of Russian 
interests, thus jeopardizing the long-term stability on the European continent? 
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Different visions clash concerning the appropriateness of enlargement, with rarely 
consensus even among the same schools of thought. To keep a clear overview in 
this confusion we will refer to the two dominant approaches on the consequences 
of NATO enlargement. (Fouskas, Autumn 2001: 53-54; David, 1999: 9-25) The 
first can be called the “Yalta” approach and the second can be called the 
“Maastricht” approach, as done by Charles-Philippe David. 
 
The Yalta approach is a geopolitical one. According to it, the enlargement 
causes a new partition of Europe, similar to the one which occurred in Yalta, 
where in February 1945, as indicated by the myth, the USA, the UK and the 
Soviet Union divided Europe amongst themselves. This reflects, as in 1945, the 
prevailing geopolitical realities, which are today dominated by the end of the Cold 
War. The victorious powers of the Cold War – namely NATO and the USA –, 
wishing to control the strategic vacant space in Central and Eastern Europe, have 
responded favourably to the request made by the CEECs to join the Western 
military alliance, given the fact that these countries were searching protection 
from a potential Russian aggression. The realist school of thought puts forward 
two general responses to the question of NATO enlargement according to the 
Yalta approach. The first one is based on an analysis of the balance of power 
among the great powers. It implies the need to counter geopolitical threats 
through the balance of power, given that the existence of alliances calls on the 
need for balance. According to this approach, alliances – promoting balance and 
protecting their member states from the threat posed by other states and    
alliances – remain a central element in defining this balance. The old bipolar 
world order could thus be replaced by a new system – whether it be a bipolar or 
even a multipolar one – which the enlargement could only promote. But, on the 
other hand, since no threat exists today for Western Europe – if one considers 
Russia as representing no treat –, some neo-realists assert that there is less 
justification for an alliance such as NATO in the current European geopolitical 
context. One of the leading neo-realists, Kenneth Waltz, predicted in 1993 that 
«NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are.» (Waltz, Fall 1993: 76) Other 
neo-realists – as for instance the offensive neo-realist John Mearsheimer – assert, 
on the contrary, that NATO is still necessary as a balance against the prospect of a 
long-term threat, which could take the form of either a Russian hegemony or a 
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German one. They believe indeed that, without NATO, these hegemonies could 
re-emerge as traditional spheres of influence. (Mearsheimer, Summer 1990: 5-56) 
Both tendencies of this “balancing” argument agree nonetheless that in theory 
without a balancing function, NATO has no raison d’être. As for the second 
variant of the Yalta approach, it is based on a “bandwagoning” (i.e. jumping on a 
moving train) argument. It suggests a tendency to join the winning power and 
alliance in periods of fundamental change in the world order. When a hegemonic 
power leads to the emergence of a unipolar system – as the international system is 
witnessing nowadays with the US hegemon, especially in Europe –, states tend to 
support this dominance in order to share the benefits. The CEECs’ request to join 
the Western alliances, essentially NATO, in the wake of the disappearance of the 
Soviet Union can be understood in this sense, as they are looking to fully exploit 
the opportunities the rising US hegemon is leaving in its wake. Thus, in terms of 
security, the CEECs’ aspiration to join the “Western camp” «can be explained not 
by fear of threat but by the opportunity for gain.» (David, 1999: 15) Since in this 
case strategic order is maintained by hegemony, the US hegemony improves 
prospects for security and stability through NATO enlargement. 
 
The realists and neo-realists are however sharply divided on the issue of 
the consequences of NATO enlargement, be they supporters of one or the other of 
the two variants of the Yalta approach. There are some who see a beneficial effect 
of NATO’s expansion for European security, while others only envisage the 
impact of NATO enlargement on European security as a cause for concern.  
 
The pro-enlargement stance follows the following reasoning. The United 
States should take advantage of the geopolitical void left by the collapse of the 
socialist camp (through “bandwagoning”) and impede a new Russian threat in a 
long-term perspective (through “balancing”). This viewpoint is advocated by 
many realist and neo-realist strategists, most notably Henry Kissinger and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. One can summarize their arguments into the following 
observations. First, NATO had to expand towards the CEECs in order to prevent 
«a zone of insecurity between Europe and Russia [that could] (…) have a suction 
effect on both, inevitably causing tensions and rivalry.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 81) 
(See also Brzezinski, 2004: 97) Second, the rapidity of NATO’s expansion 
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towards the former Soviet satellites plus the Baltic states and maybe Ukraine 
should prevent Russia from retrieving its former sphere of influence, as it would 
deter Russia from engaging into territorial revisionism to recover lost territories or 
intimidate its neighbours. Third, NATO’s enlargement towards the East is a 
condition to seize the opportunity of a new and stable European security 
architecture, although the realist and neo-realist strategists generally reject as 
irrational the admission of Russia in NATO. Fourth, it is argued that NATO 
expansion confers also benefits to Russia, since it contains the CEECs – in 
particular the Baltic states – from taking advantage of Russia’s weakness. 
(Kissinger, 1994: 823-825; Brzezinski, 2004: 96-98; Brzezinski, 1997: 80-86; 
Brzezinski, January-February 1995: 26-42; Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 92-93; 
Chauprade, 2003: 53-58) 
 
As for other realists, such as the moderate George Kennan218 as well as 
Michael Mandelbaum, they express the opinion that NATO’s eastwards 
expansion can lead in the long-term to the reappearance of the Russian threat, by 
fostering insecurity in Russia, and the overstretching of the Atlantic Alliance, thus 
undermining its political and organizational cohesion. They fear the following 
developments. First, NATO enlargement could thrust Russia towards a radical 
nationalist regime willing to rebuild a security zone in opposition to NATO, based 
for instance on the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] transformed into 
a military alliance. Second, NATO expansion could prompt Russia to lose respect 
for disarmament treaties and care less about the climate of trust that it has 
developed with Washington. Third, they assert that the enlargement process 
triggers the question of exclusion, that is, the case of countries wanting to join 
NATO but banished from the organization’s expansion. This hypothetic case 
could most certainly only concern a few countries, if one thinks in the future 
about, possibly, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasian countries or (though less likely) 
Belarus. Fourth, they fear that, «in seeking a military alliance with the Central and 
Eastern states, NATO would be undermining the progress of common security 
[which has yielded different disarmament agreements, confidence-building 
measures and a better mutual understanding] in favour of a conception of defence 
rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War.» (David, 1999: 17) In other words, 
it would place in doubt the entire post-Cold War settlement. Fifth, «within NATO 
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itself, expansion might reduce the alliance’s credibility at the politically most 
fundamental point: its promise to defend without exception any member in the 
event of an attack.» (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 94) Indeed, it is feared that 
NATO’s capacity and political will to defend its member states’ security will 
decrease with its enlargement, as one deems NATO neither capable nor willing to 
defend some of them considered too close to Russia, all the more if it is done with 
the risk of a war with the latter. Sixth, one fears that the prospect of NATO 
expansion into areas of Europe which are more difficult to defend might also 
encourage US isolationism, causing in turn a fatal blow to international peace and 
security. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 94-96) 
 
In the geopolitical arguments both in favour and against the Yalta 
approach, the real issue raised by the realists is not the extension of security to the 
CEECs – though considerable importance is given to it – but the way and manner 
to cope with Russian power. 
 
As for the second dominant approach to the consequences of NATO 
enlargement, it is referred to as the “Maastricht” approach. The Maastricht 
approach is a regionalist and integrationalist one. According to it, European 
integration and institutionalism is meant to further secure and develop the stability 
of the European security, political and economic space, as in the spirit of the 
treaty on the European Union. As advocated by the liberal school of thought, 
cooperative security and economic interdependence, favoured by the development 
of institutions and European integration, produce stability, peace and economic 
growth. Alliances are seen as instruments for the propagation and sharing of 
security values and resources. In terms of security, institutions such as NATO 
force states to negotiate and to respect common principles and standards, thus 
facilitating mutual cooperation. In the security field, cooperation can take the 
form of institutionalisation of mechanisms for consultation, crisis prevention, 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, confidence-building, disarmament 
and so on. As for the political benefits, one postulates that since democracies tend 
to share a community of identical values and to promote ever greater 
interdependence, they avoid conflict, thus bringing a democratic peace. In terms 
of economy, one expects that increasingly interdependent national and regional 
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economies consolidate free markets and reinforce regional economic cooperation, 
thus reducing prospects of conflict. According to these three ideas, NATO’s role 
in the post-Cold War era is first to make a contribution to reinforce the security 
community and consolidate European stability (as the creation of the CJTF, the 
EAPC and the PfP illustrates), second to act as a political alliance with the 
objective to maintain and reinforce – among other things – democratic norms, and 
thirdly to foster economic growth through the preservation of a secure and stable 
climate favourable to economic exchanges. 
 
The supporters of the Maastricht approach agree that an opening to the 
East would ensure greater stability for Europe. Yet, once again, they do not agree 
on the role of NATO expansion and adopt consequently two contrasting 
standpoints. The pro-enlargement position perceives NATO as the ideal 
institution for permitting the CEECs to participate in the process of regional 
integration, thus assigning an important role to NATO enlargement in the 
development of broader integration and institutionalisation. Other liberal theorists 
believe, on the contrary, that NATO is not the appropriate institution for that role 
and judge other institutions – as the EU or even the OSCE – as better suited for 
embedding the CEECs into European integration and institutionalism. Again, this 
debate seems to address only barely the basic issue, which is the fate of Russia. 
(David, 1999: 9-25) 
 
It seems that US strategists follow to a great extent the pro-enlargement 
Yalta approach, as advocated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The latter states: «a 
comprehensive U.S. policy for Eurasia as a whole will not be possible if the effort 
to widen NATO, having launched by the United States, stalls and falters. That 
failure would discredit American leadership; (…) for America, it would (…) be 
not only a regional defeat but a global defeat as well.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 80) 
«Ultimately at stake in this effort is America’s long-range role in Europe. (…) If 
that new Europe [i.e. the enlarged EU] is to remain geopolitically a part of the 
“Euro-Atlantic” space, the expansion of NATO is essential», argues Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. (Brzezinski, 1997: 80) Moreover, he asserts that a failure to do so 
would by the same token signify the end of the Alliance’s credibility. Therefore, 
for the US strategists, it is important that NATO expands towards Central and 
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Eastern Europe – through intervention in former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and the Serb province of Kosovo) and 
through the 1999 and 2004 NATO enlargements – in order to create a new rim in 
Europe going from Turkey and the Black Sea up to the Baltic states and the Baltic 
Sea. Beyond this rim, Russia would only keep a powerless zone of influence, 
mainly Belarus as well as parts of Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian countries. 
(Chauprade, 1999: 245-246) The US decision to enlarge NATO can thus greatly 
be explained in this light.219 Moreover, NATO enlargement is also intended, 
partly, to contain the potential politico-economic, military and foreign policy 
independence of Germany since its reunification. (Gardner, 2002: 40)  
 
Yet, at the same time, the EU – through its latest enlargement process – 
fosters the scenario of the Maastricht approach. Indeed, as EU member states have 
long since moved from a balance of power to “cooperative security” concerning 
security issues – in the sense that it is extremely unlikely that member states 
would use military force to resolve disputes amongst them. The EU is exporting 
this “cooperative security” approach – characterized by a high degree of 
institutionalisation and an important commitment to common rules and norms – to 
Central and Eastern Europe through enlargement. This is at least the image the 
EU is seeking to project through its enlargement process. Hence, Javier Solana, 
High Representative for the CFSP, argued in 2001 that: «European integration has 
worked as a strong catalyst for political stability and economic prosperity in 
Western Europe. We are now extending the benign effect of integration to the rest 
of the continent. ... An enlarged Union means strengthening the stability of the 
continent.» (Sjursen, 2004: 16-18) The EU seems thus more appropriate than 
NATO – as advocated by some liberal theorists – to fulfil the objective of 
permitting the CEECs to participate in the process of regional integration. 
Accordingly, one can consider the US emphasis on the importance of EU 
enlargement as an acknowledgment of this matter of fact. Yet, the EU and NATO 
have increasingly become overlapping organizations when one looks at their tasks 
and at the geographical area they are covering. 
 
In the years following the end of the bipolar world order, both 
organizations – the EU and NATO – seemed to fulfil each one distinctive 
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objectives, economic growth for the former and hard security for the latter. The 
general expectation of the early 1990s was to have a reunited Europe under the 
joint aegis of both organizations within approximately a decade, unless Russia 
would stand in the way. But after the Madrid summit in 1997, it appeared that the 
two enlargement processes would take different paths. NATO seemed to choose a 
relatively rapid but selective enlargement, while the Union seemed to favour a 
slower but also selective enlargement220. For the Alliance, the motivation was 
quintessentially of geopolitical nature, whilst the EU’s driving factor was of 
functional character. However, more recently, the two processes have certainly    
– as we just noted – become more comparable, if not parallel and overlapping. At 
the same time as NATO’s further expansion – following the first one of 1999 – 
has pursued more rigorous functional criteria, the European Union has started 
reasoning in strategic terms, by weighting the geopolitical and security 
implications of successive waves of new member states. Whereas at the turn of 
the century both processes seemed to lose momentum – partly as a result of the 
lukewarm support in Western public opinion –, the events of 11 September 2001 
have put an impulse on both processes. Indeed, the importance of stabilising the 
peripheries of the Western core and of forging wide coalitions against new 
potential threats posed by non-state actors having been dramatically shown, the 
pace of the two enlargement processes were accelerated, so that NATO and the 
EU decided in late 2002221 to enlarge respectively to ten and seven countries. 
Since NATO expanded in March 2004 and the EU in May 2004, NATO counts 
now twenty-six member states and the EU twenty-five. Nineteen states are 
members of both organizations. This marks the return to a situation of almost 
overlapping memberships – lost in 1995 with the entry into the EU of three non-
NATO members – but on a larger scale than ever before. This reinforces 
Zbigniew Brzezinski’s thesis, when he wrote: «In any case, it ought to be 
axiomatic that Europe’s political unity and security are indivisible. As a practical 
matter, in fact it is difficult to conceive of a truly united Europe without a 
common security arrangement with America.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 84) Yet, the 
most obvious cost of the enlargements is the increasing complexity of decision-
making within each organization. One fears that the two Western “security 
communities” covering almost the entire old continent will internally be ever less 
manageable. In other words, «a strategic gain may be offset (…) by a functional 
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loss.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 10) This is the reason why both organizations are 
since the mid-1990s constantly working on making their decision-making 
procedures and operational structures more flexible. (Missiroli, March 2003: 9-
10) 
 
One should finally emphasize the three most immediate implications of 
the double enlargements of 2004. First, Bulgaria and Romania stay out of the EU 
– though not of the Atlantic Alliance – probably until 2007. Yet, such differential 
will certainly not create major problems, since their membership in NATO will 
stabilise Bulgaria and Romania domestically; all the more that their eventual EU 
accession does not seem in doubt. Anyway, one of the principal tasks of the CFSP 
and the EU’s external relations will be to develop external policies that do not 
create a sense of exclusion in the rest of Europe, as much as NATO will have to 
promote its relations with the European non-NATO states. (Sjursen, 1998: 12) 
Second, «the extended ‘format’ for the involvement of ‘third’ countries in ESDP 
operations (…) changed from 15+15 (…) [to 25+5].» (Missiroli, March 2003: 11) 
Indeed, the former format involved 15 EU member states [the former EU Fifteen 
members] plus 15 extra-EU states [the ten former CEECs applicant states, 
Cyprus, Malta and the three European NATO non-EU states (Turkey, Norway 
and Iceland)], while the extended format includes the 25 EU member states plus 5 
non-EU states [the two CEECs which were excluded from the last wave of EU 
enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania) as well as Turkey, Norway and Iceland]. 
These five non-EU member states are all NATO member states (contrary to the 
former fifteen non-EU states), all the more with considerable military capabilities 
or infrastructures (with the exception maybe of Iceland). Thus, the scope of the 
format as well as the nature of EU-NATO cooperation in combined operations 
will certainly have a new dimension. Moreover, the member states of both 
organizations constitute the absolute majority within the OSCE; it will not have a 
direct impact on the strict consensual OSCE decision-making, but will certainly 
have a psychological one. Third, the EU and NATO the CEECs joined are both 
very different organizations from those they were applying to become member in 
the early post-Cold War years. The EU has indeed a Euro area, an elaborated 
Schengen area as well as a more ambitious CFSP. As for NATO, it has undergone 
a limited war in former Yugoslavia, has reacted with a very timid use of the 
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guarantees included in its Article 5 – which have long been seen as its principal 
raison d’être – just after the events of September 2001 and is now planning a 
more global role. Thus, «instead of serving two distinct and separate (albeit 
mutually compatible and even reinforcing) purposes – economic prosperity vs. 
hard security – the EU and NATO have increasingly covered the same tasks in the 
same geographical area. CFSP/ESDP lies exactly at the functional juncture of the 
two organisations.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 11) The debate over the compatibility 
or competition between EU’s Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] and the more recently 
created NATO Response Force [NRF] illustrated openly this state of affairs. Both 
organizations have thus plenty of matter for cooperation and synergy, as well as 
for a fundamental redefinition of their respective objectives and functions in the 
enlarged Europe as much as across the Atlantic. (Missiroli, March 2003: 9-11; 
Sjursen, 1998: 11-13) 
 
 
 
2) THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES 
TOWARDS THE ENLARGEMENTS 
 
Given the various interests of the EU member states, the modalities of the 
two enlargement processes have been rather actively discussed, both inside the 
EU as much as domestically in the different EU member states. Undoubtedly, it is 
the current EU enlargement process which sustained the discussions even more 
than the NATO one. NATO’s eastwards expansion provoked discussions mainly 
with regard to Russia and less amongst EU or NATO members. As far as EU’s 
current enlargement process is concerned, each EU member state has indeed its 
own interest to stand up for. Amongst them, there are in particular the two 
greatest founding States – France and Germany – plus the United Kingdom which 
have played (and still play) a decisive role in this process. Moreover, to analyse 
the positions of these three countries helps one to understand the repercussions the 
enlargement process has on the development and formation of partnerships, 
notably the Franco-German tandem.  
 
 165
This chapter will thus deal with the diverse positions of the EU member 
states towards the enlargements, in stressing principally the interests of the three 
aforementioned countries, which are, after all, the main actors within the EU. In 
doing so, attention will be given to the expectations, hopes and threats they have 
in the enlargement processes. Consequently, this chapter first sets out the 
incentives of the United Kingdom, before considering France’s attitude. Finally, 
the position of Germany will be analysed.  
 
As the integration of the CEECs into NATO has been less controversial 
amongst the EU member states than their integration into the EU, we will 
primarily focus on the position of the European Union member states towards the 
EU enlargement. 
 
 
a. The Incentives of the United Kingdom  
 
As far as London’s position towards the Western institutions’ eastern 
enlargement is concerned, one has to observe that the British government 
continually pronounced itself in favour of an enlargement of the EU, but was 
rather lukewarm towards NATO’s eastwards expansion.  
 
Indeed, as far as NATO’s eastwards expansion is concerned, the UK was 
not really in favour to expand the security guarantees to the CEECs – not even to 
the Višegrad countries – in the early 1990s, notably because of London’s 
impression that the United States was acting unilaterally on that issue. But from 
the mid 1990s, London came slowly closer to the idea of a swift NATO 
enlargement, but under the condition to not weaken the Alliance’s military 
structure. However, the UK was preoccupied not to offend Russia. London thus 
supported NATO’s eastwards enlargement without enthusiasm when the Atlantic 
Alliance first expanded to the East in March 1999. It was therefore not a surprise 
that the United Kingdom was one of the most active countries in trying to restore 
the dialogue with Moscow, after the relations between the Western countries and 
Russia were harmed following the 1999 NATO enlargement. «Tony Blair alla 
jusqu’à recevoir en grande pompe à Londres le nouveau président russe Vladimir 
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Poutine début 2000.» (Schnapper, 1999: 96) Yet, on the whole, the United 
Kingdom was satisfied with the result of the two eastwards NATO enlargements, 
as it provides greater stability and security for the entire European continent. 
 
As for the EU enlargement, the UK favours it – as Germany – but partly 
for other reasons than the latter. Similar to Berlin, London supports enlargement 
principally for reasons of security and stability in Europe as a whole, 
notwithstanding the fact that the UK is both geographically distant and lacks 
major economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, it is also reckoned 
that – contrary to Germany – the United Kingdom believes and hopes that an 
enlargement of the Union would hinder to some extent the deepening of the EU 
and thus further integration of the latter. (Edwards, 2005: 46) This was especially 
the case under the governments of Margaret Thatcher and of John Major and less 
under the Labour government of Tony Blair. 
 
Consequently, during the 1990s, while many EU member states were 
rather lukewarm about enlargement, the UK – together with Germany – showed 
fairly great and consistent support for it. The Labour government elected in May 
1997 continued thus to support eastward enlargement as the previous 
Conservative government did. One has to note, however, that UK’s approach 
towards EU enlargement seems to be more pragmatic than strategic, as it is based 
on a step-by-step attitude rather than founded on a clearly defined strategy. The 
UK has certainly fewer doubts about the consequences of EU enlargement and is 
thus less ambivalent about it than most of the other EU member states. Yet, the 
other member states often question the motives behind London’s strong support 
for EU’s eastwards enlargement. They do mistrust the British stance mainly for 
two reasons. Firstly, as we stressed above, they considered the previous 
Conservative government encouraging EU enlargement so as to weaken the 
Union. Although the Blair government appears to be less eurosceptic, some 
doubts still remain, since the Labour government is not strongly integrationist. 
Secondly, they do not understand the British enthusiasm towards enlargement, 
given the fact that UK’s immediate and direct interests in Central and Eastern 
Europe are minor. 
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Although UK’s overall approach towards enlargement implies a relative 
continuity in terms of policy between the previous Conservative government and 
the current Labour government, London’s approach to EU developments in the 
wider context has changed. «The deep divisions within the Conservative party 
over Europe led to increasing problems in Britain’s relations with the rest of the 
EU, culminating in the non-cooperation crisis over beef exports in mid-1996. The 
negative tone and behaviour of the Major government, together with the various 
opt-outs of the UK on the single currency and social chapter, contributed to 
Britain’s growing isolation in the EU and its loss of influence. This trend even 
extended to areas where Britain was not involved in controversy, including 
enlargement.» (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 7) Yet, the Labour 
government has sought to establish more constructive relations with the EU since 
its election in May 1997, thus rapidly changing the nature of their relations. 
Overall, there is no doubt that the relations between London and Brussels have 
improved considerably under the Labour government, as Blair’s announcement of 
the social chapter opt-out shortly after its election as well as UK’s intention to 
potentially join the Euro-zone by means of a referendum illustrate. But, as far as 
UK’s joining of the European single currency is concerned, due to the still 
important hostility of British public opinion and since a date for the referendum is 
not yet established, one can expect that the United Kingdom will remain outside 
the Euro for some time to come. Remaining outside the Euro-zone, the UK will 
certainly continue to lose influence over key economic and political developments 
within the EU. However, the Labour government seems to have recognized          
– contrary to the previous Conservative governments – the need for the UK to act 
jointly with the EU to maximize its interests and influence. Consequently, it 
realised that the more the UK remains outside key EU developments – such as the 
Euro-zone and the Schengen area – the more difficult it will be to further UK’s 
interests and influence. It is worth noting that the United Kingdom already tried to 
counter this loss of influence by taking some initiatives in other areas, as in 
particular its initiatives on developing a European defence policy since autumn 
1998. (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 6-9) 
 
One has to add that although being – as Germany – rather enthusiastic 
about EU enlargement, the United Kingdom wants at all costs to prevent that a 
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long-term consequence of the latter will be the end of the British rebate 
mechanism that the UK has defended so far since its introduction in 1984. This is 
why London has supported changes that could help Germany’s position as an 
excessive net contributor, but only so far it did not have any major unfavourable 
effects on its own contribution. 
 
Despite its lack of major economic interests in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the UK has nevertheless interests and motivations in the current eastern 
enlargement process. UK’s motivation in EU’s eastern enlargement – supported 
both by the former Conservative governments and the current Labour  
government – are basically of geopolitical nature. This implies the establishment 
of structures promoting security and stability in Europe as a whole as well as the 
recognition of the historical opportunity to unite the old continent. As a result, the 
UK has rapidly – in the wake of the end of the Cold War – championed the cause 
of EU enlargement for all the CEECs and even Turkey. It is noteworthy to 
mention that the case of the UK supporting the EU enlargement is rather unusual 
in the sense that most of the EU member states that are relatively strong advocates 
of the enlargement are geographically close to Central and Eastern Europe and 
have strong economic interests in the region, as it is the case with Germany, 
Austria, Greece and the Scandinavian countries. As far as Turkey is concerned, 
the UK – being motivated by broad geopolitical considerations – considers very 
positively Turkey’s EU accession. This distinguishes the UK from most of its EU 
partners. 
 
Effectively, London’s immediate interests in the CEECs are relatively 
small. Not only is the UK geographically remote to Central and Eastern Europe, 
but in comparison with both its general international commitment and other major 
EU member states, it also has weak economic relations with the CEECs. Indeed, 
UK’s trade and investment flows are very low, especially if compared to those of 
Germany. As far as trade is concerned, UK’s market share in Central and Eastern 
Europe is very low. In 2003, the UK achieved a market share of only 4,1% in the 
CEECs, very far from Germany’s market share (28,1%) and also smaller than 
Italy’s (6,4%) or France’s (5,2%) one. Indeed, the CEECs take up very little place 
in UK’s trade. As far as FDI is concerned, the amount of British direct 
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investments in Central and Eastern Europe is also very low and amounted only to 
3,8% in 2003 (when one takes into account the FDI in the eight CEECs of the first 
wave), that is, very far behind such countries as Germany (22,2%) and the 
Netherlands (21,0%), and also behind France (8,7%), the United States (8,1%) 
Austria (8,0%) and Sweden (3,9%). For the UK, interests in Central and Eastern 
Europe are very small, especially when one compares it with UK’s trade and 
investment in other regions of the world. Compared to Germany in particular, one 
can advance different factors. Besides the fact that the size of its economy is 
smaller222 and that it is geographically distant, the UK does share neither long-
standing cultural ties nor historical trade or investment links. In addition, there 
exist less similarities between CEECs legal systems and the Anglo-Saxon model 
than with the German one, thus partly explaining the greater difficulty for UK 
firms to do business in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Contrary to France and to Germany – the former supporting more 
Romania and the latter having backed the entrance of the Višegrad countries –, 
the UK does not favour any of the Central and Eastern European Countries, 
although it recognizes the central geopolitical position occupied by the biggest of 
the CEECs, that is, Poland. Thus, it is not surprising that, in general, UK’s trade is 
at a large extent dispersed among all the CEECs, with Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary however slightly ahead. 
 
To sum up, despite UK’s geographical distance to the CEECs, its support 
for EU enlargement is nonetheless primarily motivated by geopolitical concerns 
for stability and security on the whole European continent. A sense of historical 
and moral obligation to the former communist sates has further persuaded it in its 
support. All these concerns go certainly far before its economic interests. But, 
suspicions of a British desire to weaken the EU through its eastern enlargement 
did not completely disappear, despite the coming into power of a less eurosceptic 
Labour government in 1997. (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 111-
120) 
 
One has to add that for their part, the Nordic countries are also in favour of 
an enlargement of the EU. Besides the geopolitical and security concerns relevant 
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to all the European countries, this is particularly due to substantial economic 
interests in some of the CEECs, especially the Baltic States. In addition, similar to 
the suspicions raised against British support for EU enlargement, one can also 
wonder if Denmark and Sweden do not hope secretly that an enlargement of the 
Union would hinder in part the deepening and thus further integration of the EU. 
 
 
b. The Attitude of France 
 
The role of France is somewhat more difficult to analyse, as the interests 
of Paris in a double enlargement – which would both amount to expansions 
eastwards – are less evident. France, which does indeed have far less evident 
interests in the enlargements – especially of the EU – than for instance Germany, 
was less willing to support enlargements towards the CEECs. 
 
When it comes in particular to the French position on the EU enlargement 
towards the East, it seems that France does have difficulties in following a 
constant enlargement policy. The French policy makers give the impression to be 
somewhat hesitant in the attitude to adopt in this process. Paris never really knew 
which position to adopt. That is a reason why the public opinions of the Višegrad 
countries – especially the Polish one – had the feeling that it was in particular to 
France that the accession negotiations were very difficult and that the perspective 
of enlargement grow more and more distant in the years preceding the effective 
first wave of enlargement in May 2004. (Védrine, Mars 2001: 47) It is thus not 
surprising that former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, 
asserted in 2001: «Il y a un énorme enjeu qui passe complètement inaperçu en 
France, depuis des années et dans tous les commentaires, alors que ce fut une 
bataille énorme en Europe, c’est la question de l’élargissement. En France, on dit 
qu’il ne s’est rien passé (…).» (Védrine, Mars 2001: 68) The question of the 
enlargement process was not (and is still not) so much discussed in France, since 
Paris does not have a real interest in seeing an enlarged EU shifted to the East. 
While French public opinion is not very interested in the eastern enlargement of 
the EU, the French policy makers tried to study thoroughly the impact that this 
enlargement would have on France. Yet, as they could not find out any obvious 
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“national” advantage in the enlargement, French policy makers seem to have 
difficulties both in implementing a constant enlargement policy and in finding the 
righteous manners.223 Whereas France does, in reality, have some interests in the 
EU expanding towards the CEECs, it is more worried about its consequences. It is 
certainly only a small comfort for France to know that the CEECs are attracted to 
the EU, because of its values, which stem mainly from the French values of the 
Age of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution. Nonetheless, before 
setting out the fears France has in seeing the enlarged EU effectively to the East, 
we will firstly examine the interests Paris has in the eastwards enlargement of the 
EU. We will also briefly discuss the French attachment to the South, as a 
counterbalance to the East. 
 
As far as France’s interests in an EU enlargement towards the CEECs are 
concerned, they could mainly be appraised in terms of political and security as 
well as economic benefits. First, France has a political and security interest. As 
the UK and the other European countries, France has geopolitical and security 
concerns. In fact, the entire European continent would gain in an enlargement to 
Central and Eastern Europe in terms of security. In allowing the EU to carry out 
crisis prevention in the region, the “reunification of the continent” would thus 
bring political stability in Central and Eastern Europe through increased 
prosperity, support for democracy and the provision of security. As a European 
country, France would of course benefit from stability in this region. Nonetheless, 
one can easily admit that, as far as security is concerned, a country like Germany 
would benefit more than France from an enlargement towards the CEECs. 
Secondly, France has economic interests in an enlargement towards Central and 
Eastern Europe. Again, the economic interests that France has are less important 
that those of the neighbouring countries of the CEECs. One can indeed assert that 
«in general, economic interests in CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] for most EU 
member states except Austria, Germany, and Italy are fairly small.» (Lippert, 
Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 19) Yet, «dans les pays d’Europe centrale et 
orientale, soumis à une forte influence allemande et américaine, la France est 
perçue comme un contrepoids indispensable, et bénéficie d’un capital de 
sympathie important.» (Sénat français, Novembre 2001: 12) Nevertheless, even 
though French companies turn increasingly to the CEECs, their presence in the 
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region remains weak. Indeed, although both French trade and investments 
progressed in the nineties – especially in its latter half –, the presence of French 
companies remains fairly small in relation to their potential and to other EU 
Members, in particular Germany. As far as trade is concerned, France certainly 
increased its exports to the CEECs between 1992 and 2001 by more than four, but 
its market share in this region is still modest. In 2003, France achieved a market 
share of 5,2% in the CEECs, whereas Germany’s market share in the region 
amounted to 28,1% and the one of Italy added up to 6,4%. Thus, as for its market 
share in Central and Eastern Europe, France ranked behind Germany, Austria and 
even Italy. Indeed, similar to the case of the UK, the CEECs take up very little 
place in French trade. As far as FDI is concerned, the amount of French direct 
investments in Central and Eastern Europe increased a lot in the 1990s and early 
2000s (notably thanks to important investments in Poland), to rank even in third 
position in 2003 (when one takes into account the FDI in the eight CEECs of the 
first wave). Placed behind Germany (22,2%) and the Netherlands (21,0%), France 
(8,7%) is slightly ahead of the United States (8,1%) and Austria (8,0%). (Gabel, 
Janvier 2003: 41) 
 
To sum up, one can assert that France has political and economic interests 
that are however less important that those in particular of Germany. Somehow, 
France’s interests are the common interests any other EU member state has in the 
EU enlargement towards the East. Yet, France fears that Germany would benefit 
from enlargement far more than itself. One has to add that a French interest in EU 
enlargement towards the CEECs could also be to see it as a «means to secure 
French influence and restrict German “Alleingang”.» (“France – Fear of German 
Dominance”, 27 January 1999: 1) This leads us to analyse now France’s fears of 
an enlarged EU effectively shifted to the East.  
 
France never supported eastern enlargement of the EU with very much 
enthusiasm. Indeed, in keeping with a long-held French habit, President Chirac 
spoke – in the years preceding the 2004 enlargement – of the idea of enlargement 
«with more resignation than enthusiasm». (Young, 4 December 2001: 1) Paris 
admits certainly that Europe has a vocation to shore up peace and democracy. But 
the disadvantages affect France more than any other EU member state. France 
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worries that enlargement would inflict in the long-term serious damages to the 
values that it has defined for itself and for Europe. Hence, French worries of the 
long-term consequences of the eastward enlargement could principally be 
considered as follows: Paris fears not only a thorough reform of the CAP – or 
even its simple disappearance –, but a reduction in the Frenchness of Europe too. 
From that latter fear, one can derive another apprehension that is one of a German 
dominance in Europe.  
 
So firstly, France is afraid of a thorough reform of the costly Common 
Agricultural Policy or even its pure and simple disappearance. As the country 
most benefiting from the agricultural policy, France had a special interest in a 
status quo of the CAP and was always terrified about the idea to reduce the costs 
of this common policy. Chirac has spent a lifetime resisting this fate. Yet, as we 
have already noticed, the European Council of Brussels in October 2002 endorsed 
a financing plan for the CAP through 2013224, concocted somewhat surprisingly 
by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Chirac.225 
Since it was decided to reform the CAP not before 2006 and even to keep the 
CAP basically unchanged until 2013, it seems as if Jacques Chirac has tried to 
limit at best the “damages” caused by the EU eastwards enlargements. Though, as 
the new member states receive direct aids from 2004 on and then progressively up 
to 100% in 2013, the farmers of the old member states – particularly in France – 
will see their aids simultaneously shrink drastically. Furthermore, as we have also 
already noticed, the CAP still has to be brought to further reforms, notably in 
connection with the trade negotiations taking place within the WTO; and the 
negotiations – henceforth held at Twenty-Five – might be even harder.  
 
Secondly, France is afraid of an enlargement likely to dilute the 
prominence of all members. This would mean a Europe wherein the influence of 
France would be much less. France fears indeed a loss of influence in an 
expanded EU, whose fulcrum has shifted several hundred kilometres eastwards. 
This reality is well shown by a telling symbol: «10 years ago - at the time of 
negotiations on the Maastricht treaty - a small village in France’s Massif Central 
proclaimed itself to much fanfare as the physical “centre” of the EU. Today the 
small monument they put up there is not just dilapidated, but irrelevant.» (“France 
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squirms as enlargement looms”, 7 December 2001: 1) There is another 
phenomenon which shows a certain decline of the influence of France, that is, the 
decline of the use of the French language in the EU institutions. Whereas in the 
beginning of the European construction, French was used in Brussels as much as 
English, the first enlargement of the EC (when the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark joined) as well as the last enlargement of the EU (which saw two more 
Scandinavian countries, namely Sweden and Finland, as well as Austria join the 
EU) led to the increase of the use of English and to an undeniable decline of the 
use of French. There is no doubt that the next enlargement would give a new 
impetus to this tendency. Indeed, the ten new member states as well as the three 
remaining Central and Eastern applicant countries having already opened 
accession talks (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) – not to mention Turkey – speak 
English rather than French. «A single lingua franca [that is, English] reaches, by 
vast majority, round Europe, and only President Chirac needs the services of an 
interpreter. (…) For a founding mother of Europe, the symbolism could hardly be 
more potent.» (Young, 04 December 2001: 1) 
 
Thirdly, there is the apprehension widely spread in France that the 
enlargement will eventually lead to a German dominance in Europe. France 
apprehends the reality of the shift of Europe’s centre of gravity towards a 
traditional German Hinterland, due to membership of Central and Eastern 
European countries. Yet, this type of reasoning can go both ways. One could 
indeed argue that even if «keeping the Višegrad [countries] distanced would keep 
the center of gravity of the EU closer to France, (…) it would probably weaken 
the EU, and it would probably make Višegrad [countries] even more dependent 
upon Germany given their geographical and functional position both in economy 
and security questions.» (“France – Fear of German Dominance”, 27 January 
1999: 3) Furthermore, one could say that the fact of bringing the Višegrad 
countries quickly into the EU regime makes «German investments and political 
influence more constrained by the EU system. This would be in line with 
traditional French policy toward EU integration, favoring the type of integration 
that increases the French influence in Europe.» (“France – Fear of German 
Dominance”, 27 January 1999: 3) Defending this second alternative, one has to 
admit that French interests would be pleased of an enlargement to the CEECs. 
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Thus, enlargement as a means for France to keeping under a certain control 
German investments and political influence in Central and Eastern Europe 
through the EU could be added as another interest France has in the EU 
enlargement towards this region. One has to add that «this favoring of EU 
integration goes back to 1989 when France tried to prevent German unification 
but failed, and France fell back to the use of EU as a [means of] control of 
Germany. Mitterrand argued that the prospect of German unification called for 
“strengthening the structures of the community” or as Moisi226 argued “Either 
we’ll get a strong Germany within a divided Europe, or a strong Europe and 
within it a powerful Germany”.» (“France – Fear of German Dominance”, 27 
January 1999: 3) As a result, the second reasoning could help to satisfactorily 
resolving the two contradictory fears in French European policy: «seeing 
Germany dominating the (…) [Union] and/or distancing (…) [itself from the EU] 
in order to have a very active policy in Central and Eastern Europe.» (Sjursen, 
1998: 12-13)  
 
After having analysed both France’s interests and fears when it comes to 
the consequences of EU’s enlargement to the East, it seems now appropriate to 
have a look at the relative unimportance to France of this region in comparison to 
the interest France bears in the southern rim of the Mediterranean, which is the 
aim of our next focus. 
 
Central and Eastern Europe is a region that is quite unknown to France. 
Indeed, this part of Europe does not have special relations with France.227 One 
exception to this is, to some extent, Romania. Indeed, the Francophile Romania, 
that has somewhat Latin origins, considered itself, even during the communism, 
quite close to other “Latin” countries, like Italy or France. Thus, the relationship 
that France has with Romania is a rather friendly one, to such an extent that the 
former French Minister in charge of European Affairs, Pierre Moscovici, said that 
France had to be the advocate of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU. One of his 
predecessors at this post, Elisabeth Guigou, already stressed, shortly after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the importance of Romania and Bulgaria to France. «La 
présence allemande en Hongrie, en Pologne et en Tchécoslovaquie est 
traditionnelle, mais la France a une position comparable en Bulgarie et en 
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Roumanie et elle fait en sorte que ces deux pays ne soient pas oubliés par la 
Communauté» (Deloche, Octobre 1998: 29-30), she said indeed in 1992. 
However, some have interpreted the French insisting in the early 2000s on a 
simultaneous entry for all twelve applicants – including also the two stragglers, 
which are Bulgaria and Romania – as a way to hold back the whole enlargement 
process. Already, concerning NATO’s eastwards expansion, French sensibilities 
were hurt, when NATO – under the pressure of the United States – chose to 
support Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and not to retain Paris’ 
preferred candidate, Romania228, in its application for NATO membership, at the 
Madrid summit of NATO in July 1997. (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 32-33; Plantin, 
1999: 102-103) 
 
Anyway, there is no doubt that French people are not very interested in 
Central and Eastern Europe, because particularly of «une très grande ignorance 
des cultures, de l’histoire et même de la réalité géographique [de la région. En 
effet,] de nombreux Français parlent toujours de la Tchécoslovaquie, alors que les 
deux pays sont séparés depuis longtemps. Et souvent la Slovaquie est confondue 
avec la Slovénie.» (Kinsky, Automne 2001: 21) 
 
Rather than turning towards Central and Eastern Europe, France turns 
indeed traditionally towards the southern edge of the Mediterranean. Thus, 
worried about the eastern tilt of the EU, France stresses now and then the security 
threats that EU faces also from the South along the southern rim of the 
Mediterranean, because of political instability and poverty in the region. Indeed, 
due to its geographical location that exposes it to the Mediterranean as well as to 
its history, France feels somehow closer to this part of the world than to Central 
and Eastern Europe. That is why France seeks constantly to promote tighter ties 
with southern Mediterranean countries. One has to note, however, that France was 
first a little reluctant to see a more encompassing relationship of the EC in an area 
in which it held itself privileged. While Italy and Spain had been pushing for a 
time to strengthen the EC/EU’s relationship to the South Mediterranean area, 
France’s changed its mind because it acknowledged the increased insecurity in the 
area and perceived the growing imbalance in the EU’s relationship with its 
neighbours (one thinks especially about the 1995 enlargement towards Central 
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and Northern Europe as well as at the intended Eastern enlargement). (Edwards, 
2005: 45) France became in the meantime the key advocate for continually 
improving the EU’s relationship with the Southern Mediterranean countries. In 
the post-Cold War era, the EU – but especially France, Italy and Spain – became 
increasingly concerned by the sense of insecurity engendered by continued 
instability in the Mediterranean region and growing migration coming from North 
Africa. Moreover, the EU was keen on ensuring stability in North Africa but also 
in the Middle East region, because it is well aware of the tension generated by the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the need to ensure oil and gas supplies and supply routes and 
the Mediterranean market. Yet, it was especially France – together with Italy and 
Spain – which pushed for a more holistic approach to the Mediterranean region. 
(Edwards, 2005: 44-45) This leads now and again to some results, as the Euro-
Mediterranean forum, the Barcelona Process and EU approvals of Mediterranean 
aid packages prove. The most significant achievement is certainly the Barcelona 
Process. The latter – also called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – was 
launched in 1995 and aims at creating a Euro-Mediterranean Free trade area by 
2010 and a Common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability.229 The 
Barcelona Process not only covers security and economic relations, but also 
humanitarian and cultural relations, thus taking into account the interdependence 
of the economic, social and political stability problems of the region. (Alecu de 
Flers and Regelsberger, 2005: 330) It is interesting to note that the launch of the 
Barcelona Process was significantly favoured by the 1995 enlargement of the EU 
«as a sort of compensation for those EU members who felt penalised by the 
Central and Northern ‘drift’ of the Union.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 1-2) (See also 
K. Smith, 2003: 76) In this context, one has also to mention the EU’s cooperation 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council230. Much more limited than the former, this 
model of dialogue in the Middle East region is driven by both political and 
economic interests. Politically, the Gulf countries are perceived by the EU as an 
influential interlocutor to assist its policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to help 
ease tensions in its relation with key actors in the Gulf region such as Iraq and 
Iran. (Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger, 2005: 330) 
 
So, one can say that France tried – especially since the early 1990s – to 
promote EU cooperation with the South. Thus, within the EU, France is often the 
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one which is behind aids, assistance programmes and other kinds of cooperation 
that the EU agrees on with the Southern countries. With its concerns about the 
EU’s eastwards tilt and the increased influence this might give to Germany, 
France is even more eager to seek a counterbalance to Central and Eastern Europe 
by promoting closer cooperation between the European Union and the Southern 
countries. While Germany appears to be the ally of the Central and Eastern 
countries, France sets itself up at the same time as the defender of the Southern 
countries. This was very well illustrated at the allocation of the Union’s external 
aid in 1995. «La France [s’y est faite] (…) l’avocat des pays “Afrique-Caraïbes-
Pacifique” [ACP] et des pays méditerranéens, alors que l’Allemagne [a considéré 
qu’il fallait] (…) désormais privilégier l’Est.» (Deloche, Octobre 1998: 2) 
 
Concerning France’s attitude towards NATO’s eastwards expansion, 
France was rather lukewarm in supporting NATO’s eastwards move. It was 
partially a tactic so as to have a stronger weight in dealing with the United States 
about its re-admittance into NATO. The objective of France was the re-
admittance into NATO under conditions reckoned favourable to Paris. As the 
USA was the key supporter (with Germany) of NATO’s enlargement towards the 
East, Paris acted more reticently and voiced concerns about the potential critical 
impact of the enlargement on Russia; it even had as a result that some Central and 
Eastern European capitals had for some time the impression that Paris was not 
averse to an Eastern Europe under Russia’s sphere of influence. (Brzezinski, 
1997: 67) Furthermore, one should note that the failing in the years 1995-1997 of 
the original French objective of re-admittance into NATO under favourable 
circumstance has serious consequences for the latter. Indeed, – as we have already 
mentioned – France «was left isolated and exposed as NATO instead concentrated 
on enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.» (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 33) This 
process might continue to twist both Washington’s and NATO’s focus towards 
the East, thus increasing France’s isolation in both military and political terms; a 
scenario strongly feared by Paris.  
 
As for the Southern countries, benefiting a lot from the regional policy of 
the EU – like Spain231 and Portugal –, they express worries occasionally about the 
long-term consequences of the enlargement to the East. They apprehend indeed 
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the strong reduction of their benefits arising from the regional policy due to the 
adherence of even “poorer” CEECs. 
 
 
c. The Position of Germany 
 
The strongest supporters of the Eastern EU enlargement have tended to be 
those countries with immediate geopolitic and security concerns caused by 
geographical proximity to the CEECs and significant economic interests. These 
are Austria232, the Scandinavian countries as well as to some extent Greece and 
Italy, but most particularly Germany. There is no doubt that one has always 
regarded Germany as the main supporter of the eastwards enlargement process. 
Not only because of its geo-strategic position and its economic interests, but also 
its close political, historic and cultural ties with Central and Eastern Europe, 
Germany is certainly the country which benefits the most from the EU 
enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European Countries. 
 
Given its size, its power and its geographical location at the eastern limit 
of the EU, the interests and the preferences of Germany with regard to the 
enlargement matter greatly. There is no doubt that the Federal Republic has 
defended, defends and will defend relentlessly its interests concerning the Eastern 
enlargement process. Within the EU, Germany has indeed a difficult job, since its 
enlargement policy has regularly been criticized by some Southern countries and 
to some extent by France. It is evident that – despite its preponderant position in 
the question of enlargement – Germany also must take into account the wishes of 
both the former and the new member states of the EU in order to find a consensus 
on how to deal with the consequences of the enlargement.  
 
It is clear that Germany has benefits from the eastwards EU enlargement. 
It was one of the most disposed countries to reform the functioning of the 
institutions in order to avoid their paralysis in the enlarged EU. As well politically 
as economically, the Federal Republic is indeed taking advantage of an EU 
expansion towards the East. It is the country that is gaining the most from stability 
in the CEECs and from their economic integration. Since instability in this region 
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would be a direct threat for it, EU membership of the CEECs seems to be granting 
the best perspectives for stability and integration of these countries.  
 
Thus, the economic and political interests of Germany in Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as its security interests speak – from the point of view of 
Berlin – in favour of the enlarged Union. One does not have to forget the moral 
concerns and commitments that pushed Berlin to support the eastward 
enlargement of the EU. Amongst the former EU member states, Germany has 
been – along with Great Britain and the Scandinavian member states – indeed the 
keenest advocate of enlargement.  
 
First, let us analyse the economic interests. As far as these are concerned, 
one can undoubtedly assert that the geographical location of Germany makes it 
indeed the country «most likely to benefit from the economical opportunities 
allowed by post-communist Europe.» (Baun, 1997: 7) Not only thanks to its 
cultural and historic ties, but also thanks to its economy traditionally turned 
towards exports and armed with an industrial offer in line with the needs of 
transitional countries, Germany has nowadays the lead in developing Western 
trade and investment ties with Central and Eastern Europe. It replaced Russia 
which was the principal trade partner of the region until 1990 but became since 
then a minor partner of the CEECs. Since the fall of communism, German trade 
with the Central and Eastern European countries has expanded much more rapidly 
than any other Western country233. Germany’s economic relations are particularly 
close with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In 2003, Germany’s market 
share in the region amounted to 28,1%. Consequently, Germany is the most 
important trading partner for nine of the ten former CEECs applicant states (all of 
them but Romania) and its trade with the CEECs represents about half of the total 
trade between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe; to such a degree that 
Germany trades more with the CEECs than with the United States of America. 
This trend appears not to be on the verge of ending. As far as foreign direct 
investment [FDI] is concerned, one can notice the same tendency. The amount of 
German direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe was bigger than the 
direct investments of any other member state of the EU. Germany is indeed the 
biggest foreign investor in the region. Placed ahead in 2003 with 22,2% of the 
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FDI in Central and Eastern Europe (when one takes into account the eight CEECs 
of the first wave), Germany preceded the Netherlands (21,0%) slightly and much 
more the other states, France ranking in third position with a mere 8,7%. Yet, one 
has to notice that many of Germany’s EU partners are currently catching up the 
time they lost, either in terms of trade or FDI. Especially concerning the FDI, 
where it still had a share of 41% in 1996, the Federal Republic lost some of its 
advance so as to be only ranked in third place in 2000 – with a share of 19% – 
behind France (24%) and the Netherlands (21%). (Gabel, Janvier 2003: 38-42) 
The economic forces (lobbies, economic actors…) in Germany play a role in 
setting up the position of the government. The great majority of these actors is 
confident about the benefits arising from the enlargement towards the CEECs. 
The German companies are indeed aware of the economic opportunity of an 
eastern enlargement. Since 1989/1990, numerous German companies in sectors 
such as automobiles, chemicals and small manufacturing have established 
factories in Central and Eastern Europe from which they have supplied the EU 
and other markets. (Baun, 1997: 7). «Motives for investment are market access 
and economic penetration as well as the creation of production sites which, 
because of lower labour costs, are more competitive than sites in Germany or 
elsewhere in the EU.» (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 19) Moreover, 
the EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe is meant to promote the 
German economic interests «by securing stable markets for trade and investment 
(…) [and also by ensuring] against threats to economic relations and investments 
posed by political instability in new member countries.» (Baun, 1997: 7) In this 
sense, economic and security arguments for enlargement are closely linked. 
Furthermore, in the perspective of an emerging economic area – extending from 
Slovenia to Poland and even to the Baltic States across Hungary, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic –, «parts of eastern Germany and the Berlin region in particular 
would benefit from an economic recovery of the east to complement the 
prosperous western areas of Germany.» (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 
2001: 20) In that light, «the ‘centrality’ of Germany becomes particularly 
apparent in the economic sphere.» (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 
20) In sum, there is no doubt that – from an economic point of view – the benefits 
of EU enlargement for Germany widely outweigh its costs. Since its most 
important partners from Central and Eastern Europe – namely Poland, the Czech 
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Republic and Hungary – are henceforth inside the EU, one can only wonder if 
Germany will still support enlargement to the remaining CEECs as strong as it did 
so far. (Gabel, Janvier 2003: 36-47) (See also Rugraff, 2004: 275-298) 
 
Second, traditional geopolitical and security concerns are a second reason 
for Germany’s satisfaction to see the enlarged Union taking shape. Especially 
«the security in Mitteleuropa is inextricably intertwined with the dynamics of the 
wider European integration process.» (Hyde-Price, 1997: 1) Throughout its 
history, Germany has suffered from its central geographical location, paying the 
price in terms of war and insecurity. During the Cold War, the security and 
borders of the two Germanys – though divided – were ensured by the integration 
of these two countries into opposing superpower alliances. However, the end of 
the Cold War in 1989/1990 changed the situation: «in the post-old war 
environment, (…) a united Germany peers once again at geopolitical uncertainty 
to its east.» (Baun, 1997: 5) Thus, from the standpoint of German security 
interests, the EU enlargement offers essentially two benefits. Firstly, it repositions 
Germany from the Eastern border of the EU towards a more comfortable position 
in its middle. It is obvious that Germany – placed in the centre of the Union – 
gains considerably. Germany thus escapes «the insecurities of being in the middle 
– the Mittellage – of two potentially hostile power blocs, and the suspicions and 
temptations of vacillating between East and West.» (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and 
Becker, 2001: 17) Furthermore, it would have a buffer zone of allied and friendly 
countries (in particular Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) that 
would be a protection against threat of renewed Russian nationalism and great 
power ambition. In other words, Germany would be in a definitely more 
comfortable position, in occupying a geographically central position inside the 
Western world. (Stark, Mars 1997: 58) One can thus assert that, from a strictly 
geopolitical perspective, EU’s Eastern enlargement has been a question of vital 
national interest. (Baun, 1997: 6) Secondly, the eastwards enlargement allows the 
EU to carry out crisis prevention in the region. The “reunification of the 
continent” brings thus the political stability in Central and Eastern Europe through 
increased prosperity, support for democracy and the provision of security. 
Undoubtedly Germany benefits largely from stability in this region. Given its 
geographic position and its political ties with the CEECs, the Federal Republic is 
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indeed particularly vulnerable to the unpleasant consequences of instability – as 
potential mass migration, organized crime or potential environmental   
degradation – in its neighbouring countries. As far as the environment is 
concerned, «the German public, as well as the political elites, are acutely aware of 
potential environmental damage and of risks of nuclear mishaps.» (Lippert, 
Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 18) This perception of threats and its counter-
strategy was summed up in the warning of the former President of the Federal 
Republic, Roman Herzog: «If we do not stabilize the East, the East will 
destabilize us.» 234 (Herzog, 15 März 1995: 165)  
 
More to the point, let us for a moment turn our attention to the concept of 
“pluralistic security-community235” developed in 1957 by Karl Deutsch. This 
“pluralistic (or transatlantic) security-community” is based on «stable liberal-
democracies, economic interdependence, institutional integration, a high degree 
of transnational societal communication and interaction, and shared normative 
values. Within this pluralistic security-community, war has been eliminated as an 
instrument of policy, and the balance of power no longer operates.» (Hyde-Price, 
1997: 2) As for EU’s Eastern enlargement, its objective would be to include the 
CEECs in this transatlantic security-community – of which Germany is now a 
central bulwark – and thus extend a stable pacifist union into, first, Central 
Europe, and then Eastern Europe. Accordingly, extending the pluralistic security-
community into Central Europe is seen as «a major step along the road to 
realizing the dream of a Europe ‘whole and free’.» (Hyde-Price, 1997: 2) But, it 
could also have potentially contrary and unforeseen consequences for the future 
European order. Some worry indeed that it «could destabilize the transatlantic 
security-community, reopen the ‘German question’ and provoke Russia.» (Hyde-
Price, 1997: 2) 
 
Finally, a third reason for Germany’s contentment to see the Union 
enlarging eastwards is one of moral duty and responsibility. This historic 
responsibility is certainly the less substantial reason, especially from a realist 
point of view. Yet, Germany still has the idea of having a moral duty and a 
responsibility towards the CEECs; so much so as to be relieved, for that reason, to 
see Central and Eastern Europe progressively entering the Western institutions. 
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This feeling towards these countries stems from several observations. Firstly, 
Germany has still a kind of aspiration to be forgiven for its past aggression 
towards Central and Eastern Europe – especially those committed in its name 
under the Third Reich –, as well as «pangs of conscience in realizing that 
Germany’s own post-war prosperity was built on Soviet victimization of East 
Europeans and the erection of an Iron Curtain that let modernization proceed in 
Western Europe without being overstrained by claims from the East.» (Pond, 
1996: 32-33) Communist regimes were imposed by force in Eastern Europe for 
more than forty years as a direct consequence of the devastation caused by 
Hitler’s armies.236 In addition, the Federal Republic has the feeling of having a 
debt of gratitude owed to the people of Central and Eastern Europe – especially 
the Hungarians, Poles and Czechs – whose struggle for freedom made Germany’s 
unification possible.237 There are also guilt feelings that the reunification allowed 
East Germany to automatically enter both NATO and the EU, while the other 
former members of the Warsaw Pact have been forced to wait outside.238 
(Létourneau and Hébert, 1999: 110-111) 
 
Since Germany has substantial interests in the eastwards enlargement of 
the EU and has welcomed it very positively, one should take a glance on how 
Berlin managed to resolve the “conflict” between two objectives – widening and 
deepening – which are widely considered as divergent objectives. This dilemma 
did not exist for the FRG until the collapse of communist rule in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The role of West Germany in the European post-Second World 
War environment was clear: its role was that of a promoter of deeper European 
integration. The deepening of West European integration thus became part of 
West German foreign policy. The changed geopolitical situation which appeared 
with the end of the old bipolar world order placed new demands on German 
foreign policy makers. The CEECs «placed demands on Germany which partially 
conflicted with its traditional role as a promoter of deeper integration.» (Tewes, 
April 1998: 120) The fundamental European dilemma of the reunified Germany 
was thus the following. «On the one hand, Germany [– firmly anchored in the 
West –] had long-standing, actual commitments to the West. On the other hand, it 
wanted to make commitments to the East. Its primary foreign policy orientation 
was in the West. Yet the primary risks to its security and well-being lay in the 
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East. These conflicting foreign policy aims explain that much of what German 
policy makers did in their Europapolitik was indeed contradictory, and that much 
of what they said attempted to cover this contradiction.» (Tewes, April 1998: 129) 
The question of whether widening or deepening was thus posed to the German 
foreign policy makers. Yet, the tension that emerged between deepening and 
widening did not change fundamentally the German foreign policy. The 
enlargement policy of the reunified Germany proved indeed to be the heritage of 
the foreign policy culture of West Germany with its emphasis on deepening 
European integration. «Although German policy makers employed a variety of 
strategies in order to pursue their incongruous foreign-policy aims, their principal 
concern remained with the deepening of Western integration.» (Tewes, April 
1998: 117) Indeed, every time the two objectives came into conflict, the German 
government clearly favoured deepening at the expense of widening. Thus, 
inherited from West Germany, the traditional role of Germany as an integration 
promoter always prevailed over its wish for an eastward enlargement of the EU. 
Germany’s support for enlargement became cautious, when it appeared clearly 
within the German foreign policy that deepening had the priority over widening. 
(Zaborowski, January 2005: 41-68) Besides, as we have already analysed, the 
2004 enlargement was seen by many EU member states – and most notably 
Germany – as the opportunity to further deepen integration, as the Schäuble-
Lamers239 paper published in September 1994 for the Kohl government or the 
ideas developed at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000 by 
Germany’s then Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer240 illustrate. 
 
As far as NATO’s eastwards expansion in particular is concerned, this 
ambition was one of the main foreign policy objectives of the German 
government after 1990. Although – like the UK – Germany seemed not to be very 
happy in the early and mid 1990s about the noticeable US unilateral attitude on 
the matter, its national interest ‘forced’ it to push for NATO’s expansion to the 
East. (Schnapper, 1999: 94) Germany’s interests in NATO’s eastwards expansion 
are fairly the same as its interests in the EU’s enlargement towards the East. With 
the exception of the economic interests, Germany – in supporting NATO’s 
eastwards enlargement since the end of the Cold War – has indeed the same 
aforementioned security-geopolitical interests and historic responsibility that 
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made it one of the greatest supporters of the current EU enlargement process. Yet, 
the issue of NATO enlargement has not generated heated debates in Germany, 
since both public and political elites seem to have almost immediately recognized 
that the German reunification of 1990 would lead to the inclusion of a good part 
of Central Europe in the Western institutions, most notably NATO and the then 
EC.241 German political leaders made a great effort to spare Russian sensitivities. 
Aware of the role played by Mikhail Gorbachev and his Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Edward Shevardnadze, who allowed German reunification, accepted a 
reunited Germany within NATO and agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from the 
territory of the former GDR, Germany adopted an understanding attitude towards 
Russia on this issue. However, former Defence Minister Wolfgang Rühe gave 
NATO’s enlargement process new impetus, when he called in 1993 for the swift 
integration of former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO, given the uncertain 
timetable for their EU accession. It is worth mentioning that in the early 1990s 
NATO enlargement was clearly unpopular with the majority of the German 
government (amongst them the Minister for Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel as well 
as Helmut Kohl himself), clearly opting for a European solution to Germany’s 
security needs. Normative reasons were in great part behind the swing on the 
issue of NATO enlargement in 1994, «when in response to a nationalist turn in 
Russia’s parliamentary elections (Zirinovsky’s far-right party became the biggest 
one in the Duma) Bonn officially moved to endorse the notion of NATO 
membership for its eastern neighbours.» (Zaborowski, January 2005: 49-50) One 
has to note that Germany pushed then for an early admission of its protégés          
– namely Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – in both NATO and the 
EU242. In favouring a strategy of limited EU enlargement, Berlin sought to be in 
line with NATO. The German government was reluctant to admit countries into 
the EU that were not also liable to admission into NATO. Germany wished indeed 
to avoid «the de facto extension of security guarantees to Eastern European 
countries without the capacity to fulfill them.» (Baun, 1997: 20) One has to note 
that NATO’s expansion to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in March 
1999 satisfied to a large extent both the security interests of the Union, in 
particular those of Germany, and the desires of the three mentioned CEECs for 
integration into Western institutions. It therefore reduced the pressures for EU 
enlargement and explains partly why Germany’s support for the latter became 
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more hesitant once the 1999 NATO enlargement to its protégés was effectively 
achieved. (Létourneau and Hébert, 1999: 108-118) 
 
Finally, one should take a glance at the public opinions in the UK, France 
and Germany when it comes to the EU eastwards enlargement. The 
Eurobarometer of December 2003243, thus some months before the enlargement, 
showed that neither the French nor the Germans and not even the British were 
very keen on seeing the EU expanding towards the East. They seemed rather 
scared about the enlargement. Indeed, according to the last Eurobarometer 
concerning the support for enlargement published in December 2003, less than 
40% of the population, as well in France, in Germany, as in the UK, support it. 
They are hence the three most reluctant public opinions in the EU, which as a 
whole supports the enlargement only at 47%. Germans and British people were 
supporting enlargement only at 38% (with respectively 42% and 40% opposing 
it), while French public opinion supported enlargement only at 34% and even a 
high 55% opposing it. Despite the disagreement of a popular majority in the 
principal three actors within the Union, the enlargement process was pursued to 
its culmination with the entry in May 2004 of eight CEECs plus two 
Mediterranean islands. In Germany, already the EMU had witnessed a virtual 
exclusion of the public, when the venture was also pursued despite the reluctance 
of a popular majority. (Wood, March 2002: 23) 
 
 
 
3) THE TURKISH QUESTION 
 
The question of Turkey’s EU membership and the still unresolved Cypriot 
question can be analysed as contextual problems of the Western alliances’ 
enlargements towards the East. The question of Turkey’s accession into the EU, 
to which the Cypriot question is linked, has to be worked out in the next decades 
to avoid an impasse scenario. The endless upholding of these controversies is 
undoubtedly not a positive solution for the future evolution of the EU and the 
completing of the geopolitical reunification of the old continent.  
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This chapter will examine these two essential questions. Thus, it firstly 
analyses the geostrategic situation of Turkey, before considering its implications 
in light of its willingness to join the EU. The Cypriot question will be considered 
in the first section.  
 
 
a. The Geostrategic Position of Turkey 
 
At a crossroads between North and South, East and West, Turkey is in an 
exceptional position to act as a regional influence. Besides, it has a history of 
empire and leadership. Geographically stretching across the Dardanelles and the 
Bosporus, its political centre – Ankara – is located towards the East, while its 
economic and historical centre – Istanbul – lies in the West. One also finds this 
duality in the Turkish identity, which in turn sees itself within Europe or within 
the Middle East. Its unclear geographical position – neither fully in Europe nor in 
the Middle East – entails both burdens and opportunities. Under the leadership of 
Mustafa Kemal – known as Atatürk244 –, the modern Turkey has been founded in 
1923 from the vestiges of the Ottoman Empire, with the proclamation of the 
Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. Mustafa Kemal was elected its first 
president. Aiming to guide Turkey to Europe, he westernised the country. 
Therefore, he passed reforms so as to eradicate the country of its Islamic culture 
deemed as harmful to its progress. This consisted principally of the secularisation 
of society. The decision in 1928 to remove the clause designating Islam as the 
official religion of the Turkish state was certainly the most important in defining 
Turkey’s secular status. But, diverse measures, as notably the removal of the 
Arabic alphabet – replaced with the Latin – or the insistence on adopting Western 
style of dress were also included in Atatürk’s westernisation. Another important 
step was the 1926 civil code, copied on the Swiss one, which grants women 
unprecedented legal rights. In 1934, women even received the right to vote and to 
stand for election, that is, ten years ahead of France, fourteen ahead of Belgium, 
eighteen ahead of Greece and forty-two years ahead of Portugal. So, taking that 
into account one would rather speak about modernization than about 
westernisation. Moreover, in addition to the adoption of the civil code copied on 
the Swiss one, the penal code, the public law and the commercial code – 
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respectively copied on the Italian, the French and the German code/law – were all 
adopted from February to June 1926. One should add that Atatürk understood the 
Turkish identity as inclusive to all ethnic groups living on the territory of the new 
republic, provided they “sacrifice” the perception of their own identities in the 
interest of state cohesion. His determination to develop Turkey into a modern 
European state implied somehow the rejection of its Ottoman past and all its 
corollaries. (Pinar Tank, 1998: 169-170) The death of Atatürk in 1938 did not 
interrupt Turkey’s impetus towards Western modernisation. 
 
In the wake of the Second World War, Turkey showed its will to get closer 
to the Western bloc. It notably feared the Soviet threat, when Stalin claimed right 
of way through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straights. (Giuliani, 2003: 243-244) 
Turkey joined NATO in February 1952 alongside Greece. Turkey, serving as a 
solid NATO ally during the Cold War, is thus firmly anchored militarily in the 
West for more than half a century and contributes to Europe’s security in a 
decisive way both at the south-western rim of Europe and at the southern flank of 
the Atlantic Alliance. Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s geostrategic 
position had significantly altered. With the end of the ideological confrontation, 
the Black Sea was no longer perceived as a separating sea, but as a mare nostrum 
and a core of regional cooperation. (Ghebali and Sauerwein, 1995: 205-206) Yet, 
at the same time, the importance of both NATO and Turkey’s geostrategic 
position declined. One has to note that, notably because of the revival of the 
Kurdish question in the country’s South-East, Samuel Huntington positioned 
Turkey in the Middle East and not in Europe in the early post-Cold War years. 
(Huntington, Summer 1993: 22-49) Turkey sought to remedy its relative loss of 
geopolitical power in strengthening its influence in the newly independent Central 
Asian Republics, thanks to the revival of traditional historic, ethnic and religious 
affinities. (Pinar Tank, 1998: 170) Turkey is engaged in establishing some degree 
of influence in Azerbaijan and the Central Asia region, exploiting the retraction of 
Russian power. Thus, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
established close diplomatic, cultural and economic relations with Azerbaijan, the 
Islamic Republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, whose inhabitants are mainly Turkic people, with the exception of 
Tajiks who are ethnic Persians. (Ghebali and Sauerwein, 1995: 206) It is the 
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reason why Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts in his book The Grand Chessboard: 
American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives that Turkey is a geopolitical 
pivot and might even be considered also as a geostrategic player, a characteristic 
meaning that it might have the capacity to alter the existing state of affairs. 
Brzezinski identifies only three key geostrategic players in Europe, France, 
Germany and Russia, but to which one might add Turkey. Anyway, Brzezinski 
regards Turkey as a geopolitical pivot in the sense that its important but sensitive 
location makes it potentially vulnerable faced with the behaviour of geopolitical 
players.245 (Brzezinski, 1997: 40-47) «Turkey stabilizes the Black Sea region, 
controls access from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the Caucasus, 
still offers an antidote to Muslim fundamentalism, and serves as the southern 
anchor for NATO. A destabilized Turkey would likely unleash more violence in 
the southern Balkans, while facilitating the reimposition of Russian control over 
the newly independent states of the Caucasus.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 47) Although 
Turkey has taken an initiative in the region, from the Balkans to the Middle East 
and Central Asia, it has to resolve some internal difficulties and disputes with 
neighbours – especially Greece but also Iran and Armenia246 – in order to play a 
leadership role in the region, as well as to be “qualified” for the EU. 
 
As far as its internal problems are concerned, one refers particularly to the 
strengthening of human rights and fundamental freedoms – which includes the 
Kurdish question – and economic difficulties. Yet, Turkey’s fervent aspiration of 
Europe permitted the country to realise important progress on these two issues. 
 
Turkey’s passionate aspiration to join the “EU club” also pressed Ankara 
to accomplish progress in its relations with its neighbours, primarily with Greece. 
Indeed, Turkey’s long-standing dispute with its western neighbour acknowledged 
a positive evolution since the normalization of their relation in summer 1999.247 
Many reasons explain the latest Turkish-Greek détente. The principal reason is 
certainly the comprehension of both countries that the resolution of their disputes 
is necessary alongside the dynamics of their relations with the EU. Both realised 
that the resolution of their disputes – the Cypriot conflict and territorial disputes 
in the Aegean Sea – is necessary for both of them; for Turkey if it wants to 
proceed with its accession process to the EU and for Greece if it wanted to join 
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the first row of EU member states of the Euro-zone and if it wanted the Republic 
of Cyprus to join the EU even without any a priori political settlement. 
Furthermore, in both countries, there is strong domestic public support and the 
majority of both political leaders and business elites backs the Turkish-Greek 
rapprochement. Amongst other reasons of the latest Turkish-Greek détente, one 
should also mention the following ones: the change in leadership in Greece from 
the hardline Minister for Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos to the more 
pragmatic George Papandreou; Greece’s hope that a more Europeanised and 
democratised Turkey would be more peaceful and cooperative in its foreign 
policy; Turkey’s perception of the relative position of Greece inside the EU 
started to change in the late 1990s in such a way that the Turkish political elite has 
realised that the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations have been strongly affected by 
the tone of relations between Ankara and Athens; Turkey’s interest’s increase in 
joining the EU in the post-Cold War era, given the decline of NATO’s cementing 
role across the Atlantic. Moreover, Turkey’s interest in EU membership has 
further increased since 1999, and more particularly since the events of 11 
September 2001, given that the stakes of exclusion from the EU – principally on 
cultural and civilizational grounds – proved to be higher than in the past; the EU’s 
and United States’ active support of the Turkish-Greek cooperation process for 
security reasons, Washington hoping that a Turkey member of the EU would 
more easily and likely cooperate with the USA in the realisation of its strategic-
security interests in the Greater Middle Eastern region. (Oguzlu, Summer 2003: 
45-49; Pinar Tank, Autumn 2002: 147) Thus, many observers of Turkish-Greek 
relations deem that both sides of the Aegean Sea believe in the legitimacy of the 
everlasting settlement of their disputes, principally the dispute over Cyprus and 
the Aegean problems. They have therefore concluded that cooperation has 
definitely replaced the old confrontational logic. However, some are not so 
optimistic, arguing that «the underlying reasons behind Turkey and Greece’s 
cooperative attitudes towards each other have been mainly driven by strategic and 
instrumental factors rather than reciprocal change of hearts.» (Oguzlu, Summer 
2003: 54) According to them, the decades-long culture of mistrust has made its 
way deep into the national thinking in both countries, so that it will be extremely 
difficult for Greece and Turkey to break this well-established conflictual cycle in 
bilateral relations. In view of that, they accuse Ankara to instrumentalize its 
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relation with Greece in order to accelerate Turkey’s EU accession process. 
Similarly, Athens is accused of acting on the supposition that Turkey would never 
be part of the EU. The Greek government has therefore been criticized to have 
had a very intransigent attitude during the ESDP dispute that broke out in fall 
2002 between the EU, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance over EU access to NATO 
military assets and planning procedures.248 Although an agreement had eventually 
been reached in mid-December 2002, the Greek government has indeed been 
accused to have acted on the assumption that Turkey would never join the EU and 
had therefore not seen any justification for offering it full rights to participate in 
the decision-making process of EU-led military operations. (Oguzlu, Summer 
2003: 51, 57) 
 
We have just mentioned the two main disagreements in the Turkish-Greek 
dispute. The first one is about their complex maritime, air, territorial and 
boundary disputes in the Aegean Sea. Within the context of their recent détente, 
Athens and Ankara began discussions on resolving the decades-long disagreement 
over Aegean Sea boundaries. It seems that the discussions are developing well, 
although a definite settlement of the dispute in the Aegean Sea has not yet been 
achieved.249 
 
As for the Cyprus dispute, it is the second disagreement and lies also at the 
very core of the Turkish-Greek dispute. The latest rapprochement between Athens 
in Ankara had also an impact on that issue. Yet, before pointing out the latest 
development, one should beforehand briefly analyse the origin of the conflict. 
Cyprus has been under Ottoman sovereignty until 1914 and became a British 
crown colony in 1925. Tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
did already exist at that time.250 One hoped that the tensions would end once the 
Republic of Cyprus achieved independence on 16 August 1960 and after eighty-
two years of British rule.251 The island’s independence was guaranteed by three 
countries, namely Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The hostility between 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots did only cease briefly. The return of inter-
communitarian tumults and violent unrest revealed that the Cypriot question was 
far to come to a solution. The tumults in Cyprus were intensified by Greece’s and 
especially Turkey’s threats to intervene militarily in the island. The Greek 
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Cypriots even imposed an embargo on the Turkish Cypriots, controlling entrance 
to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The latter thus became completely dependent 
upon Ankara’s aid. Turkey reacted in launching air strikes on some Cypriot 
villages in summer 1964. Cyprus – having already obtained the establishment of 
the United Nations Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus [UNFICYP] – protested to the 
Security Council. A cease-fire requested by the Security Council calmed down the 
general situation for a while on the Mediterranean island. Besides, one has to note 
that the objective of the Greek Cypriots was the enosis252, i.e. the union with 
Greece. Although the enosis was officially forbidden by the international 
agreements of 1959-1960, the Greek government acted along the same lines, in 
order to accomplish Cyprus’ incorporation into “the mother land”. On the 
contrary, Turkey did everything to preclude the enosis option. Ankara wanted the 
strict observance of the 1959-1960 agreements and the preservation of the Turkish 
Cypriot minority’s privileges. The Turkish Cypriots, dependent upon Ankara’s 
military and economic aid, completely backed up the position of the Turkish 
government. Furthermore, a number of Turkish Cypriots became convinced that 
the only way to protect the interests and identity of the Turkish Cypriot 
population in the event of enosis would be the taksim253, i.e. the division of the 
island into a Greek sector and a Turkish sector. «L’affaire de Chypre, qui se 
présentait au début plutôt comme un conflit interne entre deux communautés, (…) 
prit [alors] l’aspect d’une confrontation directe entre Athènes et Ankara, pour 
devenir en quelque sorte un élément du contentieux gréco-turc.» (Constantinides, 
Juin 1965: 3) Negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots started 
in 1968, but eventually failed in April 1974, not only because of both Greece’s 
and Turkey’s intransigence, but also because of a lack of motivations of the two 
communities in Cyprus. In April 1967, the Greek junta came into power following 
the military coup d’Etat in Athens. This event accelerated things. The military 
government in Athens backed the enosis and was consequently opposed to the 
head of the Cypriot government, Mgr Makarios, who distanced himself from his 
earlier enosis convictions and committed itself to the further independence of 
Cyprus. As a result, on 15 July 1974, the Greek junta toppled the Makarios 
government by another coup d’Etat.254 Mgr Makarios was replaced by a man who 
was devoted to the military government in Athens and consequently an avid 
supporter of the enosis. Considering the threat of the enosis, Turkey was duly 
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bound to act. But, Ankara did not manage to convince the United Kingdom to act 
alongside it. Yet, Turkey did not want to let the opportunity to intervene militarily 
slip; a military intervention would indeed permit it to solve the Cypriot dispute 
according to its own wishes. Turkey invaded on 20 July 1974 with troops landing 
at Kyrenia on the island’s northern coast, invoking its right under the Treaty of 
Guarantee of 1960 to protect the Turkish Cypriots. That claim was – and is still – 
contested by Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Turkey declared itself preoccupied for 
the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority following the coup d’Etat and had to 
restore order on the island. Ankara was however not in its right, since it did not 
get the situation back to the one provided for in the agreements of 1960. On the 
contrary, thanks to its military intervention, Turkey seized more than one third of 
the island, placing it under its own security, whereas the 1960 agreements laid 
down the independence and integrity of Cyprus. The Republic of Turkey further 
violated the principles of international law, like the articles 2§4, prohibiting 
expressly the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, and 2§7 – providing for the principle of non-interference – of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
«The Greek junta’s adventurism in Cyprus (...) offered a golden opportunity 
for Turkey to put it (its invasion) into effect without international resistance.» 
(Markides, 1977: 155) Turkey sized in effect the great opportunity to intervene 
without the international community having a real possibility to react.255 The 
Cypriot government in favour of the enosis collapsed shortly after the fall of the 
Greek junta in Athens in summer 1974. Violent fights opposing Cypriot to 
Turkish troops took place after the landing of the latter on 20 July 1974. The 
Turkish troops progressed until they occupied about 37% of the island’s territory. 
The fighting stopped then, on 14 August 1974, followed by the expulsion from 
the northern part of the island of Greek Cypriots, while the Turkish Cypriots 
withdrew into Cyprus’ northern part. In 1975, the Turkish Cypriots declared 
unilaterally the Turkish federal State of Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. 
Through its invasion, Turkey brought about the division of the island. Yet, that 
division which exists de facto does not exist de jure: neither the Turkish federal 
State of Cyprus, nor the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC], created in 
1983, were recognized by any state except Turkey. Numerous Security Council 
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resolutions called the unilateral declaration of an independent TRNC as illegal 
and a result of a foreign (namely Turkish) intervention. As for the government of 
the Republic of Cyprus, it pretends to govern upon the whole Mediterranean 
island and is considered internationally as the foreign representation of the entire 
Cypriot territory.  
 
The European Community – which had concluded an association agreement 
with the Republic of Cyprus in May 1973 – had to face the Republic of Cyprus’ 
EC application, submitted in July 1990. While practically not including the 
Turkish Cypriot North, the application was technically made on behalf of the 
entire country. Although well disposed towards this application, the EC and then 
EU thought that the time was not ripe due to the impasse in the Cypriot dispute 
and for fear of offending Ankara. Nonetheless, developments in the Eastern 
Mediterranean from mid-1999 onwards have raised hopes that the time was ripe 
for a resolution to the Cyprus conflict. However, while the atmosphere between 
Greece and Turkey has considerably improved since summer 1999, the Cyprus 
problem has remained a constant sore in their relationship. Talks have 
consistently stalled on the Turkish Cypriot demand – backed by Ankara – to 
recognize the self-declared TRNC. The hope that the formal recognition of 
Turkey’s candidacy in December 1999 (at the Helsinki European Council) would 
have brought about a more flexible attitude from the Turkish side was not 
fulfilled. The UN proximity talks, begun in December 1999, stumbled again on 
the Turkish Cypriot demand to be recognized as a political equal, something 
utterly inconceivable to the Greek Cypriot side. So, in November 2000, the 
Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the UN proximity talks, both sides maintaining 
their stances, the Greek Cypriots being sustained by international law and the 
Turkish Cypriots backed by the Turkish state. Yet, gradually realising that Cyprus 
would be admitted into the EU even without a settlement256, the Turkish side 
announced in November 2001 its willingness to resume talks on the issue of 
Cyprus. Talks resumed effectively in January 2002. From November 2002 on, 
negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were based on the 
plan of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. But, once again the talks stalled 
and were suspended in March 2003. As the decision over the opening of EU 
accession negotiations with Turkey – to be taken at the end of 2004 – was 
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looming, Turkey showed itself again more conciliating and backed the resuming 
of negotiations in January 2004. Accordingly, the Greek Cypriot President Tassos 
Papadopoulos and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash agreed to start talks 
in February and due to end with a positive outcome before the accession of a 
united Cyprus on 1 May 2004. They agreed to hold the talks on the basis of the 
plan of Kofi Annan. Following the talks, the UN Secretary-General presented to 
the two sides the final revised version of its plan – a proposed final settlement – 
on 31 March 2004. Based on the model of Switzerland, the United Republic of 
Cyprus, as laid down by Kofi Annan’s plan, would be «an independent state in the 
form of an indissoluble partnership, with a [common state] government and two 
equal [component states], one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot.» 
(Foundation Agreement for the United Cyprus Republic, 31 March 2004: Art.2 §1 
(a)) Moreover, there would be «a single Cypriot citizenship» (Foundation 
Agreement for the United Cyprus Republic, 31 March 2004: Art.3 §1). Among 
other provisions, the UN plan provides for a territorial adjustment: the territory of 
the Turkish Cypriots should be reduced from 37% to 28,5%, as a shown by a map 
included in the Kofi Annan plan. The problem of the right to return of Greek 
Cypriots expelled or taking refuge in the southern part of the island following 
Turkey’s invasion in 1974 was the most debatable issue together with the related 
question of return of property. Kofi Annan’s plan was placed before the two 
communities in a parallel and simultaneous vote on 24 April 2004 on both sides 
of the border in the so-called Cyprus reunification referendum. Supported by the 
majority of the international community, the plan did not get the support neither 
of Rauf Denktash nor Tassos Papadopoulos. Whilst the proposal received nearly 
65% of favourable votes from the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots rejected it 
by more than 75%257. Since implementation of the plan was dependent on its 
approval by both communities, Cyprus did not reunify at that occasion. As a 
result, while officially the entire Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, only the 
southern part of the island did de facto become member of the Union. 
(Yakemtchouk, Mai 2004: 293-297; Pinar Tank, Autumn 2002: 146-150) 
Consequently, as the disputes in the Aegean Sea, the Cyprus issue cast a shadow, 
particularly with regard to Turkey’s effort to enter the EU. Compromise will 
certainly not be easy, even if both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots are 
basically in favour of a solution.258 Yet, with the Turkish-Greek rapprochement 
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one can be more optimistic that these disagreements will be sorted out sooner or 
later; all the more so since Mehmet Ali Talat, the pro-EU and pro-unification 
candidate was elected, on 17 April 2005, President of the self-declared TRNC, to 
succeed Rauf Denktash – who rejected over the years various attempt to resolve 
the conflict – in the post. Besides, recently, Ankara showed repeatedly its 
predisposition and willingness to resume talks on Cyprus’ reunification on the 
basis of the Annan Plan.  
 
As for Turkey’s relation with Iran, instead of defining it as a conflict one 
should rather refer to rivalry. Turkey’s south-eastern neighbour is indeed 
considered as a rival to Turkey. Both countries seek to become the major regional 
player and tend thus to negate each other’s influence. The relations between 
Turkey and Iran relate basically to the Kurdish question, the Caspian Sea and 
Azerbaijan. The still fragmented Iraq, which is not yet completely independent as 
it depends still upon the United States for survival, gives Teheran cause to worry. 
Iran’s geopolitical position is already reduced in the region, particularly in Iraq. 
This represents a loss of leadership, especially in relation to the United States’ 
ally Turkey, whose ability to project power as a player in the Gulf region has 
increased. Facing the potential further increase of Turkey’s geopolitical position, 
Iran is worried about its sensitive Kurdish and Azeri regions. It fears notably the 
triggering of tensions between Iranian Kurdistan and Teheran as well as signs of 
national revolt of Azeri people in Iran259. Those tensions and border conflicts in 
its North would even further weaken Iran’s geopolitical position, in impeding it to 
efficiently project power into the Caspian Sea region. Turkey’s strategic alliance 
with the United States – but also with Israel260 – has brought it a stronger position 
vis-à-vis Iran, notably on the three issues above-mentioned. It seems likely that 
the balance of power between Turkey and Iran will continue to evolve in favour 
of the former, as a result of the US “war against terrorism” as well as Iran’s non-
cooperation with some of the United States’ objectives. (Olson, June 2002) In 
trying to counterbalance, Iran leans on Armenia and seeks a stronger connection 
to Russia. For instance, in Azerbaijan, where Turkey has gained an influential role 
in the post-Cold War era, Iran’s attitude has been more helpful to the Russians. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 47, 133-135)  
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Finally, concerning the Turkish-Armenian tension, it has basically two 
sources. The first source concerns the Armenian “Genocide” of 1915-1917. It is a 
top priority of Armenia’s foreign policy to win global recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide. Ankara steadfastly refuses to characterize the events of 
1915-1917 as genocide. Turkish officials and scholars argue that at the time, 
Ottoman forces were trying to repel a Russian invasion of what is now eastern 
Turkey, an area then largely inhabited by Armenians. 1,5 millions of Armenians 
died during these events. «Much of the suffering occurred because of an Ottoman 
decision to deport the entire Armenian population, which was perceived by 
Ottoman leaders as being pro-Russian, away from the front lines to the 
southeast.» (Gorvett, May 2002: 1) A second source of Turkish-Armenian tension 
has been the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave lying within Azerbaijan 
but which is inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians. Starting in 1988, Turkey’s 
neighbours – Azerbaijan and Armenia – fought a war in which some 30’000 
people died over Nagorno-Karabakh. «Armenian forces emerged victorious and 
ended up occupying a large chunk of Azerbaijani territory adjoining Karabakh. 
Since 1994, the enclave has been under the control of an unrecognized ethnic 
Armenian government.» (Gorvett, 29 May 2002: 2) As Azerbaijan’s strongest ally 
in the region, Turkey imposed an economic blockade on Armenia, even closing 
up the Turkish-Armenian border. Ankara has so far been reluctant to normalize 
relations with Armenia. One hopes that normalization will come sooner or later, 
as a Turkish-Armenian dialogue has started up the last years. (Jégo, 15.12.2004: 
IV-V) 
 
One can assert that there is no doubt that Turkey’s ambition is to become 
again a cultural, economic and politic leader of the Turkish world. Resolving 
internal difficulties and disputes with neighbours would certainly greatly help 
Ankara in its enterprise. As Turkey is still in the process of redefining its identity, 
one can wonder in which direction it will be attracted. «The modernists would 
like to see it become a European state and thus look to the west; the Islamists lean 
in the direction of the Middle East and a Muslim community and thus look to the 
South; and the historically minded nationalists see in the Turkic peoples of the 
Caspian Sea basin and thus look eastward.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 134) To the East, 
although Turkey is engaged in establishing some degree of influence in Caucasus 
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and the Central Asia region, it seems that the thrust towards these regions has 
rather to be understood in terms of cultural and economic presence than in terms 
of annexation and revival of a mythic Turkish Empire. To the South, it appears as 
the secular Turkey does not give way to the Islamist temptation to get closer to 
the Muslim community, though their influence is quite strong within the country. 
Ankara counts even on the US and Israeli support to counter the nationalist Arab 
axis; in addition, it is opposed to its Iranian rival. (Chauprade, 2003: 479; 
Chauprade and Thual, 1998: 400) Turkey seems to look rather to the West. The 
country’s apparent attraction towards the West and the EU, is demonstrated by the 
pro-Western stance of the current government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The 
latter favours indeed the integration into the EU, despite the Islamist roots of the 
movement of which he is the leader.  
 
 
b. The Turkish Willingness to Join the European Union  
 
It appears effectively that Turkey is seeking within the last decades to 
enter the EU at all costs. Founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949, 
Turkey – where the Westernisation remains a constitutional principle since 1923 – 
became rapidly interested in the European integration efforts following the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957. In 1963, the then EEC signed an association agreement with 
Turkey, the so-called Ankara Agreement. This agreement laid down as objectives 
the progressive establishment of a customs union and the preparation of a possible 
accession of Turkey in the EC. (Kaleagasi, 1994: 247) An additional Protocol      
– signed in 1970 – entered into force in 1973, providing for a transitional period 
of 22 years that would end in a customs union as provided by the association 
agreement. But, in spite of these objectives, an estrangement of the EC-Turkey 
relations became apparent from then on. Only very little progress occurred in the 
1970s. This was notably due to the political instability in Turkey and to the 
Turkish economy steeped in state interventionism which was not compatible with 
the EC liberalism. Things changed with the military coup in 1980 and the 
subsequent economic policy of Turgut Özal’s government. Turgut Özal opened 
up the Turkish economy. Not satisfied with the mere association agreement, the 
Turkish government filed an application for accession on 14 April 1987. Yet, two 
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years later, the European Council – endorsing the European Commission’s 
opinion – postponed the application in the short and medium term. It suggested as 
an alternative to focus on the customs union as provided for in the Ankara 
Agreement and to revitalize the association. As a result, the customs union was 
accepted and ratified in 1995, that is, at the end of the transitional period of 22 
years, but only after many debates within the EU. Moreover, the Union put its 
finger on the question of respect for human rights in Turkey, notably concerning 
the Kurdish question. This outcome had as a consequence to deeply deceive the 
entire Turkish political elite, who wanted the sheer EU accession. As justified as 
the criticisms of the EU were, they never happened to totally convince Ankara, 
which used to regard these criticisms as bad excuses. Nonetheless, Turkey felt 
even worse when the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 decided 
to recognize the status of the ten CEECs and Cyprus as candidate countries and 
even to begin negotiations with some of them, while refusing Turkey’s candidacy. 
Upon this decision, Turkey broke off its political dialogue with Brussels. The 
normalization of Turkish-EU relations happened only a year later, in November 
1998. In December 1999, following the European Commissions’ opinion, the 
Helsinki European Council reversed the Luxembourg decision by formally 
recognizing Turkey’s candidacy. (Avci, Spring 2002: 93-94) One has to note that 
the Turkish-Greek détente started in summer 1999 has largely contributed to this 
decision.261 In December 2002, the European Council of Copenhagen then even 
decided to review Turkey’s membership bid no earlier than in December 2004 
and – if the EU will by then deem Turkey’s efforts in fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria as enough – «will open accession negotiations with Turkey without 
delay.» (Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002: 5) 
 
The decisions taken in Helsinki and in Copenhagen have undoubtedly 
encouraged Ankara to implement a series of fundamental reforms. The victory at 
the elections of November 2002 of the Justice and Development Party, a 
movement with Islamist roots, has quickened the pace of reform, its leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan262 being a man with strong European ambitions. The Turkish 
government thus introduced economic reforms as well as in the domain of human 
rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Ankara made a spectacular effort in 
implementing structural reforms, after Turkey went through a financial crisis in 
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late 2000-early 2001. It is thus not surprising that, as regards the 
Copenhagen economic criteria, the European Commission decided in November 
2005 to grant Turkey the status of «a functioning market economy, as long as it 
firmly maintains its recent stabilisation and reform achievements.» (European 
Commission, 9 November 2005: 54) Yet, major reforms concerned those 
implemented in response to the political elements of the Copenhagen criteria. 
Many reform packages were passed in 2003-2004 with the aim to harmonize 
Turkish laws and regulations with those of the EU. These reforms include notably 
the introduction of cultural freedoms for the Kurdish minority (the Turkish state 
television lifted its ban on broadcasting in Kurdish, the Kurds have now the 
possibility to give Kurdish names to their children, and so forth), a ban on the 
death penalty, a zero-tolerance policy towards torture in prisons and a diminution 
of military influence (thus ending the army’s power to intervene in politics), a 
penal reform bill (eventually excluding a clause banning adultery). (Schmid, 
Septembre 2004: 493-494) Turkey was rewarded for its efforts. In effect, the 
Brussels European Council of December 2004 «decided that (…) Turkey 
sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria263 to open accession 
negotiations.» (Brussels European Council, 16 and 17 December 2004: 6) It 
proposed the 3 October 2005 as start date for opening negotiations with Ankara 
for EU accession. Following a series of debates among the EU Twenty-Five – 
notably marked by Austria’s insistence that accession talks with Turkey should 
include clear reference to a ‘privileged partnership’ as an alternative to full 
membership status –, the European Council effectively opened accession 
negotiations on that date. Nonetheless, Turkey faces special conditions. Amongst 
them, one should mention the following: The negotiations are an open-ended 
process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand.» (Brussels 
European Council, 16 and 17 December 2004: 7); Accession negotiations can be 
suspended «in the case of a serious and persistent breach (…) of the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law on which the Union is founded.» (Brussels European Council, 16 and 
17 December 2004: 8); «Long transition periods, derogations, specific 
arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently 
available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered264.» (Brussels 
European Council, 16 and 17 December 2004: 7). Moreover, Turkey signed in 
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July 2005 the protocol that envisages the adaptation of the customs union to 
extend it to the ten new member states, including the Republic of Cyprus. 
Although Turkish leaders assert that the adoption of the protocol does not mean 
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus265, some emphasize that the signing by 
Turkey of the protocol means de facto an implicit recognition of the Greek 
Cypriot government, for the first time since the division of Cyprus in 1974. 
Anyway, Brussels emphasized that Turkey has to officially recognize the 
Republic of Cyprus prior to its full EU membership. 
 
A lot of discussion is going on about the Europhile intentions of the 
current government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. There are two conflicting 
hypothesis that interpret the fast pace of the Islamist government to comply 
Turkey with the Copenhagen criteria. The first one suggests that the EU embodies 
for Turkey a hope of normalization and a haven of stabilisation in which the 
Turkish institutions and economy could eventually find a lasting stability. For its 
part, the second assumption refers to Turkey as a Trojan horse of the USA or even 
of radical Islam. One generally gives preference to the first hypothesis, believing 
that the potential EU accession is also the best means for Erdogan’s government 
to reform the country rapidly and profoundly. (Schmid, Septembre 2004: 494) 
 
The fear of an EU accession of Turkey perceived as an American Trojan 
horse is however present. The United States is without a doubt one of the 
strongest supporters of Turkey joining the EU. For Washington, Turkey 
represents a «staunch ally in the Muslim world supporting the US’ global 
coalition against terrorism.» (Pinar Tank, Autumn 2002: 149) According to the 
neo-realist approach and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Turkey’s EU membership would 
create a stable role model for the whole Islamic world, thus helping its plans to 
control Eurasia’s southern zone, which in turn would contain Russia and permit 
the USA to remain the unique and global superpower.266 Indeed, if Europe’s door 
to Turkey remains open, the states of the Caucasus are also likely to gravitate in 
the European orbit, as Washington fervently desires. But if not, it will become 
more probable that Armenia and Georgia will have to adapt to Russia’s 
inclinations and have their future linked up with Russia’s own relation to the 
expanding EU. This second option will hinder Washington’s project to control 
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Eurasia’s southern zone. (Brzezinski, 1997: 149-150, Chauprade, 2003: 55) Some 
suspect also that US support to Turkey’s EU accession to be a means for 
Washington to control the EU from inside via Turkey.267 The outspoken 
statements of the United States in favour of Turkey’s candidacy have been 
«judged on the European side as inappropriate interference in EU affairs.» (Avci, 
Spring 2002: 98) Besides the USA, the United Kingdom is also a key supporter of 
the Turkish EU bid. This distinguishes the UK from most of its EU partner states. 
In UK’s opinion, the EU would benefit greatly from Turkey’s enormous 
geostrategic potential. The UK is thus motivated by broad geopolitical 
considerations. Yet, one has to add that Turkey’s EU accession also has London’s 
favour, because of the fact that Turkey is a significant trading partner of the 
United Kingdom: the United Kingdom was Turkey’s third largest export 
destination (7,8%) and fifth largest import source (5,1%) in 2003. The suspicion 
addressed at London’s support for EU’s enlargement towards the CEECs – that is, 
that the enlargement of the Union is likely to hinder further integration of the 
latter – can also be directed to its support for Turkey’s EU bid. Apart from the 
UK, most of the other EU member states are somewhat divided about the question 
of Turkey’s entry into the EU. Among them are especially France and Germany, 
which both officially support Turkey’s EU bid. French President Jacques Chirac 
and former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder have indeed backed Turkey, though 
there is strong opposition within both countries, especially in France268. Actually, 
public opinion across the EU is rather lukewarm to letting Turkey in269, not only 
in France (56% of the people oppose it according the IPSOS poll on September 
2004) and Germany (41% opposing it and 55% in favour of it, according a poll of 
1’000 Germans conducted for public broadcaster ARD in September 2004), but 
especially in Austria (a September 2004 Gallup poll showed 76% against it and 
20% in favour). The Dutch are also against Turkey’ EU membership. (A 
September 2004 poll found 41% against Turkish entry and 21% in favour). As 
President Chirac has promised to launch in France a referendum on Turkish EU 
membership once the negotiations with Turkey completed, the likelihood of 
Turkey becoming one day an EU member state seems thus fairly jeopardized. The 
fact that Austria has announced its intention to most certainly put the issue to 
popular vote does not add optimism on the Turkish side. As for Germany, it does 
not consider launching a referendum. But, as Austria, Angela Merkel – the 
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conservative German Chancellor of the current left-right grand coalition270 – 
proposed, when she was leader of the opposition, to offer Turkey a privileged 
partnership rather than full membership. However, the failure of Germany’s 
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) to win a clear victory in the 2005 federal 
elections makes it less likely that Merkel’s Coalition government will strongly 
oppose Turkish membership, since the Christian Democrats share power with the 
more “turkophile” Social Democrats. Germany’s economic interests are certainly 
speaking in favour of Turkey’s EU membership or at least a strong economic 
partnership. Germany is Turkey’s most important economic and commercial 
partner. The volume of trade has doubled in the 1990s. In 2003, 15,9% of 
Turkey’s exports went to Germany, while 13,7% of Turkey’s imports came from 
Germany. Moreover, Germany has a strong relationship with Turkey, as about 2.5 
million ethnic Turks are living in Germany (with an estimated 700’000 of them 
having already become German citizen). (Auswärtiges Amt, October 2004: 1) 
Observers of international politics are, in majority, of the opinion that Turkey’s 
presence within the EU will make it harder for France and Germany to remain the 
masters of the EU project. As for the new member states of Central and Eastern 
Europe, several of them remain opposed to Turkey joining the Union, arguing that 
Turkey, once accepted into the EU, would draw massive subsidies to their 
expenses. As for Turkey’s traditional (but former) enemy, Greece, it has by now 
become a strong supporter of Turkey’s EU bid. The current conservative Prime 
Minister Costas Karamanlis, continuing the rapprochement policy of his socialist 
predecessor, Costas Simitis, openly supports Turkey’s EU membership, despite 
the unresolved Cyprus dispute. Athens sees Turkey’s EU accession as a way to 
boost security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, as it implies a package 
deal covering the settlement of the territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea and the 
Cyprus question. In Turkey itself, the population has long been indifferent to the 
European project. But nowadays, not only the political elite, but also a large 
majority of the population (63,5% according to the Eurobarometer of April 2005) 
desires to become member of the EU, hoping for better living conditions and 
more economic growth.  
 
The interests of the EU member states seem very important in the Turkish 
question, since the final decision to let Turkey into the EU is not solely taken in 
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line with that country’s ability to meet the Union’s criteria but also as a result of 
certain EU member states’ interests and their relative influence. In other words, 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria will probably be a necessary condition, but not a 
sufficient one, as all accession negotiations are affected by the policy preferences 
of the member states. Even if the candidates could meet all the Copenhagen 
criteria in their political and economic systems, a potential opposition of an EU 
member state would complicate their accession to the Union relative to the power 
and influence of the opposing state. (Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, March 2003: 
28)  
 
Anyway, there are as many factors speaking in favour of Turkey’s full EU 
membership as factors speaking for an admittedly close relation, yet not going as 
far as full membership. Besides the elements against full membership that have 
already been pointed out, one should not omit the following geostrategic element. 
Its EU membership could hinder Turkey’s ambition to become once more a 
cultural, economic and politic leader of the Turkish world. In other words, EU 
accession could hinder Ankara to play its role as a regional leader. (Chauprade, 
2003: 479) A Turkey member of the EU could at best extend its influence towards 
the Balkans (Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), where it could act as 
a leader, even inside the Union, provided all of those countries will then be EU 
member states. As for the elements in favour of Turkey’s full membership, one 
should add the two following observation to those already mentioned. First, one 
has to emphasize again that the greatest worry is of course that Turkey’s rejection 
would lead to instability in the region, as «Turkey would have nowhere else to 
turn». (Melakopides, 2000: 327) Second, the fact of having Turkey without the 
EU signifies its de facto exclusion from the ESDP and the European security 
caucus. This explains Turkey’s irritation at the arrival of ESDP and the dispute 
between Greece and Turkey in late 2002 over EU access to NATO military assets 
and planning procedures eventually settled by the “Berlin Plus arrangement”. 
Turkey understandably fears that the ESDP will lead in the short-term to an EU 
on its borders with a powerful foreign and defence policy in which it would not be 
able to participate. (Hill, Autumn 2001: 321) Moreover, as feared notably by the 
United States, a strong ESDP without Turkey could obviously produce some 
considerable problems within the Atlantic Alliance as well as instability at 
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NATO’s southern flank. The problem of a Turkey not involved in European 
security and defence cooperation is exacerbated by the country’s centrality to 
most of the potential crisis scenarios in the European theatre. 
 
Yet, the EU has anticipated a potential failure of Turkey’s EU bid. It has 
thus taken precautions to avoid as many negative outcomes as possible of such a 
turn of events. If it turns out that Turkey «is not in a position to assume in full all 
the obligations of membership it must be ensured that (…) [Turkey] is fully 
anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.» 
(Brussels European Council, 16 and 17 December 2004: 7) This appears to 
amount to a “privileged partnership” as already proposed by some, notably by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is also leader of the CDU. But, a 
potential “risk” of Turkey’s setback in joining the “European club” is to see 
Turkey permanently turning towards the Muslim South or towards the Turkish 
peoples of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. (Brzezinski, 1997: 134) 
 
As, all in all, the EU accession negotiations with Ankara will most 
probably last at least 10 to 15 years, it seems obvious that Turkey’s effective EU 
membership will in any case not occur in the short-term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III: 
THE ZONES OF INFLUENCE IN THE UNIFYING EUROPE 
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The changes of 1989/1990 induced most of the European countries to pose 
new demands on the European security system. Hence, the new Europe has new 
geopolitical realities. The states, but also the international institutions, seek their 
position and role in that new geopolitical context. Each country seeks as much as 
possible to take advantage of the new geopolitical situation in Europe notably – as 
far as the great powers are concerned – in defending or increasing their respective 
zone of influence. Generally, countries not directly affected by the geopolitical 
change of the post-Cold War era – like France and the United Kingdom – try first 
and foremost to limit the damage and as far as they can to find new ways to 
maintain and even increase their influence. As for the countries that have been 
directly affected by these changes, there are those which fear to lose much of their 
influence, most notably Russia, those which try to recover their geopolitical rank, 
in the main the CEECs, and those, like Germany and Turkey, which are seeking 
to take advantage of the new geopolitical context by establishing (or re-
establishing) their “natural” geopolitical area in the unified Europe. In sum, one 
assists to the affirmation of geopolitical areas (or spheres of influence) in that 
European security complex, especially around key states.  
 
In parallel, but also on top of, these national moves aiming at asserting 
their geopolitical position in the unified Europe, there is the dynamics of 
European integration. As noticed in the first part, one witnesses in particular the 
boost in the last years of the European defence project, thus challenging somehow 
the transatlantic community which is symbolized by the protection of Europe by 
NATO and the USA and which was deemed as absolutely vital in the Cold War 
years. In Europe, one consequently observes the opposition of Europeanist 
countries versus Atlanticist countries; the reason of this opposition is primarily to 
be found in the national interests and preferences of the different European 
countries. 
 
One has to note that from a neo-realist point of view, France and Germany 
– with their respective geopolitical areas – make up the very heart of Europe’s 
security in that new Europe. Whether it be inside the EU or within the European 
continent as a whole, France and Germany are considered to constitute Europe’s 
security core. Both countries seem necessary for any European integration in the 
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area of defence and security and are regarded as the main contenders of US 
security and defence domination on the continent. In that context, one has to 
address the particular role of the genuine dynamics of the EU as well as the 
prospect for other countries – as for instance the UK, Turkey or Poland – to be 
also destined to play, besides Germany and France, a major role in the security 
complex of the unified Europe. 
 
The United Kingdom, France and Germany represent the countries having 
the most powerful influence on the direction taken by the EU. They are also the 
most critical – positively as well as negatively – when it comes to the future 
development of European security and to the preferable intensity of the 
transatlantic link. Moreover, the United Kingdom and France are – with the 
United States – the three Western allies, whose seat as permanent members at the 
UN Security Council, possession of the nuclear capacity, overseas interests and 
tradition based on power politics distinguish them from the other Western 
countries271. The principal debates about the European security alliances thus first 
involve them – the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany – 
«qui se font souvent le champion de l’une ou l’autre conception et regroupent 
autour d’eux les autres Etats alliés.» (Colson, 1995: 87) 
 
One has to add that it is clear that inside this ménage à trois272 – the UK, 
France and Germany – «as soon as any combination of two of the three shares a 
position which the other opposes, the latter is out of the game. But it is difficult to 
see how Europe, or any meaningful European defence identity, might be built 
outside this triangle.» (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 35) 
 
Yet, Zbigniew Brzezinski – an analyst having a realist/neo-realist view of 
international relations – identifies only three key geostrategic players in Europe, 
namely France, Germany and Russia, whereas the United Kingdom is only 
regarded as a geopolitical pivot, together with Ukraine and Turkey. As noticed in 
the chapter about the Turkish question, Turkey might under some circumstances 
even be considered as a geostrategic player273. In his book The Grand 
Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski defines the active geostrategic players as being the «states that have 
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the capacity and the national will to exercise power and influence beyond their 
borders in order to alter – to a degree that affects America’s interests – the 
existing geopolitical state of affairs. They have the potential and/or the 
predisposition to be geopolitically volatile.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 40) As for 
geopolitical pivots, he defines them as «states whose importance is derived not 
from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from 
the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of 
geostrategic players. Most often, geopolitical pivots are determined by their 
geography (…). In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield 
for a vital state or even a region. Sometimes, the very existence of a geopolitical 
pivot can be said to have very significant political and cultural consequences for a 
more active neighboring geostrategic player.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 41) 
 
Having set the scene with a discussion of the institutional security 
architecture in the first part and with the issue of the “unification” of the European 
continent and its consequences on a security level in the second part of the paper, 
the purpose of this third part is to apprehend the structure of zones of influence in 
Europe and the potential coalitions emerging or likely to appear between states in 
the new Europe. To this end, this part analyses the different aspects of 
geopolitical areas – formed by the interests and behaviour of the states – in 
Europe and the main tendencies observed, by concentrating principally on the 
main great powers of the old continent.  
 
Consequently, this part firstly examines the interests and attitudes of the 
different European states towards the European security architecture, in stressing 
in particular those of the three great powers, the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany; in doing so, a certain opposition between Europeanists and Atlanticists 
can be observed. Then, it analyses the geopolitical areas of the countries 
considered to constitute Europe’s security core, i.e. Germany and France. 
Concentrating on Europe’s core, an analysis of the Franco-German engine and of 
its potential extension to other countries will follow. In that context, Russia’s 
standpoint and willingness to keep its sphere of influence in post-Cold War 
Eurasia will also be addressed. Finally, a discussion about the possibility of the 
EU to become a potential “non-state” great power will conclude this part. 
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One has to note that, despite Russia does not form the object of a separate 
and all-embracing discussion, we will refer to the role of Russia – playing an 
important role in the formation of spheres of influence in Europe – throughout 
this part. 
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1) THE POSITION OF THE DIFFERENT EUROPEAN STATES 
TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 
Besides revealing the traditional dilemma of transferring sovereignties, the 
complexity of the European security system reflects particularly divergent 
interests and conflicting strategies of the nation-states in Europe and North 
America. Basically, the divergent interests and incentives of the European states 
can be condensed in the opposition between the integrationists and the 
intergovernmentalists within the EU as well as between the “Europeanists” and 
the “Atlanticists” within NATO. It also reveals the contradiction between 
Washington’s demand for a stronger and more responsible Europe and, in spite of 
this, a Europe still yielding to the United States of America. (Seidelmann, 2002: 
62-63)  
 
This chapter considers this opposition, in particular stressing the interests 
and attitudes of the principal three actors within the EU, namely the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany, those countries having – as we stressed above – 
the most powerful influence on the direction taken by the EU. The ideas which 
dominate the European security debate in the post-Cold War period will also be 
outlined. 
 
As far as the interests and attitudes of the European states are concerned, it 
became evident that even though the security challenges to Europe had changed 
since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the actors’ preferences for solutions were 
still influenced by some of the same factors as during the Cold War. These were 
essentially the view of the United States’ role in Europe and the view of the 
purpose and future development of the EU, notably as a principal actor in 
Europe’s post-Cold War security system. Behind the changes made within the 
diverse security institutions, particularly in the EU, there were still divergent 
views about the method and means to develop a European security policy. 
(Sjursen, 1999: 4-5) 
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a. The Incentives of the “Atlanticist” United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom is doubtless an important factor and the most 
important country in the development of an all-European security initiative. The 
UK is the key player of the CFSP/ESDP, since a successful CFSP/ESDP without 
Europe’s leading military power is as probable as a common currency without 
Germany and the weight of its economy. (Toje, Summer 2003: 66) European 
military cooperation has long been limited to some loose cooperation between 
France, Germany and a few other states. Before St.Malo, London has for a long 
time been very sceptical about any development of an independent security and 
defence role for the EU.  
 
The British government reacted to the end of the Cold War and to the new 
challenges for European security in producing a document called Options for 
Change which had the objective to reduce the amount of troops and the budget 
allocated to defence. Yet, despite the changing circumstances and the 
restructuring of the UK armed forces, the basic elements of British foreign and 
defence policies remain firm, especially the vital role of NATO, its special 
relationship to the USA and the need for nuclear weapons to prevent war. (Scott, 
1992: 178; Schnapper, 1999: 57-66) It is true that what distinguished British 
foreign policy since 1945 is the special relationship with the United Sates together 
with the development of an independent nuclear capacity. The successive British 
governments, though not keen on thinking systematically about security, were 
determined to play a greater role in international affairs, «in part by harnessing 
American firepower through NATO to the service of British national interests.» 
(Hodge, 2002: 160) Even if present-day domestic critics – as well on the right as 
on the left – in the United Kingdom often turn into derision the British insistence 
on a nuclear capacity as a misled quest for prestige, a great majority of British 
policy makers – sustained by most British people – agree that the country has to 
have an independent nuclear capacity as long as other states have nuclear 
weapons. Yet, the United Kingdom is a nuclear power more out of resignation 
than enthusiasm. (Hodge, 2002: 160) As for the special relationship with the 
United States, it is of a great importance in the UK’s attitude in Europe’s security 
debate in the post-Cold War. Since the Anglo-American alliance had ups and 
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downs, the commonly shared thought of a British policy always conforming, from 
1941 on, to the line of the USA – with the notable exception of the Suez crisis – is 
not right.274 Yet, one is used to say that the arrival of Margaret Thatcher at 10 
Downing Street brought new momentum to Anglo-American relations. This is 
right to a large extent, in particular due to personal and ideological affinities 
between the British Prime Minister and the then US President Ronald Reagan, 
even if some minor frictions and oppositions occurred all the same275. However, 
since the end of the Cold War there has been a revaluation of the importance of 
the special relationship by the US Americans, hardly acknowledgeable by the 
British leaders. The two countries collaborated, militarily and politically, very 
tightly during the Gulf War in 1990/1991 and their positions were still very close 
in the period preceding the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, both countries 
apprehending strong European defence projects. Yet, the United States began to 
revaluate the special relationship under the Bush senior administration and the 
tendency increased under the Clinton one. The United Kingdom feared to be 
superseded in the role of United States’ privileged European partner by the 
reunified Germany. Emphasizing the economic and trade dimensions of 
international relations as well as the relations of the United States with Russia and 
the CEECs – Germany playing a more central role than the United Kingdom in 
both cases –, the Clinton administration stressed the ‘unique’ relationship between 
the USA and Germany. During the Bosnian conflict, the divergences between the 
United States and the United Kingdom were quite important. While the United 
Kingdom alongside the other European states – with the exception of Germany 
that shared more the US point of view – were in particular worried to provide 
humanitarian assistance and guarantee the neutrality of their troops, the USA 
clearly pointed the Serbian aggressor out. The divergence about Bosnia was even 
described as the most important since the Suez crisis. The creation of the Contact 
Group – which included the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and 
Russia – allowed relations to improve slightly, but the fundamental divergence 
between the USA and most of the European states lasted until 1995 when the 
diplomatic involvement of the USA led to the Dayton Accords. One had to await 
the coming to power of Tony Blair, the current British Prime Minister, who re-
established a ‘functioning’ special relationship, helped notably by the ideological 
proximity with the Bush junior administration. Tony Blair – setting in particular 
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the United Kingdom up as the most loyal partner of the United States in the fight 
against terrorism – perpetrated indeed the importance and pertinence of the 
special relationship in participating in the moot US-led coalition intervention in 
Iraq in 2003 with a large amount of British troops. Thus, the United Kingdom – as 
the “Number One ally” of Washington – represented an important part of the US-
led coalition that topple Saddam Hussein’s regime; the UK is still present in Iraq 
alongside the USA and the other states of the coalition that did not withdraw – as 
Poland and Italy – in spite of the controversies triggered by the rather 
questionable nature of the invoked reasons. Hence, Tony Blair’s loyalty to the 
Bush junior administration is frequently considered as a sign of ‘blind’ reliance of 
the British Prime Minister – often depicted in that sense as a “lackey” of the US 
President – on the USA. Yet, the British keep on caring about the special 
relationship.276 A functional special relationship seems to exist anyway between 
the two countries. 277 Principally in the military field, incessant contacts, 
intelligence exchanges and so forth created a tight and lasting network of 
cooperation, which functions well even in the periods of tension or crisis between 
London and Washington. The fact that the United Kingdom was always striving 
to maintain such good relations with the United States can be explained by two 
main reasons. The first reason is that in the eyes of the British leaders, the USA 
were considered as absolutely indispensable for the security of Europe; everything 
had to be done to keep the US Americans in Europe. The second reason is the 
cooperation with the USA permitted the United Kingdom to maintain the status of 
a great military power, through US financial and military assistance, diplomatic 
consultation and US insurance of a major role in NATO. In great part because of 
the respect and affection the United Kingdom continues to direct to the United 
States and NATO, its influence in international affairs thus far exceeds the 
aggregate weight of its military and economic power. All this explains that the 
United Kingdom is more sensitive than the United States when it comes to the 
notion of “special relationship”, whereas the USA was clearly ready on several 
occasions to enlarge it to the Federal Germany, even to the entire Western 
Europe. (Hodge, 2002: 160; Schnapper, 1999: 42-43) Furthermore, with regard to 
pending European and NATO issues, the UK «is at the very center of the partly 
conflicting pressures the United States applies to its European allies. Washington 
wants Europeans to achieve a greater degree of self-reliance for their own security 
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yet undermine neither NATO nor qualify American leadership of it, in effect a 
challenge to be more self-reliant yet abstain from any proportionate quantum of 
autonomy.» (Hodge, 2002: 161) As for United Kingdom’s relation to the EU, 
though its membership is not really challenged anymore inside the country, 
London systematically refused the EEC/EC/EU to discuss matters concerning 
defence and international or European security. There is no doubt that – despite 
some crisis and tensions in the special relationship – the UK had always had an 
Atlanticist line, during the Cold War and even after it ended, the reasoning being 
that defence was dealt with in NATO and only for certain very specific European 
issues in the WEU. In other words, Atlanticism remained the UK’s primary 
reference first and foremost because of the importance it gives to its close ties to 
the USA – notably its confidence in the US hegemon (rather than in its European 
partners) – and the fear that any serious move towards European autonomy in 
defence matters would jeopardize the Atlantic Alliance by pushing the United 
States towards isolationism, which is as we have seen one of the main concerns of 
the British. In addition, the United Kingdom has a lack of confidence in the 
European project and has concerns about “discrimination” against European 
NATO members that were not also members of the EU. All these reasons pushed 
the British policy to stress the necessity of having a strong transatlantic link in the 
framework of NATO. Further, the United Kingdom hangs on to NATO, arguing 
that it succeeded so far in its mission and that one invested financially and 
military so much in it. Also, NATO is for London – and this is most likely the 
strongest argument – the platform which secures it the most important lever to 
defend its interests.278 (Howórth, Autumn 2000: 378; Schnapper, 1999: 101-102) 
As a result, the UK never really had a leading role in the EU279, consenting this 
role to the Franco-German tandem which was at the root of most of new European 
initiatives, while London contented itself with its role in NATO.  
 
Nonetheless, a change occurred under Prime Minister Blair in the British 
approach to European defence and security. In July 1998, the United Kingdom 
undertook a ‘Strategic Defence Review’ in which it stressed the vital role of the 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. UK’s decision to take 
European defence seriously – which would be called the ‘Blair initiative’ – was, 
as we have already noticed, absolutely crucial for further developments. At the 
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informal European Council in the Austrian city of Pörtschach in October 1998, 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair had raised the need for the EU to have a 
defence role, given the weakness and confusion the CFSP has experienced, 
notably in Bosnia and Kosovo. Prime Minister Blair signalled that the British 
would no longer object to military cooperation within the European Union 
provided it was militarily sound, intergovernmental in nature and not harmful to 
Atlantic solidarity. A month later, Austria hosted the first ever informal EU 
defence ministers meeting. (Cameron, 1999: 77-78) This change in British 
approach led notably to the Franco-British St.Malo declaration of 4 December 
1998280. The British government became very eager in wishing to «bestow upon 
the EU a robust and responsible decision-making capability in the defence and 
security area.» (Howórth, Autumn 2000: 385) As for EU’s military capability, 
Kosovo having proven sorely that the EU was still deeply missing a military 
capability, the UK was also pushing for the EU to have such a military capability. 
Washington, London and some other capitals – but clearly not all of them – 
desired that the European partners close the capabilities gap with the USA. To 
that purpose they would favour anything which would persuade the Europeans to 
do so. Since it seemed that many of the EU partners would put some money in 
military capabilities only in the framework of the EU, the UK decided somewhat 
suddenly to back military cooperation within the European Union. The argument 
of giving the EU genuine capacity in the defence and security field in order to 
strengthen and perpetuate the Atlantic Alliance was certainly one of the most 
important motivations for UK’s policy shift on European security and defence. It 
is unquestionable that London considers that the long-term prospects for the 
cohesion and even the survival of the Atlantic Alliance are thin unless the EU 
considerably enhances its military capacity, especially since the Clinton 
administration clearly warned the Blair government that European capability 
would weaken rather than strengthen those voices in the US Congress which 
question the need for a continuing US commitment to Europe. The ‘Headline 
Goal’ – adopted at the European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 
with the aim to establish an authentic EU military capability – was thus largely of 
British inspiration. (Howórth, Autumn 2000: 384-387)  
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However, there are number of other motives which seem to have played a 
more or less important role in United Kingdom’s policy shift on European 
security and defence. A motive often advanced by different commentators is the 
reasoning that «with more than one decision-making centre within the Alliance 
(…) the USA will be indirectly welded even more solidly to Europe since the 
Europeans will thereby possess the potential to force the Americans into a 
military operation even against their better political judgement.» (Howórth, 
Autumn 2000: 387) In addition, the change in the British approach seems to have 
also been partly influenced by Blair’s desire to lead an active lead in European 
policy281, the UK’s recognition of Europe’s incapacity in dealing with the Balkan 
crisis, the notion that the UK is cunningly leading France back into NATO’s 
integrated command structure, as well as increasing British frustrations with the 
USA, the British government being particularly disappointed with the way the 
United States behaved towards the UK during the Balkans crisis282, notably in 
relation to what it considered to be an US sabotage of the Vance-Owen plan for 
Bosnia. (Treacher, Spring 2004: 60-62; Gegout, Automne 2002: 69-71; Howórth, 
Autumn 2000: 384; Sjursen, 1999: 8) Hence, the United Kingdom – under the 
leadership of its Prime Minister Tony Blair – somewhat suddenly abandoned its 
former position to become more supportive of a more independent security role 
for the EU. Therefore, the UK moved actually from an essentially reactive stance 
to something more positive. (Treacher, Spring 2001: 22) However, its 
commitment would not put into question either NATO or other national defence 
arrangements, as the UK hold on as much as possible to its national sovereignty, 
its relations to the United States and NATO283. Neither did the British government 
think of a European armed force, nor of a federal Europe. It excluded any 
involvement for the European Commission and the European Parliament in 
European defence affairs. Still, the British U-turn was significant. (Missiroli, 
Février 2004: 2; Teunissen, Autumn 1999: 347) Yet, the UK is still considered as 
the leader of the Atlanticists within the EU. Despite the U-turn, the United 
Kingdom indeed still puts enormous importance – for all the reason we have 
mentioned – in the special relationship and in the transatlantic relation. As a 
result, the UK often has an ambiguous position. The British duality is time and 
again manifested in the pro-US stance of the UK Ministry of Defence and the 
fairly pro-EU approach of the British Foreign Office. The United Kingdom is 
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basically trying to combine these two positions – which appear often to be 
incompatible – into a continued Atlanticist orientation nicked with European 
predispositions. (Toje, Summer 2003: 67-68) Further, it remains still to be seen 
whether the British U-turn at St.Malo marked effectively the beginning of a 
sustained reorientation in the security policy of the United Kingdom. (Hodge, 
2002: 161) 
 
In the middle of what had to be called the Atlanticists, which emphasize 
the need to preserve the primacy of NATO, one finds the USA and the UK 
(despite its U-turn) and – maybe to a lesser extent – the Netherlands. Although 
having traditionally supported the idea of a political Union and wishing to see the 
EU developing into something more than an economic organization, the 
Netherlands has been with the UK particularly sceptical towards the development 
of an independent security and defence role for the EU. Like the United Kingdom 
and Germany to some extent, the Dutch have been sceptical towards strong 
security and defence cooperation because of its worry that this might weaken the 
ties with the United States and reduce future American involvement in European 
security and defence. (Sjursen, 1999: 2-3) Other Atlanticists certainly also include 
Portugal and Denmark, the large majority of the CEECs as well as the non-EU 
members Norway and Iceland. 
 
 
b. The Motivations of the “Europeanist” France 
 
As for France and with regard to its security and defence policy, it has 
always been a country very vigilant in keeping its autonomy. The roots of the 
French security doctrine date back to the Gaullist Fifth Republic. The French 
security doctrine based around the notion of autonomy was actually introduced 
with the election of Charles de Gaulle as President of the Fifth Republic in 1958. 
De Gaulle organized French security and defence policy around the principle of 
political autonomy. As its successors maintained this doctrine, France has always 
been since then and still remains the champion of autonomy, which thus remains 
the basis for French security policy (Hodge, 2002: 160) De Gaulle was convinced 
that France needed an independent defence capacity in order to ensure this 
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autonomy and at the same to allow France to maximise its national interests. 
Under this optic, France’s possession of nuclear striking power acquired 
enormous symbolic significance. This was certainly due to France’s military 
humiliation in 1940 by Hitler’s Germany, but also to the French belief that there 
existed no save protection for France other than the nuclear weapon in the hand of 
the French President – at that time the “monarch” de Gaulle – who was very 
sceptical that the United States was wholly committed to France’s defence from 
the Soviet threat. Therefore, the French security doctrine «came to emphasise the 
centrality of the Sanctuary (mainland France), protected by French strategic 
nuclear forces, and underlined that it was only the nuclear weapons pertaining to a 
particular state which could credibly purport to offer that state security 
guarantee.» (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 22) Gaullist orthodoxy concerning that issue 
was bequeathed to its successors, from moderate Gaullist President Pompidou, to 
socialist President François Mitterrand to current neo-Gaullist President Jacques 
Chirac. Although France’s nuclear might has today become more potent 
symbolically than in substance, the possession by France of nuclear weapons has 
not diminished in importance, since it is still a key symbol of the Fifth Republic 
which can not be questioned284. (Hodge, 2002: 161) Further and for the same 
reason of clinging to its national autonomy, France is reluctant to adhere to a 
collective defence system. France is seeking both to protect its authority in 
refusing to contract any automatic agreement and to take advantage of the 
increase of its national power inherent to every alliance. In other words, it seems 
to prefer coalitions than alliances. (Colson, 1995: 95) For the sake of its 
autonomy, de Gaulle came even to the conclusion that membership in NATO       
– and by implication subordination to US wishes – was no longer in France’s 
national interests. As a result, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military 
structure in 1966 and closed at the same time all foreign bases which still 
remained on French soil.285 Those two initiatives – a nuclear striking power and 
the withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure – have often been 
considered as an expression of anti-Americanism. This is certainly only a small 
part of the explanation, one having to taking into account that French security and 
defence policy is built upon the concept of nation state, an idea that gave 
legitimacy to French policy. The other European NATO states decided to remain 
within NATO, thus seeming more pragmatic with regard to the question of 
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autonomy. Their security and defence policies were nonetheless also organized 
around the same principle of territorial defence. For a majority of these states, 
membership in NATO represented, as a traditional military alliance, an efficient 
means to obtain this security objective. (Sjursen, 2001: 3) France and NATO 
secretly reached agreements concerning the role of French forces in any potential 
assault on Western Europe, so that successive French presidents came to the 
conclusion that «the benefits of continued non-membership outweighed any that 
may accrue by rejoining the organisation.» (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 23) 
 
In the 1970s and in the 1980s, for the sake of autonomy, the French line 
still refused to reintegrate NATO. France has evidently supported greater 
European independence from the United States since the 1960s, but it was 
particularly in the 1980s that Paris focused in the place of the reintegration in 
NATO on the need to develop proper European structures to meet the continent’s 
security requirements. This was notably demonstrated by its encouragement of the 
WEU from 1983 and its policy of further European economic and political 
integration. 
 
To sum up, one can discern a first phase in the French Fifth Republic’s 
security and defence policy. From its beginning in 1958 until around the late 
1980s or early 1990s, France’s aspiration was indeed to transfer its national 
ambitions onto its European partners and to mobilize them into a cohesive global 
political actor under implicit French leadership (notably through the ultimately 
dumped 1961 Fouchet Plan and the reactivation of the WEU in 1983).  
 
Yet, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, France had to reassess its 
stance on the importance of the transatlantic link, thus leading to a similar 
reassessment on its relation with NATO, which in turn initiated the second phase 
in the French Fifth Republic’s security and defence policy. Due to a divergence 
between Europe and the USA that loomed in the 1980s and intensified in the 
1990s over economics, aspects of international trade and the well-known defence 
burden sharing, the Europeans in general begun to question the transatlantic 
relationship. Many of the European partner states of France began to question the 
benefits arising from their ‘blind acceptance’ of US leadership, particularly in 
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security matters286. As the economic potential of Europe has been transformed, a 
major tension in the transatlantic relationship had definitely to do with the 
perception of the Europeans – and most notably certainly of France – as free 
riders, since the burden sharing in the security of Europe seemed inequitable, 
leading the US Americans to encourage its European allies to take over more 
responsibilities while threatening to withdraw large numbers of troops from the 
continent. 
 
This led in particular France to reaffirm its enduring concern about the 
transatlantic link, questioning the reliability of US defence guarantees to Europe 
in any case and the extent to which it was advantageous to expect the United 
States to continue to meet the needs of Western Europe’s security. «As the 1980s 
progressed, the dilemma of France – and indeed, for the rest of Europe – was that 
even ahead of the collapse of the old order in 1989, the developing European 
defence structures were too weak to stand alone.» (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 25) 
Yet, France still advocated further promotion of European answers – particularly 
EMU for economic and WEU for security matters – to Europe’s respectively 
economic and security challenges in the wake of the changes in the post 1989 
international system. The French government ardently resisted in the early post-
Cold War years any initiative promoting the perpetuity of NATO’s impact and 
role on the old continent. This reticence to NATO can to a great extent be 
explained by its belief that the integrated military command structure – serving 
certainly a useful function during the Cold War in containing a potential Soviet 
threat – was no longer necessary in the new international order in which a Soviet 
threat was no longer discernable. France has thus advocated a reform of NATO 
with a significantly weaker role for the integrated military command and much 
greater responsibility for a Europe with revised structures. This led inevitably to 
tension with the United States taking into consideration that the US government 
had completely different plans for the role of NATO in post-Cold War Europe. 
Therefore, one observed a kind of rivalry «between a French led ‘European’ 
approach to security and an [US] American led ‘transatlantic’ one». (Bryant, 
Autumn 2000: 26) The ‘frustrating’ events, in the eyes of the French, of the early 
post-Cold War era – as notably instability in the Soviet Union, conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia and laboriously slow progress on the CFSP – tended to change 
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France’s perception of the worth and importance of NATO. As a consequence, 
France began to be concerned far more about the worrisome consequences of any 
additional US disengagement than about the US dominance over Bosnia. Greatly 
to the relief of many of France’s partners, Paris had to acknowledge that an 
independent European defence was not yet strong and well-defined enough 
neither in the military nor in the political area to meet the challenges of the new 
international order alone, thus admitting that the situation necessitated more rather 
than less NATO involvement. Although French full reintegration into NATO has 
still been rejected in a 1994 Defence White Paper, the distinctive French coldness 
towards NATO began to thaw hesitantly into warmth from the end of 1992 
onwards. The rapprochement with NATO was certainly favoured by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, but it was also a response 
to the intransigence of France’s West European partners refusing any solution that 
was not inclusive of NATO. (Treacher, Spring 2001: 41) Consequently, France – 
represented by its Defence Minister and Chief of Staff – began even to attend 
NATO meetings on a case-by-case basis, if basic interests of France were at stake. 
The election of the neo-Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac, to the Presidency in 1995 
led to further rapprochement of France and NATO. Thus, due to a US-French 
rapprochement, the agreement about the authorization by the WEU to use NATO 
and/or US equipment for its missions was reached. In addition, France announced 
in December 1995 its intention to continue to attend NATO meetings where 
French matters would arise and its decision to rejoin the Military Committee. 
Although France got back its seat at the Military Committee, it did not reintegrate 
the military command structure, thus remaining outside the hierarchical structure. 
(Walch, Avril-Juin 2001: 350) 
 
Yet, France concretely considered to fully reintegrate NATO. It supposed 
to gain benefits from its future reintegration in NATO, since it believed that a new 
NATO – with a real working and active European dimension, largely due to 
French initiatives – was starting to emerge from the old one and that it would be 
an increasingly active participant to promote the Europeanisation of the new 
NATO from inside. Thus, it may be put forward that «while the changes France 
had hoped to see occur in the Alliance (and the absence of which France had used 
to justify its withdrawal from the organization in the 1960s) had not demonstrably 
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altered, (…) France came to feel increasingly strongly that the best way of 
promoting the Europeanization of the Alliance was from the inside.» (Bryant, 
Autumn 2000: 28) Nevertheless, France’s greatly announced return to NATO has 
eventually fallen through. France’s unfulfilled requests concerned in particular the 
reform of the integrated military command structure and the strengthening of the 
political control over the latter. France was indeed of the opinion that the 
integrated military structure – particularly SACEUR – was lacking basic political 
responsibility, since France desired to have the closest link possible between an 
operating commander and the controlling political powers – notably the North 
Atlantic Council [NAC] – especially for non-article 5 operations.287 Furthermore, 
once the agreement about the authorization by the WEU to use NATO and/or US 
assets for its missions has been reached, the real controversy came to the fore, 
namely the extent to which the Europeans could effectively expect real 
unimpeded autonomy from the United States. For France, it was not normal that a 
US commander could be the effective key player in ESDI, since any WEU use of 
NATO and/or US assets in a European-led operation would still require the 
approval of all NATO member states.  
 
The Franco-US disagreements over the role and scope of NATO structures 
in the context of the overall NATO reform hampered eventually France’s full 
reintegration within the organization, since the readjustment of US-European 
weighting in NATO structures was a prerequisite for France’s complete return 
within the Atlantic Alliance288. The final result is somewhat rather displeasing for 
Jacques Chirac, certainly the most pro-United States President under the Fifth 
Republic. The incumbent President took a chance in showing himself ready to tip 
over the traditional Gaullist thinking over the Atlantic Alliance, thus exposing 
himself to domestic critics from both the left and the right over this sensitive 
issue. He was not rewarded for that act, as the original objective of re-admittance 
into NATO under conditions reckoned favourable for France was not realised. 
Moreover, «France was left isolated and exposed as NATO instead concentrated 
on enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. A French fear must be that this 
process will continue to skew the focus of Washington and the Alliance towards 
the East, thus increasing its isolation in both military and political terms.» 
(Bryant, Autumn 2000: 33)  
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Some, nonetheless, point out the advantages of the current position of 
semi-integration of France into NATO. Besides the praised (and dear to De 
Gaulle) autonomy that Paris has maintained, France’s current involved but 
detached posture gives France a position of increased flexibility and freedom. In 
effect, France is often “used” by full members as an authority to raise opposition. 
France is also quite frequently encouraged by other NATO member states to 
express its opinion, which it can and does thanks to its special and particular 
status. Furthermore, France gets some satisfaction out of the fact to be courted by 
its European partners – especially Germany and the United Kingdom – which 
want to see France “inside” NATO. 
 
Thus, the second period initiated around the late 1980s or early 1990s and 
characterized by a greater emphasis on working within NATO had ended up        
– from France’s standpoint– in frustration towards the end of 1997. Consequently, 
France’s focus was directed back mainly to the autonomous European project, 
corresponding thus to the beginning of the third phase. Nonetheless, by the end of 
the 1990s, progress towards a functioning and autonomous European defence was 
fairly minor, as moving forward occurred only by tiny steps. 
 
Yet, numerous significant events occurring at the end of the 1990s boosted 
the European defence project. These events were most notably the Franco-British 
St.Malo declaration of December 1998 as well as the decision taken by the EU in 
December 1999 to incorporate the WEU in the Union. The crisis of Kosovo in 
1999 convinced all the more France – in particular – of the necessity to refocus its 
efforts on rapidly acquiring the means to act independently of the United States 
since US Americans and Europeans will have increasingly divergent sets of 
priorities. Yet, acknowledging the existence of informal links between the EU and 
NATO and put under pressure by the other EU member states – especially 
Germany and the UK – thus fearing to get isolated, France at the same time 
accepted formal EU-NATO links and also reassured its EU partners that it was 
willing, while asking for a European defence, to maintain the transatlantic 
relations. (Gegout, Automne 2002: 73-74) 
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To sum up, one can assert that France’s ideas of the European security 
architecture have been a projection of its national objectives on a larger scale.289 
On the one hand, France has a complex relation to NATO and towards the 
transatlantic link. Recent Franco-US divergences over the Iraq crisis do only 
emphasize the complexity of Franco-US relations, thus not helping to facilitate 
France’s relation with NATO. France will certainly strive to reintegrate the 
organization according to its terms. Yet, it seems that France has eventually come 
to the conclusion that cooperation with NATO is in its own national interest. One 
has to notice that in practice French operational integration with and in NATO is 
deeper than generally believed, especially in light of recent developments. There 
is no doubt that the war in the Balkans – first in Bosnia and then more recently in 
Kosovo – has moved this integration a step forward with each crisis. Undeniably, 
the major contribution of France to the air campaign during the Kosovo crisis 
between March and June 1999 necessitated closest coordination and integration. 
Another revealing fact was the support – according to polls – of 70% for the 
intervention of French troops for humanitarian purposes against France’s 
traditional allies, namely the Serbs. One can thus assume that, even though France 
is enjoying some benefits from its current situation of semi-integration, the real 
issue is not about how France and NATO might be brought together – since it is 
de facto done (in operational terms) – but rather about how to formalize it and 
how long this process might take. (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 21-37) On the other 
hand, European affairs have consistently been a central aspect of France’s foreign 
and security policy. France has throughout the duration of the Fifth Republic 
constantly sought to engage in European matters on a positive manner and to 
manipulate them to its country’s distinguished advantage. Therefore, successive 
leaders of the Fifth Republic have searched to control Western Europe in order to 
attain its strategic objectives that it was no longer able to achieve by itself, but at 
which it was not prepared to renounce, namely the pursuit and aura of national 
grandeur as well as an elevated global rang (or standing). To that purpose, France 
has shown – with regard to its European security policy – its drift to change the 
course of a policy for the sake of the overall strategic objective. But, the long-
standing goal of French leaders to develop a Europe that is more independent of 
US influence has always been present. France has often played the role of the 
driving force in European foreign and security policy, with the objective of an EU 
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autonomous decision-making structure and process vis-à-vis NATO. (Gegout, 
Automne 2002: 72-74; Treacher, Spring 2001: 22, 38-41) This is explained 
mainly by the fact that France is limited by its relative lack of power to compete 
with the great powers as the US, Germany or even later China290. In this sense, the 
EU is a means to increase its influence. Tying its hands in the EU – by 
establishing a European security institution – served thus to maximize France’s 
security and defence as well as its influence. It helped France to achieve security 
by constraining German power, as the French leaders calculated that Germany 
would accept the constraints of a security institution only if France was willing to 
do the same. In addition, France is motivated to shape a regional power in order to 
be able to play a more prominent international role, the EU thus constituting the 
means to achieving greater regional and international influence. (Jones, August 
2001: 15-18) Further, one has to note that the EU member states – through the 
progresses made in the fields of common security and defence, especially with the 
ESDP – have to progressively transfer additional sovereignty in the field of 
defence to the EU; and it is certainly in France – which has an intense traditional 
attachment to its autonomy and liberty of military choice – that the debate about 
this issue is one of the most passionate, since France is not used for a long time    
– contrary to its NATO European partner states – to subordinate its own effort to 
international decisions taken beforehand within a supranational structure. (Walch, 
Avril-Juin 2001: 350-352) In other words, a key dilemma involves French efforts 
to reconcile the Gaullist legacy of preserving national autonomy with an ever-
increasing commitment to European integration and France’s growing role in the 
integrated defence and security architecture of Europe. 
 
In light of what has been exposed, one can easily characterize France as an 
“Europeanist” country. Besides France, one finds especially Belgium among the 
“Europeanists”. It was those two countries in particular which sought in the wake 
of the end of the Cold War – and still do – to develop European security structures 
on a West European basis, or rather on the basis of the willing EU states, with a 
real defence arm of the EU, to be spread across the continent as the European 
Union enlarged. They support the integration of the armed forces of the 
Europeans – at least the willing states, most notably the West Europeans –, 
making them separable and, unlike the CJTF concept, separate from NATO 
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structures. This perspective is not sacrificing the transatlantic relations, but would 
have given the Europeans the real ability to conduct military operations without 
the United States. Further, one has to add that countries like Spain and Italy could 
also habitually be described as “Europeanists”291. 
 
 
c. The German Position 
 
As for Germany – the third major power in Europe alongside France and 
the United Kingdom –, one should when it comes to its role in Europe’s security 
firstly take a glimpse at the well-known “German problem”. It is about the 
question of «how to integrate – or at least contain – the prodigious economic 
strength and military potential of a united German state, situated at the very heart 
of the European continent.» (Hyde-Price, 1998: 204) The “German problem” 
appeared for the first time in 1871 at the time of the German unification 
accomplished under the Chancellor Bismarck. At the end of the Second World 
War and the division of Germany that ensued, this problem seemed to have been 
reasonably resolved. As the Cold War progressively became a reality, the division 
of Germany became smoothly accepted – both in East and West – as a relatively 
satisfactory solution to the problem of integration into the European system of a 
too powerful Germany. 
 
This division shoved the GDR into the Eastern politico-military alliance 
and the FRG into the Western one. West Germany’s security policy was then 
established onto three bases: first on a transatlantic alliance, NATO, in which it 
will be admitted in 1955; second on a West European alliance, characterized by 
the participation in the EEC and the WEU and by the Franco-German axis; third 
on a policy of détente – through its Ostpolitik – towards the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact countries, which favoured the launching of the CSCE process in 
1975. As for East Germany’s security policy, it was based on the Warsaw Pact 
established in 1955. Germany was directly affected by the consequences of this 
bipolar world order. None of the two Germanys had then to organize its own 
security, since it were actually the four victorious allied powers – the United 
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States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union – which had the fate of 
the two countries in their hands. 
 
Nonetheless, with the opening up of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many things 
changed. One had first to organize the reunification of Germany. While the 
domestic unification was left to the assessment of the two Germanys, the external 
aspects of the unification had to be settled in a series of negotiations amongst the 
four occupying powers, the FRG and the GDR. These negotiations ended on 12 
September 1990 in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, where the worries and interests of 
the Soviet Union and Poland were taken into account. Accordingly, in the article 
1, the reunified Germany committed itself to recognize and not to question in the 
future its external borders, and amongst those the famous Oder-Neisse border 
with Poland. 
 
Germany – once reunified – had then to find its place in Europe again. 
With the end of the East-West conflict, the new Germany had to face new 
responsibilities. It was nonetheless feared from all sides – with the notable 
exception of the United States – that the reunified Germany would not be able to 
cope with the new situation and not be in good terms with its neighbours, thus not 
being capable to carrying the responsibilities its geopolitical situation, relative 
prosperity and stability confer on it. One actually thought that the “German 
problem” would resurface similar to the pre-1945 period. The fear to witness 
again a destabilisation of Europe caused by the power of the German state was 
indeed highly present in the European minds. However, due to economic 
interdependence between states, economic globalisation, cooperation and 
integration through institutions as well as consolidation of stable liberal 
democracies, the problem was redefined, so that the “German problem” does not 
arise anymore as such. (Hyde-Price, 1998: 204-207) 
 
Moreover, the geopolitical environment has changed with the 
reunification. During the Cold War, West Germany’s security policy concentrated 
on threats on its East posed by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact. This even greatly vindicated FRG’s admission into NATO and the 
WEU. But, with the end of the Cold War, Germany does not have any patent foes 
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or any obvious threat to its security anymore. It therefore drifts its attention to the 
new security challenges and risks in post-Cold War Europe, which are far more 
diffuse and many-sided. 
 
Yet, expectations that Germany will make a major contribution to greater 
European security autonomy are likely to be dissatisfied. Contrary to France and 
the United Kingdom which deemed the possession of nuclear weapons as a 
crucial step for maintaining their influence in the post-1945 international order, 
Germany considered their absence as a key element to establish the domestic and 
international legitimacy of Germany’s reconstituted democracy. Indeed, «an 
explicit rejection of nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry was an important 
step in the Federal Republic’s admission to NATO in 1955.» (Hodge, 2002: 162) 
Furthermore, the successive German governments – either the current one made 
of a coalition of the Social Democrats (the SPD) and the Greens or the former one 
constituted of a coalition of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals 
(FDP) – have given no indication that their newly normal country will seek to 
increase its military capacity so to approach the level of the UK or France. This is 
largely explained by the fact that Berlin does not approach its foreign relations as 
those of a great power. It is so, not only because it has become a taboo for the 
German state to act as one, but even more importantly because its political 
leadership genuinely does not envisage Germany in this way. The post-1945 anti-
militarist tradition combined with budgetary constraints, caused by the costs of 
the national unification and the rigors of the EMU, has rendered any move to 
professionalise the armed forces – a step France, Belgium and the Netherlands 
already did – very sensitive politically. In addition, the cuts into post-reunification 
defence spending292 have accordingly been important, Germany reducing 
radically its troop levels293. It is a tendency all the more justified by the evidence 
that Germany does no longer need the manpower of the Cold War era in 
anticipation of a great land war in Central Europe. Yet, both public and elite 
opinion remain attached to the concept of citizen-soldiers by way of compulsory 
conscription, rejecting so far «the professional and highly mobile forces that 
would be more appropriate to Europe’s new security challenges» (Hodge, 2002: 
162)294 The same economic, political and “moral” constraints have also 
obstructed Germany’s capacity to develop planning and command capabilities. 
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This is an obvious fact that occurs much to the annoyance of the United States 
which make sure to usually cite the case of Germany – the EU’s largest economy 
committing around a moderate 1,3% of its GDP to defence expenditure in the 
post-Cold War era – to illustrate their scepticism that the Europeans are prepared 
to assume a greater military burden, so as to bridge the growing gap between US 
and European military capabilities for a better balance of burden sharing in the 
security of Europe.295 
 
Nevertheless, there is official recognition in Germany that the latter has, 
on its own as well as more importantly together with the EU, a responsibility to 
take on an equitable share of international security tasks. To best achieve these 
responsibilities, there is no doubt that Berlin’s security and defence policy            
– besides being marked by anti-militarism and a whiff of reticence – is committed 
to multilateralism. Thus, in the post-1945 international order, the FRG committed 
itself – through its foreign as well as security policy – to cooperate within 
multilateral institutions. German leaders indeed estimated that a self-binding 
commitment to multilateralism was the most effective approach to attain security 
and wield influence. This represented also a strong signal to the other European 
States – including the Soviet Union – of Germany’s benevolent intentions, so that 
they do not have to worry about Germany. Moreover, Berlin was convinced that 
its commitment to a multilateral approach would allow German leaders to 
exercise more effective influence on the international and regional levels, through 
the aptitude to influence respectively international organizations as well as 
regional institutions and policies, in a way to promote and protect German 
national interests. Most notably, working through the European Union permitted 
Germany to formulate its national interests in regional terms; while its 
commitment to the EU – in order to be credible – limited its ability to act 
unilaterally, it allowed at the same time the German government to achieve 
security and wield influence without causing fears of German revanchism. (Jones, 
August 2001: 16-17) 
 
Germany’s security policy is thus led within the framework of these 
regional, European and international institutions. Amongst them, one finds 
especially the following three key organizations which are of particular 
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importance for the German security policy: besides the EU – with its CFSP/ESDP 
(having taken also the legacy of the WEU) –, these are NATO and the OSCE. 
Germany supports the idea to not have any hierarchical order between those three 
organizations. Nonetheless, although Germany’s policy security has attempted to 
not give the priority to any of these organizations and albeit the German 
government is torn between its European commitment and its loyalty towards the 
United States296, Germany’s post-Cold War Sicherheitspolitik is even so primarily 
based on the Atlantic Alliance. (Guillen, 1996: 199) 
 
Effectively, neither the end of the Cold War, nor Berlin’s willingness to 
develop an independent European defence around the Franco-German axis, nor 
the enthusiasm felt towards the OSCE, not the US-German clash over Iraq have 
managed to significantly reduce Germany’s commitment towards NATO. The 
important attachment of the German government to NATO is explained by four 
essential reasons. Firstly, the Atlantic Alliance represents a security guarantee 
against a potential menacing Russia – which could become once again a threat to 
the West under a reactionary regime – and against still relatively unstable former 
Republics of the USSR. Thus, in order to promote a better understanding between 
NATO and these countries, Germany has strongly encouraged the project 
“Partnership for Peace” [PfP], which offers to these former Soviet Republics a 
bilateral military cooperation with NATO. Secondly, Germany’s participation in 
the Atlantic Alliance illustrates its willingness to preserve the cohesion of the 
West. Thirdly, the German leaders are of the opinion that NATO has proved its 
worth. The Atlantic alliance is indeed considered in Germany as an alliance 
contributing for an essential part to the security and stability of the old continent. 
The Germans thus do not want to risk abandoning such an alliance as long as no 
other institution proves to be more secure. Fourthly, the German government 
remains convinced of the necessity to have a strong US military commitment 
towards Europe in order to guarantee peace, stability and security on the 
continent. Germany encourage however a reform of NATO so as to make it a 
more European organization. As a result, Germany is certainly in favour both of a 
reinforcement of the European pillar inside NATO, by means of the ESDI, and of 
a more independent European security and defence based around European 
Union’s ESDP. Yet, the German government is afraid of committing itself too 
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much in favour of an independent European defence, fearing to weaken in this 
way the transatlantic links to which it is extremely attached. (Hyde-Price, 1998: 
205-207) 
 
Among Europe’s three major states, Germany represents thus «the policy 
conservative, speaking up for the elusive “European identity” within NATO yet 
going quiet on anything it considers even potentially alienating to US leadership» 
(Hodge, 2002: 163) Berlin wants indeed to avoid at all costs that the USA lose 
interest in maintaining a considerable commitment to European security. In other 
words, the German leaders are seeking to manage by some means the potential 
tensions that could arise between the transatlantic alliance and the development of 
the ESDP. Germany’s position towards the ESDP (and the WEU) is thus 
relatively ambiguous. Nonetheless Germany is trying to use the ESDP, in a way 
quite similar to the ESDI, as a bridge between NATO and the EU, hoping in this 
way to find a better equilibrium between two approaches of European security     
– the transatlantic one on the one hand and the Europeanist one on the other – 
which appear rather contradictory. Yet, since this position seems not tenable in 
the long run, a debate is essential in the country between the Atlanticists and the 
Europeanists, still a minority in today’s Germany. Nonetheless, one has to add 
that, even though the US-German clash over Iraq had an insignificant impact on 
Germany’s loyalty towards the United States, this clash represented something 
new in their relations.297 For the first time in post-1945 history, Germany              
– together with France – took the lead in opposing the United States on a security 
policy issue deemed as crucial by the Bush Junior administration. Consequently, 
realist and neo-realist theorists interpreted US-German confrontation over Iraq as 
a declaration of independence from the USA, putting an end to more than half a 
century of nearly automatic compliance with US aspirations. But, the fact that the 
Red-Green coalition government did not effectively obstruct the USA from using 
the military infrastructure in Germany in the US-led Coalition’s war against Iraq 
illustrate that «a functionally driven cooperative relationship will remain a 
cornerstone of German foreign policy culture – albeit of lesser importance than in 
the past and posing more challenges.» (Rudolf, July 2004: 5) 
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As far as the OSCE is concerned, the Germans along with the Czechs had 
the idea in the very early post-Cold War years to organize the European security 
around the then CSCE. They dropped this idea already in the years 1991-1992, 
Germany having come under great pressure from its Western allies – the USA and 
the UK found the concept insufficiently Atlanticist while France considered it 
insufficiently Europeanist – and the Czech Republic preferring the more secure 
NATO solution in light of the chaos prevailing in the Soviet Union. (Croft, 
Autumn 2000: 5-6) Today, Berlin is of the opinion that the OSCE provides the 
ideal structure for pan-European cooperation and interaction. According to 
Germany, the organization has thus to help integrate the post-communist states 
into a new and more cooperative security structure. In addition, the OSCE 
constitutes the ideal place in which to take into account the legitimate worries 
Russia has concerning its security. But, the German government – alongside the 
other European governments and Washington – is evidently opposed to the 
Russian plan intending to subject NATO and ESDP to decisions taken within the 
framework of the OSCE, with the possible creation of a type of Security Council. 
According to the German leaders, the OSCE represents indeed “only” an 
important complement to NATO and the EU in a European security system which 
is pluralistic and non-hierarchical.  
 
To sum up, Germany found itself in a completely changed geopolitical 
situation after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. It is certainly better off under the 
new circumstances, since it is now surrounded by friendly neighbours and, with 
the exception of Switzerland, all EU member states. The German government has 
however to face a series of dilemmas concerning its security policy: Berlin seeks 
to avoid that its special links to Paris come into conflict with its somehow still 
particular relation to Washington and at the same time to avoid tensions that could 
arise from its parallel commitment in the process of European integration and in 
NATO. Furthermore, it is important to notice that Germany has always chosen a 
multilateral approach, avoiding – in contrary to some other European states – to 
take unilateral measures. Given the population’s repulsion for military matters 
and the pacifistic strategic culture of Berlin298, Germany is facing a new kind of 
dilemma, namely the question of how to deal with this psychology in an era 
where the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have added 
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to the uncertainty of the new world order. «A new interpretation of the 
Constitution made by the Federal Constitutional Court ruling on [12 July] 1994 
allowed Germany to participate in multinational combat military operations that 
take place outside of NATO territory. The ruling allowed Germany to do so if the 
mission is approved by the Bundestag and takes place under the authority of the 
United Nations prior to deployment. The law also stated the mission needed to be 
led by NATO or the (…) European Union.» (Lohmann, March 2004: 11) 
However, Germany’s participation in multilateral defence or collective security 
operations is still very moot, particularly in the current Red-Green coalition 
government.  
 
Finally, one should mention the particular case of Europe’s neutral states. 
These neutral or rather “non-aligned” states299 – which include Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and Ireland plus the non-EU member Switzerland – are re-evaluating the 
role they should play in the changing European security setting, but remain so far 
sceptical to commit themselves to any military structure. Thus, while being 
participating states of the OSCE, none of them have become so far full member 
state neither of NATO nor of the WEU.300 As for the EU non-aligned states          
– resolved to preserve their security policy specificity without compromising the 
political solidarity emanating from deepened cooperation within the EU, notably 
through the recent reinforcement of the CFSP and creation of the ESDP –, they 
were willing to keep the CFSP/ESDP centred around the former WEU Petersberg 
concept, thus permitting them to avoid resorting to an ‘option-out’ strategy that 
was judged to be damaging to their image. One has to specify that the ESDP, 
focused indeed primarily on the Petersberg tasks – which allow for a voluntary 
involvement in conformity with domestic constitutional rules –, enable them to 
continue to stick to their military non-aligned stance without compromising their 
full participation in the CFSP/ESDP. (Ferreira-Pereira, March 2004: 12-13) Even 
though most of the tasks of the WEU were transferred in the EU, a distinction still 
has to be made. While the EU non-aligned states participate in the CFSP/ESDP, 
they are not part of the WEU, thus not involved in the mutual defence 
commitment of the modified Brussels Treaty. For the EU non-aligned states, 
mutual solidarity towards other EU member states is only conceivable in strict 
political and security terms and could not possibly involve any military 
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responsibility for other EU member’s territorial defence. Yet, their contribution to 
European security and defence marks the beginning of the progressive 
renunciation of a reluctant attitude towards an external military action. 
 
One has to add that – like the EU non-aligned states – Denmark, the 
CEECs, Malta and Cyprus301 participate in the CFSP/ESDP, but are excluded 
from the “Berlin Plus arrangements” and its implementation. Furthermore, these 
countries are not member states of the WEU, thus neither automatically involved 
in the mutual defence commitment of the modified Brussels Treaty. A potential 
adherence to the WEU is however not to be excluded for any of these countries.302 
 
 
 
2) THE GEOPOLITICAL AREAS OF THE TWO KEY EUROPEAN 
GEOSTRATEGIC PLAYERS 
 
Although the United Kingdom is, together with France and Germany, 
among the three most influential countries when it comes to decisions about 
Europe’s future – notably concerning the development of Europe’s security and 
defence as well as the structure of the transatlantic link –, France and Germany 
make up the very heart of Europe’s security complex. Indeed, and 
notwithstanding the fact that some observers of world politics argue that due to a 
series of common characteristics303 Paris does in many ways have more in 
common with London than with Berlin on foreign and security policy304, France 
and Germany constitute – seen through a neo-realist prism – the key and dynamic 
geostrategic players in the western periphery of Eurasia.  
 
It is worthwhile to note that not only is the European unification project 
mainly constructed upon France’s and Germany’s partnership, but also does the 
adding of their respective geopolitical area cover the great majority of the 
European continent. Moreover, both countries are regarded by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski as being the two key geostrategic players having «the capacity and the 
national will to exercise power and influence beyond their borders in order to alter 
the existing geopolitical state of affairs [in Europe].» (Brzezinski, 1997: 40) For 
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the USA, Europe is extremely important, since it constitutes the western periphery 
of Eurasia, considered to be the most important playing field. Being geopolitically 
volatile, France and Germany are thus likely to become at some point potential 
rivals to the United States and affect its Eurasian geopolitical interests305. To a 
lesser extent Russia can also be considered as a European key geostrategic player. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 37-42, 30-36) 
 
Hence, this chapter examines the geopolitical areas of what are regarded in 
this paper as the two key European geostrategic players. Accordingly, it first sets 
out Germany’s and then France’s geopolitical area. 
 
 
a. Germany’s Geopolitical Area  
 
Germany’s history is centred on the search for continental power, which 
would give it access to global supremacy. Since its unification in 1871, Germany 
realised gradually that in order to achieve world leadership, it had first to attain 
European leadership. Bismarck’s Germany – from 1862 to 1890 – was focusing 
on the supremacy in Europe. Bismarck’s policy of European economic 
unification, based on the Zollverein – a customs union formed in 1834 under the 
leadership of Prussia and to include gradually all the states of the future German 
Empire – was meant to counterbalance the economies of the great sea powers, 
which was first the UK and then the USA306. As for the Germany of Wilhelm II 
from 1888 to 1918, it was looking for world supremacy, with its Weltpolitik. The 
Germany of Wilhelm II was largely influenced by the reasoning of Friedrich 
Ratzel307 who – in opposition to Bismarck’s exclusive focus on Europe – favoured 
a worldwide ambition for Germany and encouraged consequently Germany to 
develop its colonial policy. When Germany entered the First World War, it 
aspired to domination in Europe which in turn would have permitted the 
domination of the world. To this end, Germany sought to diminish France’s and 
United Kingdom’s world – marine – predominance and to supplant these two 
countries from its natural geopolitical area, that is, from Central Europe as well as 
from the Balkans. But, Germany’s bid failed308. Germany got even considerably 
put down due to harsh peace conditions. The country lost 78’378 km2 (nearly 
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15%) of its territory – notably Alsace-Lorraine to France, Northern Schleswig 
after a plebiscite in 1920 to Denmark and most of Greater Poland (Provinz Posen) 
and Eastern Pomerania (Westpreußen) 309 – and all its colonies, namely Togo, 
Cameroon, Southeast Africa310, Southwest Africa311 and a micro-Empire in 
Oceania312 to be administered as mandates by the newly created League of 
Nations (except German concessions in the Chinese Shandong which were 
transferred to Japan, then in 1922 to China). The Weimar Republic managed to 
stabilise the situation in the 1920s, although the population felt in great majority 
oppressed by the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles313. 
 
However, the Great Depression – started by the “Crash of 1929” – 
reopened the political instability. Feeling not only humiliated by the severe peace 
conditions, but also demoralized by the consequences of the 1929 slump314, the 
Germans increasingly supported anti-democratic parties, both right-wing and left-
wing. Hitler’s Nazi and anti-democratic party, the National Socialist German 
Workers’ Party [NSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei], 
obtained 33,1% in the elections of November 1932 and 43,9% in the elections of 
March 1933. He was thus appointed Chancellor of Germany on 30 January 1933. 
By passing the Enabling Act on 23 March 1923 – which allowed Hitler to rule by 
decree – and an emergency decree suspending civil liberties, Hitler soon declared 
himself Führer of the Third Reich, bringing to an end the Weimar Republic. 
Hitler’s Germany revived Pan-Germanism.315 Pan-Germanism got already a boost 
following the Napoleonic Wars, which launched a massive movement of 
nationalism (born in France during the French Revolution). Many German people 
sought to unite all the German-speaking and ethnic-German (Volksdeutschen) 
people, as most of the Germans were a loose and disunited people since the 
Reformation in the 16th century when the Holy Roman Empire was shattered into 
a patchwork of entities. The German Empire was achieved in 1871, following the 
victory over France and the crowning of William I. Yet, many ethnic Germans 
still lived outside of this Second Reich, established upon Bismarck’s plan of a 
Kleindeutschland (“Small Germany”)316. These German populations used Pan-
Germanism to push for unity with the Fatherland.317 In that context, regions like 
Austria and the Sudetenland became the centre of controversy. Following the First 
World War, triggered by German nationalism, things got even worse. Not only 
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the loss of territories of Germany, but also the creation of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the expansion of Romania had as a result to 
separate the German people318, once united under the two empires of Germany 
and Austria-Hungary. 
 
As many of the Slavic states harmed German minorities, in spite of 
guarantees on the protection of German minorities, allegations of oppression were 
made319, which were later used by Hitler’s Germany. Gustav Stresemann320, first 
German Chancellor and then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Weimar, dedicated himself to the protection of minorities in general, notably 
inside the League of Nations – which Germany joined in 1926 – in the hope that it 
would one day lead to the revision of the Treaty of Versailles (considered as a 
“Versailler Diktat”), thus allowing the redrawing of Germany’s borders which 
Germany could not accept. One has however to note that Stresemann’s Germany 
sought to achieve this “national” objective in a peaceful way. Besides, Gustav 
Stresemann was gradually committed to détente with Germany’s former enemies, 
as the signing in 1925 of the Locarno Pact321 – with the UK, France, Italy, and 
Belgium – illustrates. But, after he seized power, Adolf Hitler began a radical      
– and less peaceful – policy of exploiting Pan-Germanism, notably by taking 
advantage of the allegations of oppression against German minorities. To all 
intents and purposes, Hitler’s Germany revived the Pan-Germanism idea and 
considered – according to the reasoning of the geopolitician Karl Haushofer322 – 
geopolitics to be a means for liberating Germany from its defeat. Karl Haushofer 
developed the idea of the organic relation of the territory and the population living 
upon it. Aware of the danger of Germany’s geopolitical location, the German 
geopolitician applied first his idea to Germany’s geopolitics. Pan-Germanism 
relies on a fundamental geopolitical fact: «le poids considérable d’un peuplement 
allemand produit d’un mouvement de colonisation entamé au Moyen-Age, et dont 
l’enracinement territorial ne coïncidait pas avec les frontières du Reich; une non-
coïncidence du Reich et du Volk qui fut donc à l’origine du pangermanisme.» 
(Chauprade, 2003: 823) Klaus Haushofer developed geopolitics in the service of 
German purposes: «l’objectif d’Haushofer est de raffermir le sentiment 
d’appartenance des Allemands à une communauté de civilisation – le Deutschtum 
–, et de favoriser la création d’un espace où ils pourraient déployer librement leur 
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virtualités – le Lebensraum.» (Chauprade, 2003: 36) Hitler’s coming into power 
represented the opportunity to implement this objective. The idea of Pan-
Germanism is to gather the German-speaking peoples into a Lebensraum (“living 
space”) extending beyond the borders of the German state into the wide-ranging 
territory of Germanism. According to Haushofer’s geopolitics, the states               
– fighting for a Lebensraum in a “completed” world – reject the statu quo and try 
to stretch out. «Les frontières n’ont alors pas plus de sens que de légitimité 
juridique et seuls les Etats faibles peuvent prôner le statu quo. (…) [Ainsi,] la 
science haushoférienne, fondamentalement marquée par l’humiliation du traité de 
Versailles, apparaît comme dangereuse pour la paix.» (Chauprade, 2003: 37)  
 
With the intention to strengthen the Deutschtum and to recreate the 
German Lebensraum, Hitler’s Germany323 marched into the demilitarised 
Rhineland in March 1936, annexed Austria (the so-called Anschluss) in March 
1938324, got the Sudetenland ceded following the Munich Agreement on 29/30 
September 1938 and dismantled the rest of Czechoslovakia – state created by 
London and Paris in order to counterbalance German ambitions towards the 
East325 – in March 1939 to create the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia” and 
an independent Slovakia, tightly controlled by Berlin. «Malgré la singularité 
politique du nazisme, l’Allemagne hitlérienne ne réinventait cependant pas une 
nouvelle géopolitique allemande; elle confirmait de manière brutale les désirs 
géopolitiques profonds de l’Etat impérial allemand. Le but de l’Allemagne restait 
la domination de l’Europe comme préalable à la domination du monde.» 
(Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 26) To achieve its objective, the Third Reich leaned 
on different allies: Japan (Anti-Comintern Pact326 in 1936), the fascist Italy (Pact 
of Steel in 1939), the revisionist countries327 Hungary and Bulgaria and the Spain 
of Franco. But, the invasion of Poland by German troops on 1 September 1939 
ignited the Second World War, as France and the United Kingdom honoured their 
defensive alliance with Poland by declaring war to the Third Reich two days later. 
Ultimately, once again, despite the above-mentioned alliances, tactical shifts in its 
relation with the Soviet Union328 and initial military successes329, Germany’s bid 
to “unify” Europe under its leadership failed330. Although Klaus Haushofer was 
harassed by the Nazis in the 1940s, his geopolitics got discredited in the opinion 
of the Allies. «Géopoliticien sous l’Allemagne hitlérienne, bien plus que 
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géopoliticien de l’Allemagne hitlérienne, Haushofer contribua néanmoins à 
disqualifier la géopolitique, et à rendre celle-ci infréquentable, jusqu’à ce qu’elle 
réapparaisse dans les années 1970, aux Etats-Unis d’abord, en France ensuite.» 
(Chauprade, 2003: 38) Yet, even if Haushofer’s geopolitics leads to a conflictual 
view of the world, it is – contrary to the Hitlerian reasoning – not at all tainted 
with ideological prejudices. His geopolitics is indeed essentially concrete, i.e. non 
ideological, and realist. One has to note that Pan-Germanism has always been a 
steady objective of German foreign policy, since the setting up of the German 
Empire in the 19th century. As accurately observed by the French geopolitician 
André Chéradame, whichever has been the system of government in Germany     
– imperial (1871-1918), democratic (1918-1933) or totalitarian (1933-1945) –, the 
ultimate Pan-Germanist objective was always present, only did the strategies to 
achieve it change. 
 
The failure of Hitler’s totalitarian regime to achieve the goals of Pan-
Germanism by military means led to the retaliation of the Soviet Union and of the 
newly installed governments in what will be called Eastern Europe during the 
Cold War. On its progression towards the West, the Red Army considerably 
massacred the German minorities living in Eastern Europe331. In 1945-1946, these 
German minorities had then to face the decisions of the newly invested 
governments of Eastern Europe ordering their massive and brutal expulsion. 
While about 5 million Germans fled from the advancing Red Army, most of the 
remaining Germans were collectively held responsible for the crimes committed 
by Hitler’s Germany and thus quickly expelled from what the Soviet Union and 
its satellites designated “recovered territories”. Between 1944/1945 and 1949, 
about 12 million Germans from the 16.5 million living in the former Eastern 
territories of the Reich and in other Central and Eastern European areas were 
expelled from their homeland: nearly 7 million from the former German 
territories (Silesia, East Prussia, East Pomerania, East Brandenburg)332, about 3 
million from Czechoslovakia (essentially the Sudetendeutsche), almost 1 million 
from pre-war Poland and Danzig, about 300’000 from Yugoslavia, 270’000 from 
the Soviet Union (including the Baltic States, but Soviet Union’s pre-war Poland 
part excluded), 250’000 from Rumania and 210’000 from Hungary. Because of 
these human tragedies, the international organizations tried towards the end to 
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“organize” these transfers of population. Yet, an estimated 2.1 million Germans 
died as a direct result of these mass expulsions. (Alburquerque Gutiérrez and al., 
July 2004: 20-22; Chauprade, 2003: 826)333 Ironically and somehow brutally, one 
can assert that the Pan-Germanism objective has been attained, but only due to 
these massive expatriations inside a far smaller German state than the one 
stemming from the Treaty of Versailles. This result was of course not at all the 
one hoped for by the advocates of Pan-Germanism. Since almost no German 
minorities were living anymore neither in Poland nor in Czechoslovakia nor in 
other Eastern European countries, the limit where Germanism ends became 
indeed the German-Polish and German-Czechoslovakian borders. «Comme l’écrit 
[l’historien français] Pierre Hillard: “La disparition de la présence germanique 
dans tout l’Est européen met fin à près de mille ans d’histoire dans cette région et 
à l’un des plus vastes mouvements de colonisation du monde.”» (Chauprade, 
2003: 826) For instance, the Germans in Bohemia-Moravia settled in the region 
from the 13th century onwards, called in by the Bohemians kings. They 
represented 23% of the Czechoslovakian population in 1921, three years after the 
creation of the Czechoslovakian state, and even 33% of the population in 
Bohemia. It is also noteworthy that the German minority represented the second 
ethnic group in Czechoslovakia, after the Czechs but before the Slovaks. These 
figures remained fairly stable until the expulsion of the Germans following the 
Second World War. (Chauprade, 2003: 29-41, 818-826; Chauprade et Thual, 
1998: 23-31; Geiss, 2001: 202-317) 
 
After the Second World War, Germany faced an entirely new geopolitic 
situation. The world was divided in two ideological spheres, and Germany too. 
Being in the middle of the East-West confrontation, Germany was eventually cut 
into two parts with the establishment in 1949 of two separate German states: the 
Federal Republic of Germany established in May and the German Democratic 
Republic in response in October. Europe and Germany were thus definitely cut in 
two by the Iron Curtain. In this bipolar world, the FRG was in the West camp 
alongside the USA, while the GDR was in the other camp – the socialist one – 
alongside the other superpower, namely the Soviet Union. On the one side, there 
was the strong economic West Germany, supported by the US ally willing to 
reconstruct a Germany reoriented towards the Atlantic Alliance and in position to 
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counterbalance France. At the forefront of the defence against the Warsaw Pact 
and willing to rehabilitate the country in its position as a major European power, 
Bonn remained a reliable ally of the United States and gave great importance to 
its reconciliation with France. Its reconciliation with its main former enemy led 
Bonn to participate in a decisive way in all the stages of the European 
construction. On the other side, a somewhat archaic East Germany was 
completely loyal to Moscow and tried even to attain some kind of co-leadership 
with the Soviet Union in the socialist camp.  
 
For the sake of ideological alignment, but also in order to reassert its 
presence in a zone considered by East-Berlin as being its geopolitical area, East 
Germany participated in repressions within the Eastern bloc. East German troops 
participated in the Warsaw Pact334 invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August 1968 
to put an end to the Prague Spring and Alexander Dubček’s Socialism with a 
human face and stood ready to intervene in Poland in 1980/1981 alongside Soviet 
and Czechoslovakian troops to carry out a campaign of military coercion against 
the Polish leadership.335 The GDR had as an ambition to play an international 
role. «Elle semblait, alliée à l’impérialisme soviétique, s’inscrire dans la 
continuité de l’ancien Etat impérial allemand quant à la recherche d’une 
dimension mondiale. A cet égard, l’Allemagne de l’Est participa à toutes les 
entreprises de déstabilisation soviétique dans le Tiers-Monde (…).» (Chauprade et 
Thual, 1998: 28-29) There was a great antagonism between the two Germanys, 
strongly symbolized by the Berlin Wall, constructed in August 1961 on the orders 
of the East German leaders. In this bipolar world, a détente between East and 
West Germany took place in the 1970s within the context of Bonn’s Ostpolitik336. 
The rapprochement happened in spite of the fact that a decrease of the antagonism 
between the two Germanys did not occur. It is important to note that the 
Ostpolitik of the German government of Willy Brandt led most significantly to the 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the factual border between Poland and the 
GDR.337 East Germany’s government had already recognized the Oder-Neisse 
line in a treaty with Poland in 1950. It seemed that from then on Germany said 
goodbye to its former Pan-Germanist ambition to have a Lebensraum extending 
beyond the borders of the German state. The challenge was of a new kind. While 
it still consisted in gathering the German-speaking peoples into a Lebensraum, the 
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territory concerned was not the same. Since the signs of Germanism beyond the 
borders of the two German states had by then disappeared for the most part 338, 
one can somehow assert that the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a 
permanent border had as a result to limit the Pan-Germanist idea to the 
reunification between the FRG and the GDR.  
 
The eventual collapse of the Iron Curtain made the German reunification 
finally possible, on 3 October 1990. The reunification was achieved with the 
support of the United States, the approval of the Soviet Union, and despite some 
reluctance of many European capitals. These, in particular Paris and London, had 
to eventually give in and an international consensus approving the irreversible 
German involvement in an integrated European security system took place. Since 
the united Germany became effectively a NATO member state on the same day as 
its reunification, that is, on 3 October 1990, Washington – whose interest was to 
have a united Germany as a member of NATO – was very satisfied about the 
outcome. As for Russia, confronted with the failure of communism and with the 
US American SDI, it had no other real choice than the rapprochement with the 
reunified Germany. The reunified Germany had however to reassure the 
Europeans and especially its neighbouring countries. According to the already 
mentioned Two-Plus-Four Treaty339 of 12 September 1990, taking into account 
the worries and interests of the Soviet Union and Poland, the reunified Germany 
committed itself to recognize and not to question in the future its external borders, 
and amongst those the famous Oder-Neisse line. Moreover, as requested by the 
Two-Plus-Four Treaty, the reunified Germany amended on 14 November 1990 its 
constitution, its Grundgesetz (Basic Law), to remove the article concerning 
unification of pre-war German areas. Thus, article 23340 of the Basic Law was 
used for reunification. Accordingly, five new German Bundesländer341 (from the 
former GDR) joined the new German state and had thus been re-established into 
Germany. After article 146 had been updated, article 23 was repealed to avoid 
parts of pre-First World War Germany, existing outside the unified territory, to 
accede to the reunified Germany. In addition, also as requested by the Two-Plus-
Four Treaty, a German-Polish border agreement was adopted in 1991, which 
finalized the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish border. The two neighbours 
also recognized, as part of the agreement, basic political and cultural rights for 
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both German and Polish minorities living on either side of the border. The 
reunification of Germany was the prelude to a return to its traditional geopolitics. 
Germany recovered its central geographical location, which is quite similar to the 
pre-Second World War Germany, though the territory is much smaller. Germany 
lost 192’041 Km2 (about 35%) of its territory in relation to its size in 1914 
(549’000 Km2) and 113’663 Km2 (about 24%) to its size in 1919-1937 (470’622 
Km2). Germany’s territory had thus been drastically reduced within the 20th 
century. 
 
In post-Cold War Europe, there is a strong concurrence between 
Bundesstaat and Volk. Pan-Germanism has lost one of its principal raison d’être. 
Consequently, Pan-Germanism is very far from being as strong as it was in the 
19th century and in the first half of the 20th century and even less strong as it was 
in the Cold War, when it had as an objective to achieve reunification between 
West and East Germany.  
 
Yet, the further evolution of the European Union in the context of post-
Cold War Europe and the Union’s continued extension to the East raise the 
question of the new German geopolitics342 and Germany’s key geopolitical area. 
As already noticed, Germany is not only the most important trading partner since 
mid-1990s for almost all the CEECs, but Germany is also geopolitically, 
culturally and historically the closest to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Despite the expulsion of German ethnics following the Second World 
War, these remarks apply especially to Germany’s old sphere of influence, 
namely Poland, Bohemia, Moravia and Hungary, that makes up the heart of 
Central Europe. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are indeed commonly 
considered as being part of the “German Hinterland”. These Central European 
countries are finding again their historical and cultural references which 
traditionally tied them to their Western neighbours, most notably Germany. 
(Chauprade, 2003: 90-91) Close ties with this region seem thus normal for 
Germany, since Germans in general consider their inhabitants to be closer to 
themselves than to the Russians. This even appears to have been the case during 
the Cold War: for instance, Konrad Adenauer is said to have defined the Poles as 
a people of Western culture, who happened to live farther East. (Létourneau and 
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Hébert, 1999: 110-111) As already noticed, these close links explained 
fundamentally Berlin’s willingness to have the CEECs, in particular the three 
above-mentioned Central European states, inside both NATO and the EU. Besides 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia can also be 
considered as being part of the post-Cold War Central European countries where 
Germany’s economic, political and cultural influence is strong, as well as to some 
extent the Baltic states.343 Some observers of international politics wonder 
however whether the rapprochement between Germany and the CEECs would be 
sustainable in the long-term, notably after these countries (except Croatia) have 
joined the EU in 2004. On the one hand, EU enlargement represents a common 
success for the CEECs that have joined and Germany that consistently pursued 
this objective since 1989/1990. On the other hand, «the actual realisation of 
enlargement opens up the question as to whether the rapprochement is sufficiently 
advanced to encourage Berlin and its neighbours to put their differences aside and 
work together in an EU of 25.» (Zaborowski, January 2005: 64) 
 
Some facts do not allow for much optimism when considering the 
question. First, there is the question of the expelled Germans after the Second 
World War. A minority of expelled Germans and their descendants are still 
demanding return of their former property confiscated after the Second World 
War, thus trying to keep alive some kind of Pan-Germanist idea extending beyond 
Germany’s borders. This is less the case for the Germans expelled from the now 
Polish territories, but much more the case for the Sudetendeutsche and their 
descendants344. There are various organizations representing those expelled 
Germans, in particular the Sudetendeutsche345. The political influence of these 
Sudetendeutsche organizations is carried on, although the nostalgia for the former 
homeland fades gradually with the passing years and the passing generations. The 
topic should have been effectively closed within bilateral relations346 and within 
the framework of the EU enlargement. It seems that this is the case with regard to 
German-Polish relations, but not completely when it comes to the Sudeten 
question which appears to be still unresolved and causes occasional tensions 
between Germany and the Czech Republic (and also sometimes between Austria 
and the Czech Republic).347 Within the framework of the enlargement process, for 
fear of a homecoming of the former German owners, Poland has however insisted 
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and eventually agreed with the EU on a 12-years transition period on sales of 
agricultural lands and secondary residences to foreigners in Poland (i.e. until 31 
May 2016). As for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and the three Baltic 
states, the transition period on this matter finishes on 31 May 2011.348 Second, 
there were disagreements between Germany, backed by most of the other EU 
member states, and Poland about the EU constitution. The difference was 
eventually overcome, but it has shown that Poland was prepared to oppose its 
Western neighbour when deemed appropriated. Third, there were the 
disagreements over the war in Iraq. They opposed those countries against the war, 
notably Germany, France and Belgium, to countries in favour of the war. 
Amongst them one found the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain (where the Aznar 
government supported the United States and the war in Iraq until it was voted out 
of power in March 2004 and replaced by the socialist government of Rodríguez 
Zapatero), Denmark, Portugal and Ireland as well as most of the CEECs. This 
division between European governments was illustrated by the current Secretary 
of Defence of the United States Donald Rumsfeld, when he labelled Germany, 
France and Belgium – because of their stance against a war in Iraq – as being part 
of the “Old Europe”, implying that those European countries which supported the 
war effort – especially the CEECs – were part of a newer modern Europe. Poland, 
as a reward for its loyalty to the United States, even received a zone under Polish 
command (alongside zones occupied by the US army and a zone under British 
command) for the duration of the military occupation established in Iraq in the 
post-invasion period. There is no doubt that there has been an opposition between 
Germany and the CEECs on the Iraq war, but also more generally on the relation 
they have towards the EU and the USA. This remark applies especially to Poland. 
Not only did they align themselves with the USA concerning the war in Iraq, but 
more fundamentally they look primarily and essentially to the United States and 
NATO to ensure their security.349 Germany and France certainly do not look on 
this evolution favourably, but appear to lack the influence to stop it. Some 
observers of international politics argue that one of the most important reasons for 
that situation was the following. Most of the CEECs share the historical 
experience in betrayal by France and domination by Germany and Russia and feel 
thus natural to search further abroad for allies to help guarantee their security. 
(Zaborowski, January 2005: 61-65; Missiroli, March 2003: 6-8; Heisberg, 1998: 
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192) But, all in all, it seems that Germany tries to keep – with relative success – 
Central Europe under its influence, in a manner vaguely reminiscent of earlier 
notions of a German-led Mitteleuropa. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Germany’s key geopolitical area includes in the West France and spans in the 
East from the former communist states of Central Europe to the Baltic states, 
Ukraine and Belarus, and even into Russia.350 The comparison with the old 
Mitteleuropa is evoking, but not entirely relevant, as it is this time – as far as the 
area including the new EU member states is concerned – a much more benign 
community of stability and peace as well as of economic renewal stimulated to a 
large extent by German trade and investments.351 (Brzezinski, 1997: 42, 68-69) 
 
Besides its strong influence in Central Europe, Germany seeks to achieve a 
European leadership not only by fostering further European integration and the 
Franco-German axis – which lies at the core of the European integration –, but 
also by cultivating its close connections to both the United States and Russia. It 
seems appropriate to stress at this point two geopolitical concerns Paris – and to a 
lesser extent London – has: an alliance between Germany and the United States so 
as to contain Russia and to manage to build a Euro-Atlantic economic and 
political area consisted of Germany as the linchpin on the European continent; an 
alliance between Germany and Russia in an attempt to establish a very influential 
Eurasian bloc. (Chauprade, 2003: 162) 
 
As far as its close connections to the two extra-European Union great 
powers are concerned, one can say that Germany aims to keep its strong ties to the 
USA and to “spare” Russia. For the latter, one can certainly assert that the 
German policy towards Russia is something special, so that Germany takes a 
special place within the EU when it comes to relations with Moscow. This was 
notably illustrated by the central role played by Germany to spare Russian 
sensitivities when one had to make Moscow bite the bullet of NATO’s expansion 
up to its border352. Germany retains indeed, most notably because of its 
geographic location, «at least theoretically, the grand option of a special bilateral 
accommodation with Russia.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 42) Moreover, with the 
enormous boost that the enlargements of both NATO and the EU bring to 
Germany in terms of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, the relationship 
 249
between Berlin and Moscow turns out to really be the most important to European 
peace and stability in a long-term perspective. (Hodge, 2002: 156-157; Edwards, 
2005: 62) For its part, US-German relations have a strong history, although their 
solidity dates back recently, given that the strength of the relationship was mainly 
formed thanks to the context of the Cold War. German embeddedness in NATO 
conjoined to American leadership and benign Cold War occupation by the 
Western allies, particularly the United States, has created between Bonn and 
Washington a positive shared history and sense of common destiny in the Euro-
Atlantic area. (Hampton and Sperling, December 2002: 286-287) It seems that the 
nature of the relationship grew even in terms of importance since the end of the 
bipolar world order. It appears indeed that in post-Cold War Europe, «le 
partenaire des Etats-Unis en Europe, ce ne sont plus comme cela l’avait été depuis 
1917 l’Angleterre et la France, c’est l’Allemagne.» (Hureaux, Automne 2001: 
623) “Partnership in leadership” is a proposition made by the administration of 
George H. Bush in Mainz in May 1989 (even before the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall), and repeated by Bill Clinton in Berlin in June 1994 and which aims fully at 
Germany. Some observers of international politics argue that the Kosovo War in 
1999 illustrated clearly this new Washington-Berlin axis. «En agrégeant autour 
d’eux les forces de l’ensemble des pays membres de l’OTAN pour réduire à merci 
ce qui restait de la Yougoslavie, les Etats-Unis ont épousé aussi étroitement qu’on 
le pouvait les intérêts stratégiques traditionnels de l’Allemagne: (…) revanche sur 
le peuple serbe, principal pôle de résistance à sa poussée du germanisme en 
Europe du Sud, vieille alliance avec les Croates et les Albanais et, par delà, la 
Turquie et le monde musulman (…), défiance vis-à-vis du monde slave orthodoxe 
qui reconnaît le leadership de la Russie.» (Hureaux, Automne 2001: 623) These 
interests coincide with those of the United States: to contain Russia; to spare the 
Muslim world in order to both control Israel’s surroundings and limit Europe’s 
influence in this region rich in oil resources and fossil fuels. (Hureaux, Automne 
2001: 623-625)  
 
Even if this analysis could seem fairly brusque, it lays emphasis on the 
importance of the US-German relationship and the convergence of their 
respective interests. Yet, the Iraq crisis in 2003 cast a shadow on the brightness of 
this harmony. As the clash between Berlin and Washington was unfolding, some 
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realist and neo-realist theorists, in particular Henry Kissinger, interpreted this 
clash as a normal consequence of a profound change in German post-Cold War 
foreign policy. They indeed interpreted US-German confrontation over Iraq as the 
logical development of what they have been expected: the disagreement over Iraq 
was merely a pretext for a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more 
national direction, which would represent a challenge not only to the United 
States but also to the European countries. From a neo-realist point of view, it had 
actually been expected that the end of the Cold War would see Germany redefine 
its politics and turn towards a more nationalistic foreign policy stance that would 
increasingly assert and defend its own interests. For that reason, Germany’s 
opposition to the US position in the Iraq crisis was interpreted by realist and neo-
realist theorists as a declaration of independence from the United States. (Waltz, 
Fall 1993: 45) They thought that the end of a half-century of nearly automatic 
compliance with the US desire was reached. 
 
One has to notice at this point that US-German relations went already 
through a crisis, even though it was one of a less significant importance. It was in 
1973, during the Yom Kippur war. At that time, Bonn demanded – confidently 
and then publicly – the end of US weapons delivery from and over West German 
territory to Israel. However, the German government did it only after most other 
NATO allies, in particular France and the United Kingdom, had already denied 
the USA the right to fly over their territory. As Paris and London were leading the 
opposition to the United States in the confrontation of 1973, it was the first time 
in post-1945 history that Germany – together with France – took the lead during 
the 2003 Iraq crisis in opposing Washington on a security policy issue considered 
vital by the George W. Bush administration. (Rudolf, July 2004: 3-4) But, in spite 
of its official position and the lack of international legitimacy of the war, the 
Schröder government undertook nothing to restrain the United States from using 
the military infrastructure in Germany in the US-led Coalition’s war against Iraq. 
So, one can not really speak of a declaration of independence from the United 
States. Neither a dramatic break in the premises and approaches guiding 
Germany’s policy towards the United States nor a deviation from the fundamental 
norms shaping national German interests occurred in Germany’s role in 
transatlantic relations. At the most, German policy towards the United States can 
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be interpreted as an adjustment process to strategic changes in the US substantial 
strategy – bolstered under the George Bush Junior administration353 – which 
eventually lead to a new paradigm of hegemonic unilateralism. Yet, with Europe 
being no longer the central front and with a new US security agenda – in the midst 
of which normative world order conflicts354 have become sharper in the US-
German relationship as a result of Washington’s war on terror –, the relationship 
between the USA and Germany has lost its uniqueness. (Rudolf, July 2004: 3-15; 
Lohmann, March 2004: 11-15) Nevertheless, «in spite of the changing perception 
of the United States and the “deromanticizing” of the relationship, a functionally 
driven cooperative relationship will remain a cornerstone of German foreign 
policy culture – albeit of lesser importance than in the past and posing more 
challenges.» (Rudolf, July 2004: 5)  
 
Moreover, and with the same logic, one can also reject neo-realists’ 
apprehension of a change of Germany’s foreign policy concerning its 
commitment to European integration. In general, one can say that despite the end 
of the Cold War which represented the most massive structural change in 
international politics since 1945, Germany has not changed its basic foreign 
policy orientation. Consequently, similar to its relation to the United States, one 
can assert that Germany has not recently fundamentally changed its European 
policy, thus refuting so far neo-realist predictions asserting that a more powerful 
Germany would surely abandon European integration and establish instead its 
dominance in Europe. (Mearsheimer, Summer 1990: 5-56; Engelmann-Martin, 
February 1999: 2-3)  
 
As a way of conclusion, one may assert that Germany does not seem to 
have definitely abandoned its geopolitical pretensions within Europe. The 
reunified Germany has no territorial claims and acts as a power in the service of 
peace and European stability. Yet, at the same time, it shows again some 
geopolitical ambitions both within Europe and worldwide, as its active attitude 
during the dismemberment of Tito’s Yugoslavia – when it backed Croatia and 
Slovenia – and its constant bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council 
perfectly illustrate. In parallel, Germany has set up the economic conditions of 
some kind of European leadership with the completion of the Economic and 
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Monetary Union. Moreover, one should specify that Germany seeks this European 
leadership inside an integrated Europe and together with a strong Franco-German 
axis. First, it is true that Berlin now seeks further European integration, in 
particular in the areas of security and defence. Germany’s wish is indeed to have a 
role of leadership inside a European Union which would act as both a strong 
political entity and an international great power. (Cohen-Tanugi, Automne 2001: 
612; Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 30) Second, Germany wants the Franco-German 
alliance, which lies at the core of the European integration, to play a fundamental 
role. Closely together with France, Germany wants to shape something 
ambitiously new in Europe. (Brzezinski, 1997: 42) In other words, the Federal 
Republic of Germany is trying to achieve – in a concerted and peaceful way – a 
unification of the European continent where it would play a leadership role. Yet, 
Germany would share its leadership role together with France, thus forming a 
dynamic tandem inside the European Union.  
 
 
b. France’s Geopolitical Area 
 
France has a special geographical position, because France is both a 
peninsula and an isthmus. While considering France as a peninsula favours the 
axis East-West and sets the country into a wider whole, regarding France as an 
isthmus favours the North-South axis, thus further emphasizing its specificity. 
(Colson, 1995: 96) Moreover, metropolitan France has as many shores as 
territorial borders. France is both a continental hub – between Spain and 
Germany, between England and Italy – and a maritime hub between the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. As a result, France has 
always been very sensitive and worried to contain the Anglo-Saxon maritime 
hegemony and the German territorial one. Due to its particular situation, consisted 
of this equilibrium between maritime shores and territorial borders, France’s 
geopolitical stability has also been constantly characterized by a balance between 
European – or continental – policy and world policy.  
 
Thanks to its dual policy, France became the most important great power 
in the late 17th century. This French domination lasted until the supplanting of 
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Napoleon I and the end of the First French Empire, also known as the Napoleonic 
Empire. Even then, France continued to play a major role thanks to its dual policy 
and despite the terms of the 1815 Congress of Vienna and more importantly of the 
1814 Treaty of Paris355, which imposed the abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte and 
restored the Bourbon Dynasty on the French throne. One has to note that the 
Treaty of Paris restored France’s borders to those of 1792. As a result, France did 
not lose any territory in relation to pre-Napoleon Bonaparte France, nor did the 
Treaty provide for important punitive action against France. The European 
influence of post-1815 France was maintained thanks to its maritime world 
policy. Notwithstanding the Napoleonic defeat, France progressively conquered a 
vast colonial Empire, under Napoleon III and especially under the Third 
Republic356 which was established after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The 
French colonial Empire was the Second in importance after the British one. The 
geopolitical objectives of the French colonial Empire were the following: in 
Africa, the control of entire North Africa, including the Sahara, and the junction 
to black Africa; in the Indian Ocean, the control of its south-eastern part; in Asia, 
the Indochinese peninsula. 
 
As far as the African continent is concerned, France would have 
effectively colonised Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, most of West Africa (French 
West Africa [Afrique occidentale française]), a great part of black Africa (French 
Equatorial Africa [Afrique équatoriale française]) and French Somaliland [Côte 
française des Somalis] (with Djibouti); as for the Indian Ocean, Madagascar, 
Réunion Island, the Comoros and other minor islands would be part of the French 
colonial Empire; in Asia, France would have colonised French Indochina (made 
of current Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and some minor acquisitions; as for 
America, the French colonial Empire included French Guyana, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique and St-Pierre-and-Miquelon; finally, as for the Pacific, France had 
colonised some islands (as most notably New Caledonia and French Polynesia). 
Concerning in particular Africa, the French colonial policy consisted essentially 
of the idea to ensure a continued French presence, notably by connecting both 
Dakar to Djibouti and the Niger River to the Nile, thus challenging the United 
Kingdom. France had to face the British concept of gathering its vast African 
colonial Empire by connecting its South African colonial Empire to its territories 
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in East Africa and these two areas to its North African colonial Empire; to put it 
this way, the British were seeking to connect Cairo to Cape town357. Besides, the 
French “D” policy opposed to the British “C” policy had as a consequence that 
both nations faced each other in Fashoda358 – situated in Sudan – in 1898 in one 
of the most significant episodes of European imperialism. In its extra-territorial 
ventures, France had also to face, though to a lesser extent, Germany (notably 
during the two Moroccan Crisis in 1905 and 1911) and Italy (notably in Tunisia 
and in the Red Sea region). In the wake of the First World War, France came to 
administrate the former German colonies (Togo, Cameroon) and an Arab part of 
the former Ottoman Empire (Lebanon and Syria) as mandates of the League of 
Nations. Yet, France had to face in the 1950s much unrest in its colonial Empire, 
especially in Indochina and Algeria. Subsequently, France – under the 1946 
proclaimed Fourth Republic – handed over many of its colonies, as for instance in 
West Africa. Furthermore, following France’s eventual defeat in Diên Biên Phu 
during the First Indochina War, the French government completed the liquidation 
of France’s empire in Indochina in 1954, thus completely withdrawing from Asia. 
Yet, it still kept Algeria, which has been made an integral part of France in 
1848359 and where a large French population lived. The Algerian crisis of the 
1950s would bring an end to the Fourth Republic in 1958 when Charles de Gaulle 
used the crisis as an opportunity to create a new Republic, the Fifth Republic, 
with stronger powers for the President. It was under the new elected President de 
Gaulle that Algeria would eventually become independent in July 1962.  
 
Anyway, historically, the French colonial policy – which premises begun 
already in the 17th century – illustrates the French tendency, which exists still 
today, to lean on its world policy in order to keep its influence in Europe. Yet, the 
opposite is also true, as shown by the French insistence to cooperate more closely 
with its former colonies inside the European Community/European Union. 
(Edwards, 2005: 43-45) Indeed, without Europe, it would have been more 
difficult for Paris to keep its importance inside its “much sough-after” sphere of 
influence, as the Lomé Convention and Cotonou Agreement with the Africa-
Caribbean-Pacific [ACP]360 countries as well as the Barcelona Process with the 
Mediterranean countries best illustrate. Paris was really willing to transform the 
colonial link it had with its colonies into a policy of association and cooperation. 
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It did it not only by means and within the framework of the EC/EU, but also on a 
bilateral basis and within other organizations, notably l’Organisation 
internationale de la Francophonie. The agreements of that latter organization 
were offered not only to the former French colonies, but also to countries that 
have never be part of the French colonial Empire, thus proving the French-
speaking project being something other than a reminder of the colonial Empire. 
France can lean on the French-speaking cultural, political and economic area        
– consisting of about fifty countries representing more than 10% of the world 
population – to have more influence worldwide. In that perspective, 
l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
361 plays a significant role, since 
it permits France to work on a dynamic based on a common language. Albeit the 
French-speaking project is sometimes considered as having a dynamic going 
against the dynamics of regionalisation and building of integrated continental 
entities such as the EU, it can help France to maintain its political influence in 
numerous former colonies. (Chauprade, 2003: 277-280) Yet, one should add that 
today France still has important Overseas Departments and Territories [DOM-
TOM]362 all over the world, permitting France to be present in terms of 
sovereignty on each continent. In other words, «la France conserve (…) une 
politique mondiale active fondée autant sur sa souveraineté multi-continentale que 
sur sa volonté de soutenir des politiques étrangères spécifiquement françaises 
(politiques francophone, arabe,…).» (Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 162) (See also 
Brzezinski, 1997: 63)  
 
Besides, France’s traditional dual policy has brought the country – as we 
have already noticed – to have two main rivals, the United Kingdom on the 
overseas and Germany on the continent. In the 1880s and 1890s France was fully 
devoting itself to the colonial battle against the UK and from the mid-1990s with 
fervent approval from both Russia and Germany; France had concluded an 
alliance with the former in 1893 and worked towards appeasement with the latter 
since 1895 in spite of the context of revenge for the 1870 defeat. This scramble 
for colonial territories would have eventually led to the above-mentioned Fashoda 
incident in 1898. Yet, the peaceful resolution of this incident is considered, 
alongside the increase in strength of Germany, as being the main precursor of the 
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Anglo-French Entente Cordiale. Moreover, the Dreyfus Affair had as a result to 
favour a détente towards the UK and to hinder the rapprochement with Germany.  
 
Having embraced the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale363 in April 1904, 
France redirected its policy in exposing itself again to a more likely war on the 
continent against Germany than on the sea against the UK. The First Moroccan 
Crisis at Tangier364 in 1905 illustrates that the rivalry between France and 
Germany was never really over despite the rapprochement in the last years of the 
19th century. France became more and more preoccupied with the containment of 
German power, especially since the crisis of 1905 at Tangier and even more since 
the Agadir Crisis365 in 1911. This purpose should have been achieved with the 
formation of a cordon sanitaire around Germany. Geopolitically, it seemed thus 
natural to have an alliance with Russia, because the latter would act for France as 
a counterbalance to Germany. The formulation of French geopolitics at that time, 
notably under Paul Vidal de la Blache and André Chéradame, has also to be 
analysed in that context. Contrary to German determinist geopolitics, as 
developed by Friedrich Ratzel, French geopolitics elaborated by the geographers 
Paul Vidal de la Blache366 and Jacques Ancel367 focuses on the notion of wishing-
to-live-together, notably to justify the belonging of Alsace and Lorraine to France. 
As for the already mentioned French geopolitician, André Chéradame, he stressed 
in 1902 the danger for France of a dismemberment of the empire of Austria-
Hungary to the advantage of Germany. That is the reason why André Chéradame 
– who was also professor of Political Science and journalist – suggested in 1902 
an alliance between France, the United Kingdom and Russia to counterbalance 
German power. France would effectively follow that reasoning as the Entente 
Cordiale and then the Triple-Entente368 were set up soon after. Yet, the French 
government would not take any notice of further analyses and warnings of André 
Chéradame. The French geopolitician – in contradiction with the common opinion 
that the harsh terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles have humiliated Germany, 
thus favouring the emergence of National Socialism – was of the opinion that in 
the wake of the First World War France had a much heavier financial burden to 
carry than Germany and considered thus the German reparations as not sufficient. 
According to him, Germany would easily recover and become a danger once 
again for France. Moreover, he warned in 1935 against letting Germany               
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– together with Hungary and Italy – complete its Pan-Germanist objectives, 
fearing notably the loss for France of not only its colonies, but also Nice, Corsica, 
Savoy (to Italy), and Alsace-Lorraine (to Germany). Having not taken serious 
notice of this analysis, France – alongside the Allies – could neither prevent 
Hitler’s Germany from trying to achieve the goals of Pan-Germanism by military 
means nor stop the Second World War from breaking out. (Chauprade, 2003: 62-
79) 
 
Fortunately for France, the country could emerge on the side of the 
victorious countries. This helped Paris to be able to retain considerable influence 
worldwide, especially in Europe. France would, as mentioned above, soon hand 
over most of its colonies in the years following the end of the war, Algeria being 
the last former French colony to become independent in 1962. Yet, the existence 
of a considerable Overseas Departments and Territories would have permitted 
France not only to be present in terms of sovereignty on each continent, but also 
to underpin its options for strategic independence (as the site France made use of 
in Mururoa until 1996 demonstrates). (Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 162; 
Brzezinski, 1997: 63) At the same time, France was one of the main actors of 
European integration which was based initially on French-German reconciliation. 
The first steps of European construction are greatly symbolized by the working 
together of French President de Gaulle and German Chancellor Adenauer. 
Developed around the French-German axis, European integration made slow but 
important progress all along the Cold War, with France seeming rather satisfied 
with the geopolitical situation on the old continent. On the one hand, the bipolar 
world order divided Europe and Germany in two different spheres of influence. 
On the other hand, France together with its West European allies was building a 
politically stable and economically strong supranational entity, with West 
Germany firmly anchored in the West. All this prevented notably Germany from 
becoming the central power in Europe and the dominant power towards the East. 
Under such circumstances, Paris regarded Germany as not representing a danger 
for France. (Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 162) 
 
Yet, the waning of the bipolar world order has redefined the problem for 
France. The restoration of Germany as a great power gave way to some anxiety, 
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especially in France369. But, after having received some guarantees, France came 
over to the international consensus approving the involvement of a united 
Germany in an integrated European security system. 
 
In the post-Cold War area, France’s post-Cold War geopolitical stability 
depends basically on its relations with Russia, the United States and Germany and 
its ability to balance the interplays of these three powers. 
 
Russia, despite having been reduced to a medium-level power, is still of 
importance for Paris. Somehow in parallel to Berlin, but certainly to a lesser 
extent, Paris feels itself also enabled to represent Europe in dealings with 
Moscow. Furthermore, France is inclined to tactically play off Russia not only 
against a too mighty Germany but also against a unilaterally acting United States. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 41-42; Edwards, 2005: 62) 
 
Frances’s relationship with the United States is of an extremely different 
nature than the special UK-US relationship, and not only for the reason that the 
former cannot rely on a community of shared language. (Colson, 1995: 96) The 
relationship binding Paris to Washington is also extremely different than the one 
existing between Germany and the United Sates. Although historically unique, 
long-standing and intense, the relationship between France and the United States 
is not only characterized by strong cooperation. Their relations are also 
characterized by intense competition, persistent tension, distrust and irritation. 
The tension between the two partners is repetitively demonstrated. Richard 
Perle370 asserting that «we don’t trust the French»371 and the description by former 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine of the USA as an 
hyperpuissance that must be counterbalanced are two recent examples of the 
recurring state of distrust between the two partner states. (Hampton and Sperling, 
December 2002: 284-285) (It is interesting to note that these reflections seem to 
be sentiments and interests, respectively pertinent for the constructivist 
approach372 and realists’ balance of power concern.) At the same time, France and 
the USA are aware of «their historic friendship based on a genuinely shared (and 
tested) commitment to democratic values.» (Brzezinski, 2004: 155)  
 
 259
Several reasons can explain the ambiguity afflicting the Franco-US 
relationship. First, both countries consider themselves as the epicentre of Western 
democracy and civilization. The French and US models of democracy and 
civilization are distinct ones: equality, fraternity and relatively strong state on the 
French side facing individuality and a weak state on the US side. (Hampton and 
Sperling, December 2002: 285) The ongoing competition to export their 
respective model worldwide has intensified in the last decades, in particular since 
US power and culture have increasingly shrunk that of France. According to 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the French political and intellectual elite considers the 
current US preponderance – even if tolerated as a necessary evil for the sake of 
international security – as representing a form of cultural hegemony. He argues 
that many of the French elite, which is proud of its own heritage and regards it 
also as universally pertinent, «view globalization as an American-propagated 
design for the dissemination of a mass culture that is pervasively and perniciously 
undermining individual national heritages.» (Brzezinski, 2004: 155) Second, 
France has – as we already mentioned373 – its own geostrategic concept of 
Europe. (Brzezinski, 1997: 42) Third, historical experiences have intensified 
French suspicions of the United States. One can in particular point out the 
following ones: France’s experience of the Second World War and the feeling of 
Charles de Gaulle that «Washington (and London) had slighted the Free French 
during the war and at the peace table» (Hampton and Sperling, December 2002: 
285); the 1956 Suez crisis where France felt that the USA had violated important 
norms of the transatlantic community, thus reaffirming reciprocal suspicions 
between Paris and Washington. About that latter event, the author Thomas Risse-
Kappen even describes the crisis as having «set in motion a trend of gradually 
weakening the transatlantic ties between Paris and Washington.» (Risse-Kappen, 
1995: 84) In the post-Cold War period, French hopes of a Europe emerging as a 
world power in its own right and henceforth independent from the United States 
were only partly achieved, thus maintaining the ambiguity in the relationship 
between Paris and Washington, as it stemmed from the Cold War. Moreover, the 
recent Franco-US clash over Iraq – exaggerating anti-US feelings in France and 
vice versa – did reaffirm once more the reciprocal suspicions between both 
countries. So, France and the United States «have been and remain competitors as 
much as partners, and each continues to see itself as a world power whose 
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ambitions are constantly challenged by the other.» (Hampton and Sperling, 
December 2002: 286) It seems that shared values have produced neither a 
convergence nor a sense of shared identity. Contrary to US-German relations and 
to the US-Anglo “special relationship”, those elements – supposed to be 
characteristics of relations in a democratic community – appear to be missing (or 
at least in question) in the relations between the United States and France. 
(Hampton and Sperling, December 2002: 284-286) Besides, many observers of 
international politics highlight the danger of French politics yielding either to an 
utter anti-US American stance, or at the opposite extreme to an absolute 
Atlanticism and emphasize an important French dilemma related to it, that is, the 
question of the combination of the still essential US security commitment to 
Europe with the gradual reduction of US domination in Europe. (Brzezinski, 
1997: 63-64) 
 
As for its policy towards Germany, France is principally willing to hinder 
Germany’s supremacy in Europe. Paris is notably searching to oppose the above-
mentioned strong alliances between Germany and the United States on the one 
side as well as between Germany and Russia on the other side. In order to prevent 
as much as possible German supremacy from happening but also for its own 
advantage, France is not only inclined (although relatively rarely) to play off the 
UK against Germany, but much more importantly seeks, as mentioned above, to 
keep up with Germany in terms of importance and influence on the continent. In 
order to realise this latter objective and to “regain its past greatness”374, France 
relies particularly on a leading role in the European integration process, 
necessarily based on the French-German axis. One generally agrees that the 
Franco-German alliance permits France to offset its own relative weakness. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 42, 49-50) More generally, and as has been observed further 
above, one asserts that France has since the beginning of the European integration 
process constantly sought to commit itself in favour of European integration and 
to manipulate the European matters to its country’s distinguished advantage375. 
(Treacher, Spring 2001: 38-41)  
 
On the one hand, France seeks a central political role in an enlarged and 
more integrated European Union. Despite the rather poor French initiative in 
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Central and Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era, there have been some 
French attempts in the last years to reaffirm the presence of France both 
economically and politically in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular with 
regard to Germany. France seems to have become more aware of its – political 
but also economic – interests in that region. The 1993 Stability Pact (originally 
known as the Balladur376 plan)377, important FDI in the CEECs – especially in 
Poland – in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the revitalization of cultural links with 
Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova378, and the reintegration of Poland379 and 
Romania (as well as to a lesser extent Bulgaria) into its Eastern European 
geopolitical scheme380 are often seen as French attempts to regain some initiative 
in the region. (Sjursen, 1998: 12-13; Chauprade, 2003: 278; Chauprade et Thual, 
1998: 162-163; Daguzan, 1999: 68) On the other hand, as mentioned further 
ahead in this paper381, setting itself up as the defender of the southern 
Mediterranean countries, France sees itself as the basis of a Mediterranean-North 
African group of states that share common concerns. (Deloche, Octobre 1998: 2; 
Brzezinski, 1997: 42, Daguzan, 1999: 55-69) For traditional, historical, 
geographical and security reasons, France seeks constantly to promote tighter ties 
with southern Mediterranean countries both in its own right and inside the 
EU382.383 Yet, two additional reasons explain why France is even more eager to 
promote closer links with these countries. The first – already mentioned – is to 
have a counterbalance to a Central and Eastern Europe appearing to be essentially 
dominated by Germany: Paris wants to be the main ally of the Southern countries, 
while Berlin seems to be the ally of the Central and Eastern countries. A principal 
difference between the CEECs and the South Mediterranean countries – whether 
it be the North African states or the non-EU East Mediterranean states – is that the 
former are member or at least have a vocation to become member of the Union, 
whereas the latter (with the exception of Turkey) would never become EU 
member states and could only be satisfied with at best an association with the 
Union. (Daguzan, 1999: 56-62) The second additional reason for the French 
attachment to the South Mediterranean area is France’s world policy element of 
its dual policy, enjoining it to face up to the US ambition to be present in all key 
areas, notably in the so-called Great Middle East. 
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Consequently, in post-Cold War Europe, France’s foreign policy and 
geopolitical stability still rest on a balance between European, or continental, 
policy and world, or maritime, policy. This argument is notably made by the 
contemporary French geopolitician Aymeric Chauprade who asserts the 
following: «Une politique européenne et une politique mondiale doivent pouvoir 
être menées de front. La politique européenne est une politique d’intérêts 
communs aux Européens; la politique mondiale de la France est une politique 
d’exception française – Outre-mer, Francophonie, rôle privilégié en Afrique. Le 
défi de la politique étrangère française est donc de réussir à rendre compatibles 
une politique d’intérêt commun [one thinks especially about the CFSP and the 
ESDP] (…) et une politique d’exception – une majorité de pays de l’UE n’ont 
jamais eu, et ne veulent pas avoir, vocation à s’intéresser aux pays du Sud ou à la 
politique maritime.» (Chauprade, 2003: 162) 
 
Moreover, Aymeric Chauprade argues that «une politique maritime sans 
politique continentale viserait à laisser la prépondérance à l’Allemagne; une 
politique continentale – européenne – sans politique maritime, contribuerait à 
laisser l’hégémonie mondiale aux Etats-Unis.» (Chauprade, 2003: 162) Today, 
France has effectively still to be active in and outside the continent. In Europe, 
France seeks to make a success out of the European integration and to keep up 
with Germany in terms of importance and influence on the continent. Outside 
Europe, slightly similar to its altercations with the UK and Germany during the 
scramble for colonial territories, France faces up to the willingness of the United 
States to be present on the whole planet, whether it be in Africa, in the Middle 
East or in Latin America. (Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 164) 
 
In summary, one can say that according to the neo-realists France has a 
key geopolitical area: Zbigniew Brzezinski draws that area in the form of a 
semicircle including the Iberian Peninsula and the northern shore of the western 
Mediterranean and the Balkans up to Germany and Central Europe.384 It is 
considered as the minimal radius of French security and at the same time the 
essential area of French geopolitical interest. France’s objective is obviously to 
combine a united Europe under French leadership with the similar reduction of 
US presence on the continent. This brings up the two central dilemmas in French 
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foreign policy. The first one, to which we referred to slightly above, is the 
following: how to preserve the US security commitment to Europe – which Paris 
recognizes as still being essential – while simultaneously seeking to gradually 
reducing the US domination in Europe. (Brzezinski, 1997: 63-64) One of the 
major problems of France is that in a world dominated by US hegemony and 
unilateralism France has – in spite of its aura of a great power – only the resources 
of a middle power, an objective of French diplomacy is certainly trying to rally 
the other states around a pan-European system which would ensure the French-
desired multilateralism and reduce simultaneously the necessity of US presence in 
Europe. Undoubtedly, for Paris, the CFSP/ESDP is an element playing a central 
role in that object.385 Yet, to pursue its objective of an effective united and 
independent EU – with a “liberated” defence – led by France, Paris needs the 
backing of the Southern states and the close support of Germany. This brings us 
to the second dilemma for France’s policy: how to commit Germany to Europe’s 
future and to further Franco-German partnership as the joint political-economic 
driving force of European unification while ruling out a Europe under German 
leadership. (Brzezinski, 1997: 63-65) The backing of Germany seems very 
important for France since the Franco-German axis, which will be the focus of the 
next section, plays a fundamental role in France’s hopes to remain in the leading 
role on the European and international scene. A strong EU, with the Franco-
German alliance lying in its nucleus, is certainly one of the main and most 
effective means permitting France to offset its own relative weakness; especially 
with the current enlargement process towards the East, which has as a 
consequence to accelerate the progressive fading of what an adviser of former 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl coined a “jardin à la française” (when referring 
to the EEC/EC/EU which France influenced strongly for a long time, but which 
Paris finds it harder to influence as it progressively enlarges] (Vernet,  
14.12.2000: 1). 
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3) EUROPE’S CORE 
 
One has noticed that from a neo-realistic point of view, France and 
Germany make up the very heart of Europe’s security and constitute the key and 
dynamic geostrategic players in Europe, or as one can also refer to as the western 
periphery of Eurasia.  
 
This chapter focuses on the importance of Europe’s Franco-German 
nucleus, but also on the possibility to reinforce it by expanding it – somehow or 
other – to other state-actors. Russia’s zone of influence will also be discussed in 
that context. Thus, this chapter first examines the significance of the Franco-
German tandem. Then, attention will be given to United Kingdom’s geopolitical 
area and to the role of the country in relation to the Franco-German alliance. 
Although not considered anymore as a geostrategic player by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, the UK remains a very important actor both on the European 
continent and globally. Admittedly seen as being also a key player in the 
development of the European defence, some observers of world politics deem the 
recent initiatives on security and defence taken together by Berlin, Paris and 
London386 as well as the Franco-British impetus of St.Malo in December 1998 as 
attesting to the enduring importance of the UK. According to them, it appears 
difficult to conceive any significant European defence identity outside the Franco-
Anglo-German triangle. (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 35) The chapter analyses also the 
possibility of extension of that Franco-German core elsewhere, as suggested by 
many neo-realists. The latter tend to see the critical core of Europe’s security on 
the very continent stretching from France (for some even from Spain) to Ukraine 
and including the Benelux states, Germany and Poland. According to that scheme, 
the key states are of course Germany and France, but also Poland and Ukraine. In 
that context, this chapter will also address Russia’s zone of influence and its 
doctrine of the “near abroad”. Since Russia seeks to keep strong influence in the 
former Soviet area – an area Moscow considers to be part of its zone of   
influence –, the broader European security system is also somehow shaped by 
Russia’s interests and preferences. Finally, this chapter ends with the examination 
of whether the EU, constructed around a Franco-German engine, could become a 
genuine “non-state” great power. 
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a. The Franco-German Tandem 
 
Although we have mentioned further above that Pan-Germanism has lost 
one of its principal raison d’être in post-Cold War Europe, a further objective of 
the Pan-Germanist idea – namely the continental unification necessarily centred 
on Germany387 – has been revived with the end of the bipolar world order. This 
objective was close to prevail during the First World War and then again during 
the Second World War, but in a very aggressive and hostile manner (especially 
with respect to the latter)388. (Chauprade, 2003: 488) For Germany, the unification 
of the European continent within the framework of European construction is a 
strategy which differs fundamentally from the former methods of pan-
Germanism, at the same time as it remains in line with its traditional objective, 
that is, re-establish the unity of the German people. Germany’s 1990 reunification 
was only the beginning to what is meant to lead through EU’s eastern 
enlargement and the unification of the European continent towards the complete 
reunification of the German people. (Chauprade, 2003: 832-833) 
 
European construction – in which framework European unification is 
meant to be achieved – proves thus to be important for German geopolitics. 
Thinking especially of the possibility given to France by the European Union to 
remain in a leading role on the European and international scene (as noticed in the 
former section), European construction proves also to be of great importance for 
French geopolitics. 
 
The process of European unification has so far relied on the Franco-
German axis. Historically, German geopoliticians reflected already over the 
importance of a Franco-German alliance for a continental unification in the 19th 
century.389 Yet, for a long time, German thinkers opposed a federal and Christian 
Europe to a rationalist and centralized Europe as advocated by French thinkers. 
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It is only in the wake of the end of the Second World War that the Franco-
German partnership has provided the crucial foundation for the gradual and 
constant development of European construction. During the Cold War years, 
France and Germany were obviously the major actors of Europe’s unification 
process, which was based essentially on the reconciliation between the two former 
enemies. Europe’s unification process pushed by Franco-German cooperation was 
tacitly backed by the United States; this made certainly things easier for France 
and Germany to push European integration forward. Washington regarded the 
cooperation between Bonn and Paris as essential for the recovery of Western 
Europe, which was in turn fundamental for the US interests and position in 
Europe. (Brzezinski, 1997: 65) Despite sporadic tensions in the Franco-German 
partnership – as most notably the crisis due to the euro-missiles in 1977 –, the 
bilateral disagreements have always been resolved before the holding of European 
summits, where the two countries have generally shown a common position, 
which served as the engine of the EC. It is true that in the wake of the end of the 
Second World War and all along the Cold War period, both countries needed one 
another. For France, the creation of a genuine Europe was the best medicine 
against its lost of power and influence in world affairs and the best means to free 
itself from the Anglo-Saxon domination of the West. Somehow, together with 
(and thanks to) Europe, France sought to re-emerge in the forefront of the 
international scene; the French political elite thinks that there is no alternative 
than a France acting as a global power. For its part, Germany sought through its 
keen commitment to Europe to recover its moral and political credibility. 
Simultaneously to this historical rehabilitation, by promoting Europe’s common 
interest based on Franco-German reconciliation, Germany is re-establishing its 
own greatness, without generating fear and even restoring confidence with the 
other European states. Yet, contrary to France, Germany deemed at the same time 
a close relationship with the USA as essential for its own security as well as for 
the security of Western Europe in general. Due to the Soviet threat, Germany 
considered loyalty to the United States as an essential precondition for survival. 
Even the French have admitted it390. But, while Germany regarded security as 
intimately linked with the United States, France tempered its support for NATO 
by simultaneously aspiring to seek a separate French military-political identity 
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and to preserve its decisive freedom of action. (Brzezinski, 1997: 61-62, 68; 
Hampton and Sperling, December 2002: 285-287) 
 
One may sum up the French-German tandem in the Cold War period as 
follows: France assumed the political leadership (easily accepted by Germany ‘as 
the price to pay’), while West Germany provided the economic dynamism. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 65) Yet, the German reunification, in changing Europe 
geopolitically, also changed progressively this observation. The change in 
European geopolitics implied changes for both countries. For the united Germany, 
it entailed that it became the most powerful state on the continent, thus 
outmatching France in terms of power. Via its considerable financial contribution 
not only to the European institutions, but also to key international organization, it 
developed partially into a global power. As for France, the new post-Cold War 
geopolitical order involved a loss of political influence. This led France to 
reconsider its position towards NATO in order to regain greater influence as a 
result of its more active participation in that organization391. (Treacher, Spring 
2001: 41; Walch, Avril-Juin 2001: 350) It led also Paris to make use of greater 
diplomatic tactic, leaning alternately on Moscow or London, in an attempt to put 
pressure on Washington and Berlin, thus compensating its relative weakness. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 66-67) Consequently, the new geopolitical order explains in 
great part the ambiguous position France has adopted towards the integration of 
Central and Eastern Europe into both the EU and NATO. It is also a large part of 
the explanation about both certain mutual disenchantment and tensions that one 
observes now and then in the Franco-German partnership since the collapse of the 
Iron Curtain. Amongst other tensions and divergences, one should in particular 
mention tension in the early 1990s provoked by previous recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia by Germany, the friction turned up at some stage in the preparation of 
the EMU as well as the divergences surfacing at the European Councils in Berlin 
and Nice at the turn of the century. The tensions and divergences became more 
open in the post-Cold War era. Especially in the years 1999 and 2000, the French 
and German governments had open disagreements – which were obvious at the 
summits in Berlin in March 1999 and in Nice in December 2000 – on important 
issues such as institutional reforms, the CAP or the European Constitution. (Stark, 
Avril-Juin 2001: 289)  
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The two countries have certainly some divergences when it comes to 
Europe’s future, even though these divergences do neither seem very opposed nor 
insuperable. France and Germany have relatively different conceptions – though 
not diametrically opposed – about the nature of the transatlantic alliance and 
about the development of further EU integration. (Stark, 2003: 247-250) Yet, one 
has to note that Paris and Berlin seem to be less opposed on the latter than on 
Europe’s preferable link to NATO and the United States. 
 
As far as its conception over the post-Cold War transatlantic link is 
concerned, Germany continues – similar to the Cold-War period – to insist on a 
central role in European security for the United States. Berlin is of the opinion 
that as long as neither a united and independent ESDP nor a European state inside 
that structure392 is strong enough to provide Europe with the security that 
Germany itself cannot, it will continue to deem as crucial – for its own as well as 
Europe’s security – the United States’ role and presence in the European security. 
Moreover, as already mentioned, close relations between the USA and Germany 
have also the advantage to reassure the CEECs on the benign intentions of 
Germany in Central and Eastern Europe.393 As for France, it agrees on the one 
hand with Germany over the necessity that the US Americans have still to play a 
central role in the European security, but on the other hand the less 
“Americanophile” France is eager on developing the CFSP/ESDP with the hope 
that it would in time replace NATO and the United States as the principal security 
provider for Europe. Yet, meanwhile it seems that France has to accept 
Germany’s predilection for a primary security link with their US ally. (Brzezinski, 
1997: 64-65, 68-69; Hampton and Sperling, December 2002: 284-287) For its 
part, the United States wants the construction of a viable Europe – based 
essentially on Franco-German cooperation – that remains linked to the USA and 
«widens (at the same time) the scope of the cooperative democratic international 
system on which the effective exercise of American global primacy so much 
depends.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 71) As a result, the United States has to commit 
itself in favour of European unification with the eventual acceptance of Europe as 
a global partner, but strongly linked to the United States. The preservation and 
expansion of a Europe acting both as a global partner and as a bridgehead is 
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geopolitically directly relevant and important to the security of the United States. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 71-72) One has to note that the divergences appeared during 
the recent Iraq crisis – though having cast a doubt for some time over the relations 
between Washington on the one side and France and Germany on the other side – 
do not seem to have altered this analysis.  
 
As far as the development of further EU integration is concerned, both 
neighbours have their own conception Paris and Berlin try however, with some 
success, to conciliate them. Berlin keeps on focusing on the importance of 
Germany being anchored both in the EU and in NATO. In order to reinforce that 
double anchorage – permitting it notably to reposition the problem of Germany’s 
rediscovered centrality within wider alliances –, Germany seeks further 
attachment to both institutions, particularly in requesting further sovereignty 
sacrifices towards the EU. Henceforth, Germany is more able and willing to 
openly promote its own vision of Europe’s future, but it still wants France as its 
partner in that venture. Yet, one should note that Berlin now wants France and 
Germany acting as equal partners. According to Germany, the era of France 
assuming solely the political leadership, while Germany acting in the partnership 
as its protégé, is outmoded. It is true that since the collapse of communist rule in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Germany is more able and willing to openly promote 
its own conception of the EU’s development.  
 
In this respect, the publication in September 1994 of the already 
mentioned and so-called Schäuble-Lamers paper was the first important German 
contribution to the European debate in the post-Cold War period. The authors of 
this paper, published under the name ‘Reflections on European Politics’, were the 
leader of the CDU/CSU caucus, Wolfgang Schäuble, and its foreign policy 
spokesman Karl Lamers. This paper did however not really call into question the 
strategy of separation of the two objectives. It rather proposed a two-tier EU, 
consisting of a core of very tightly integrated countries394 and a periphery with 
those countries that were not willing or not able to become part of the core. 
According to Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers395, the precondition for the 
eastwards enlargement was a tightly integrated core, in order to not hinder the 
core-countries to take the next step towards further integration. They fear that if 
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these core-countries would not dare to take the next step towards further 
integration, centrifugal tendencies would lead to an eventual loosening of ties. 
The creation of a group of core-countries was not seen as an objective in itself, 
but as a means to resolve the tension between deepening and widening and to 
accomplish the unification of the old continent without hindering further 
European integration in a ‘unified’ Europe. Although the Schäuble-Lamers paper 
was not a governmental proposal396, it was nevertheless written by Wolfgang 
Schäuble, who was at that time an influential politician, at least at the domestic 
level. Moreover, it seems that the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl accepted this 
paper. It can therefore be assumed that the ideas expressed in the paper reflected 
the thinking of the closest governmental circles. As such, they can be taken as 
important background information on the European policy of the German 
government of Helmut Kohl. (CDU/CSU, 1994; Tewes, April 1998: 127-128; 
Gouzy, 1997: 125-132) As for the speech pronounced on 12 Mai 2000 at the 
Humboldt University in Berlin by Germany’s then Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Joschka Fischer,397 it is the second important German contribution to the 
European debate in the post-Cold War period. Emphasizing once again the 
fundamental characteristics of the German European policy – the main priority 
continuing to be the primacy of integration –, Joschka Fischer’s vision is 
reminiscent of the Schäuble-Lamers paper. (Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 71-72; 
Tewes, April 1998: 118) Fischer’s speech lies indeed in the pro-European 
tradition Germany always stood for. In his speech – where he sets out the 
development of a real European Federation398 –, the then German Minister for 
Foreign Affairs went back to the idea already developed by Wolfgang Schäuble 
and Karl Lamers of a core of very tightly integrated countries. According to 
Joschka Fischer, the creation of the “core Europe”, as developed by the Schäuble-
Lamers paper was, however, «stillborn, as it were, because it presupposed an 
exclusive, closed “core”, even omitting the founding state Italy, rather than a 
magnet of integration open to all.» (Fischer, 12 May 2000: 10) Indeed, according 
to Fischer, this centre of gravity399 – which creation would constitute an 
intermediary step400 towards the completion of the political integration – would 
involve several states401 willing and able to progress towards the political 
integration. The centre of gravity «must never be exclusive but must be open to 
all member states and candidate countries, should they desire to participate at a 
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certain point in time.» (Fischer, 12 May 2000: 11) Besides, so far, when it was 
impossible for the EU member states to progress altogether, groups of countries   
– formed differently – have moved forward, as the cases of the Euro-zone and of 
Schengen illustrate. Joschka Fischer asserts in addition that «precisely in an 
enlarged and thus necessarily more heterogeneous Union, further differentiation 
will be inevitable.» (Fischer, 12 May 2000: 10) Although Joschka Fischer 
emphasized that he was speaking in his own name and not as the German Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, his membership in the European Convention has ensured an 
important platform for his vision. Even if it appears that Joschka Fischer has later 
on slightly distanced himself from that vision and focused rather on the possibility 
of the enlarged EU – which would have the critical size – to play a role as a global 
power, Fischer’s vision expressed in May 2000 continues to express the logical 
continuity of German European policy. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 284; Glotz, April 
2004: 25-30) As for Gerhard Schröder, although having declared – though 
without greater enthusiasm – to approve the ideas brought forward by his Minister 
for Foreign Affairs at the Humboldt University, he seems to keep out of that 
European debate. Some denote the tendency the outgoing German Chancellor had 
to express, especially in his first years in office, a more national view on Europe 
and request a greater degree of discretion for national authorities. Schröder’s view 
had had as a result to qualify for a time the centrality of the Franco-German 
relationship, the former German Chancellor trying to shift towards a multiple 
bilateralism, as its initial closeness to the UK of Prime Minister Bair illustrates. 
(Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 71) Gerhard Schröder became however rapidly 
conscious of the pre-eminence of the Franco-German tandem and moved 
progressively towards a more traditional German European policy, trying to 
conciliate deepening (the top priority), widening and a global role for the EU. 
(Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 285; Cohen-Tanugi, Automne 2001: 612) The Schröder 
government emphasized thus once again the fundamental characteristics of the 
German European policy. Yet, one can assert that there is a growing tendency in 
German European policy to make short-term calculations of cost and benefits (as 
expressed somehow in Schröder’s position), though not seeming to threaten the 
continuity of its inherited fundamental values (as showed by both the Schäuble-
Lamers paper and Fischer’s vision). (Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 72)  
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As for France, progressively forced to admit Germany as its equal partner, 
it still seeks to put forward its own vision of Europe, although it appears 
somewhat that Paris is doing it in reaction to – and rather in line with – 
Germany’s contributions. The Germans regretted certainly the way the successive 
French governments – as well from the right-wing as from the left-wing – replied 
to the German proposals made in 1994 by Schäuble and Lamers and in 2000 by 
Fischer concerning the creation of a hard core around France and Germany. But, 
due to their republican traditions and values as well as the domestic political 
context marked notably by the case of Corsica, the French have difficulties to 
commit themselves to a path leading towards more federalism. Moreover, the 
French policy makers have another dilemma that they can hardly resolve, which is 
to accept a certain degree of federalism without making a “German Europe”. 
(Goulard, 2001: 28) But, despite its greater reluctance than its neighbour to 
sacrifice some practices of sovereignty towards the EU, France has also 
considered the possibility of forming in the EU a hard core around France and 
Germany. Although less prolific about that topic than the Germans, some French 
political personalities tried to give the beginnings of a response to Fischer’s 
federalist vision. So, there was first the French President Jacques Chirac who tried 
to reply to Joschka Fischer in a speech at the German Bundestag on 27 June 2000. 
He spoke from a group of pioneers for the coordination of economic policies, the 
security and defence policy and crime prevention. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 284) This 
group of pioneers can be understood more or less as a synonym to Fischer’s 
centre of gravity. In the centre of this group of pioneer countries, Jacques Chirac 
saw of course France and Germany. But, the French President did not go as far as 
Fischer, because contrary to the former German Minister for Foreign Affairs he 
did not bring a visionary project. Indeed, contrary to Joschka Fischer and scared 
of too much federalism, Jacques Chirac did not want a separate Treaty for this 
group of pioneer countries. However, he later attributed the idea of a Federation 
of Nation-States to himself, as had done Lionel Jospin already a bit before him.402 
Jacques Chirac recently took up again the idea of a group of pioneer countries403. 
Nonetheless, these French ideas404 do not go so far as goes the visionary project 
of Joschka Fischer. France seems somehow hesitant when it comes to the future 
of the EU. The French policy makers seem to be sceptical about the idea of a 
project of European integration where France could lose some of its political 
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influence. The French hesitation is fairly similar to the one observed in its 
position towards the EU’s eastwards enlargement.  
 
Yet, both conceptions of Europe’s future do not seem to be completely 
opposed; they are even after all rather close, especially when considering their 
conception on further EU integration. Both Paris and Berlin are in favour of the 
mechanism of enhanced cooperation. The mechanism of enhanced cooperation, 
which is called as well “flexibility clause” or “two-speed Europe”, goes into the 
same direction than Fischer’s centre of gravity and Chirac’s group of pioneers. 
This mechanism, allowing a group of countries to go deeper into integration, was 
overhauled by the Treaty of Nice and then again by the Constitution for Europe. 
A group of countries has to fulfil some conditions to build an enhanced 
cooperation. Hence, the minimum of member states required to establish 
enhanced cooperation is set by the European Constitution at one third of the 
member states, whereas the Nice Treaty currently sets its number at eight states. 
According to both the European Constitution and the Nice Treaty, the enhanced 
cooperation has as well to be favourable to integration and to be used only as a 
last resort. (Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-44 (2); Consolidated 
version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 
February 2001: Title VII Art.43 (g)) Besides this Franco-German accord of the 
need for enhanced cooperation, some recent propositions of further integration 
between France and Germany to indeed form the “avant-garde” and “hard core” 
of Europe illustrate also the still thriving and fairly successful Franco-German 
tandem. Among these recent propositions, one should mention the two following 
ones. First, a proposal for a Franco-German union has been made in 2001 by 
some leaders of the Socialist Party in France; the idea has then been developed by 
two European commissioners of the former Romano Prodi Commission, the 
French Pascal Lamy405 and the German Günter Verheugen406; subsequently, in 
November 2003, even the then French Minister for Foreign Affairs Dominique de 
Villepin407 explicitly evoked the hypothesis of a Franco-German union. Second, 
two politicians of the CDU – the already mentioned Karl Lamers together with 
Jürgen Rüttgers408 – reasserted in 2004 the need for the Franco-German tandem to 
serve both as a model for the European Union and as the hard core of the greater 
Europe; thus, according to them, the Franco-German partnership has its own 
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raison d’être. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 285; De Bresson et Leparmentier, 
13.11.2003: 2-3) 
 
It is generally admitted that neither France nor Germany is sufficiently 
strong to build a Europe under its sole leadership. (Brzezinski, 2004: 3) Especially 
concerning Germany, it is in particular “emotionally” not thinkable to have a 
Europe led solely by Germany. (Brzezinski, 1997: 79) Thus, each one member of 
the Franco-German partnership still needs the other. All in all, both countries are 
still aware of – and still believe in – the importance of the Franco-German 
alliance as the engine for further integration and unification of the European 
continent; they thus try hard to keep their partnership very active and thriving. In 
addition, seeking a central political role in a unifying Europe (which it hopes 
would permit itself and Europe to get free of Anglo-Saxon domination), France 
still needs Germany to achieve that aim. Paris needs Berlin certainly even more 
than Germany needs France, since the centre of gravity of Europe is moving 
continually eastwards as EU’s eastern enlargement process goes on. Anyway, 
«the political elites of [the] two leading European nations – France and Germany 
– remain largely committed to the goal of shaping and defining a Europe that 
would truly be Europe. They are thus Europe’s principal architects.» (Brzezinski, 
1997: 60) Therefore, the sporadic tensions – though appearing to have become 
more open – and divergent conceptions seem all to be eventually overcome 
because of the dynamics and the deep substance of the Franco-German 
partnership. Yet, in order to still serve as the engine of the EU, Paris and Berlin 
have to resolve their disagreements bilaterally before great summits of the EU.409 
It is indeed one of the most typical arguments pleading in favour of the necessary 
and exemplary role of engine of the French-German tandem that any other EU 
member state can easily agree on a common French-German proposal, since with 
France and Germany one simultaneously combines two “national” perceptions     
– centralism and politico-economic interventionism on the one hand, federalism, 
corporatism and social partnership on the other one – that are poles apart. (Guérot, 
März-April 2001: 38) 
 
Furthermore, from a pure geopolitical perspective, «the areas of special 
concern to the French (…) and the Germans, when viewed together (…) define 
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the western and eastern limits of Europe, while the overlap between them 
underlines the decisive geopolitical importance of the Franco-German connection 
as the vital core of Europe.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 69) In effect, if one looks at 
France’s and Germany’s key geopolitical areas410 together, one easily understands 
that from a security and geopolitical point of view the Franco-German tandem, 
this “vital core of Europe”, has to be the joint political-economic driving force of 
European unification. 
 
One has however to note that two important political personalities, a 
German and a French, seem to be less enthusiastic about the Franco-German 
tandem serving as Europe’s engine. There is first Angela Merkel, current German 
Chancellor and leader of the CDU. She seems to be a strong Atlanticist – she 
backed the United States on Iraq – and, given her belief in liberal economics, her 
European policy is likely to be closer to the British than to the French one. 
Moreover, coming from the North-Eastern Budesland Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania, the first woman Chancellor in history is indeed originating from a 
Bundesland – situated in the ex-GDR – in general less Francophile than those 
located closer to France. In addition, the Franco-German reconciliation has a 
lesser emotional impact on the citizens of the former East-Germany. Nevertheless, 
one has not to forget that she has to compromise with the Social Democrats, who 
are forming together with the CDU/CSU the current government, known as the 
grand coalition. This government includes indeed some Francophiles, notably the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Second, there is, on the 
French side, Nicolas Sarkozy, current Minister of the Interior and regarded as the 
strongest candidate on the right to replace President Jacques Chirac in 2007. 
Recently, he is said to consider the primacy of the Franco-German partnership to 
be outdated; according to him, a Europe of Twenty-Five leads to rethink the 
central core of Europe, which he is keen to see formed by a grouping of the big 
five (France, German, the UK, Italy and Spain). (“Franco-German relations: Je 
t’aime, ich auch nicht”, 03.06.2004: 3)  
 
This reminds us of Gerhard Schröder who tried in his first years as 
Chancellor to shift towards a multiple bilateralism in getting notably closer to 
Tony Blair’s UK; it had as a consequence to qualify for a time the centrality of the 
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Franco-German relationship; but Gerhard Schröder became rapidly conscious of 
the pre-eminence of the Franco-German tandem and moved progressively towards 
a more traditional German European policy. So, one can think that like Gerhard 
Schröder, Angela Merkel – and Nicolas Sarkozy, in case he would become French 
President – will rapidly be overtaken by the dynamics and primacy of the Franco-
German partnership.  
 
Anyway, one generally considers the Franco-German tandem as 
fundamental for EU integration, notably in the process towards a security and 
defence policy. Progress is possible only if the two countries are in harmony. 
(Pedersen, 1998; Edwards, 2005: 54; Stark, 2003: 247) The other EU member 
states appear to accept this Franco-German leadership, although in different ways, 
depending on their own status. The United Kingdom is certainly the one which 
accepts it the least, as its occasional attempts to balance the Franco-German 
leadership indicate. (Pedersen, 1998) 
 
 
b. Enlarging Europe’s Core and the Russian Component 
 
Assuming that France and Germany make up Europe’s very core, one 
should firstly consider the probability of enlarging this nucleus to other countries 
while taking into account the Russian component. The next section will examine 
the possibility of the EU becoming a potential “non-state” great power. 
 
Prospects of an extension of the Franco-German tandem to other countries 
have regularly been on Europe’s Cold War agenda. One of the greatest aspirants 
is certainly the United Kingdom. London was traditionally the main manager of 
the balance of power on the European continent, taking care especially that 
neither Germany nor France got the upper hand on the continent. Its insularity411 
thrust it however, as a geopolitical principle, to give preferences to the maritime 
extension of its Empire. Paradoxically, it was at the height of its Empire412 
(during the interwar period) that the UK initiated its decline as the world’s 
greatest power. Although twice on the victorious side, the United Kingdom lost its 
global leadership to the United States in the course of the two World Wars. With 
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the beginning of the Cold War, the UK – financially bled white by the wars – had 
no choice but to become the brilliant second in command behind the USA. 
Moreover, the beginning of the decolonisation led to the decay of the British 
Empire, as the UK handed over its African colonies in the late 1950s and, later in 
the 1970s, its colonies in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. Yet, like France, the 
United Kingdom still possesses important overseas territories413 – mostly in the 
Caribbean, in the Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean, but not to forget Gibraltar – 
and strategic alliances with other islands (like is former Mediterranean colonies 
Cyprus or Malta). The “special relationship” with the sort of continent-island 
North America (USA-Canada) is certainly also important in this context. 
Consequently, still today the UK retains a major maritime dimension, which 
seems to be at least as vital as its European commitment. This largely explains 
London’s steady reluctance towards too much deepening in the EU, its loyalty 
towards the United States and its preference for a transatlantic policy within 
NATO rather than a continental policy within the Union.414 (Chauprade, 2003: 
126, 495-496, 499; Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 328-333, 518)  
 
Nonetheless, a change seems to have occurred with the Labour 
government starting to acknowledge the need for the UK to act closer with the EU 
to maximize its interests and influence. Fearing to lose even more influence and 
power because it removed itself from crucial EU developments like the Euro-zone 
and the Schengen area, the United Kingdom tried as we have already noticed415 to 
counter this loss of influence by taking some European initiatives in other areas, 
especially in the area of security and defence since its U-turn in autumn 1998. 
(Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 6-9) Consequently, some observers 
of international politics believe that the Franco-British impetus of December 1998 
combined with the “new” importance granted to London by Paris and Berlin in 
the areas of security and defence (as illustrated by the Franco-Anglo-German 
summit in Berlin in September 2003, where Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and 
Gerhard Schröder tried to conceal their views on the ESDP) would eventually 
lead inside the Union towards a Franco-Anglo-German triumvirate, at least as far 
as any independent European foreign and defence policy is concerned. (Bryant, 
Autumn 2000: 35) It is true that this combination has the advantage to regroup the 
three most important EU member states and even – if one excludes Russia and 
 278
Turkey – the three most important European states in terms of not only military416 
and economic417 power but also in terms of population418, avoiding thus largely 
any realistic resistance to initiatives taken jointly by them. In addition, from a 
security and geopolitical point of view, one could perceive this combination as a 
strong and reliable transatlantic connection added to Europe’s vital core. Yet, 
even though some consider it difficult to see any meaningful European defence 
identity be built outside this Franco-Anglo-German triangle, hindrances to such a 
combination are fairly important. Among other hindrances, one should mention 
the strong British euroscepticism, key divergences about Europe’s future between 
France and Germany on the one side and the UK on the other, as well as the 
proper dynamics of the Franco-German tandem. (Schnapper, 1999: 150-157) The 
latter is admirably illustrated by the change of mind brought about by Gerhard 
Schröder, who thought at its beginnings as Chancellor to be able to replace the 
Franco-German relationship by a triangle Paris-London-Berlin; he had however 
rapidly – within a year – to become conscious of the primacy of the Franco-
German tandem. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 285; Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 71) 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that in recent times the leaders of these three 
countries meet more often to speak about all kinds of European matters, 
particularly those concerning security and defence issues.  
 
One could also expect in a unified Europe the transformation of the 
Franco-German tandem into a Franco-German-Polish triangle, based on the 
Weimar Triangle. The latter is a trilateral relation which was launched in Weimar 
in 1991, at the instigation of the then French and German Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs – respectively Roland Dumas and Hans-Dieter Genscher –, with the 
intention to reconcile Germany and Poland on the model of the Franco-German 
reconciliation. The idea was also to associate France to the German-Polish 
reconciliation, in opening the Franco-German tandem to the post-Cold War 
context. Providing an annual meeting of the respective Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, the troika has further a political, security and defence dimension, as well 
as an economic and cultural one. Moreover, it has advantages for its three 
members. Through the German-Polish reconciliation, Germany can extend its 
influence northwards, into the Baltic states, and eastwards, into Ukraine and 
Belarus. (Brzezinski, 1997: 70) Besides, at the same time as France acts for 
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Poland as a partner counterbalancing Germany’s domination in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Poland acts for France as a partner limiting French fears of a 
German Alleingang in the region. In parallel, the incorporation of France in the 
German-Polish relationship can from a German and Polish point of view offset 
not only possible French temptations to “withdraw” from Central and Eastern 
Europe in order to re-orientate its responsibilities solely towards Southern Europe, 
but also more generally any temptation of an East-West-sharing between France 
and Germany. (Kolboom, März-April 2001: 55, 57) In addition, Poland can 
occasionally be included in important Franco-German discussions regarding 
Europe’s future. The Weimar Triangle represents altogether 179,7 millions 
people419, i.e. more than one third (37,3%) of the population of the EU enlarged to 
twenty-seven member states (if one includes Bulgaria and Romania) which will 
have 481 millions inhabitants. (Künhardt, Ménudier, Reiter, Hiver 2001-2002: 17; 
Lukac, Printemps 2001: 44-51) Therefore, based on both Franco-German 
reconciliation and on German-Polish reconciliation (the latter assuming a 
geopolitical importance in Central Europe matching the impact the former had on 
Western Europe), the Weimar Triangle created «a potentially significant 
geopolitical axis on the European continent.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 70) It could thus 
become the spine of the unified Europe, especially if Ukraine would be added to 
the Franco-German-Polish constellation. A spine for the European continent is 
definitely of great importance in security terms. 
 
Ukraine is of very crucial importance for European security. Sharing 
borders with three EU member states (Poland, Slovakia and Hungary), one soon-
to-become EU member state (Romania) and three former Soviet Republics 
(Russia, Belarus and Moldova), the country is of geopolitical importance, as it 
connects Europe to Russia as well as Europe to Asia. (Molchanow, December 
2004: 468-469; Kaminski, 1999: 44-50; Ghebali and Sauerwein, 1995: 193-194) 
Ukraine is also important for European security in the sense that should an acute 
ethnic, political or economic crisis occur in the country, its consequences (mainly 
in the form of refugees and economic migrants) would certainly spread beyond 
EU’s borders. Economically the country is losing about 300 million dollars per 
year in neighbourhood trade, since the EU accession of its Polish, Slovakian and 
Hungarian neighbours in May 2004. Recent agreements between Ukraine, Russia, 
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Belarus and Kazakhstan to form a free economic zone – the Common Economic 
Space420 – have to be understood in this light. (Molchanow, December 2004: 468-
469) Yet, with the political change that occurred in the country, Ukraine seems to 
initiate a more pro-Western European path, thus getting closer to the EU. The new 
pro-European Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko421 even openly asserted 
Ukraine’s short-term objective of EU membership422 and long-term objective of 
NATO membership. Ukraine’s bid to join the two Western institutions is 
obviously driven by both national interest and identity considerations. It is 
jeopardizing Ukraine’s participation in the Common Economic Space, all the 
more that Kiev is also currently negotiating its membership to the WTO. The 
prospect of Ukraine’s admission in these institutions is however not yet decided. 
Ukraine – regarded as a geopolitical pivot by Zbigniew Brzezinski – is still tied to 
Russia in numerous ways. After having recently lost noticeable influence in 
Georgia, Moscow will certainly not easily accept to “lose” definitely also its 
geopolitical important neighbour that it planned to maintain in a more integrated 
CIS. The loss of Ukraine was since its independence a considerable geopolitical 
setback for Russia. It meant for the latter «the loss of a potentially rich industrial 
and agricultural economy of 52 million people ethnically and religiously 
sufficiently close to Russians to make it into a truly large and confident imperial 
state, (…) [the deprivation] of its dominant position on the Black Sea (…) [and 
the limitation of its] geostrategic options.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 92) An independent 
Ukraine – the second largest country in Europe423 – separates Russia from the 
Balkans, from Romania, Hungary and Slovakia; it also changes at the expense of 
Russia the whole situation in the Black Sea region and in the area between the 
Black and the Baltic Sea. (Kaminski, 1999: 45) While trying to spare Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia, Ukraine seems to be firmly determined to get closer to EU’s 
Europe. This seems to be in the interest of the EU member states, as well as of the 
United States. It would be strategically perilous for the EU and also for NATO to 
reject Ukraine’s aspirations, as it could have as an effect to revive Russia’s 
imperial ambitions. (Brzezinski, 2004: 98) The USA in particular is interested in 
seeing an independent pro-Western Ukraine, for the main reason that it would      
– alongside NATO’s and EU’s eastwards expansion – further contain Russia, thus 
serving its broader geopolitical interests in Eurasia. Connecting Europe to Asia, 
Ukraine is indeed of particular significance in Washington’s reasoning 
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considering Eurasia to be the most important playing field. As Ukraine is a key 
state for any control of Eurasia, one understands easily why in the post-Cold War 
era the USA increasingly turned its attention to this country, which is the third 
largest recipient of US aid after Israel and Egypt. 424 As for the EU, a pro-West 
Ukraine – potentially soon ready for EU and NATO accession negotiations – 
would bring further stability on the European continent. The European states        
– above all the CEECs – regard in effect an independent Ukraine, especially if 
orientated towards the Western institutions, as further protection against a still 
unpredictable Russia. Besides, Poland and Lithuania are the two most enthusiastic 
supporters of Ukraine’s EU bid. (Denysyuk, Avril 2005: 228-229) Moreover, one 
must not forget that Ukraine’s strategic position on the energy supply market 
makes it a crucial partner for both the EU and Russia. (Missiroli, September 2003: 
27) 
 
Given the special geopolitical interest of Germany and Poland in 
Ukraine’s independence, one can imagine Ukraine being progressively drawn into 
the Weimar Triangle. Since one can think that the Franco-German-Polish 
relationship is likely in the next years to deepen considerably in the area of 
security and defence, one can expect a Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian 
collaboration in this area to effectively reinforce the spine of the unified Europe 
and enhance Europe’s geostrategic depth. This constellation would form an arc 
throughout the European continent from the Atlantic to the Black Sea. As 
mentioned by Zbigniew Brzezinski, France, Germany, Poland and Ukraine           
– representing altogether close to 229 million people425 – are indeed forming the 
critical core of Europe’s security.426 (Brzezinski, 1997: 85-86) Protecting the core 
of the unified Europe, this Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian spine would 
constitute the foundations of Europe’s security, all European states seeming to 
profit from it, except maybe Russia.  
 
Therefore, this potential security collaboration would certainly have to be 
realised within a broader European security arrangement including one way or 
another Russia so as to reassure the latter that it will not be excluded from all 
European security systems. Russia wanted to create a strong Commonwealth of 
Independent States [CIS]427 or some Eurasian entity, both being under Russian 
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leadership and based on the Russian doctrine of the “near abroad”. From the 
Russian viewpoint, the “near abroad” doctrine has also a geopolitical content, 
since it emphasizes that the former Soviet space should be more or less a Russian 
sphere of influence. Accordingly, Moscow aims at keeping its strong influence 
over political, economic and military affairs in the former Soviet states, a region it 
considers as being part of its sphere of influence. As a result, Russia endeavours 
to retain broad military deployment and extensive economic presence in these 
sates. While Russia’s military presence in these states is illustrated by the 1997 
agreement on the Black Sea Fleet with Ukraine, the joint military space with 
Belarus and the presence since 1992 of a military force in the eastern regions of 
the Republic of Moldova, Russia’s economic presence in these countries is 
witnessed by their energy dependence on Russia and the wide-ranging Russian 
investment in a series of key sectors of their economies. (Lynch, September 2003: 
40) Additionally, Russia tries to revitalize the CIS, which has often been 
considered as moribund. It is in that optic that Moscow is eager to see the creation 
of the Common Economic Space with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (which 
are all member states of the CIS) or the revitalization of the Eurasian Economic 
Community [EurAsEC]428 with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan (which are also all member states of the CIS). The revival of the 
EurAsEC in 2005 offers the possibility for the Common Economic Space to be 
implemented in its framework with or without the participation of Ukraine. Given 
Kiev’s interest in Ukraine’s membership in the European Union, a Ukrainian 
participation to the Common Economic Space seems rather uncertain. A 
simultaneously membership in the EU and in the envisioned Common Economic 
Space seems indeed incompatible. 
 
Besides Ukraine, other CIS states – suspicious of Moscow’s intentions – 
either oppose or avoid pressure from Russia for closer political and military 
integration. Having developed a sense of national consciousness, most of the CIS 
were not seduced by Russia’s plans. Both Georgia and Ukraine have made 
membership in the EU and NATO priorities. In August 2005, the Ukrainian 
President, Viktor Yushchenko, met his counterparts form Georgia, Mikhail 
Saakashvili, Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, and Lithuania, Valdas V. 
Adamkus, to discuss the setting up of a new regional alliance – the 
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Commonwealth of Democratic Choice – which would include the four countries. 
The new axis – stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, down to the 
Caspian region – is officially meant to champion democracy in the former Soviet 
space. For now still just a concept, its unofficial objective is to move out from 
under Russia’s shadow. (Chauffour, 4 November 2005: 1-3; Torbakov, 12 
September 2005: 1) This axis would notably constitute a corridor to transport 
energy resources to Europe from the oil and gas-rich Caspian Sea basin, 
bypassing Russia.429 Not only Ukraine and Georgia, but also Azerbaijan (getting 
closer to Turkey) and Moldova (seeming quietly drifting towards the West)430 
seem to slowly slip away from Russia’s sphere of influence, as illustrates the 
existence of the regional organization GUAM431, created as a way of countering 
the influence of Russia in the area. Moreover, to a far lesser degree, even the 
former Soviet Republics of Central Asia – especially Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, but also Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent the fairly 
loyal (to Russia) Kazakhstan – are increasingly suspicious of Russian efforts to 
realise its geopolitical goal of the “near abroad” doctrine.432 But, despite of that, 
Russia does not seem to have lost considerable influence in these countries. In 
Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the overthrown of Askar Akayev in March-April 2005 
does not seem to have led to a loss of influence of Russia. Experts even tend to 
believe that Russia appears to be the primary beneficiary of Kyrgyzstan’s 
revolution as it is of the bloody suppression of protest in Uzbekistan in May 2005. 
As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, a mutual defence pact has been signed between 
Tashkent and Moscow in November 2005. The two countries agreed also on 
closer military cooperation. The external relations of Uzbekistan have 
considerably evolved in the post-Cold War era. In the early 1990s it was the 
United States which appeared to be Uzbekistan’s favoured foreign partner, 
whereas relations with Russia were cooler. At present, it seems to be the opposite. 
The Uzbek government urged in July 2005 the US government to leave the 
airbase it leases in Uzbekistan, while a Russian and a German airbase remain. The 
last US troops left Uzbekistan in November 2005. 
 
Only Belarus, which even signed an agreement with Russia providing for 
the Community of Sovereign Republics, a union between the two countries433, 
and Armenia434 – mainly out of geopolitical interests435 – seem to remain 
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continually loyal to Russia, putting up with Russia’s geopolitical ambition. It is 
interesting to note that among the CIS, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the six CIS member states forming the so-called 
Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO].436 The CSTO – whose objective 
is mainly to ensure peace, coordinate regional security activities, preserve 
member countries’ territorial integrity and to provide immediate military 
assistance to a CSTO member state in the event of a military threat – maintains 
notably a Collective Rapid Reaction Force with 1’500 military personnel 
deployed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Some experts consider 
however the CSTO to have essentially been created to prevent NATO’s further 
eastwards expansion. 
 
Furthermore, one has to note that the excuse of the joint struggle against 
terrorism made it easier for the Soviet Republics of Central Asia to oppose 
Russia’s geopolitical objectives. In the name of the post-11 September fight 
against terrorism, the post-Soviet states of the region could even explore closer 
security links with the Euroatlantic community. Undoubtedly, Russia is not strong 
enough politically anymore to impose its will, nor is it attractive enough 
economically to be able to seduce most of the countries formerly part of the 
Soviet Union. (Brzezinski, 1997: 106-115; Romer, 1999: 54-61; Hodge, 2002: 
154-155) Therefore, it is widely believed that Russia has no other real choice than 
to resign itself to the inevitability of continued NATO and EU enlargement and to 
acquiesce to a US «security role in Russia’s hitherto sacrosanct “near abroad”, 
(…) [Moscow even acknowledging] it through the American-Russian “Joint 
Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship” [of May 2002]437» (Brzezinski, 
2004: 100) But, as indicate Moscow’s current relations with the former Soviet 
Republics of Central Asia, it seems that Russia succeeds so far in keeping its 
influence in that area. 
 
Yet, it became important in the post-Cold War period to reassure Russia 
that it will not be excluded from all European security systems. With the aim to 
include Russia in broader European security arrangements, the European states 
and the United States made sure to involve Russia in the European security 
architecture. Thus, besides US-Russian bilateral security relations as well as 
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Russia’s membership in the existing OSCE and Council of Europe, a series of 
relationships have been established. As already noticed, NATO set up in May 
1997 the already mentioned NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and had 
permitted Russia to contribute to NATO’s IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia. 
As for the EU, it signed with Russia in 1994 the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, entered into force in 1997 and still the cornerstone of the EU-Russia 
relationship. The agreement has as its main objective the establishment of a 
common free trade area, but it also calls for a more intensified political dialogue 
between the EU and Russia. Furthermore, one has to note that the EU-Russia 
biannual summit meetings438 broadly drive the relations of the EU with Russia 
and produce some progress in the security relations between the two countries, as 
for instance the launch of practical cooperation in the framework of the ESDP. 
Yet, despite some achievements, one generally acknowledges a lack of substance 
in the EU-Russia relationship.439 (Forsberg, Summer 2004: 253-256) Moreover, 
Moscow has often been criticized for keeping its distance, «not least when 
criticisms of its Chechnyan policies have been particularly vociferous.» (Edwards, 
2005: 47) Furthermore, being aware of the fact that several member states wish 
for close ties with Russia, Moscow has often sought to use its bilateral relations 
with key EU member states (most notably Germany, but also France and the UK) 
to protect its interests with regard to the EU. (Lynch, September 2003: 41; K. 
Smith, 2005: 286)  
 
It is in the perspective of a broader European security arrangement 
including the close neighbouring areas (that is, the wider Eastern European area 
as well as the South Mediterranean region) that the European Neighbourhood 
Policy [ENP] has been presented in May 2004 by the European Commission. The 
ENP provides for closer ties with “new neighbours”, but does not aim to open up 
the prospect of membership to the countries concerned. The EU has understood 
the need to have stable and prosperous neighbourhood, while simultaneously 
avoiding (or for a few postponing) enlargement. Seeking mainly to strengthen 
stability, security and well-being for all concerned440, the ENP aims at tackling 
one of the EU’s biggest concern, which is to preclude its periphery to become an 
area of conflict. (Beurdeley, Octobre-Novembre 2005: 577-582) The ENP has as 
an objective to avoid the creation of some kind of new “Iron Curtain” at its 
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eastern border; the Union wants also to avoid a gap with the South Mediterranean 
countries. The EU clearly hopes that the ENP will find acceptance as a credible 
alternative to full membership. (Edwards, 2005: 48; Grazulis, 2005: 310-312) 
Thus, the ENP is addressed to former Soviet Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Moldova plus Ukraine and Russia) as well as to South Mediterranean 
countries441, even though the latter are already involved in the EU’s Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. One has to point out that the ENP will also include 
Russia and Ukraine, despite the fact that the EU has a long-standing separate 
partnership programme with Moscow and a newer one with Kiev. Being aware, as 
noted just above, of the need to reassure Russia that it will not be excluded from 
the extensive European security system, the EU member states – in particular 
Germany – have long been pushing for a more inclusive relation between Russia 
and the Union, notwithstanding regular criticism of Russia’s Chechnyan policies. 
(Edwards, 2005: 47) As for its part, Belarus will not be included, as long as it is 
considered authoritarian by the EU. In other words, the ENP is basically 
addressed to countries lying beyond the EU’s prospective new borders. Therefore, 
the ENP does not include candidate countries for EU membership such as 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey, nor does it include the other countries of 
the Western Balkans, whose relations with the EU are addressed within the 
framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process and for which EU 
membership is foreseen in medium-term perspective442. Amongst the countries 
benefiting from the ENP, only Ukraine and Moldova appear to have a potential 
(though remote) perspective for EU membership443. 
 
Let us now return to the prospects of an extension of the Franco-German 
tandem to other countries. Concerning the two previously mentioned political 
collaborations, namely the Franco-German-Polish partnership and the Franco-
German-Polish-Ukrainian partnership, one observes – alongside potential 
reluctance of Russia (particularly as far as Ukraine is concerned) – two major 
problems. First, both Poland and Ukraine are unequal partners to France and 
Germany. So, one already sees the Weimar Triangle tagging along the stronger 
special French-German relationship. But, although not serving as an engine for 
the EU, the trio today and maybe the quartet tomorrow can serve to add force to 
any potential independent European defence and security policy. Second, these 
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two constellations do not integrate the worries of the South in a unified Europe. 
The Southern countries, which are still not completely reassured about the 
eastwards EU enlargement process, are a bit sceptical about those collaborations. 
In relation to their apprehensions, it was therefore question to include Spain in the 
Weimar Triangle, in order to have an East-West-South Triangle which would 
benefit everyone. 
 
An extension of the Franco-German-Polish collaboration to Spain444 
would prolong the spine of the unified Europe. Forming a significant geopolitical 
axis, the spine would stretch across the European continent from Poland to Spain 
via France and Germany. If one also includes Ukraine, Europe’s security spine 
would be the longest that one can think of. Stretching from the Atlantic to the 
Black Sea, from the straight of Gibraltar right up to the Crimea, this spine would 
have almost the same characteristics as the Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian 
spine. Although not bringing any genuine geopolitical advantage compared with 
the latter, the spine from the straight of Gibraltar to the Crimea would – similar to 
the Spanish-Franco-German-Polish one – have the advantage of including a 
southern dimension to Europe’s security foundations. 
 
One could also envisage an extension of the Franco-German partnership to 
other EEC founding members. A Franco-German-Italian constellation would form 
an axis stretching from the North and Baltic Seas to the Ionian Sea passing 
through the Atlantic. Furthermore, one has to note that the four greatest EU 
countries – namely France, Germany, the UK and Italy445 – form successfully 
together with Spain the so-called G5, gathering since 2003 the Ministers of the 
Interior of the mentioned countries as regards police cooperation. (Lefebvre, Mai 
2004: 285) Yet, an inclusion of the founding member Italy into the Franco-
German partnership would bring no substantial geopolitical or security advantage 
in relation to the exclusive Franco-German tandem. Moreover, it would 
geopolitically still be less interesting than the Franco-German-Polish relationship. 
In addition, one has to point out that recently (actually under the government of 
Silvio Berlusconi) Italy appears to regularly search for a counterbalance to the 
Franco-German tandem. This is greatly demonstrated by its sporadic tactical 
alliances with Tony Blair’s United Kingdom, its pro-US stance in the Iraqi crisis 
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(and more generally in the US-led war against terror), as well as its refusal to 
grant Germany a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. As for an 
incorporation of the Benelux countries, it seems to make not much sense, as it 
contributes nothing new in terms of geopolitical advantage. It is interesting to 
note furthermore that Belgium and Luxembourg appear to be the most reliable 
and loyal countries to the Franco-German tandem. 
 
While keeping in mind the potential enlargement of the Franco-German 
nucleus to other countries, the specificity of the Franco-German relationship is 
generally accepted by everyone. Even if it has lost a bit of its exclusivity, the 
Franco-German tandem must continue to work as a tandem, while other triangles 
or collaborations would only exist next to it but not in substitution to it. Even 
without a characteristic of exclusivity, even after successful reconciliation and 
after the geopolitic change after 1989, there is no credible alternative to the 
special Franco-German partnership and thus also to its special responsibility for 
Europe. (Guérot, März-April 2001: 43) Despite occasional tensions and Gerhard 
Schröder’s initial temptation for a triangle including the UK, the strength and 
importance of the Franco-German engine seems to be firmly entrenched in the 
process of European integration. Both France and Germany desire it, while the 
other European states broadly accept it. (Frisch, Octobre-Novembre-Décembre 
2003: 49; Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 69; Guérot, März-April 2001: 43; 
Leparmentier, 31.01.2001: 1) 
 
One has however to take into consideration several distinct, though 
sometimes overlapping, collaborations existing outside the Franco-German core. 
Some of these collaborations are quite integrated and others are merely of ad hoc 
nature. Amongst the rather developed partnerships, one should mention the 
collaboration between the Scandinavian countries446, which try often to defend 
their common interests within the EU, and between the three Benelux countries, 
which are in the habit (despite recent signs of strains between Belgium and the 
Netherlands) of elaborating a common position before EU summits. As for the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it is also rather ambitious. In addition, one 
observes many less elaborate sub-regional groupings, as for instance the Višegrad 
countries or the Council of the Baltic states (or more recent arrangements in 
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South-Eastern Europe). Besides these permanent collaborations, one remarks 
some ad hoc alliances, grouping states having similar interests on special matters. 
One thinks in particular inside the EU about the alliance of neutral states on 
security and defence issues, the alliance of the so-called “cohesion countries” 
(Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland), the alliance of small states as well as the 
alliance of the net contributors (the biggest being Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Sweden). And more generally, some states shift alliances 
occasionally to better defend their interest, as is shown for instance by the UK 
which relies sometimes on Italy or even Denmark to counterbalance the Franco-
German tandem. (Schnapper, 1999: 150-157) 
 
 
c. The European Union as a Genuine “Non-State” Great Power 
 
At this point, one should question the possibility of the EU, driven by a 
Franco-German driving force, to become a genuine “non-state” great power, with 
its own interests and own geopolitical area. According to the neo-realist theorist 
Kenneth Waltz, a great power only achieves that status if it fulfils the five 
following criteria: population and territory; economic capability; political stability 
and competence; military strength. (Waltz, 1979: 131) While the EU indisputably 
fulfils the first four criteria, one questions if it also meets the fifth criterion, that 
is, military strength. Military strength entails both great military capabilities and a 
unified foreign policy. (Gibbs, September 2000: 1-2; Andreatta, 2005: 33) «Since 
foreign policy can – ultimately – lead to the use of force, no real foreign policy 
can be worthy of the name unless it has a military component.» (Andreatta, 2005: 
33) (See also Allen, 1998: 42) Accordingly, the EU would need both great 
military capabilities and a unified foreign policy, which together would permit the 
Union to consistently produce a single policy position with a credible and 
effective political capacity to decide when and how to use its military capabilities. 
It has always until recently been generally deemed that the EU per se did not have 
great military capabilities and no unified foreign policy. For instance, the fact that 
the EU does not act as one in the UN Security Council is a rather eloquent 
example of the EU’s lack of a unified foreign policy; still, there is undeniable 
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evidence that the voting cohesion of EU member states has drastically grown 
within the UN in the 1990s and 2000s. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 396)  
 
According to Kenneth Waltz’ criteria, the EU consequently failed to be a 
great power. It is therefore not a surprise that in 2000 Kenneth Waltz suggested 
that the European Union will not become a great power unless it undertakes 
radical change. Being dubious about that prospect, Waltz consequently reckoned 
the likelihood of the EU becoming a great power as quite remote. (Waltz, 2000: 
31-32; Andreatta, 2005: 25) 
 
Yet, there have been in the last years – especially since the St.Malo 
impetus of December 1998 – rapid progresses made in the area of security and 
defence, notably at the European Council in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999, in 
Nice in 2000 as well as with the adoption of the European Constitution at the 
European Council in June 2004. Already, given that the EU is served by nuclear 
deterrence through France and the UK as well as for its greatest part via NATO, 
one can consider that the creation of the RRF in May 2003 provides sufficient and 
requisite military capabilities for the EU to efficiently protect its security and 
support its diplomacy. From this point of view, Kenneth Waltz’s criterion of 
military strength is fulfilled as regards its first component, that is, great military 
capabilities. 
 
However, it seems as though the European states can still improve the 
efficiency of their military capabilities. The EU Fifteen’s defence spending 
amounted in 2003 up to almost US $ 200 billion on defence447. This represents on 
the one hand a bit less than half of the defence budget of the United States (US $ 
405 billion) for that year, but on the other hand more than three times the 2003 
defence budget of the second biggest military spender, i.e. Russia (US $ 65 billion 
spendings), and still more than that of the five next biggest spenders put together, 
namely Russia, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia and India (US $ 198 billion). If one 
refers to the current EU Twenty-five, the total of the defence spendings for the 25 
EU member states slightly rises for 2003 to US $ 208 billion, which represents 
about a quarter of the 2003 global military expenditures. In accordance with these 
figures, it appears that «it is not necessarily greater spending that is required, as is 
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so often asserted. Wiser spending would certainly help.» (Howórth, 2005: 188) 
Besides, it is interesting to note that the three major countries in the EU – namely 
France, Germany and the UK – together spend 60% of the combined defence 
budgets of the EU Twenty-Five. (Howórth, 2005: 188) 
 
Yet, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (especially during the 
Bosnian and the Kosovo Wars) and the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the 2000s clearly illustrate that there were still areas and ways in which only the 
United States had the capacity to act. This assertion applies particularly to 
situations involving the rapid mobilisation of major military assets, as it was the 
case in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. (M. Smith, 2006: 298; Howórth, 
2005: 191; Hill and Smith, 2005: 402) In the former case, it was NATO and the 
United States which proved to be the only viable means of collective action, 
whilst in the two latter cases, the EU was to all intents and purposes bypassed by 
the USA and even to some extent by key EU member states such as the UK. (M. 
Smith, 2006: 298) The Union could merely console itself with the evidence of its 
capacity to effectively manage post-conflict stabilisation processes, as was the 
case in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Afghanistan. (M. Smith, 2006: 299; Hill and Smith, 2005: 402) 
 
In other words, despite surprisingly rapid progress since the late 1990s, 
«there is still a long way to go in terms of coordination, spending, and 
technological advance before the Union can attain a level of coordinated and 
autonomous military strength which is consonant with its size and wealth.» (Hill 
and Smith, 2005: 402) 
 
These observations somewhat qualify the assertion that Kenneth Waltz’s 
criterion of military strength is fulfilled as regards its first component, that is, 
great military capabilities. 
 
As for the second component of this criterion, i.e. a unified foreign policy, 
the treaties on which the EU is based do so far not provide a genuine unified 
foreign policy for the EU. Indeed, despite sanctioning the build-up of the ESDP, 
the Nice Treaty did not provide the sufficient progress so as to assert that the EU 
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possesses a unified foreign policy. Such a unified foreign policy, also labelled 
common European foreign policy, can broadly been defined as «the attempt of the 
European Union and its member states to ensure that their many and various 
external relations present as coherent a face as possible to the outside world.» 
(Andreatta, 2005: 19) 
 
Before analysing the measures permitting the EU to approach such a 
unified foreign policy, one should have a glimpse at some effective EU presence 
and action on the international scene. The Union already has some influence on 
the international arena, as continued EU action in such diverse places as Darfur, 
the Congolese-Rwanda border and Ukraine as well as its increasingly effective 
presence in the Balkans illustrates. Moreover, it decisively acted upon important 
‘security’ issues, such as the carrot and stick policy towards Libya, which 
eventually enabled Colonel Ghaddafi to come in from the cold, or the support by 
the EU to the Ukrainian opposition in early December 2004, which contributed 
greatly to achieve a re-run of the contested elections in that country. (Hill and 
Smith, 2005: 403) 
 
Through these examples, one can observe that the EU endeavours both to 
keep influence in its traditional spheres of influence and to set up new ones. The 
former colonies as well as overseas territories of the EU member states – 
especially on the African continent (most notably the Mediterranean region) and 
in the Middle East (yet again most particularly the Mediterranean region), but also 
in the Caribbean and the Pacific – are certainly part of the Union’s traditional 
spheres of influence448. Thus, through well-institutionalised frameworks, the 
Union has established intense relations with these regions. Among these 
institutionalised frameworks, one should in particular mention the cooperation 
with the ACP countries and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The latter has 
very ambitious objectives, but did so far not completely meet the expectations. 
«While the economic dimension has been foremost, it has not provided the 
expected leverage in other fields.» (Edwards, 2005: 45). The security dimension 
has done little progress, with the Arab-Israeli conflict (and to a lesser extent the 
Western Sahara conflict) repeatedly impeding progress. The Arab-Israeli conflict 
caused considerable problems, as it proved to be rarely separable and was 
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frequently to the fore, with Lebanon and Syria often not attending meetings so as 
to demonstrate their opposition to Israeli policy. It thus seems as though the 
deadlock in the Arab-Israeli peace process has reduced the prospects for progress 
in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.449 (Edwards, 2005: 45; Alecu de Flers and 
Regelsberger, 2005: 330-331; K. Smith, 2003: 76; Beurdeley, Octobre-Novembre 
2005: 575)  
 
As for the spheres of influence “taken over” by the EU more recently, one 
distinguishes the Balkans, Eastern Europe450 and some former Soviet Republics. 
The current enlargement process has permitted the EU to expand eastwards so as 
to encompass by 2007-2008 all the former Soviet satellite states – except the 
states from the Western Balkans – and the three Baltic states, which were part of 
the Soviet Union. As far as the Balkans are concerned, it had quickly been 
considered – following the fall of the Berlin Wall – to be part of the EC’s/EU’s 
sphere of influence. Consequently, there was no doubt for the Europeans that it 
was the task of the EC/EU to handle the problem of Yugoslavia’s collapse. 
Despite its failure to successfully resolve that problem and although it played little 
role in the Bosnian, Albanian and Kosovo crises, the EU has eventually (with the 
end of the Kosovo War) retaken matters into its own hands in that region. The 
prospect of EU membership – entailed in the Stabilisation and Association 
Process – has since been an integral part in the reconstruction objectives in the 
Balkans. (Edwards, 2005: 47-48; K. Smith, 2005: 284-285) Besides the Balkan 
states, there are other countries having remained under Soviet/Russian influence 
for some time that are gradually more intensively looking towards the European 
Union and that the latter would be keen to see evolving within its sphere of 
influence. One thinks especially about Ukraine, to some degree also about 
Moldova. Moreover, the Eastern EU member states are eager to have the three 
Caucasian states (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) involved451 in a way or 
another. In that optic, the European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP] – aiming at 
creating a “ring of friends” from the Arctic Circle to the Sahara – represents a 
relevant and appropriate tool so as to include the Union’s fundamental spheres of 
influence within a broader security arrangement centred around the EU. 
(Edwards, 2005: 47-48; Grazulis, 2005: 310-312) One has to notice however that 
the EU’s eastern neighbours on the one side and the southern Mediterranean rim 
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on the other constitute two different kinds of neighbourhoods, both strategically 
and geographically. (Missiroli, September 2003: 26) 
 
In addition, the European Union seeks to enhance its influence in Asia and 
Latin America. It has thus established several partnerships and dialogues with 
these regions. In Asia, the EU has developed relations with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]452 and set up the broader Asia-Europe 
Meeting [ASEM]453, which includes political, security, economic and cultural 
aspects. It seems as the EU-ASEAN relations have somewhat diminished in 
intensity since 1996 and increasingly compete with the new, much broader and 
more dynamic interregional dialogue, that is, the ASEM. As for Latin America, a 
traditional zone of influence of the United States454, the EU has rather recently set 
up a series of relationship, notably with the Andean Community455 (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), the Central American states456, the Rio 
Group457 and more significantly with the Mercosur458 countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). Moreover, a strategic partnership between the EU 
and Latin America and the Caribbean – including political, economic and cultural 
aspects – has been established with regular summits taking place. It is worthwhile 
to notice that both the EU and Latin America have a joint interest in trying to 
counterbalance, to some degree, the strong US influence in the region. (Alecu de 
Flers and Regelsberger, 2005: 331-335) 
 
Let us now analyse which are the central measures to be taken to approach 
a genuine EU foreign policy. In order to develop such a unified foreign policy, the 
EU should provide the CFSP with an authoritative representative and reduce 
unanimity voting on CFSP matters. Accordingly, one can question whether the 
European Constitution entails provisions which would bring the EU closer to 
these objectives. Concerning the qualified majority, on the one hand, although 
extending in some areas the scope of qualified majority, the European 
Constitution stipulates – like the previous EU treaties – that a unanimous vote is 
still required for the most part in decision-making on CFSP matters. (Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.III-300) On the other 
hand, still concerning the qualified majority, the Constitution brings 
improvements, since it permits the European Council to adopt a European 
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decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority in the area or in the 
case, where the European Constitution has in its text provided for the Council to 
act by unanimity. (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: 
Art.IV-444 (1)) Nevertheless, the Constitution emphasizes that this provision 
shall not apply to decisions with military implications or those in the area of 
defence.459 Still, this implies that qualified majority could possibly apply to those 
CFSP matters having no military implications and not being in the area of 
defence. Moreover, one has to emphasize that even in the area of defence the 
strict unanimity rule is partially broken. Indeed, besides the already existing 
‘constructive abstention’ (since the Amsterdam Treaty), the European 
Constitution entails five additional policy arrangements for closer cooperation in 
the ESDP area, permitting thus some member states to integrate further on 
security and defence issues. Concerning the EU’s authoritative representative, the 
Constitution also brings improvements. It institutes a President of the European 
Council – chairing the European Council, established on that occasion as an 
institution distinct from the Council – and in particular an EU Minister for 
Foreign Affairs.460 As far as the President of the European Council is concerned, 
appointed for a period of two and a half years, he «shall at his or her level and in 
that capacity ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning 
its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, 25 June 2004: ArtI-22 (2)) 461 The President of the European Council has 
limited powers and will certainly not bring about as much as the EU Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. The latter, regarded as the main institutional innovation of the 
European Constitution, will be responsible for the representation of the Union on 
the international arena. The creation of the post of EU Minister for Foreign 
Affairs strengthens the Union’s role on the international scene in all areas, most 
notably in the CFSP.462 Critics however point out that the EU Minister for Foreign 
Affairs would remain the servant of the Council and the EU member states. 
(Edwards, 2005: 43) 
 
In summary, it is in particular the creation of the post of Union Minister 
for Foreign Affairs – with the task of developing mutual confidence –, combined 
with the European reflex of the EU member states, that resolutely strengthens the 
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Union’s role in world affairs in all areas. Moreover, the possibility of providing 
more ways for the EU member states to cooperate more closely in the field of 
defence will underpin the credibility of the Union’s foreign policy. 
 
Consequently, one can consider that the European Constitution entails 
decisive progress for the EU in having a credible foreign policy. The 
implementation of its relevant provisions would thus permit the Union to fulfil the 
second component of Kenneth Waltz’ fifth criterion. Therefore, on the assumption 
that the EU fulfils with the RRF its first component – i.e. sufficient military 
capabilities –, the implementation of the relevant provisions of the European 
Constitution would provide the theoretical basis for the EU to effectively also 
fulfil Kenneth Waltz’ fifth criterion of military strength. One should note, 
however, that in the opinion of Kenneth Waltz the EU has to become a state in 
order to have a unified foreign policy required of a great power and, according to 
Christopher Hill, the EU would ultimately have to become a federation in order to 
equal the foreign policy of a state. (Waltz, Fall 1993: 52; Hill, September 1993: 
316) Nonetheless, some analysts deem that the EU could be considered as a “non-
state” great power, as soon as the criterion of a unified foreign policy is fulfilled. 
(Gibbs, September 2000: 2; Wessels: 143-144) Some observe that despite the 
hybrid nature of the EU project that places it outside conventional forms of 
political actorness, the leaders of the Union – by embracing miniaturization – are 
conforming the EU to a conventional state model for dealing with security. 
(Treacher, Spring 2004: 66)  
 
As a result, and still on the assumption that the EU has sufficient military 
capabilities, the EU would, as soon as it fulfils the criterion of a unified foreign 
policy, effectively act as a sui generis “non-state” great power, potentially even 
retaining widely an intergovernmental system. One has to admit that there is great 
optimism amongst the Europeanists463 to soon have a genuine and well-
functioning CFSP/ESDP for the EU, but one still has to expect the further 
developments to see if the Union and its member states will in fact jump at the 
opportunity so as to give the EU the status of a genuine “non-state” great power.  
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But, as we have already noticed, the assumption that the EU has sufficient 
military capabilities is not yet undisputed. It is even a very controversial issue. As 
far as its unified foreign policy is concerned, the European Constitution                
– bringing decisive progress on the matter – is not about to enter into force, given 
its rejection by France and the Netherlands (through a referendum, respectively in 
May and June 2005). Yet, the process of ratification464 has not been abandoned 
and many European leaders – such as Angela Merkel – are willing to see the 
European Constitution eventually entering into force. Moreover, one has to note 
that some of its provisions are (and will be) implemented anyway; one thinks 
especially about the creation of the EDA. Besides, the European Constitution 
provides an important guide to where future policies might head. (Smith,       
2006: 291) 
 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the EU is already an economic 
superpower. Not only because of its weight in world trade, of the increasing 
strength and importance of its common currency and its sheer size and wealth, but 
also because it seeks changes in Third World regimes through political 
conditionality linked to their development policy and because of its leverage on 
those states in its orbit which wish for accession or at least special relationships. 
(Hill and Smith, 2005: 402; Edwards, 2005: 41, 44) As a result, one can certainly 
regard the Union as being a superpower when the power considered is limited to 
power coming from economic means. In other words, one can definitely consider 
the EU as a civilian superpower. (Edwards, 2005: 53) 
 
But, as we have just mentioned, one still has to question the EU’s status as 
a military power. Thus, as far as power coming from military means is concerned, 
we have to question whether it is likely to see the Europeans states cooperating in 
the very sensitive field of security and defence to eventually provide the EU with 
an effective common foreign policy as well as an effective security and defence 
policy. 
 
Tensions will certainly continue to exist about the question whether to 
continue to consider the EU as a mere civilian power or whether the nature and 
scope of the CFSP/ESDP are gradually – though slowly – transforming the EU 
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also into a military power. (Edwards, 2005: 60) Some observers of international 
politics – like Robert Kagan – have doubts about the possibility of the EU to 
assume a larger role on the international arena, because they think that the 
political will of the European leaders to actually demand more power for Europe 
is lacking, given that the genuine mission of the EU is to oppose power. Robert 
Kagan believes that the ambition for European “power” is «inconsistent with the 
ideals of postmodern Europe, whose very existence depends on the rejection of 
power politics465. Whatever its architects may have intended, European 
integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power and, indeed, 
of an important European global role.» (Kagan, June/July 2002: 13) In that optic, 
the EU’s emphasis on conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation process 
management seems to offer an escape-route from the dilemma it faces, that is, the 
question of whether it should «attempt to develop its capabilities according to 
conventional definitions of power, including the military element, when this 
might put a risk the very (irenic) values which Europe has come to stand for in 
international relations.» (Hill and Smith, 2005: 403) Robert Kagan notes further 
that «it is revealing that the argument most often advanced by Europeans for 
augmenting their military strength these days is not that it will allow Europe to 
expand its strategic purview. It is merely to rein in and “multilateralize” the 
United States466.» (Kagan, June/July 2002: 14) According to him, Europeans are 
not teaming up against the US hegemon by creating a countervailing power          
– because after all they do not increase their power –, but they simply hope to 
constrain US hegemon power without wielding power themselves. (Kagan, 
June/July 2002: 7) Defensive neo-realist theorists could reply to those critics that 
since the fundamental aim of the European member states is not to maximize 
power but security, the European leaders will overcome their “power complex” 
and – for the sake of achieving maximal and mutual security – will strongly 
cooperate in the fields of security and defence.467  
 
It is true that an analysis based upon defensive neo-realist assumptions 
allows us to assert that cooperation is likely to happen under some circumstances. 
Although agreeing that anarchy creates a self-help system where competition is 
inherent, defensive neo-realists do not believe that it necessarily induces states to 
have aggressive intentions. Instead, they argue that states can achieve their 
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security interests by cooperating with other states. According to defensive neo-
realist theorists, the conditions to be met for states to cooperate in order to achieve 
mutual security are the following: the intentions of the states have to be 
transparent; their gains from cheating have to be low; mutual cooperation has to 
be more beneficial than defection; strategies of reciprocity have to be adopted 
between states. (Jervis, Summer 1999: 52) Moreover, states facing each other in a 
security dilemma have to be status quo oriented powers. According to defensive 
neo-realists, institutions can play a key role in supporting that cooperation by 
providing favourable circumstances to meet those conditions468. 
 
The cooperation within the EU member states as well as the role of the EU 
institutions provides admirable examples of this analysis based upon defensive 
neo-realist assumptions. The EU is not only composed of status quo oriented 
states, but the EU institutions also provide transparency and strategies of 
reciprocity as well as very low gains from cheating and more benefits from 
cooperation than defection (that is, an EU member state would not easily take the 
risk of cheating, for fear of potential retaliations and of losing later benefits 
stemming from the cooperation). Furthermore, the EU institutions provide an 
array of fora, allowing communication between its member states to happen at 
several levels. Even though one considers these institutions to not have (yet) taken 
a life of their own and to still depend on the states that have founded them469, they 
play a key role in the cooperation between the EU member states, which in turn 
largely rely upon them both for achieved and for further cooperation. In that optic, 
the level of trust which has been achieved between EU member states is eloquent. 
(Hill and Smith, 2005: 398) For all these reasons, defensive neo-realist 
assumptions can easily explain that the EU member states have deliberately 
chosen to cooperate so as to generate mutual security, given that they consider 
cooperation to be the best means to maximize security. Even concerns about 
relative gains have not restricted that cooperation. This can be explained as 
follows. One can certainly deem that some member states of the EU – as for 
instance France or the United Kingdom – could be worse off by cooperating in the 
fields of security and defence with the other EU partner states, because the latter 
would become relatively more powerful, meaning that they would have a relative 
advantage vis-à-vis France and the UK. However, although France and the UK 
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may be relatively worse off, both are better off in relation to all extra-EU states. 
This has as a consequence that cooperation would occur even then. (Gibbs, 
September 2000: 35-36) 
 
Yet, it remains to be seen if the security cooperation would go so far as to 
endow the EU with efficient policies in the common foreign policy area as well as 
in the area of security and defence. On its way, the EU faces numerous obstacles, 
such as those stemming from the enlargement process, the complex nature of EU 
integration and the protection of its diversity. In addition, third states (notably 
Russia), considering their interests to be threatened by growing EU power, will 
undoubtedly defend their interests by at least playing on internal divisions inside 
the Union (which will become more easy in an increasingly large and diverse 
Union). (Hill and Smith, 2005: 406) It is precisely these divisions and 
disagreements among EU member states – particularly concerning the EU’s 
desirability to become a great power – which certainly constitute the major 
obstacle. 
 
This leads us to the question of which European states would eventually be 
on board to actually and fully get involved in such policies. It could be that all the 
European member states participate fully in the creation of a genuine and fairly 
homogeneous European geopolitical area, axed around a Franco-German(-British) 
axis (triangle). But it could also be that not all of them participate, either because 
they are not willing to (one can imagine the UK, Denmark, Sweden or other so-
called “non-aligned” states, or even Poland470, to be in this category) or not able 
to (this could be the case of Greece and many CEECs). So, one would in the long-
term maybe end up with a “multi-speed Europe” or “a variable geometry Europe”, 
with the founding members (France, Germany, the Benelux states and Italy) and 
maybe some other states (for instance Spain or the Czech Republic) forming the 
most integrated group, notably in the fields of security and defence. This would 
allow France and Germany as well as the other willing and able states to go 
further, while paradoxically permitting the EU member states to generally rely 
less on the Franco-German engine. (Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 74; Frisch, 
Octobre-Novembre-Décembre 2003: 49) A breach in this direction has already 
been made with the mechanism of enhanced cooperation, which allows a group of 
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countries to delve deeper into integration. As we have already noticed, the 
mechanism of enhanced cooperation – supported by both Paris and Berlin – is 
included in the treaty of Nice, and would be overhauled if and once the 
Constitution for Europe enters into force. 
 
Anyway, when the criterion of military strength (entailing both sufficient 
military capabilities and a unified foreign policy) would be fulfilled either for the 
EU as a whole or in form of an enhanced cooperation, one could consider the 
Union – seen through a defensive neo-realist prism – as having the potential to act 
as a great power, though not in the form of a traditional state. 
 
Yet, there remains a problem of legitimacy with which one must deal. 
Despite the attempts to provide mutual defence and solidarity clauses and more 
clarity over who is responsible for the representation of the Union on the 
international arena, «there remains a lack of certainty about the sources of action 
– and consequently a lack of legitimacy, particularly if the use of force is 
envisaged.» (Edwards, 2005: 62) 
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The hypothesis that in post-Cold War Europe, security and defence 
concerns continue to induce the states to form spheres of influence has largely 
been demonstrated. Backed by neo-realist assumptions, the paper has given 
evidence that the states, especially the great powers, are aiming at asserting their 
respective geopolitical area, by seeking to defend their national interest. 
Moreover, by basing its analysis primarily on the defensive variant of neo-
realism, the paper also focused on the possibilities of cooperation. 
 
To apprehend the hypothesis, the paper has subsequently analysed the 
European security system – by focusing on its evolution, its parameters and its 
institutional actors –, the dynamics of the changing geopolitical face of post-Cold 
War Europe, by concentrating notably on the issue of the eastwards enlargements 
of the Western alliances, and the spheres of influence as well as the potential 
coalitions emerging or likely to appear between states in that post-Cold War 
Europe. In other words, having taken into consideration the – essentially    
security – interests and preferences of the different actors of post-Cold War 
Europe as well as the dynamics of their interactions, the paper has aimed at 
figuring out the diverse geopolitical areas in Europe and the potential coalitions 
emerging or likely to appear between states. A neo-realist emphasis on the 
interests and preferences of the actors, being first and foremost the states, has 
indeed been laid. The further emphasis on the defensive variant of neo-realism 
has brought us to consider cooperation. Asserting that security is the fundamental 
aim – and number one preference – of states and that states do not seek to 
maximize power in order to achieve security, defensive neo-realists argue that 
states can achieve their security interests by cooperating with other states, either 
within international institutions or on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis. The EU 
is certainly the most egregiously example of such cooperation. 
 
In other words, geopolitical interests – involving economic, cultural, 
historical, political and especially security concerns – lead the states to care for 
their zone of influence. At the same time, economic, cultural, political and above 
all security concerns lead the states to cooperate. Security being the underlying 
aim of states, security concerns are the most important motive for states to assert 
their zone of influence, unilaterally or through cooperation. It is in that context 
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that one can perceive the importance of security institutions, regional 
collaborations and security coalitions between states. One can thus understand in 
the geopolitical evolving and unifying post-Cold War Europe the important role 
played by such security institutions as NATO and the EU with its CFSP/ESDP or 
to a lesser extent the OSCE as well as the existence and potential formation of 
diverse geopolitical coalitions between European states. 
 
It seems thus that defensive neo-realism is a very appropriate theoretical 
approach to analyse the fundamental interests and preferences of the states in 
Europe, while simultaneously taking into consideration state cooperation within 
the diverse security institutions, most notably the EU with its CFSP/ESDP. 
Moreover, one has to add that the emphasis on neo-realist assumptions has so far 
been broadly neglected when it came to the analysis of the European security 
architecture and the cooperation of EU member states in the field of security and 
defence. 
 
But, the use of diverse variants of neo-realism, such as defensive neo-
realism, has also been met with criticism. It has been argued that the diverse 
adjustments – often friendly amendments – to correct perceived realist and 
neorealist shortcomings risk being transformed into substitute motions, which, if 
accepted, would threaten the realist-neorealist research project. (Kolodziej, 2005: 
140, 143-44) Those amended variants of neo-realism have even prompted critics 
to wonder whether “anybody today is a realist”. (Legro and Moravcsik, Fall 1999: 
5-55; Kolodziej, 2005: 140) 
 
Yet, the aim of the thesis is precisely to apply neo-realism, in taking its 
defensive variant, to try to comprehend that the European states have spheres of 
influence. So, the thesis has provided evidence that major European states – such 
as France, Germany and the UK but also Russia and Turkey – endeavour to 
maintain their respective sphere of influence. As noted, in order to assert their 
sphere of influence and increase their security, these states cooperate on a 
bilateral basis and within international institutions. Their participation in 
international agreements and institutions permits them to increase their influence 
and security. 
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Nonetheless, given the central role played by the EU – which is the most 
striking example of cooperation between states –, the EU member states are 
facing some ambiguity when it comes to their foreign policies and to the 
geopolitical interests they aim to defend. Being members of the EU, the ambiguity 
comes from their loyalty towards the Union and what it stands for, while at the 
same time taking great care of their national geopolitical interest. 
 
On the one hand, in the way states use international institutions as a means 
to increase their security and influence, the EU member states – especially the 
major ones – tend to manipulate the EU to their distinguished advantage. This 
phenomenon occurs more particularly in the EU than in other international 
institutions. France and the UK are notably good examples. Limited by its relative 
lack of power to compete with other great powers, France has sought to use the 
EU to maximize its security and defence as well as its influence, notably by 
constraining German power. The swing in its relations with NATO also 
demonstrate Paris’ search for a position best serving its security and influence. As 
for the UK, this quest is best revealed by its systematic vacillation between further 
integration within the EU and further consolidation of its special relationship with 
the United States. Moreover, both countries tend to regard the CFSP as an 
instrument of their own national foreign policies. (Edwards, 2005: 59) 
 
But, on the other hand, given the fact that the EU’s great powers are 
gradually pushing for more integration within the Union, the EU member states 
are increasingly underpinning the EU’s genuine status as an international actor in 
its own right and with its own sphere of influence. So, although not yet being a 
unified state actor with identifiable ‘European interests’ (Wong, 2005: 141), the 
EU reinforces its influence in its immediate neighbourhood – actually 
representing its major sphere of influence – notably by ‘europeanising471’ it 
through its different policies and partnerships. 
 
This explains to a large extent the ambiguity existing time and again 
between the foreign policy and geopolitical interests of the EU and its member 
states. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 390) Yet, one assumes generally that the EU has its 
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own sphere of influence, inside which its member states look out for their own 
sphere. 
 
On the old continent, it seems as though only Russia truly confronts the 
EU’s sphere of influence with its own one. In that respect, Ukraine appears to be a 
key state, as it sways in between. As for Turkey, it sways also, but only between 
the EU’s sphere of influence and the willingness to build its own one. 
 
At present, let us concentrate on the more detailed and in depth 
conclusions of the paper. 
 
One can speak between 1945 and 1989 of a European security system 
defined primarily by what the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet 
Union – imposed on it. The two blocs held firm for more than four decades, 
having as a consequence that Europe saw – with a few exceptions – a suspension 
of the indigenous security dynamics on its continent during the period of the Cold 
War. 
 
However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing end of the 
bipolar world order, the upper hand in European affairs was increasingly the 
prerogative of the European states themselves, rather than the two superpowers, 
as used to be the case in the era of the Cold War. As a result, Europe recovered its 
central political role in the international system, on the one side through the 
developments adopted by the EC – which had already begun to build a common 
peaceful future for Europe, in spite of divergences caused by the question of 
common defence policy – and on the other through the opening up of the Berlin 
Wall.  
 
The post-Cold War order – constituted by a very dense layer of 
overlapping organizations and institutions – brought its share of new challenges 
and regular debates about the evolving European security architecture.  
 
As far as the new challenges are concerned, one can distinguish three 
dimensions of security policy within which one should identify the different 
 307
sources of insecurity in Europe. The first, the traditional one, concerns the 
defence of a nation state’s territory – or of a group of states – from a clearly 
identified external military threat. This threat can take the form of a state or nation 
– coming from inside Europe, from its periphery or clearly outside it – that would 
become so potent in Europe so as to dominate all the others, a peripheral state that 
would be in the position to threaten Europe with long-range missiles or even 
‘anti-imperialist blockades’ or outbreaks of ‘economic nationalism’. The second 
dimension focuses on non-territorial security threats – as ethnic conflicts, 
international crime and international terrorism in all its diverse forms – and poses 
the question of the legitimacy of using military means in situations which are not 
concerned with defending national territory. The third dimension – referring to 
security challenges that affect humanity as a whole – points to social, economic 
and financial imbalances to demographic problems, environmental degradation, 
protection of human rights as well as humanitarian crises as larger security 
challenges than military threats. Given the large amount of diffuse risks existing 
in post-Cold War Europe, the tendency in the European security agenda has been 
to move away from the first dimension of territorial defence and towards the third 
dimension of an enlarged security concept. The Petersberg declaration of the 
WEU – later incorporated in the European Union’s definition of its 
responsibilities in security and defence – is a good example of the new 
formulation of security policy in Europe, as it takes into account the new security 
agenda, in declaring ‘soft security’ issues as important security tasks as military 
matters.  
 
In addition, one has to note that this led to a rethinking of the concept of 
security, notably through the approach of the Copenhagen school which 
introduced the notion of societal security, where survival of the society is a 
question of identity, in distinction with the notion of state security, where survival 
of the state is a question of sovereignty. This approach had as a result to widen the 
security agenda – in relieving the ties that by definition bind the study of security 
to the state as – but gave also rise to a few criticisms. 
 
Moreover, the intertwining in Europe – especially at a EU level – of 
economic welfare matters with matters of national or European security became 
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increasingly more apparent, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
With the geopolitical change in post-Cold War Europe came the disappearing 
within the EU of the functional division between civilian and security agendas. 
(M. Smith, 2006: 296) This is notably shown by the behaviour of states, which 
increasingly take into consideration human rights issues. In accordance with 
defensive neo-realists’ assumptions, the states consider human rights issues, but 
only as far as it is not incompatible with their security interests. Security and 
geopolitical interests remain indeed essential. 
 
As for the European security architecture, one observes that the post-Cold 
War period is still – more than a decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain – 
dominated by European security debates. Amongst the Atlanticists or the pro-
NATO countries, one has to count first of all the USA (which goes without 
saying) and the United Kingdom – despite its U-turn at St.Malo and its 
consequently ambiguous position resulting into a continued Atlanticist orientation 
nicked with European predispositions –, but also the Netherlands. The Atlanticists 
emphasize the need to preserve the primacy of NATO. Membership in NATO 
was for these states – to which one could also add Portugal and Denmark as well 
as the non-EU members Norway and Iceland – an efficient means to obtain 
territorial defence. The large majority of the CEECs also considers NATO as the 
most efficient means to obtain this security objective, especially taking into 
account their willingness to assert their independence from Russia’s zone of 
influence. Moreover, one should note that, according to the author Professor 
Jolyon Howórth, the UK and other Atlanticists seem to have accepted the 
necessity of establishing the ESDP as the price to save the Atlantic Alliance. 
(Bono, February 2002: 8) In contrast, amongst the Europeanists, one finds 
especially France and Belgium, but countries like Spain and Italy could also be 
habitually put under this description. Concerning France, one should underline 
that its ideas of the European security architecture have been a projection of its 
national objectives – first of all the pursuit and aura of national grandeur as well 
as an elevated global rang (or standing) – on a larger scale, thus trying with 
varying fortunes to manipulate its position to its distinguished advantage. But, the 
long-standing goal of French leaders to develop a Europe that is more 
independent of US influence has always been present, resulting in a key dilemma 
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for France, namely its efforts to reconcile the Gaullist legacy of preserving 
national autonomy with an ever increasing commitment to European integration 
and France’s growing role in the integrated defence and security architecture of 
Europe. As for the particular case of Germany, one can position Germany 
somewhere between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists, yet somewhat closer to 
the former. Wishing on the one hand to develop – with its most important partner, 
France – an independent European defence and security policy permitting them to 
act together as Europeans and because such a framework would offer it the 
opportunity of meeting new military responsibilities – not only on a national 
basis, but within broader European parameters –, Germany on the other hand still 
bases its security policy primarily on the Atlantic Alliance (Guillen, 1996: 199; 
Mahncke, September 1993: 2). Finally, as to Europe’s neutral or the so-called 
“non-aligned” states, they are re-evaluating the role they should play in the 
changing European security setting, but remain so far sceptical to commit 
themselves to any military structure, even though a less reluctant approach 
towards a European external military identity has been observed in the last years 
in their stance. 
 
It seemed for a long time that a NATO centred security system as favoured 
by the Atlanticists has emerged in post-Cold War Europe. Indeed, as well the 
1994 creation of the CJTF – separable but not separate from NATO structures –, 
the 1996 decision to establish an ESDI inside the framework of NATO as well as 
the first assessments of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty – considered as giving only 
secondary importance to the issue of defence – were all considered as victories for 
the Atlanticists in the struggle over the development of security structures in 
Europe. Furthermore, it looked like NATO was far more efficient in redefining its 
role and its organizational structure in the early post-Cold War years than the EU. 
Consequently, expectations about the disintegration of NATO after the ‘loss’ of 
its enemy did not come true. Yet, NATO had no real role anymore, except to 
spread stability eastwards, the enlargement of the organization remaining thus the 
only way of giving the Atlantic Alliance a task for the future. 
 
The EU had more difficulties in adapting to post-Cold War Europe, while 
the US-British idea privileging NATO emerged victorious around 1993-1994. 
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Some of the Franco-Belgian momentum to develop European security structures 
with a real defence arm of the EU was caught up in the Maastricht process, as it 
gave in 1993 a CFSP to the newly established European Union. The Maastricht 
Treaty and the following Amsterdam one were considered as a compromise 
between Europeanists and Atlanticists, as it allowed the rhetoric of greater 
Europeanisation without threatening transatlantic structures, but at the same time 
interpreted as not going far enough on the issue of European defence. In addition, 
France’s announcement in December 1995 to seek closer relations with NATO’s 
integrated military structure did not seem to help the Europeanists. 
 
Yet, a series of significant events occurred before the end of the century 
which boosted the European defence project. Amongst these events, one should 
notably mention the St.Malo declaration of December 1998 – which was a 
delicate compromise between French desires to give a boost to the profile of the 
EU and British concerns that any increase of European defence capabilities 
should occur under the umbrella of the Atlantic Alliance 472 –, the creation in 
1999 of the ESDP as well as the decision taken by the EU – in December 1999 in 
Helsinki – to incorporate the WEU in the Union as well as the nomination of a 
High Representative for the CFSP and ESDP in October 1999 in the person of 
Javier Solana Madariaga. The recent boost given to the European defence project 
did not suffer on a permanent basis from the divisions amongst the European 
States about participating or not in the anti-terrorism Coalition’s intervention in 
Iraq, although it put the Union’s unity under major pressure, jeopardizing even for 
some time the acquis of the CFSP and the ESDP. The fact that the CFSP/ESDP 
did not suffer from these events is shown by the fact that some rapid progress was 
completed at the end of 2003 and in 2004, notably with the EU starting to put the 
ESDP into practice and the perspective of the ratification of the Constitution for 
Europe473. 
 
Some observers of international affairs expect that this impetus                  
– particularly the creation of the ESDP – will not mean a shift away from NATO 
and transatlanticism, but may reinforce the partnership between Europe’s two 
major institutions, namely NATO and the EU; a partnership «in which NATO’s 
military prowess, and the EU’s skills in humanitarian issues is one in which 
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Europeans may be able to play a primary role in alleviating crises on the 
continent.» (Croft, Autumn 2000: 16) The emergence of a transatlantic 
understanding is also seen as compromise between NATO, having to rely on the 
production of a considerable European military capability, and the EU, that still 
needs the defence industrial base provided by NATO. (Bono, February 2002: 8) 
This seems conceivable notably thanks to the new Franco-British understanding, 
the UK and France having come to the conclusion that cooperation with each 
country’s former bête noire (European defence for the UK and NATO for France) 
is henceforth in their own national interests. (Hodge, 2002: 161; Howórth, 2000: 
34) Besides the political will which appeared at St.Malo, the emergence of a 
transatlantic understanding and the UK commitment behind the ESDP project, 
some authors of world affairs also highlight the impact of the 1999 Kosovo crisis 
on EU policy makers (especially the French and British leaders) – frustrated about 
the extent of EU’s lack of political voice and military capabilities demonstrated 
by the Kosovo War – as key factors of the development of ESDP. (Bono, 
February 2002: 8; Rutten, May 2001: ix) 
 
Further, one has to note that many observers of international politics are of 
the opinion that NATO’s ESDI has to be overtaken by EU’s ESDP.474 It is thus 
not surprising that many European governments hold the view that the EU «is 
legally, institutionally, and politically much more in the areas of security and 
defense than the European pillar of NATO». (Hodge, 2002: 77) There is a 
tendency to consider simply the ESDP as a compromise amongst the European 
capitals to allow NATO to survive by linking its military operations to the civilian 
and diplomatic resources available within the framework of the EU. 
 
As for the WEU, at the same time as the EU has attempted to develop a 
CFSP and an ESDP, a clear role for the WEU was decided. While the EU will 
undertake the crisis management and conflict prevention functions as defined in 
the Petersberg Tasks, the WEU is responsible for collective defence as specified 
in article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and would assist NATO in a 
conventional war. Thus, the WEU was merely kept as an organization in order to 
safeguard the mutual defence commitment of the modified Brussels Treaty. Yet, 
deprived of all its operational capacity – which was integrated in the ESDP –, the 
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Western European Union has no future and will certainly be dismantled once the 
EU will have its own proper system for territorial defence with an automatic 
mechanism for reciprocal aid. 
 
As far as the OSCE is concerned, one can assert that the organization        
– whatever Russia’s view on the matter – plays only a modest and minor role in 
shaping Europe’s security. Although being the largest regional security 
organization in the world with fifty-five participating states including the entire 
Europe, the OSCE clearly lacks the means and political will of most of its 
participating states. The function of the OSCE will thus principally remain limited 
to the formal and moral recognition of human and minority rights and to the 
respect of the OSCE norms and principles, but never really growing beyond it. 
 
It appears that in post-Cold War Europe, the two major institutions 
providing security on the European continent are the EU and NATO. It is 
consequently not a surprise that by seeking membership in those two institutions, 
the CEECs – with notably the purpose to find a guarantee against a potential 
renewed Russian threat – seek to fit irreversibly into the Western structures; a 
procedure considered by them to be the right complement to their own 
democratisation. For both organizations, the significance of their eastwards 
enlargement process is of paramount importance. The emergence of a unified 
Europe combined with an enlarged Atlantic Alliance has great repercussions on 
the European geopolitical areas as well as on possible collaboration between 
states. 
 
As far as the EU enlargement process towards the East is concerned, eight 
states belonging to the former Soviet sphere of influence already joined the Union 
together with Cyprus and Malta in May 2004. The process will surely continue, as 
Bulgaria and Romania will most likely join in 2007. The latter enlargement would 
certainly not be the last one, since one generally deems the EU to include 
eventually also the Balkan countries – with Croatia already having started 
accession negotiations – as well as maybe (though in a very distant future) 
Turkey, Ukraine and Moldova. Like its former enlargements, the current 
enlargement process of the EU is an exemplary security policy, via the extension 
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of the EU’s norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to the applicants as well as 
by the broadening of the scope of its common external policies. Contrary to its 
former enlargements, the current enlargement process is fundamentally different, 
as it differs profoundly in size, scope and character. The 2004 enlargement 
brought two fundamental internal changes: the increase of the number of member 
states, and especially of “small” member states – Poland being the only new 
member state regarded as a “large” one –, posing notably the question of the 
appropriate balance between large and small states; the increase of “poor” 
member states, causing both an impoverishment impact inside the EU – which the 
following enlargement to Bulgaria, Romania and other potential CEECs will only 
intensify475 – and a solidarity challenge within the Union.  
 
Furthermore, the European Union becomes the matrix managing the 
European continent and its periphery. With a population of 450 million [480 
million if one adds Bulgaria and Romania] and 25% of the global GNI, the Union 
– ordinating the interests and preferences of its member states – has the means to 
play a global role, although some observers of international politics do not believe 
that the EU could one day turn into a “Europe puissance”. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 
289; Hill and Smith, 2005: 398). Robert Kagan, for instance, thinks that the 
political will of the European leaders to actually demand more power for Europe 
is lacking, given that the genuine mission of the EU is to oppose power. (Kagan, 
June/July 2002: 1-21) Moreover, since the comparative advantage of the EU is 
less military and more economic, being in this field almost as strong as the USA, 
the possibility of influencing events by economic and soft power is crucial for the 
Union’s role and influence in the world (Andreatta, 2005: 35) One also regularly 
draws attention to the potentially hazardous consequences of enlargement. By 
bringing in more diverse interests into the EU, cooperation could become more 
difficult, as the unanimity remains the leading principle of CFSP/ESDP voting476. 
But, on the other hand, enlargement could represent an opportunity, by triggering 
prompter adoption of necessary and important EU reforms. (Gibbs, September 
2000: 23) So, one may also think that the EU enlargement could reinforce the 
Union’s ability to assert itself on the world stage, by reinforcing and deepening in 
particular its CFSP and ESDP (which constitute a part of the acquis 
communautaire), so as to lead the EU under certain circumstances – as for 
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instance the implementation of the progresses accomplished with the European 
Constitution – to even becoming a potential “non-state” great power. 
 
However, the approach of the CEECs set up NATO membership as their 
prime concern. EU membership was sought principally for economic matters, 
while security issues – with Article 5 security assurances – were the first cause for 
applying for NATO membership. Despite Russia’s intense opposition (especially 
during the 1999 enlargement towards Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), 
NATO enlarged eastwards a first time in 1999 and then again to seven further 
states in 2004. NATO’s eastwards expansion responded largely to preferences of 
the United States, which decisively influenced this issue. The USA seems to have 
largely followed the pro-enlargement “Yalta approach”, which was to take 
advantage of the geopolitical void left by the collapse of the socialist camp and 
impede a new Russian threat in a long-term perspective. As for the EU, it seems 
to foster the “Maastricht approach”, by exporting through enlargement the 
“cooperative security” logic – characterized by a high degree of 
institutionalisation and an important commitment to common rules and norms – to 
Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, having increasingly become overlapping 
organizations when one looks at their tasks – as the debate over the compatibility 
or competition between EU’s RRF and the more recently created NATO’s NRF 
illustrates – and at the geographical area they are covering477, the EU and NATO 
have not only many possibilities to cooperate and work in synergy, but have also 
sufficient substance to fundamentally redefine their respective objectives and 
functions in the unifying Europe as much as across the Atlantic. (Missiroli, March 
2003: 9-11; Sjursen, 1998: 11-13) 
 
With these enlargements changing the geopolitical face of Europe, the 
European states all have their views on the process of expansion of the two 
Western institutions. Among the largest EU member states, one finds Germany 
and the UK – though for different reasons – as the keenest supporters of EU 
enlargement, whereas France and Italy have been somewhat more ambivalent, 
focusing their interests principally on the single currency. (Lippert, Hughes, 
Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 113) Besides the geopolitical and security concerns 
relevant to all the European countries, substantial economic interests in Central 
 315
and Eastern Europe motivated primarily Germany’s support. Yet, from being a 
key advocate for a quick enlargement, Germany came to prefer a slower pace, 
conscious that deepening had the priority over widening. As for the UK, 
suspicions of a British desire to weaken the EU through its eastern enlargement 
have still been present with the Labour government, despite the less eurosceptic 
stance of the latter in comparison with the former Conservative governments. This 
suspicion is sometimes also raised as regards Swedish and Danish support for EU 
enlargement. France’s ambiguity is largely explained by its apprehension that the 
enlargement would lead not only to a thorough reform of the costly CAP – or 
even to its disappearance –, but also to a reduction in the Frenchness of Europe as 
well as, by the same token, to a German dominance in Europe. Moreover, 
concerned about the eastern tilt of the EU, France – whose interests in an 
eastwards EU enlargement are certainly neither as obvious nor as important than 
German ones – stresses regularly the EU’s security threats along the southern rim 
of the Mediterranean, a region to which France feels closer than to Central and 
Eastern Europe. As far as NATO’s eastwards expansion in particular is 
concerned, after reluctance in the early 1990s, Germany then showed interest for 
an early admission of its protégés, namely Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. As for the UK, despite early lack of enthusiasm, it was eventually 
satisfied with the result of the two eastwards NATO enlargements. For its part, 
France was rather lukewarm in supporting NATO’s eastwards move, first for 
tactical reasons and – after the failure in the years 1995-1997 of its objective of 
re-admittance into NATO – because it feared further isolation in both military and 
political terms. 
 
In the core of the unifying Europe, there are two key geopolitical actors, 
France and Germany. As regards Germany, its ultimate objective has long been 
Pan-Germanism. Since its reunification, there is a strong concurrence between 
Bundesstaat and Volk so much so that Pan-Germanism has lost one of its principal 
raison d’être in post-Cold War Europe. The question of Germany’s key 
geopolitical area in the unifying Europe is however of great interest. Besides 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (generally considered as forming 
Germany’s Hinterland), Croatia and Slovenia, as well as to some extent the Baltic 
states, can also be regarded as the Central European countries where Germany’s 
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post-Cold War economic, political and cultural influence is strong. Germany does 
not seem to have definitely abandoned its geopolitical pretensions within Europe. 
While acting as a European power serving peace and stability478, Germany shows 
simultaneously some geopolitical ambitions both within Europe and globally, 
notably by also cultivating its close connections to the United States and Russia. 
Having set up the economic conditions of some kind of “benign” European 
leadership, Germany seeks this European leadership inside an integrated Europe 
and together with a strong Franco-German axis. Moreover, the continental 
unification necessarily centred on Germany is a further objective of the Pan-
Germanist idea. As for France, it had historically two main rivals, the United 
Kingdom on the overseas and Germany on the continent. France embraced the 
Anglo-French Entente Cordiale in the early 1900s and reconciled with West 
Germany during the Cold War mainly thanks to the European construction. Yet, 
France had to adapt to a new situation with the waning of the bipolar world order 
and the ensuing reunification of Germany. French Foreign policy faces currently 
two dilemmas, both consisting in trying to control the power of a great power       
– i.e. the United States and Germany –, while being conscious to need it to a 
certain extent. These dilemmas are largely stemming from the consideration that, 
in spite of its aura of a great power, France only has the resources of a middle 
power. Conscious on the one hand of the need to preserve the US security 
commitment to Europe, France is willing on the other hand to rally the other 
states around a pan-European system which would ensure the French-desired 
multilateralism and reduce simultaneously the necessity of US presence in 
Europe. The CFSP/ESDP project constitutes undoubtedly a key element in that 
optic. To achieve that objective, France needs the close cooperation of Germany. 
France wants to have a strong EU based around the Franco-German alliance         
– which is certainly one of the main and most effective means permitting France 
to offset its own relative weakness –, while ruling out a Europe under German 
leadership.  
 
Not only is the European unification project mainly constructed upon the 
partnership between France and Germany, but also does the adding of their 
respective geopolitical area cover the great majority of the European continent. 
From a security and geopolitical point of view, there is no doubt that France and 
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Germany are together considered to constitute Europe’s security core, or to put it 
differently, Europe’s vital core. Since neither France nor Germany seems 
sufficiently strong to build a Europe under its sole leadership, each one of the 
Franco-German partnership still needs the other. Despite sometimes slight 
divergences over Europe’s future, they can together face and resolve them so as to 
act as the joint political-economic driving force of European unification. 
 
Considering the possibilities to enlarge the Franco-German nucleus to 
other countries, it appears that there is no credible alternative to the special 
Franco-German partnership and to the special responsibility for Europe this 
partnership has. Despite the fact that the Franco-German tandem has lost a bit of 
its exclusivity in post-Cold War Europe, its strength and importance to serve as 
Europe’s engine seems to be firmly entrenched in the process of European 
integration. Zbigniew Brzezinski is even of the opinion that «the expansion of 
both the EU and NATO eastward should enhance the importance of (…) [the 
Franco-German relationship] as Europe’s inner core.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 78) The 
different projects to transform the Franco-German partnership into a triangle or a 
quartet by the inclusion of the UK, Spain, Italy, Poland or Ukraine seem not to be 
able to replace in the long-term any well-functioning Franco-German partnership. 
While not substituting the latter, the alternative constellations have however 
different characteristics permitting them to exist as credible and relevant 
groupings besides the more special Franco-German tandem. The Franco-Anglo-
German triangle for instance, involving the three most important EU member 
states, appears as a combination of a strong and reliable transatlantic connection 
added to Europe’s vital core; it seems thus an important constellation particularly 
when considering any meaningful European security and defence identity. As for 
a potential Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian collaboration in the area of security 
and defence, it could become the spine of the unified Europe and enhance 
Europe’s geostrategic depth, by forming an arc throughout the European continent 
from the Atlantic to the Black Sea. This arc, representing the critical core of 
Europe’s security, would protect the core of the unified Europe, thus benefiting to 
the whole of Europe. Ukraine is definitely of crucial importance for European 
security and one observes with high interest that the lately pro-Western Ukraine 
now openly asserts its short-term objective of EU membership and long-term 
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objective of NATO membership. Besides, one has to note that the additional 
inclusion of Spain or Italy would have as main advantage to include a southern 
dimension to Europe’s security foundations. 
 
Let us focus on the areas constituting the EU’s sphere of influence. The 
latter is partly determined by the member states interests, shaped most notably by 
historical ties as well as economic, security, strategic and geopolitical 
considerations. In one way or another, all the EU’s immediate neighbourhood – 
that is, essentially Eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean rim – is more 
or less intensively encompassed. The EU reinforces its influence in its spheres of 
influence essentially by ‘europeanising’ it through its different policies and 
partnerships addressed especially to its immediate neighbourhood. For instance, 
the recently developed ENP is a comprehensive neighbourhood policy, aiming at 
exercising some influence in that area. Even the Caucasus – which is essentially 
torn between EU’s, Russia’s and Turkey’s influence (Georgia seems torn between 
the EU and Russia, Armenia close to Russia and Azerbaijan close to Turkey) – is 
included in that neighbourhood policy. One should note that, while the Balkan 
states have a real perspective for medium-term EU membership, the former Soviet 
republics (except maybe Ukraine and Moldova) as well as the South 
Mediterranean countries lack any medium-term membership prospect. Therefore, 
the EU faces the dilemma of exclusion for the latter. In order to prevent that 
dangerous “outsider feeling”, the EU tries to offer them an alternative strategy to 
full EU membership. The ENP is part of that strategy. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and cooperation with the ACP are further instruments for the EU to 
establish intense relations with other parts of the Union’s traditional spheres of 
influence. One should add that, additionally, the EU seeks to enhance its influence 
in Asia and Latin America, by establishing several partnerships and dialogues 
with these regions. 
 
Facing the EU, Russia and its sphere of influence seem to form the sole 
credible grouping opposing or counterbalancing somehow the EU and its sphere 
of influence, on its eastern edge. With its doctrine of the “near abroad”, Russia 
seeks to keep strong influence over political, economic and military affairs in the 
former Soviet area. To this end, Moscow retained in that area broad military 
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deployment and extensive economic presence and also intended to create in the 
former Soviet region a Russian-led entity, whether it be in the form of a strong 
Commonwealth of Independent States or some other Eurasian organization. But, 
increasing resistance in many states of its traditional sphere of influence has partly 
hampered Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. Especially Ukraine and Georgia, but 
also Azerbaijan and Moldova seem to slowly break away from Russia’ sphere of 
influence. While Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova seem all – though at a different 
pace – to converge towards the West, Azerbaijan appears to get closer to “big 
brother” Turkey. The creation of those organizations like the GUAM – regrouping 
the four above-mentioned countries – or the Commonwealth of Democratic 
Choice, involving notably Ukraine and Georgia, illustrate significantly this state 
of evolution. Amongst the former Soviet Republics, it seems as first and foremost 
Belarus, but also Armenia and possibly Kazakhstan are the countries putting up 
the most with Russia’s geopolitical objectives of the “near abroad” doctrine. As 
for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, they appear also to remain loyal to Russia, as does 
to a large extent Uzbekistan. It is thus not surprising that the two former Central 
Asian states are forming, together with Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan, 
the so-called Collective Security Treaty Organization. As for Uzbekistan, a 
mutual defence connects it to Russia since November 2005. 
 
Despite Russia’s apparent loss of influence over parts of its traditional 
sphere of influence, the broader European security system will certainly continue 
to be essentially shaped by the interests and preferences of both the EU and 
Russia. It is in that context of opposition between their respective sphere of 
influence that the fate of Ukraine is particularly crucial. In other words, Ukraine  
– connecting Europe to Russia as well as Europe to Asia – is of very crucial 
importance for European security. Russia would deeply suffer from the definitive 
loss of Ukraine. It would represent an even more important geopolitical and 
economic setback for Russia than it already experienced since Ukraine’s 
independence. The recent developments in the region lead us to deem the eventual 
integration of Ukraine into the “West” as the most likely outcome. 
 
Another crucial country in the geopolitical remodelling of post-Cold War 
Europe is Turkey. Indeed, within the context of the eastern expansion of both the 
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EU and NATO, the case of Turkey seems of very high importance. There is no 
doubt that Turkey is an important geopolitical player in post-Cold War Europe. 
Considered to be after France, Germany and Russia, the fourth most important 
geopolitical player in Europe479, Turkey occupies a very important geostrategic 
position, which could potentially predestine it to act as a regional influence. 
Contrary to Washington for whom Turkey represents a staunch ally, the EU 
member states – with the exception of London – are highly divided about 
Turkey’s aspiration to join the EU. Having agreed to start negotiations for EU 
accession with Turkey in October 2005, the EU member states have pushed 
Ankara to accomplish internal reforms – particularly in the field of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as well as economic reforms –, to improve the 
relations problems within NATO and at its southern flank, and to work on its 
relations with its neighbours, mainly Greece but also Armenia and to some extent 
Iran. Eager to join the EU, Turkey realised important internal reforms and 
normalized its relations with Greece, so much so that they nowadays even seem to 
seriously try to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute. Even though these 
progresses are generally deemed as having to be continued, some think that 
Turkey is on the right track to eventually (though not before ten to fifteen years) 
joining the EU to have a more stable Turkey and Europe. However, others do not 
want any EU membership for Turkey and prefer a close partnership, though not 
going as far as full membership. Some of them fear notably a Turkey serving as a 
Trojan horse for the United States or even for radical Islam. A rejection of 
Turkey’s EU bid could lead not only to instability in the region, but also to a 
considerable strong ESDP in which NATO member state Turkey would not be 
able to participate. But, on the other hand, an EU accession could hinder Ankara 
to play its role as a regional leader and possibly make it harder for France and 
Germany to remain the masters of the EU project. 
 
In sum, the EU and Russia form the two essential spheres of influence in 
Europe. As for Ukraine and Turkey, they are – geopolitically speaking – crucial 
states in post-Cold War Europe. While Ukraine seems to slightly shift from the 
Russian into EU’s sphere of influence – though the shift is not yet certain nor 
definitive –, Turkey will certainly remain for the next decades in a controversial 
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situation of a country balancing between the EU’s sphere of influence and the 
willingness to build its own sphere.  
 
There is no doubt that France and Germany form the genuine engine 
within the European Union (at least without Turkey). In other words, the Franco-
German tandem is the authentic driving force of the EU. It appears as the Franco-
German engine can sporadically be widened depending on the case, the 
circumstances and on the concerned areas to other European states. As regards the 
areas of security and defence, one can imagine a Franco-German-Polish-
Ukrainian (to which one might include Spain) constellation forming in the long-
term the spine of the future EU, with the Franco-German tandem remaining 
firmly the vital core of European security. 
 
Although the paper referred to the EU as having its own sphere of 
influence, the discussion about the real nature and characteristics of the EU is still 
underway. According to Kenneth Waltz’ criteria480, the EU does not yet qualify to 
be a genuine “non-state” great power, since it lacks a unified foreign policy. 
Having until recently no great military capabilities and no unified foreign policy, 
one can however consider that the creation of the RRF in May 2003 provides 
sufficient and requisite military capabilities for the EU to efficiently protect its 
security and support its diplomacy, given that the EU is served by nuclear 
deterrence through France and the UK as well as for its greatest part via NATO. 
Many observers doubt however that the RRF provides sufficient and requisite 
military capabilities and thus qualify the assertion that the first component of the 
criterion of military strength, i.e. great military capabilities, is fulfilled. It seems 
indeed as though the European states can still improve the efficiency of their 
military capabilities. 
 
As we have noticed further above, the EU enlargement will not necessarily 
hamper the progression towards a unified foreign policy, but could even have a 
positive effect. Furthermore, the entry into force of the European Constitution, 
entailing decisive progress for the EU to have a credible foreign policy, – or, at 
least, the implementation of some of its provisions relating to the fields of security 
and defence – would contribute to provide the theoretical basis for the EU to 
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effectively fulfil the criterion of a unified foreign policy. And if, in contradiction 
to Robert Kagan’s assertion, the political will of the European leaders to actually 
achieve such progress will be present, one can be relatively optimistic so as to 
eventually regard the EU as a great power. Anyway, on the assumption that the 
EU fulfils with the RRF its first component – i.e. sufficient military capabilities –, 
as soon as the EU fulfils the criterion of a unified foreign policy, the EU would 
effectively act as a sui generis “non-state” great power, even though it would 
most certainly widely retain an intergovernmental system. Yet, although not yet 
fully regarded as a genuinely great power, one can consider the EU as having 
already its own sphere of influence. 
 
It is worthwhile to note that assessed in relative terms against the 
capacities of other actors, the EU appears already to be one of the most significant 
actors of the international system. Russia, although forming the other essential 
sphere of influence on the European continent, is hobbled by internal problems 
and appears to be on the defensive geopolitically. Outside Europe, while having 
bigger populations and the potential to be superpowers, China and India are still 
far from reaching that status and have primarily a regional influence. (Hill and 
Smith, 2005: 404) Only the USA – considered often as the hegemon - «has more 
capacity to influence the shape and evolution of international politics than the 
EU.» (Hill and Smith, 2005: 402) 
 
Although the divisions and disagreements among EU member states have 
been identified as the major obstacle on EU’s way to become a genuine great 
power, the paper – by having based its development upon defensive neo-realist 
assumptions – is rather optimistic about the prospects of further cooperation 
amongst EU member states. Given that the Union is composed of status quo 
oriented states and that the European institutions play a major role in providing 
favourable circumstances for cooperation481, the circumstances are such that 
further cooperation in the field of security and defence seems very likely. And 
even in the absence of real internal or external threat, the world today – with all 
the diverse challenges to security – seems somewhat insecure, thus the 
willingness of the EU member states to further cooperation within the Union and 
with its near neighbourhood. (Andreatta, 2005: 27) But, it remains to be seen if 
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the cooperation in the security and defence areas will one day eventually lead to 
an efficient common foreign policy as well as an efficient and independent 
security and defence policy for the EU. Moreover, one has to add that the 
mechanism of enhanced cooperation undoubtedly facilitates this cooperation, 
since – by allowing a group of willing and able countries to go deeper into 
integration – consensus about such ambitious policies would certainly be achieved 
more simply among a few motivated states rather than among the whole twenty-
five states. 
 
Yet, today, the CFSP/ESDP still needs NATO capabilities; it still needs 
the USA. According to neo-realists, the US role for the Europeans is to act as a 
benign hegemonic power. (Bono, February 2002: 11) But, if the EU member 
states, especially France and Germany, increase their capabilities inside a growing 
independent ESDP, one can imagine that the US strong involvement in European 
security would not be necessary anymore in the long-term.482 (Hill and Smith, 
2005: 395) One can thus expect further evolution of a progressively growing 
independent ESDP, as France and the Europeanists as well as to some extent 
Germany483 seem to wish for. But, in particular the Netherlands and the CEECs   
– seeking for protection against a still unpredictable Russian external policy – are 
more reserved and are still willing to remain under the umbrella of US protection 
(notably via NATO). One might also believe that many EU member states could 
fear that the relative gains in case of a genuine independent ESDP would be too 
important for France and Germany in relation to them, which would consider to 
be better off with NATO being the most important security institution. As for the 
UK, it seems as if it was for a long time sceptical to cooperate within the EU in 
the field of security and defence (preferring to favour its special relationship with 
the USA), but realised in the last decade that European cooperation in these fields 
could bring it important advantages484. 
 
One will certainly, in the coming years, examine with great interest the 
evolution of the transatlantic relation and of the US role in Europe. The security 
relation between the two continents is important for both Europe and the USA, 
but is also on a global scale, since it makes not doubt that Europe and the United 
States will continue to form, in a way or another, the core of global security.  
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1. One has to note that the thesis uses the terms “geopolitical area” and “sphere of influence” 
fairly in the same sense.  
2. When speaking about the eastwards enlargement process of the European Union, the thesis 
often refers to the “enlarged” EU, but sometimes also to the “unified” or “unifying” 
Europe. 
3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, born on 28 March 1928, served as United States National Security 
Advisor to US President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981. Currently, he is notably a 
scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is generally considered to 
be the left response to Henry Kissinger. 
4. Robert Kagan is considered to be a neoconservative. 
5. The topic of security and defence policy and its influence upon geopolitical areas in 
Europe could have also been broached with the theory of hegemonic stability, by focusing 
on the United States as the dominant military and economic power – i.e. the hegemon – 
necessary for the creation and full development of a liberal market economy. The theory of 
hegemonic stability is based on such a hegemon, considered as necessary, because the 
theory argues that in the absence of such a power liberal rules can not be enforced. This 
theory – fairly widespread in the wake of the Second World War – has been became 
controversial from the late 1950s onwards, after the rebuild of Western European and 
Japanese economies; this led, according to some observers like Robert Gilpin, to a relative 
decline of the United States, which became increasingly more oriented towards national 
interests and was thus not anymore the clear dominant power to sustain the liberal world 
economy. Yet, some other scholars – as Susan Strange and Joseph Nye – reject the idea 
that US economic power has declined as substantially as indicated by Robert Gilpin. They 
consider the USA – despite the relative decline in the economic and technological areas – 
as remaining very strong in both power resources (such as its military resources, but also 
its economy and technology ones) and non-material power resources (such as its cultural 
resources, with US popular culture spreading all over the globe). As for Robert Keohane, 
he argues that the international institutions set up via the hegemonic power are able to 
promote further cooperation, despite the decline of US power, because these international 
institutions have a staying power of their own. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 190-197) 
6. See Endnote n°9. 
7. Similar to classical liberalism, neo-liberalism shares the ideas about the possibility of 
progress and change; but, contrary to classical liberalism, neo-liberalism repudiates the 
idea of idealism.  
8. Institutional liberalism is a strand of neo-liberalism, besides other strands, which are 
sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism and republican liberalism.  
Sociological liberalism emphasizes the increasing degree of interdependence, due to cross-
border activities, not only between states, but far more between private individuals, groups 
and societies. These overlapping interdependent relations between people are believed to 
be more cooperative, as their interests – contrary to states – are not overlapping and do 
cross-cut. Increasing transnational networks are thus deemed to bring more peace 
internationally. One of the keenest advocates of that strand is Karl Deutsch who argued in 
the 1950s that such «interconnecting activities helped create common values and identities 
among people from different states and paved the way for peaceful, cooperative relations 
by making war increasingly costly and thus more unlikely.» (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 
49) (See also Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 49, 111-114) 
Interdependence liberalism goes even further and concentrates on complex 
interdependence. Among them, David Mitrany and its functionalist theory of integration 
argued in the 1960s that transnational ties favoured first and foremost by technical experts 
(rather than by politicians) would lead to greater interdependence, which in turn could lead 
to peace. Build on that idea, Ernst Haas developed the so-called neo-functionalist theory of 
international integration. Rejecting however the separation of the notion of technical 
matters from politics, this theory is based on the notion of spillover, entailing the process 
of increased cooperation in one area leading to increased cooperation in other more 
sensitive areas, thus favouring progressively further integration. As for Robert Keohane 
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Joseph Nye, they are two other main contributors to this strand of neo-liberalism. They 
came up with their contribution in 1977 and argued that relations between Western states 
(Japan included) are characterized by complex interdependence, as many forms of 
connections existed between those societies, including not only political relations of 
governments but also relations on many different levels between many different actors 
(whether it be economic actors, individuals or groups outside the state). Asserting that 
modernization increases the level and scope of interdependence and military force is a less 
useful instrument of policy under complex interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye argue that welfare is becoming the primary goal and concern of states, instead of 
security. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 49, 114-118) 
Republican liberalism, most systematically addressed by Michael Doyle, is based upon the 
assumption that democracies do not go to war, because of their domestic political culture 
of peaceful conflict resolution, their common moral values and their mutual and reciprocal 
benefits stemming from economic cooperation and interdependence. According to that 
strand of neo-liberalism, those peaceful relations of consolidated liberal democracies 
would progressively lead to a peaceful world, as democracies are steadily expanding, 
despite occasional setbacks. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 50, 122-126) 
Those four different strands of neo-liberalism are «mutually supportive in providing an 
overall consistent argument for more peaceful and cooperative international relations.» 
(Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 50)  
9. Stephen Krasner defined the term “regimes” in 1982 as «principles and norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actor interests converge in a given issue-area.» 
(Krasner, Spring 1982: 1)  
One has to note that often international organizations and regimes go together, but regimes 
can also exist without formal organizations (as for instance the Law of the Sea conferences 
held under the auspices of the United Nations but without a formal international 
organization). 
10. The idea is that even though domestic disputes can arise over policy directions, only one 
policy will be directed internationally. (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000: 14; Gibbs, September 
2000: 10) It is thus argued that domestic dynamics are without consequence on 
interactions between states. This neo-realist assumption is highly controversial.  
11 The Benelux countries, which are EU member states since its creation, have notably 
successfully defended their systematic overrepresentation in the Council and also taken 
advantage of their relatively considerable influence in other EU institutions, such as the 
European Commission. All this helped them to bind the larger member states, while 
permitting at the same time to draw the attention of the larger member states on the views 
of smaller member states.  
12. We refer here to Kenneth Waltz suggesting that the EU could potentially in time become a 
single state. According to him, states could pool their sovereignty to achieve security. 
(Gibbs, September 2000: 7-8, 12) (See also Waltz, Fall 1993: 44-79) 
13. We will return to the English School of International Relations in the chapter on the 
parameters of the European security system (in the following section: Part I. Chapter 2) 
Section a. The Concept of Security), but we should clarify already the following. This 
International Relations school is often called the ‘English School of International 
Relations’, but some prefer its other name – ‘International Society (School)’ – as several 
of the leading figures of this approach were not English nor even from the United 
Kingdom but rather from Australia, Canada and South Africa. Although the second name 
may thus be more appropriate, we will use both denominations in this thesis. The founders 
of this approach are Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. Yet, three leading International 
Society theorists (also sometimes called the Internationalists) are the founder Martin 
Wright, but also Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. Beside the realist tradition (Hobbesian 
tradition) on the one hand and the revolutionary tradition (Kantian tradition) on the other 
hand, the English School distinguishes a rationalist tradition (Grotian tradition). The 
Grotian tradition is the idea that «although the states-system is anarchical (without 
overriding authority) it needs neither be violent nor chaotic. Anarchy, tempered by society, 
will allow a degree of order between states. ‘Society’ is defined as a consciousness among 
states of common interests and values, and a commitment to common rules and 
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institutions. Sovereignty, international law and diplomacy are some of the shared ideas of 
the society of states.» (McInnes, 1992: 6) Academically, the Grotian tradition is indeed 
represented by the ‘rationalist’ tradition of the International Society approach. The latter 
however view the international relations as a constant dialogue between not only 
rationalism, but also realism and revolutionism. Therefore, the theorists of the English 
School recognize the importance of power in international affairs and focus on the state 
and the state system. But, contrary to the realist tradition, the English school scholars do 
not see the world politics as a Hobbesian state of nature lacking any international norm. 
They regard the state as a combination of power state and constitutional state, thus 
considering as well power as law important characteristics of international relations. Thus, 
the International Society theorists have developed their analysis within this rational 
tradition around the notion of ‘international society’. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 53-54) 
Hedley Bull asserts that «a society of states (or international society) exists when a group 
of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.» (Bull, 1995: 
13) Accordingly to the English School scholars, international society is distinguished from 
the notion of an international system [«A system of states (or international system) is 
formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient 
impact on one another’s decisions … to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in 
the calculations of the other.» (Bull, 1995: 9)] in that in the latter, relations between its 
members are of a mechanical nature (which means that events in a state cannot be ignored 
by another state, because he will be affected), while in an international society, the 
relations between states are stronger as states are not only affected by the actions of each 
other, but they also share at least some common norms and values. The International 
Society scholars find themselves somehow between realists and idealists. They consider 
indeed – following the example of the idealists – that there are common rules and norms 
that most of the states comply with most of the time; those relations constitute thus an 
international society. But, as they do not consider that these rules and norms can by 
themselves enforce international harmony and cooperation, the Internationalists get close 
to the realists in arguing that power and the balance of power still remain very important in 
the international society they consider an anarchical society. Moreover, similar to the neo-
realists, they believe that the responsibility for sustaining order between states belongs to 
the great powers. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 173) One has to add that a ‘cosmopolitan 
element’ is also present in the English School of International Relations. The United 
Nations has set up an elaborate structure of humanitarian law – most notably through the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two Covenants of 1966 on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the one hand and Civil and Political Rights on 
the other – defining the basic rights that are intended to promote internationally a 
satisfactory standard of human coexistence; thus constituting the ‘cosmopolitan element’ 
of the International Society approach. 
One should point out that the central theme of International Society is the promotion and 
preservation of international order, with the responsibility for sustaining order between 
states belonging to the great powers. Similar to neo-realists, International Society scholars 
focus thus primarily on great powers. 
The choice to back the exposition of the concept of security and the challenges to the 
stability in Europe with the International Society theory seems appropriate for several 
reasons. Firstly, the theory – highlighting the concurrent presence of realist and liberal 
elements – does not simplify these elements by extracting one of them into a single theory, 
but it takes into account the simultaneously presence of all these elements – as power 
(‘realist’ element) and law (‘liberal’ element) – into a holistic study. Secondly, using this 
theory for a security-centred issue seems relevant in that way that the International Society 
approach was so far not very much studied in the security field; it would thus be the 
opportunity to further expand its scope to security issues. 
14. The Hobbesian tradition is the idea that «international system is akin to the Hobbesian 
‘state of nature, dominated by self-interest and with no legal or moral rules. ‘Anarchy’      
– the absence of overriding authority or government – is the key concept. From this 
perspective the drive for security is the main preoccupation. Peace and cooperation (like 
alliances) can only be a temporary arrangement between states, and there can be no 
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international ‘society’. Self-interest and expediency determine behaviour; it is a ‘self-help’ 
world of (…) ‘everystate against everystate’. To the extent that order can exist in such 
interstate relations, it will be based upon a balance of power. Academically, the Hobbesian 
philosophy is represented by the ‘realist’ tradition of ‘power politics’.» (McInnes, 1992: 6) 
Accordingly to this approach, since the world is a ‘self-help’ world, security is believed to 
lie in the accumulation of power, which is seen as the central preoccupation of state 
activity. 
15. The Kantian tradition is the idea that «states,(…) for a prolonged time, have organized 
humanity, but that the fundamental reality of world politics is the potentiality of a 
universal community of people. (…) ‘Community’ – the idea of breaking down barriers 
between people by extending moral obligation and kinship – is a key feature of this 
approach.» (McInnes, 1992: 6-7) Unlike both the Hobbesian and the Grotian traditions, 
«which take states as the fundamental units of analysis, the Kantian tradition seeks, in 
different ways, to transcend the states-system and its cultural manifestations such as war. 
(…) Academically, the Kantian approach is represented by the ‘revolutionist’ tradition of 
‘universalism’ or ‘cosmopolitanism’.» (McInnes, 1992: 7) Since the accumulation of 
power tends to provoke fear while the tightening of order can promote injustice, this 
approach states that stable security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do 
not deprive others of it. 
16. Interestingly, as noted by Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella and Pascal Vennesson, 
the English School of International Relations has often been criticized as shameful realism 
on the one hand and as a state-centred variant of liberalism having close connections to the 
American neo-institutional liberalism of the 1980s on the other hand. (Smouts, Battistrella 
et Vennesson, 2003: 169-170) 
17. Contemporary analysts often cite the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (which consists in two 
separate treaties, concluded on 24 October 1648 respectively in Münster and in 
Osnabrück) as the political conception of the modern system of autonomous states. The 
Peace of Westphalia – which ended the Thirty Years' War between “catholic nations” and 
protestant nations” – delegitimised the already waning transnational role of the Catholic 
Church and validated the idea that international relations should be driven by balance-of-
power considerations rather than the ideals of Christendom. Yet the Peace of Westphalia 
was first and foremost a new constitution for the Holy Roman Empire: the pre-existing 
right of the principalities in the empire to make treaties was affirmed, but the Treaty of 
Münster stated that such alliances should not be concluded against the Emperor or the 
Empire, nor against the Public Peace and this Treaty, and without prejudice to the oath by 
which every one is bound to the Emperor and the Empire. Furthermore, the political 
structures and the system of the Emperors election were determinate. (Stephen D. Krasner, 
January 2001) 
18. Although nowadays territory is still associated with power, it was even more the case in 
the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
19. I.e. after 1648. 
20. At this point, one should add that the European Union with its enlargement – the 
enlargements towards the eastern countries are also often referred to as a unification of 
Europe – will be the first peaceful attempt to unify the continent. 
21. In particular, the European powers controlled nearly all of Africa, Asia and Oceania; much 
of it directly in the form of colonies, if not through the mechanism of informal running.  
22. It is meant the two World Wars. Some consider that in the future, one will consider the 
time between 1914 and 1945 as Europe’s last civil war. 
23. One has to add that China benefited from it in the same way as the Soviet Union did. 
Moreover, China was released from colonial pressures. Yet, it did not become a 
superpower.  
24. On the contrary, the Yalta Conference dealt indeed with immediate, short-term issues (as 
Germany, Poland or the United Nations). 
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25. One has to observe that the Soviet control over its sphere of influence was often exercised 
with brutality. Consequently, the image of the nation of courageous and valiant Soviets 
turned into a bad one: the USSR was seen as a brutal police state with a terrifying and 
paranoiac dictator at its control. 
26. The Truman Doctrine stated that the United States would support “free peoples” who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” US President 
Harry S. Truman made the proclamation in an address to Congress on 12 March 1947 
amid the crisis of the Greek civil war (1946-1949). The doctrine was specifically aimed at 
assisting governments resisting communism. Truman insisted that if Greece and Turkey 
did not receive the aid that they needed, they would inevitably fall to communism with the 
result being a domino effect of acceptance of communism throughout the region. Truman 
signed the act – which granted US $ 400 million in military and economic aid to Turkey 
and Greece – into law on 22 May 1947. 
27. Suggested by British General Sir Brian Richardson, the Allies responded to the Berlin 
blockade by developing what was later to be known as a Luftbrüke or air bridge. Denied 
the right of surface passage, the Allies would supply all the needs of West Berlin by air. It 
started small, reaching its height with 1’000 flights every single day, representing 3’000 
tons of food, fuel, and medical supplies. For eleven months, West Berlin survived due to 
this extraordinary effort. Inclement weather and occasional Soviet harassment increased 
the danger and brought about 65 accidental deaths, but the Berlin airlift was a Western 
triumph and a blow for the Soviets. 
28. A parallel process occurred in the Far East with the so-called ‘bamboo curtain’. 
29. As for the United States, the news of the first successful testing of an atomic bomb reached 
US President Truman while he was attending the conference in Potsdam in July 1945. This 
marked the dawning of the nuclear age. 
30. One has to note that it was particularly the failure of the European Defence Community 
[EDC] in 1954 and the ensuing diplomatic crisis over its consequences that led the Federal 
Republic of Germany to NATO membership. 
31. The European Defence Community Treaty was indeed finally rejected by the French 
Parliament on 30 August 1954. 
32. The Social Democrat Willy Brandt was Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) of the FRG 
from 1969 to 1974. 
33. The Hallstein Doctrine, named after Walter Hallstein, was a key doctrine in the foreign 
policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) between 1955 and 1969. 
According to the doctrine, the Federal Republic of Germany had the exclusive right to 
represent the entire German nation, and with the exception of the Soviet Union, West 
Germany would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that 
recognized East Germany. The doctrine was first applied to Yugoslavia in 1957. The 
German Democratic Republic attempted to undermine this doctrine by forming diplomatic 
relationships with the newly decolonised nations of the Third World.  
The doctrine – which was never popular, even within West Germany’s Western allies – 
was eventually abandoned with the adoption of the Ostpolitik by Chancellor Willy Brandt. 
The idea of the Ostpolitik was to normalize relations with Eastern European states, 
including the GDR. It led notably to the recognition of the Oder-Neisse as the border 
between Poland and East Germany and to the mutual recognition between East and West 
Germany.  
Willy Brandt received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971 for his work in improving relations 
with East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union. 
34. Dean Rusk was the United States Secretary of State from 1961 to 1969 under presidents 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. 
35. See also: George R. Urban, Detente (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981), p.264. 
36. See: Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger, 
1969), 252 pp. 
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37. In the socialist camp, the ‘Western’ expression détente was known as ‘peaceful 
coexistence’. 
38. Henry Alfred Kissinger, born on 27 May 1923, was first National Security Advisor (from 
1969 to 1973) and then Secretary of States (from 1973 to 1974) in the Richard Nixon 
administration. In the Gerald Ford administration, he stayed on as Secretary of State (from 
1974 to 1977). 
39. One has nevertheless to add that the military intervention in Prague of the Warsaw Pact 
troops had as an – immediate but short – impact to increase tension between East and 
West. 
40. The European Policy Cooperation [EPC] was incorporated later – in 1986 – into the Single 
European Act [SEA], in which the term ‘security’ was also introduced but only as related 
to its economic implications. Indeed, at that time, the assumption was still that defence 
functions – and in particular territorial defence – had to be carried out by NATO and/or 
national forces. (Missiroli, Février 2004; Smith, 2006: 293) 
41. SALT = Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. 
42. ABM = Anti-Ballistic Missile.  
43. The articles III (Inviolability of frontiers) and IV (Territorial integrity of States) of the Part 
1. Section (a) indeed stipulate: «The participating States regard as inviolable all one 
another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will 
refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also 
refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory 
of any participating State. (…)The participating States will respect the territorial integrity 
of each of the participating States.» (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 
august 1975: 5) 
Nevertheless, the Helsinki Final Act provided for the change of frontiers through peaceful 
means and by agreement.  
44. In particular, the article VII (Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief) of the Part 1. Section (a) 
stipulates: «The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion. They will promote and encourage the effective 
exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of 
which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free 
and full development (…).» (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 august 
1975: 5) 
45. Europäische Friedensordnung = European peace structure. 
46. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, born on 19 December 1906, was the effective ruler of the Soviet 
Union from 1964 to 1982, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. Actually, this post was first known as First Secretary, but Brezhnev changed its 
name into General Secretary, which had been Stalin’s title. He died on 10 November 1982. 
47. One has to note that the 10 years occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89) saw the USSR 
fighting against the same sort of indigenous, nationalistic guerrilla army that the United 
States had faced in Vietnam. Therefore, it is no surprise that Gorbachev decided to 
withdraw the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989. 
48. The USSR responded in leading a boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. 
49. Ronald Wilson Reagan, born on 6 February 1911, became the 40th (1981-1989) President 
of the United States on 20 January 1981. In 1984, he was re-elected for a second term until 
1989, when his vice-president George Herbert Walker Bush succeeded him on 20 January 
as the 41st President of the United States. Ronald Reagan died on 5 June 2004. 
50. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, born on 2 March 1931, was leader of the Soviet Union 
from 1985 – when he was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party – until 1991 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
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51. CSBM = Conference and Security Building Measures. 
52. INF = Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. 
53. After the First World War, there was much talk of a pan-European system of common 
security, a transcendence of alliances through the evolution of CSCE into a self-sustaining 
community of states, indeed a ‘common European home’. After the Second World War, 
there was much talk of a supranational structure of European security, a transcendence of 
national and international defence through the eventual evolution of the EC into an armed 
federation. (Gambles, November 1991: 2)  
54. The statement made in summer 1991 by the then Luxembourg foreign minister Jacques 
Poos illustrates this optimist but naïve mood. He declared indeed «– ‘this is not the hour of 
the Americans’ – a statement which has haunted him ever since (..). Many years and many 
Balkan conflicts later Poos’ comment seems incredibly naïve but at the same time and for 
a short while that summer European action seemed effective. The European troika 
(consisting of the current, future and past heads of the rotating EU presidency) met with 
the Yugoslav leaders and secured a ceasefire. But this success proved fleeting.» (Mihalka, 
Autumn 2001: 7) 
55. The article J.4 paragraph 2 held indeed that «the common foreign and security policy shall 
include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of 
a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.» (Treaty on 
European Union [The Treaty of Maastricht], 29 July 1992: 80) 
56. The Common Foreign and Security Policy will be analysed in details in the following 
paragraph: Part I. Chapter 3) Section a. Paragraph 1. The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy / The European Security and Defence Policy. It will indeed be in this paragraph that 
the development of the CFSP will be analysed more deeply. 
57. The Western European Union will be analysed in details in the following paragraph: Part I. 
Chapter 3) Section a. Paragraph 2. The Western European Union. It will indeed be in this 
paragraph that the development of the WEU will be analysed more deeply. 
58. These tasks have come to be called the ‘Petersberg missions’ or the ‘Petersberg tasks’. 
59. However, the military forces of the individual West European countries engaged in such 
activities throughout the 1990s. 
60. We will return to the Treaty of Amsterdam and to the following developments concerning 
the European Security and Defence issues in the following section: Part I. Chapter 3) 
Section a. The Security Institutions within the Framework of the European Union. 
61. The Petersberg missions – as defined by the WEU at the Ministerial meeting in Petersberg 
in June 1992 – were indeed included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
62. The reasons of the change in the British approach to European security and defence will be 
developed in the following section: Part III. Chapter 1) Section a. The Incentives of the 
“Atlanticist” United Kingdom. 
63. We will return to the Franco-British St.Malo declaration of 4 December 1998 and to the 
causes of the British U-turn as well as to the following European Councils in a later 
section. As they are very important in the developing of the CFSP and of the WEU, we 
will analyse them more deeply in the following section: Part I. Chapter 3) Section a. The 
Security Institutions within the Framework of the European Union. 
64. The Kosovo War – like the Bosnia War – was fought on Wilsonian principles. The Clinton 
administration embodied those principles. They were conducted on a principle-based 
policy and not on an interest-based policy in South-Eastern Europe. The British 
government, while backing the US administration, was following its own principles-based 
policy based on its own tradition of liberalism.  
65. The European Constitution was signed by the European Council in Rome in October 2004, 
which opened the ratification process. 
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66. The previous Stability Pact, originally known as the Balladur (see Endnote n°376) Plan, 
was adopted in 1993. Aimed at promoting good neighbourly relations, peace and stability 
between the Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, it encouraged them to resolve 
mutual historical grievances regarding in particular ethnic minorities and frontiers. 
The new Stability Pact (or Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe) was modelled on the 
earlier Pact. It was initiated in June 1999 following a German proposal in April 1999, in 
the midst of the Kosovo crisis. The 1999 Stability Pact is a quite different tool than the 
previous Stability Pact (or Balladur Plan), since it is an independent organization outside 
the EU infrastructure. It is supported by over forty nations, regional bodies and 
international organizations (all working in partnership); it operates under the auspices of 
the OSCE. As a substantial donor for supporting its long-term conflict-prevention strategy, 
the EU carries however considerable influence  
Aimed also at promoting good neighbourly relations, peace and stability between the 
South-Eastern European countries, the objectives of the 1999 Stability Pact are mainly 
democracy building (with the promotion of human-rights), infrastructure building and 
promoting reform of the security sector. Alongside these objectives, the Stability Pact 
intends to develop a free-trade area in South-Eastern Europe to strengthen the regional 
economy. 
Both the 1993 and the 1999 Stability Pacts were/are considered by the Union as a useful 
mediating tool in the quest for regional stability. 
67. There are some who assert however that Washington intents to maintain troops in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, on its Tuzla base, within the context of the redeployment of the US forces in 
Europe. 
Thus, it seems as the US presence in the Balkans will still last for some time. 
68. As for instance, the setting up of the European rapid reaction force or the process 
permitting to take over the NATO operations in Bosnia at the end of the year 2004. 
69. Until fairly recently, International Relations theorists tended to give the term ‘security’ a 
rather restricted meaning. In that restricted sense, ‘security’ is understood to be almost 
synonymous with military power. Politicians generally use ‘security’ in that way. As a 
consequence, one considers the level of security to be proportional to that of the relative 
military power. In the works of the International Relations theoreticians, ‘national interest’ 
and/or ‘power’ were often preferred, sometimes as alleged synonyms of security. The 
‘realist’ Hans Morgenthau was thus barely concerned to define ‘security’. The closest he 
came to a definition was: «National security must be defined as integrity of the national 
territory and its institutions» (Morgenthau, 1960: 562). 
70. The Westphalian model (or Westphalian system) – as Stephen D. Krasner wrote it – rests 
on the principle of non-intervention, which derives from the principles of territoriality and 
of the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. (Krasner and Foats, 
1996; Krasner, 1999; Joffe, 1999) According to this model, «striving for security is in 
many ways the ultimate concern of the foreign policies of states. This is linked to the 
assumption of anarchy in the international system. There is no superior authority that can 
'lay down the law' from a more independent or objective position than the individual 
states. The international system is, in other words, seen to be in a 'state of nature'. In such a 
system, politics is a struggle for power where each state must look after its interests as best 
it can and with all available means. Questions of values or of morality are considered to 
have little or no place in such a system: they belong to domestic politics.» (Sjursen, 2001: 
2) 
71. Alternative understandings of security should not be seen as the exclusive result of the end 
of the Cold War. They must be understood in the context of broader changes in the 
European system of states. However, it was only with the end of the Cold War that these 
ideas gained a wider acceptance. 
72. These diverse threats to European security will be discussed more deeply in the next 
section. 
73. These observers of international politics are indeed often referred to as the ‘Copenhagen 
School’. In a series of post-Cold War publications, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and some 
colleagues have in fact developed the ‘Copenhagen’ approach in security studies. The 
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publication Security: A New Framework for Analysis – by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and 
Jaap de Wilde – is one of their most important ones. 
74. For the analysis of the three traditions, see the Introduction. 
75. The English School of International Relations considers however – as we have already 
noticed – the international relations as a constant dialogue between not only rationalism, 
but also realism and revolutionism. 
76. Thus, the security is considered in terms of territory rather than of nation. 
77. Just as well for the values to be defended as for the source of security, the referent object 
has always been the state. Indeed, the values to be defended refer to the state, as ultimately 
it is the territorial integrity and political independence of the state that is to be protected; as 
for the source of security, other states have usually been considered as the principal threat 
to territorial integrity and political independence. (Sjursen, 2001: 2). 
78. The majority of the Europeans know enough about the United States of America to find 
the idea of the latter turning its military power against them inconceivable. 
79. See Endnote n°82. 
80. The issue of terrorism has however to be considered to belong to the second dimension of 
security policy. 
81. In an influential article, entitled ‘The Clash of Civilization?’, Samuel Huntington argued in 
1993 that the future conflicts will not primarily be ideological or economic, but will 
instead be among civilizations. The idea was elaborated further in his book The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, published in 1996. Declaring the onset of 
a new phase in global history, Huntington defined the fundamental sources of conflict in 
the current world not to be economic or ideological in nature, but cultural. 
82. The term ‘rogue state’ helped simplify for the American people what might otherwise have 
seemed a complex world. It also seemed to satisfy the American tendency of manichaeism. 
But it always has been a controversial approach. «Critics have argued that it smacked of 
US chauvinism and arrogance. (..) Some in the United States were just as critical of the 
Europeans, arguing that they were pursuing dialogue for narrow and selfish reasons of 
their own, often to try to win commercial advantages for themselves. But Washington too, 
under the Clinton administration, also came to find that demonising the rogue states was 
not useful when it too tried to engage in dialogue with, for example, the authorities in 
North Korea, or moderate elements in Iran. (…) In the latter days of the Clinton 
administration, the words "“rogue state” were supplanted by the rather less confrontational 
term “state of concern”.» (Childs, December 2001: 2-3) The term ‘rogue state’ has 
however come back again with the arrival in 2001 in Washington of the Bush 
administration that never used the term ‘states of concern’. «Again, some critics argue that 
President Bush and his advisers have revived the term as well as the term “axis of evil” 
because they need a rationale to pursue their plans for ballistic missile defence.» (Childs, 
December 2001: 3) 
83. The states George W. Bush originally named within the axis of evil were Iraq, Iran, North 
Korea and then later Syria, but the definition could be interpreted broadly to include other 
regimes. 
The term ‘Axis of evil’ is reminiscent of the Axis powers of the Second World War and of 
former US President Reagan’s evil empire designation of the Soviet Union. 
84. See Endnote n°427. 
85. The document – entitled A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security 
Strategy – has been drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier 
Solana. 
86. Accordingly, the member states take – wherever possible – common positions in 
international organizations.  
87. This means that the CFSP is situated outside the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [EC Treaty]. 
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88. It corresponds today to the article 2 of Title 1 of the consolidated text of the TEU [as 
amended by the Treaty of Nice]. 
89. For the sake of clarity and accuracy, one has to specify that the article 17 §1 of the 
consolidated text states exactly the following: «The policy of the Union in accordance with 
this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which 
see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence 
policy established within that framework.» (Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title V Art.17 §1) 
90. One has to specify that these articles 11 to 28 (formerly J.1 to J.18) are still placed in the 
Title V (Provisions on a common foreign and security policy). 
91. The Treaty provided also for an expanding qualified majority voting by writing that, «after 
unanimous agreement on common strategies, the Council may proceed with majority 
voting for ‘joint actions’ and ‘common positions’. This provision was however restricted 
by a provision allowing member states ‘for important and stated reasons of national 
policy’ to oppose the adoption of a decision by qualified majority voting. Incidentally, this 
means that the French interpretation of the Luxembourg ‘compromise’ of 1966 was for the 
first time formally included in the Treaty, even though in a particular policy area.» 
(Sjursen, 1999: 6) 
92. The article 23 §1 TEU (amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) provides for the following: 
«(…) When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by 
making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be 
obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a 
spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely 
to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member 
States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention 
in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted (…), the decision shall not 
be adopted.» (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam], 2 October 1997: Art.23 §1) 
Therefore, an action taken accordingly to this ‘constructive abstention’ can however not be 
led if the States – who abstention – represent more than a third of the weighted votes. 
93. For the creation and development of the European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP], 
see a bit further. 
94. Dr. Francisco Javier Solana Madariaga was born in Madrid on 14 July 1942. He is a 
professor of solid-state physics. He is a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]) since 1964 and was a member of parliament 
from 1977 to 1995. He held a variety of cabinet posts from 1982, including Minister of 
Culture, government spokesman and Minister of Education and Science before becoming 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 1992, a portfolio he held until his appointment as 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s ninth Secretary General in December 1995. Javier 
Solana served as Secretary General of the NATO until 6 October 1999. On 18 October of 
the same year he became the European Union’s High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy with a mandate of five years. Simultaneous with this 
appointment, he was also made Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, 
also for a period of five years. Furthermore, on 20 November 1999, the Western European 
Union elected him as the Secretary General of the organization. Javier Solana’s posts were 
extended in June 2004 when he was also designated to become EU’s first Minister for 
Foreign Affairs – a job combining the head of the CFSP with the European Commissioner 
for Foreign Relations and Vice President of the Council of the EU – once the Constitution 
for Europe is ratified. 
95. However, many observers pointed out, that – in order to ensure a coherent and effective 
CFSP – one had to await the way in which the institutional changes proposed were 
implemented, and that the real question could be the political will and commitment of 
member states to use the new provisions. Many of the problems of the CFSP derive not 
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necessarily from the rules and institutions alone, but from the member states’ reluctance to 
commit themselves to the rules they fixed themselves. 
96. The reasons of the change in the British approach to European security and defence will be 
developed in the following section: Part III. Chapter 1) Section a. The Incentives of the 
“Atlanticist” United Kingdom. 
97. «In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in 
order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs (…).» (Rutten, May 2001: 8) 
98. «(…) while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are 
contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of 
the collective defence of its members.» (Rutten, May 2001: 8) 
99. As for the question of terminology, confusion can exist by the simultaneous use of the 
terms ESDP and CESDP [Common European Security and Defence Policy]. Although 
some authors prefer the use of the term CESDP in order to not confuse it with NATO’s 
European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI], the more common term ESDP is 
preferred in this paper. 
100. These ‘Petersberg’ tasks are, as we already mentioned, humanitarian and rescue 
operations, conventional peacekeeping as well as the operation of combat forces in crisis 
management including peacemaking. 
101. The Eurocorps is a European military force inaugurated by German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl and French President François Mitterrand in 1992. Its headquarters are located in 
Strasbourg. It was designed for use in peacekeeping and crisis management operations, 
first for the WEU (see the paragraph about the WEU) before being directly connected to 
the CFSP/ESDP. The Eurocorps is so far composed of forces from France, Germany, 
Belgium (who joined in 1993), Spain (who joined in 1994) and Luxembourg (who joined 
in 1996). While the Eurocorps is sometimes regarded as a European Army, its reliance on 
NATO for support effectively undermines its independence. In other words, Eurocorps as 
it stands today, is more a symbol of the desire to create a European military capacity, than 
a fully fledged European Army. 
102. To be more precise, the European Council stated the following: «For EU-led operations 
without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the EU could use national or 
multinational European means pre-identified by Member States. This will require either 
the use of national command structures providing multinational representation in 
headquarters or drawing on existing command structures within multinational forces. 
Further arrangements to enhance the capacity of European multinational and national 
forces to respond to crises situations will be needed.» (Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 
June 1999a: Annex III 4.Implementation) As for EU-led operations having recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities, arrangements should be found to assure «EU access to 
NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations 
(…) [and] the (…) availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common 
assets for use in EU-led operations.» (Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999a: 
Annex III 4.Implementation) 
It is thus worth to specify that, accordingly to the second case, the EU can make use of the 
personnel and logistical capacities of NATO for ESDP missions. The 1999 NATO summit 
in Washington indeed stressed that NATO assets and capabilities were also available for 
EU-led crisis management operations under the ESDP. 
103. «To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: 
by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and 
then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 
15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining 
with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat 
support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States 
should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide 
smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They 
must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an 
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additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide 
replacements for the initial forces.» (Helsinki European Council, 11 and 12 December 
1999: 27) 
104. It was for instance decided that «the geographical radius for EU-led missions would reach 
as far as 4 000 km from Brussels; and that this radius would be extended to 10 000 km for 
purely humanitarian operations.» (Missiroli, Winter 2003: 494) 
105. As far as the integration of defence markets and industries in Europe is concerned, a 
possible start has been made with the creation in 1996 of the Organization of Cooperation 
in Armaments OCCAR [OCCAR is the French acronym for Organisation Conjointe de 
Coopération pour l’Armement], comprising four EU nations, namely France, Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom. In addition, the aerospace industries of three of the four 
Airbus partner countries created in 2000 a European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
Company [EADS], emerging from the link-up of the French Aérospatiale-Matra, CASA 
(Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A.) of Spain and the German DaimlerChrysler Aerospace 
AG (Dasa). The opportunity is given to other nations to join this group, as for instance the 
UK which is the fourth Airbus partner, Italy or Sweden. (Irondelle et Vennesson, Automne 
2002: 7; Teunissen, Autumn 1999: 346; Sandler and Hartley, 1999: 119, 155-162) 
106. While the negative comments affecting the Nice summit have in general been directed 
towards the institutional reforms, which have made decision-making rather more than less 
complicated, the progresses on ESDP made at the summit were generally considered 
positively. 
107. The Kosovo War of 1999 demonstrated the extent to which a political voice and the means 
for backing it up were still lacking. As a result, the lesson of Kosovo strengthened the 
«developments that were triggered in autumn 1998 by the British government’s U-turn 
that led to St-Malo and - via Cologne (…) and Helsinki (…) - culminated in Nice (…).» 
(Rutten, May 2001: ix) 
108. See Endnote n°66. 
109. One has to note that the Charter for Fundamental Rights – adopted at the European 
Council in Nice in December 1999 – was integrated into the text of the Constitution. 
110. The Convention on the Union’s future has worked out the draft ‘Constitutional Treaty’, 
around a decade after the singing of the Treaty of Maastricht, at a time when the Union 
was obliged to reorientate its CFSP in light of two major developments: the EU 
enlargement as well as the changed nature of international violence, notably with the new 
perception of the threat of terrorism. (Erhardt, October 2002: 8) 
111. The EU Minister for Foreign Affairs will thus «be mandated by the Council for CFSP, 
while being a full member of the Commission and as such in charge of the Commission’s 
responsibilities in the field of external relations as well as of the coordination of the other 
aspects of the Union’s external action; in addition, he will chair the External Relations 
Council. The Union’s newly acquired single legal personality will also enable it to play a 
more visible role in world affairs.» (European Union, 28 June 2004: 3) 
This is expected to facilitate coherence and coordination between EU institutions and 
bureaucracies. (Missiroli, Winter 2003: 495) 
Moreover, the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs will preside over the ‘European External 
Action Service’, an EU Diplomatic Corps. (Howórth, 2005: 196; Vanhoonacker, 2005: 84) 
112. The article IV-444 §1 of the European Constitution states indeed as follows: «Where (…) 
[the European Constitution in its Part III] provides for the Council to act by unanimity in a 
given area or case, the European Council may adopt a European decision authorising the 
Council to act by a qualified majority in that area or in that case. This paragraph shall 
[however] not apply to decisions with military implications or those in the area of 
defence.» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.IV-444 (1)) 
Qualified majority could thus possibly apply to those CFSP matters having no military 
implications and not being in the area of defence. 
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Despite these slight progresses, some still argue that the Constitution could have been 
gone further in limiting the crude veto right of individual member states, also for 
CFSP/ESDP matters. 
[For the definition of qualified majority, see page 143 of the paper and Endnote n°197] 
113. As regards the permanent structured cooperation, the article I-41 (6) stipulates: «Those 
Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more 
binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding 
missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.» 
(Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-41 (6)) 
114. The main criterion for participating in permanent structured cooperation «reste le fait de 
pouvoir prendre part, au plus tard en 2007, à des opérations militaires déployables sur un 
terrain d’opération extérieur dans un délai de 5 à 30 jours, et pour une durée de 20 à 120 
jours, en particulier pour répondre à des demandes des Nations Unies.» (Liponska-
Hottiaux, 2004: 28) 
115. The article I-41 (5) states: «The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the 
Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and 
serve its interests.» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-41 
(5)) 
As for the article III-310 (1), it states: «The Council may entrust the implementation of a 
task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for 
such a task. Those Member States, in association with the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.» (Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.III-310 (1)) 
116. The article I-41 (7) states: «If a Member States is the victim of armed aggression on its 
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance 
by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy 
of certain Member States.» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: 
Art.I-41 (7)) 
117. The relevant articles are the article I-43 and the article III-329 of the Constitution for 
Europe. 
118. The Commission will however have one representative in the Agency. 
119. The Agency will thus to have to establish tight working relations with other existing 
competent bodies, as for instance the OCCAR.  
120. British officials insisted however that the Cortenberg staff headquarters would only have a 
skeleton staff and would only be used if national headquarters in Britain, France and 
Germany were not available. 
121. In the Treaty of Dunkirk, it was also agreed upon a common action should either signatory 
be prejudiced by any failure of Germany to fulfil its economic obligations which were 
enforced upon it by the allies at the end of Second World War. 
122. Among the aims of the Brussels Treaty were the «[strengthening of] the economic, social 
and cultural ties [between the signatories], (…) [the coordination of] efforts to create a 
firm basis for European economic recovery, (…) [and mutual assistance] in maintaining 
international peace and security». (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration 
and Collective Self-Defence (The Brussels Treaty), 1948, Preamble) 
123. Although it was dormant for three decades, the WEU has contributed to the settlement of 
the Saarland problem (until the integration, in 1959, of the Saarland as the tenth 
Bundesland in the FRG) and had the role of liaison between the United Kingdom and the 
six founding members of the European Community before the United Kingdom joined the 
EC in 1973. 
124. The European Constitution provides – in article I-41 (7) – for a ‘mutual defence clause’ 
involving all the EU member states. Some argue that this clause is however not that strong 
as the mutual defence commitment included in the article V the modified Brussels Treaty. 
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Moreover, the WEU also allowed moderate armaments cooperation throughout the 
Western European Armaments Organization [WEAO], which was something that did not 
exist within the EU until the EDA is effectively taking over completely the activities of the 
WEAO (which is due to happen in the course of 2006). 
125. Even if the SDI was born out of the worsening US-Soviet relations of the Reagan era, the 
Western Europeans feared at the time the popularly dubbed “Star Wars”. 
126. Spain and Portugal formally became full members of the WEU on 27 March 1990. 
127. However, Turkey will only get granted the status of Associate member in 1992, along with 
Norway and Iceland.  
128. Greece had to wait until 1995 to formally become full member of the WEU. 
129. It was also decided in Maastricht to relocate the WEU Council and Secretariat from 
London to Brussels for easier collaboration with NATO. 
130. One has to note that besides the Eurocorps, the WEU had also two other units, though 
smaller, at its disposal: the Eurofor (land forces) and the Euromarfor (maritime forces). 
One has to add that the Cologne European Council of 3 and 4 June 1999 decided to 
redefine the European multinational and national forces – such as the Eurocorps, the 
Eurofor and the Euromarfor – into a European crisis reaction corps directly connected to 
the CFSP/ESDP. 
131. The decision to develop an ESDI inside NATO was to a large extent made possible by 
France’s choice at that time to move closer to the military cooperation within NATO. This 
was interpreted – wrongly as one will figure out – as a signal that France had given up its 
ambitions about developing a European security policy with the EU at the core, and 
chosen instead to expand the European security and defence identity inside NATO.  
132. The article J.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, with its associated Protocol and Declaration, is 
a development of the article J.4 of the Treaty of European Union, and its associated 
Declarations, and indeed the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration of 1992 and the Hague 
Platform of 1987. 
133. The creation of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] was discussed in the precedent paragraph: 
Part I. Chapter 3) Section a. Paragraph 1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy / The 
European Security and Defence Policy. 
134. The reference to WEU in the article 17 §4 of the TEU [«The provisions of this Article 
shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member 
States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) and 
NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in 
this Title.» (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [as amended by the 
Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Art.17 §4)] is the last reference to WEU in the TEU, 
after modification adopted by the Treaty of Nice. 
135. One has to precise that the European Union’s High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Javier Solana, was also elected Secretary General of the 
WEU. 
136. The Berlin blockade was started by the Soviet Union on 24 June 1948 and ended on 9 May 
1949, that is, after the beginning of the formal negotiations on North Atlantic Treaty on 10 
December 1948 and its signing on 4 April 1949. 
137. These initial negotiations included representatives from the USA, Canada and the Brussels 
Treaty Powers (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
These seven countries were joined after invitation by five other Western European 
countries, namely Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal.  
138. See Annexe 1: Article 4 to 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
139. The Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations states the following: «Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
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has taken measures necessary to maintain inter- national peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.» (Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945: Art.51) 
140. See Annexe 2: NATO’s Civil and Military Structure. 
141. The Secretary General is also the chairman of other important committees.  
142. Having no military forces, Iceland is represented by a civilian official in the meetings of 
the Military Committee. 
143. A third military command – the Allied Command Channel [ACCHAN] – was eliminated 
on 1 June 1994 and its responsibilities are hence assumed by SACEUR. ACCHAN’s 
responsibilities extended from the Southern North Sea through the English Channel.  
144. SACLANT responsibilities extend from North America to the Atlantic Ocean, unto the 
European and North African coast.  
145. The explication of Soviet conventional forces’ superiority is that the Soviet Union had 
continued to maintain its defence industries at wartime level, while NATO member states 
had converted much of their defence industries to peacetime use. 
146. One has to note that the Czech crisis of 1968, culminating with the military intervention of 
the Warsaw Pact troops in Prague, though already lying in the next phase, could be added 
to this list.  
147. President de Gaulle also ordered the removal from French soil of all NATO installations, 
including NATO Headquarters, which were at that time situated in Paris. Accordingly, 
NATO Headquarters were moved to Brussels, while NATO military installations were 
removed from France in 1969. 
In 1995, although France got back its seat at the Military Committee, it did not reintegrate 
the hierarchical structure. Therefore, «la France a bien renoué avec l’Alliance atlantique, 
mais son retour dans le commandement de l’OTAN a été seulement amorcé. (…) Les 
bénéfices à en retirer ont été jugés insuffisants par rapport à l’abdication d’autonomie et de 
souveraineté que ce retour complet aurait signifiée.» (Walch, Avril-Juin 2001: 350) 
148. Robert Strange McNamara, born on 9 June 1916, was United States Secretary of Defence 
from 1961 to 1968. He left office in February 1968 to become President of the World 
Bank from 1968 to 1981.  
149. One has to note that the SDI and other policies under US President Reagan created for 
some time amongst its European allies a relative fear of US isolation and decoupling from 
Europe. A similar European reaction occurred to some extent at US President George W. 
Bush’s announcement in December 2001 of its intention to revive the project for a missile 
defence system for the United States, namely the US National Missile Defense [NMD]. 
Although US President George W. Bush welcomed its NATO allies to participate in the 
debate, he claimed that the USA would go forward with or without them. 
150. Dr. Manfred Wörner, born on 24 September 1934, was Minister of Defence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany from October 1982 until May 1988. He took up his appointment as 
Secretary General of NATO on 1 July 1988. Dr. Manfred Wörner died on 13 August 1994, 
while being still in office. 
151. The entry of the unified Germany into NATO occurred on the same day than its 
reunification, namely on 3 October 1990.  
152. The idea is that these operations and missions should be performed by NATO on the basis 
of mandates from other multilateral institutions, in particular the United Nations and the 
OSCE. 
153. The creation of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] was discussed previously, under the 
following paragraph: Part I. Chapter 3) Section a. Paragraph 1. The Common Foreign and 
Security Policy / The European Security and Defence Policy. 
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154. Moreover, one should note that the attacks of the 11 September 2001 have had as a 
consequence to even accelerate the widening gap between US and European military 
capabilities. (Brzezinski, 2004: 85)  
See Annexe 3: World and EU member states defence expenditures (2003). 
155. The disagreements between the USA and its European NATO allies over the ESDI will be 
analysed in the following section: Part I. Chapter 3) Section c. The Institutional Question. 
156. The Kosovo air campaign against Serbia lasted from March to June 1999. 
157. During this air campaign, US planes flew more than half of the combat missions and more 
than two-thirds of the support sorties. The then US Secretary of Defence William Cohen 
thus stated bluntly that «Kosovo revealed a huge disparity between the United States and 
our NATO allies.» (Cohen, 6 December 1999: 27) 
158. The process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration began indeed with Germany’s announcement 
on 23 December 1991 of its intention to proceed with unilateral diplomatic recognition of 
the secessionist Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia. In doing so, the German 
government renounced in effect the legitimacy of the existing Yugoslav state and pushed 
the other EC governments to do the same. Within weeks, the Yugoslav federal state fell 
eventually apart. 
159. The 7’000 strong EUFOR-Althea mission is supported by NATO under the so-called 
‘Berlin Plus arrangement’ which provides the framework for NATO-EU cooperation. 
For further details about the so-called ‘Berlin Plus arrangement’, we refer to the following 
paragraph: Part I. Chapter 3) Section c. Paragraph 2. Conceptual and Strategic 
Distinctions. 
160. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will be analysed briefly in the 
next paragraph. 
161. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became the first former Warsaw Pact countries 
to gain NATO membership in March 1999. The next historic step came 5 years later, in 
March 2004, when the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – joined NATO, 
along with Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
One has to precise that the question of NATO’s expansion will be deeply analysed in the 
following section: Part II. Chapter 1) Section b. The Dynamics of the Two Enlargements. 
162. It happens that it meets at a more senior level as a Reinforced Permanent Council, at 
which the member states are represented by officials from their respective capitals. 
163. The Ministerial Council is assisted by the Committee of Senior Officials, which manages 
the business on a daily basis. 
164. The Chairman-in-Office is assisted by the Ministerial “Troika” which includes its 
predecessor and its successor. 
165. Both the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Secretariat Office in Prague lie within the 
structure of the Secretariat. Its Office in Prague assists the Secretariat with documentation, 
research and other information functions. 
166. As far as its internal structure is concerned, other bodies were created in the 1990s. So, a 
new post of the Secretary General was established in December 1992 in Vienna and one 
year later, in December 1993, the Permanent Committee (renamed the Permanent Council 
in December 1994), was established in Vienna, significantly expanding the possibilities for 
political consultation, dialogue and decision-making on a weekly basis. 
Moreover, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has been created in 
1990. It is based in Warsaw. As for today’s youngest OSCE institution, the Office of the 
Representative on Freedom of the Media was created in 1997 in Vienna. 
167. See Annexe 4: Structure of the European security and membership/participation in the 
institutions. 
168. The OSCE makes its decisions by consensus. However, in very rare cases of urgency or in 
other extreme circumstances, a rule of “consensus minus one” has developed. 
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169. Indeed, the absence of legally binding commitments made the confronting states more 
susceptible to agreeing on common principles and political standards despite the existence 
of two opposite military blocks, the Eastern and the Western. Secondly, «the weakness in 
CSCE leadership, structures and mechanisms, posed less of a threat to those participating 
States, who were particularly afraid of any potential intrusive and interfering measures 
backed by the authority of an international institution against their national rule either 
domestically or abroad. [Thirdly,] though the CSCE had little access to financial resources, 
diminishing their operational capabilities, it was exactly this low-level funding, which 
facilitated participating States in implementing their budgets effectively and in carrying 
out domestic policy processes. Finally, the required consensus for decision-making did 
give a very high degree of legitimacy to the institution’s resolutions, and also – at least in 
politico-moral terms – raised high hurdles against any open violation or of flouting of the 
Helsinki Principles.» (Giessmann, December 2000: 62-63) 
170. In the case of former Yugoslavia, one assisted in fact to a chain of events marked by 
competitive unilateralism. It included Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatian and 
Slovenian sovereignty, American unilateralism in the Dayton Accords, NATO’s go-alone 
intervention in Serbia (notably in Kosovo) with its “Operation Allied Force”, dispute over 
UN and Russian engagement in Kosovo and counterproductive delays in Western policies 
in Kosovo following NATO’s “Operation Allied Force”. (Seidelmann, 2002: 62) 
171. One has to note that amongst them, four states assuming military responsibilities in Europe 
have veto right at the Security Council. These are France, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Russia. 
172. As a result of the absence of establishment of any permanent Military Staff Committee, the 
Security Council enforced in an alternatively way, in authorizing another actor – whether 
it be an organization or coalition of states – to use force on its behalf, as was the case in 
the First Gulf War in 1990-1991. 
173. Let us define these three terms – often employed by conflict theorists – in order to not 
confuse them: 
“Peacekeeping” is meant to keep people from attacking each other by putting some kind of 
fence, commonly made up of neutral soldiers (peacekeepers) – from the UN or another 
structure agreed through the UN – who merely keep the two sides apart.  
“Peacemaking” is the process of searching to achieve a settlement between the disputing 
parties, by means either of direct negotiations between merely the disputants, either with 
the mediation of a third-party, who assists with process and communication problems and 
might help the parties to work effectively together towards a workable peace agreement. 
“Peacebuilding” is the long-term process of following-up the peace agreement, leading to 
the normalization of relations and to the reconciliation of the differences between all the 
citizens of the conflicting parties. 
174. One thinks in particular about the small budget of the OSCE as well as of its small 
permanent staff, with less than 100 officials. 
175. At the Berlin NATO summit in June 1996, NATO and WEU ministers for Foreign Affairs 
agreed to make NATO assets and capabilities available to WEU-led operations in a bid to 
boost the ESDI within NATO. This agreement – called “Berlin arrangement” – was to be 
replaced by the extended “Berlin Plus arrangement”, which was approved at the 1999 
NATO summit in Washington. The “Berlin Plus arrangement” extended this provision for 
EU-led crisis management operations under the ESDP. 
176. Turkey was particularly disturbed by the ESDP project for three main reasons. «First, 
while Turkey had been fully involved in intra-European security discussions as an 
associate member of the WEU from 1992, ESDP offered no such facility. (…) Second, 
Turkey feared that it was witnessing a process whereby the US (in which Ankara had 
enormous faith) transferred responsibility for European security to the EU (in which 
Ankara had very little faith). Thirdly, this was all the more unpalatable for the Turks in 
that most scenarios for armed conflict and crisis management in the European theatre were 
situated in the South-Eastern parts of the continent, which Turkey regarded as its own 
‘back yard’.» (Howórth, 2005: 186) 
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177. NATO’s operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – “Allied Harmony" – 
eventually ended up on 31 March 2003. The EU then took over with the military mission 
code-named Concordia on 1 April 2003 and ended it on 15 December 2003. 
178. On 3 November 2002, the AKP received 34,20% of the vote, winning 363 of the 550 seats 
in the Turkish parliament. 
179. For the details of the compromise achieved by the British government with the French and 
the German governments as well as of the functions of these structures, see the pages 92 
and 93. 
180. The Council of Europe has 46 member states, including all the countries of Europe, with 
the exception of Belarus. It contributes to the preservation and safeguarding of the values 
of democracy and human rights. Its high membership standards, technical assistance to 
support reforms of legal systems and monitoring missions represent an important 
contribution in exporting security in countries in transition. But, as the OSCE, it suffers 
from a scarce budget and limited personal resources. (Cameron, 1999: 73) 
181. Bronisław Geremek served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland from 
1997 to 2000. 
182. In 1923, shortly after the First World War, there was in particular the project of the 
Paneurope, launched by the Austrian Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. The idea was that this 
Paneurope – which was not meant to include United Kingdom, nor Russia, but the 
European colonies of Africa – would exist besides other groupings, namely Panamerica, 
the British Confederation, the Oriental Asia and the Russian Confederation. 
183. Robert Schuman was notably French Minister for Foreign Affairs from July 1948 to 
January 1953. In this position, he played a major political role in favour of the European 
construction. 
184. The 1973 enlargement of the EC «incorporated British (and partially also Danish outreach 
overseas and gradual Anglo-Irish détente via Brussels.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 1) 
The 1980s enlargements of the EC towards the South – Greece in 1981 as well as Spain 
and Portugal in 1986 – «paved the way to a successful completion of post-authoritarian 
transitions to democracy, a significant reinforcement of the Community’s presence in the 
Mediterranean basin, and equally significant extension of European influence in the 
Americas.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 1) 
The 1995 enlargement of the EU «brought more stability to the Baltic ‘Rim’ and 
strengthened the Union’s drive to cooperate with the UN and the OSCE. It marginally 
altered the internal balance between allied and non-allied member States (until then, only 
Ireland was not a NATO member), but it also favoured – albeit indirectly, as a sort of 
compensation for those EU members who felt penalised by the Central and Northern 
‘drift’ of the Union – the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, i.e. the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference.» (Missiroli, March 2003: 1-2) 
185. One has to note that de facto, another enlargement occurred in 1990 with the reunification 
of Germany. Yet, since the GDR entered into the FRG according to article 23 of the 
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), it was legally considered only as an extension of the 
German State. 
186. Several analysts emphasize that the term “negotiation” can be slightly misleading, since, 
during the accession process, European law – i.e. the acquis communautaire – is to be 
adopted rather than negotiated.  
187. The EU granted Croatia official candidate status in June 2004. (Brussels European 
Council, 17 and 18 June 2004: paragraph 33) The European Council decided however in 
March 2005 to postpone the opening of accession talks with Zagreb, initially scheduled for 
that date, putting forward Croatia’s lack of cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]. Yet, on 3 October 2005, accession talks were 
opened, after the European Council had concluded that Croatia had met the condition on 
cooperation with the ICTY. It is interesting to note that the green light to start negotiations 
with Croatia was strongly advocated by Vienna. Croatia’s membership is planned for 2008 
or 2009. 
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188. As far as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is concerned, it has signed a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Union. On 9 November 2005, the 
European Commission recommended that the country be accepted as a candidate state. 
2012 is reckoned as the earliest date for the FYROM’s EU membership. 
189. The EU opened formal talks on Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania in 
January 2003 as well as with Serbia-Montenegro in November 2005 and Bosnia-
Herzegovina in January 2006. 
The opening of talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement is considered an 
important pace towards membership of the European Union. One reckons that the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with these countries will be signed before the end 
of 2006.  
190. Besides, we have to admit that most of these countries will certainly never be part of the 
EU. The possible exceptions are Ukraine and Moldova. 
191. The EU, which has currently 25 member states, will certainly have 27 members in 2007 
with the admission of Bulgaria and Romania and could have even more members if one 
thinks about Croatia, Turkey, the other Balkan countries or even Switzerland or Norway. 
192. A protocol on the institutions with the prospect of EU enlargement was nevertheless 
annexed to the Treaty. But, although having in principle the same juridical value as the 
Treaty, the protocol does only have a restricted compulsory character. 
Yet, the ICG of 2000 would base its judgement mainly on that protocol. 
193. This means that a coalition of three large plus one small country will usually be enough to 
block a qualified majority. 
194. Some critics exist. One can indeed disapprove the fact that «l’unanimité reste encore la 
règle décisionnelle dans trop de domaines, permettant à chaque membre de bloquer tout 
progrès par son veto [et que] (…) la coopération renforcée, qui remplace le veto par la 
méthode du “opting out” n’est toujours pas admise pour la politique de défense.» (Kinsky, 
Automne 2001: 10) 
195. Günter Verheugen, who is German, was born in 1944. He was first member of the FDP 
[Freie Demokratische Partei: the Liberals], where he was national manager and then 
secretary general. He left the FDP in 1982, at the time when this party decided 
to “abandon” the SPD [the Social Democrats] – with which it established the coalition at 
power – in order to build a new coalition with the CDU/CSU [Christian 
Democrats/Christian Socials] of Helmut Kohl and to stay consequently in power. This is 
the reason why Günter Verheugen left the FDP and joined the SPD in 1982. When the 
SPD took over the power in 1998 after 16 years in the opposition, he became Secretary of 
State at the Foreign Affairs in the government of Gerhard Schröder. He entered the 
European Commission of Romano Prodi one year later as the European Commissioner in 
charge of the enlargement. In 2004, he became European Commissioner for industry in the 
following European Commission of Jose Manuel Durão Barroso. 
196. It is interesting to note that, besides the areas and cases where qualified majority is 
provided for, the Constitution gives also the possibility under certain circumstances to 
substitute qualified majority for unanimity. Thus, article IV-444 §1 states as follows: 
«Where Part III provides for the Council to act by unanimity in a given area or case, the 
European Council may adopt a European decision authorising the Council to act by a 
qualified majority in that area or in that case. This paragraph shall [however] not apply to 
decisions with military implications or those in the area of defence.» (Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.IV-444 (1)) 
197. One has to notice that the Constitution adds that «by derogation from paragraph 1, when 
the Council is not acting on a proposal from the Commission or from the Union Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72% of the members 
of the Council, representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of 
the Union.» (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.I-25 (2)) 
Moreover, one should notice that, on the condition that the Constitution has first been 
ratified in the twenty-five EU member states, «the provisions of Article 25 (1), (2) and (3) 
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of the Constitution on the definition of the qualified majority in the European Council and 
the Council shall take effect on 1 November 2009 (…).» (Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: 34. Protocol on the Transitional Provisions relating 
to the Institutions and Bodies of the Union, Art.2 (1)) 
198. The EU enlargement is governed by article 49 of the Treaty on European Union [TEU]. It 
states that «any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) may 
apply to become a member of the Union.» (Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title I Art.49) 
Article 6 (1) lays down that «the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which 
are common to the Member States.» (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European 
Union [as amended by the Treaty of Nice], 26 February 2001: Title VIII Art.6 (1)) 
199. Although Germany and Austria did not use the unresolved Sudeten question as an 
obstruction to the admission of the Czech Republic in the EU, the question is still 
unresolved and causes occasionally tensions between Germany and the Czech Republic 
(and also sometimes between Austria and the Czech Republic).  
200. Spurred on by the Commission, Estonia and Latvia have enlarged the access to their 
respective nationality to the Russian minorities living on their respective territory. 
Hungary has adopted agreements with Romania and Slovakia on the Hungarian minorities. 
For fear of a homecoming of the former German owners, Poland has insisted and 
eventually agreed with the EU on a 12-years transition period on sales of agricultural lands 
and secondary residences to foreigners in Poland (i.e. until 31 May 2016). As for the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and the three Baltic states, the transition period on this 
matter finishes on 31 May 2011. 
201. A transition period of seven years is the same one that has been applied to Spain and 
Portugal, when they joined. 
202. Between 1988 and 2002, the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity has increased – in 
comparison to the average of the EU Fifteen – from 64% to 120% in Ireland, from 59% to 
71% in Greece and Portugal and from 72% to 86% in Spain. 
203. As the main net contributor to the budget of the EU (about 25% of the total), Germany is 
in favour of a budgetary reform that would diminish its contribution. This reform is 
however difficult to realise. The question of the budgetary reform is indeed linked to the 
reform of costly EU policies, especially the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP] and the 
regional policy. At the European Council in Berlin in March 1999, Germany obtained 
finally only a slight diminishing of its contribution to the budget of the EU. Today, 
Germany is still trying to push forward the budgetary reform, so as to see its contribution 
further reduced. 
204. Germany abandoned thus its previous position of demanding that there be an immediate 
reform of the CAP. 
205. It was at this Berlin European Council that the EU Fifteen agreed on the EU budget 
planning for the period from 2000 to 2006.  
It was also at this Berlin European Council that the money for financing the enlargement 
was made available, since it had set out – with the Agenda 2000 – a clear framework for 
the financial aspects of enlargement. 
206. This means that over the period 2007 to 2013, the CAP expenditure will not exceed in real 
terms the amount agreed in 1999 in Berlin for the year 2006. 
207. If one omits Bulgaria and Romania, one deems that the direct aids for the farmers of the 
old member states will decrease of about 15% until 2013. In other words, the ten new 
member states will receive about 15% of the direct aids in 2013. 
208. The Commission presented in February 2004 its budget plans for the period 2007-2013. It 
called for an increase in spending levels for the financial perspective 2007-2013, in 
proposing to increase the EU budget to 1,17% of GNI [Gross National Income] by 2007 
and to 1,24% by 2013. The Commission proposed also to abolish the British budget 
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‘rebate’. This rebate, obtained in 1984 by Margaret Thatcher, reimburses to the UK the 
two-thirds of its net contribution to the EU budget. The Commission proposed thus to 
replace this rebate by a general corrective mechanism under which any member state 
would get money back if it is paying more to the EU than it is getting back. 
As expected the Commission’s proposal has come under heavy fire from the net 
contributors to the EU budget. The six net contributors – the UK, Germany, France, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria (the so-called ‘gang of six’) – had indeed urged the 
Commission to limit spending levels to 1% of GNI. Berlin, in particular, is referring to the 
fact that the EU wants Germany to reduce its budget spending and is at the same time 
unwilling to limit its own spending. As for London, moreover, it refuses obviously to 
abandon its budget ‘rebate’. 
As a consequence, during the European Council on 16-17 June 2005, the EU leaders had 
failed to reach an agreement. A row between the UK and France over the London’s yearly 
budget rebate were among the major stumbling blocks as was the size of the payments of 
other net-contributing countries to the EU budget. 
The budget deal, eventually agreed upon at the European Council of December 2005, 
raises the 2007-2013 budget to 862.3 billion euros, or 1,045% of GNI. But, after the 
European Parliament rejected the deal on 18 January 2006, the Council and the European 
Parliament are now in the process of hammering out an inter-institutional deal on the 
budget. As for the European Commission, it has argued in a report issued in February 
2006 that the budget agreed at the December summit, will make it hard for the EU to fulfil 
its commitments on external relations. 
209. See Endnote n°92. 
210. One has to add that this attitude can also be found, as already mentioned, among the old 
member states, but with the difference that most of the CEECs have gained their full 
national sovereignty only lately and may therefore be unenthusiastic to “share” it right 
away. 
211. One has however to note that some of the CEECs – particularly Poland and the Baltic 
states – have substantial national communities in the United States. 
212. Nonetheless, one has to note that these issues – whether it be minority issues, cross-border 
trade, environmental issues, visa regulations or other issues – may affect the diverse 
CEECs in many different ways. 
213. The NATO-Russian Founding Act was forged a month before the Madrid summit – at 
which NATO formally invited Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the 
organization by April 1999 – to address Russian concerns, in reassuring Moscow that 
NATO enlargement would not be aimed against Russia. 
Though of minor prominence, a NATO-Ukraine Charter was also signed – five weeks later 
– to emphasize symbolically a special relationship the USA has with Ukraine, the third 
largest recipient of US aid after Israel and Egypt, which has a particular significance for 
Washington. Both the USA and its NATO allies recognized the need to reinforce the 
progressive factions in Ukraine. (Mattox, 1999: 81, 87-89) 
214. This is especially the case since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and George W. Bush’s 
war against terrorism. Both the USA and Russia indeed carry out a war against terrorism – 
against the Chechen terrorists in the case of Russia.  
215. Finland is not a member of NATO, for the reason that during the Cold War (and partly still 
today) Moscow would have considered it a provocative attitude. During the Cold War, 
Finland was even perceived as being “Finlandised”, in other words controlled by Moscow, 
but it was – despite the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the 
Soviet Union – actually pursuing a policy of neutrality. The collapse of the USSR 
permitted it to abolish the aforementioned Treaty and to normalize its relationship with its 
eastern neighbour. Not anymore intimidated by the Soviet Union, Finland however still 
felt the threat naturally coming from its huge Russian neighbour. One can easily 
understand in this context that security concerns were the main reason for Finland’s 
willingness to enter into the EU after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Forsberg and 
Vaahtoranta, Spring 2001: 69-71) 
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216. Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts that it could be that «in the longer run, Russia may come to 
realize that NATO membership will give it territorial security, especially in its 
depopulating far east. That consideration may eventually prove to be the most persuasive.» 
(Brzezinski, 2004: 101) 
217. The position of London, Paris and Berlin towards NATO and EU enlargements will be 
discussed in the next chapter: Part II. Chapter 2) The Position of the European Union 
Member States towards the Enlargements. 
218. George Kennan, born in 1904, was notably in charge of long-range planning for the US 
State Department following the Second World War. He died in 2005.  
219. Despite critics in the USA of missing debate and absence of thorough consideration of the 
implications of NATO enlargement, the US decision on enlargement was made after close 
consideration of the issue and of the repercussions of such a decision for the United States 
and for the Atlantic Alliance. In the eyes of the US leaders, enlargement – fulfilling the US 
objectives laid out in the “National Security Strategy 1994” – was indeed viewed as the 
appropriate policy for European security and NATO. (Mattox, 1999: 79, 93-94) 
220. There was no doubt at that time that the institutional adaptation of NATO in order to 
integrate the CEECs would not be as demanding or significant as for the EU. 
221. The formal decision to enlarge NATO to seven CEECs in March 2004 was taken at the 
Prague summit in November 2002; EU’s formal decision to enlarge to ten new member 
states by May 2004 dates from the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002. 
222. One should however specify that UK’s percentage share of world trade – amounting at 
around 5% – is quite similar to that of France and Italy, but only about half that of 
Germany.  
But, as for the Foreign Direct Investment, the UK has the second largest stock of FDI 
worldwide, far more than Germany and France. (Lippert et al, 2001: 60) 
223. France has certainly, during the Cold War, promised – with its EU partners – to gladly 
welcome the Central and Eastern countries, once the geopolitical situation will allow it. 
Yet, in spite of the end of the Cold War and the changed situation resulting from it, the 
French government – contrary to the German government – never really promised soon 
after the end of the Cold War that EU enlargement towards the East would occur rapidly. 
In June 1991, French President François Mitterrand declared indeed that it would be tens 
and tens of years before Central European countries could join the EU. (Deloche, Octobre 
1998: 6-7) 
224. For a detailed analysis of the reforms to the CAP decided at the European Council of 
Brussels in October 2002, see the following section: Part II. Chapter 1) Section a. The 
Process of Enlargement of the European Union. 
225. France is very sensitive to the issue of further reforming the CAP. As the country most 
benefiting from the agricultural policy, France has a special interest in a status quo of the 
CAP and is terrified about the idea to further reduce the costs of this common policy. 
226. Dominique Moisi, international expert, is columnist for the Financial Times and deputy 
director of the French Institute for International Relations. 
227. In that context, one should however mention de Gaulle’s historical vision of a Europe 
reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals. Although it was to a large extent an Anti-US 
policy, it was also a policy based on a vision of Europe seen as a cultural identity. With the 
purpose to end the political division of Europe, de Gaulle’s geopolitical vision of Europe 
aimed at the gradual disengagement of the two superpowers in Europe and at the 
simultaneous – though slow – convergence of the West European and East European 
countries. Some analysts assert that these Gaullist aspirations are underlining the 
importance of the historic links between France and Central and Eastern Europe. (Sjursen, 
2002: 505-506) 
228. France championed indeed Romania’s application, while Italy supported Slovenia’s one. 
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229. The Barcelona Process – also called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – was launched 
in 1995. It is a partnership including bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation 
between the EU member states and ten Mediterranean Partners (Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey). 
230. The Gulf Cooperation Council, officially named the Cooperation Council of the Arab 
States of the Gulf is a regional organization involving the six Persian Gulf Arab states 
(namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). It 
has been created in 1981 with many economic and social objectives in mind. 
231. Spain acts normally as the representative of the group of the so-called “cohesion 
countries” of the former EU Fifteen, including Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland.  
Because of immediate geopolitical and security concerns arising from geographical 
proximity to some of the CEECs, Greece is however less reluctant to enlargement than the 
other “cohesion countries”. 
232. Nevertheless, a more negative attitude has emerged in Austria in the late 1990s; notably 
illustrated by the inclusion of Jörg Haider’s far right FPÖ [Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs] 
in a coalition government in early 2000. This attitude reflects «domestic concerns about 
economic competition from the neighbouring countries, especially the border regions, and 
potential impact on their budget receipts.» (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001: 2) 
233. While Germany’s exports towards the 10 former CEECs applicants have increased by 
195% from 1993 to 2001, its imports towards these same countries have progressed by 
234% in the same period. 
234. With an identical belief, the former President of the European Parliament, Klaus Hänsch 
wrote: «Ou bien l’Union européenne par son élargissement vers l’Est exporte la stabilité 
politique, économique, sociale et écologique, ou bien elle sera obligée d’importer 
l’instabilité de l’Est.» (Martens, Avril-Juin 2001: 55) 
235. A “security-community” is «a group of people which has become ‘integrated’» (Hyde-
Price, 1997: 10) 
236. «This desire to repair the wrongs done by Hitler was also one of Chancellor Willy 
Brandt’s chief motivations in pursuing Ostpolitik in the early 1970s. He saw reconciliation 
with the East as the only way to transcend the burden of history and the legacy of 
Nazism.» (Létourneau and Hébert, 1999: 110-111) 
237. The European revolution that brought to the collapse of the Iron Curtain is generally 
considered to have begun in the Lenin shipyard in the polish Gdańsk. 
In summer 1989, Hungary opened a breach into the Iron Curtain and allowed East 
Germans to flee communist East Germany.  
Czechoslovakia, following the Hungarian example, let also East Germans flee into the 
FRG in October 1989. 
238. Nonetheless, one has to specify that former German Chancellor – Gerhard Schröder – 
somewhat distanced himself from this moral duty and responsibility. Shortly after he came 
into office, he stated publicly that he was not belonging to the old generation of 
Chancellors, onto whom the Second World War has had a great impact. As a result, 
Germany’s moral duty and responsibility towards the CEECs – that was still fairly 
important for the previous generation of Chancellors to which Helmut Kohl still belonged 
– did less matter in the formulation of Chancellor Schröder’s policy. 
239. The authors of this paper were the leader of the CDU/CSU caucus, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
and its foreign policy spokesman Karl Lamers. 
Wolfgang Schäuble, born on 18 September 1942, was Chairman of the CDU/CSU party 
(Parteivorsitzender) until he resigned in February 2000, following the case of illicit 
financing of the CDU. He had succeeded Helmut Kohl as Chairman of the party and was 
himself succeeded in 2000 by Angela Merkel. In November 2005, he became Minister of 
the Interior of Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel; a position he had already held 
from 1989 to 1991 in Helmut Kohl’s Federal Cabinet. 
Karl Lamers, born on 12 February 1951, is since 1994 a CDU member of the German 
Bundestag. 
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240. Joschka Fischer, born on 12 May 1948, was Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as deputy 
Chancellor under the government of Gerhard Schröder from the victory of the latter at the 
chancellery’s elections in October 1998 until the change of government in November 
2005. Joschka Fischer is member of the ecologist party [the Greens] since 1982. 
241. The lack of any debate worthy of the name is certainly explained by two main reasons. 
First, NATO enlargement reflected the will of the majority. Secondly, Germans have been 
– since unification and the disappearance of the Soviet military threat – definitely more 
concerned with internal issues, such as high unemployment, reform of social programs, 
overcoming over 40 years of division and so forth. (Létourneau and Hébert, 1999: 108-
109) 
242. This had as a consequence to notably irritate the Scandinavian member states (especially 
Sweden and Finland) which did not want the Baltic States excluded from the first wave of 
enlargement. 
243. See Annexe 5: Eurobarometer (December 2003): Public opinion in the European Union: 
Support for enlargement. 
244. Mustafa Kemal, known as Atatürk, was born in 1881. He was soldier during the First 
World War and played a major role in Turkey’s victory over Greece in 1921-1923, leading 
to the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 and 
amended, to Turkey’s advantage, the Treaty of Sèvres signed on 10 August 1920 by the 
Ottoman sultan with the Allies. Subsequently, Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey of 
which he was elected first President on 29 October 1923. He remained President until his 
death on 10 November 1938. 
It was the assembly that in 1934 gave Mustafa Kemal the name Atatürk, meaning “Father 
of the Turks”. 
245. These terms (geostrategic player and geopolitical pivot) will be developed in the next part: 
Part III. The Zones of Influence in the Unifying Europe. 
246. One has to note that Turkey has also continuous frictions with Syria. 
247. One often refers to the Earthquake diplomacy, when mentioning the warm-up of relations 
between Athens and Ankara since summer 1999. The first steps of the Turkish-Greek 
rapprochement occurred as the same time as the devastating earthquakes of August 1999 
in Turkey and September 1999 in Greece. In the aftermath of these earthquakes, mutual 
aid and support encouraged positive change in the traditionally hostile attitudes among the 
media and the population. (Pinar Tank, Autumn 2002: 147) Yet, one has to draw attention 
to the fact that the first “meeting” of the Turkish-Greek rapprochement happened already 
in May 1999, that is, before the earthquakes of August and September 1999. 
248. This dispute has already been discussed in the following paragraph: Part I. Chapter 3) 
Section c. Paragraph 2. Conceptual and Strategic Distinctions. 
249. The two neighbours notably start to removing mines along their border. The mines were 
planted after 1974 when the two countries nearly went to war over Turkey’s invasion of 
Cyprus. 
250. The Greek community represents a majority of about 78% of the island’s population, 
while the Turkish community represents only about 18% of Cyprus’ population. 
251. Although Cyprus became a British crown colony only in 1925, the United Kingdom was 
administrating the island already since 1878, when it was still under Ottoman sovereignty. 
252. Enosis (Ένωσις) means union in Greek. 
253. Taksim means division in Turkish. 
254. Mgr Makarios managed to escape from the island. 
255. Definitely no state would have helped the Greek junta. Having failed to manage the 
repercussions of the coup d’Etat of Nicosia, the military government in Athens collapsed 
anyway on 23 July 1974. 
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256. There was notably the visit in Cyprus in October 2001 of the then EU Commission 
President Romano Prodi, who declared publicly on that occasion that the island would be 
admitted into the EU with or without resolution of the Cyprus dispute. 
Already at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU set out a document 
which stated that «if no political settlement has been reached (…) [in Cyprus], the 
Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above [i.e. a political settlement 
in Cyprus] being a precondition.» (Helsinki European Council, 11 and 12 December 1999: 
paragraph 9 (b)) 
257. The reasons for the rejection of Annan’s Plan by the Greek Cypriots were many, but 
included, most importantly, the refusal to cede 28,5% of the territory to a Turkish Cypriot 
population representing only 18% of the island’s population. 
258. On the one side, the Turkish Cypriots want to put an end to their isolation and their 
considerable dependency on Turkey. They are aware that reunification would reduce the 
substantial economic gap between North and South. On the other side, the Greek Cypriots 
are also in favour of the reunification, but not on every condition, as their rejection of the 
Annan Plan showed. They fear a permanent division of the island in the sense that an 
increasingly dissatisfied neighbour would be a constant source of insecurity for them. 
(Pinar Tank, Autumn 2002: 149) 
259. The Azeris represent almost one quarter of the inhabitants of Iran.  
260. The spectacular rapprochement between Turkey and Israel is quite recent. In March 1996, 
both countries have concluded important military agreements, including an agreement on 
military mutual assistance. The alliance between Turkey and Israel is considered as a 
threat by the Middle East Arab states. 
261. Although one of the accession conditions for Greece was not to block Turkey’s entry into 
the EC, Athens did so after Greece was admitted in 1981. Consequently, 1999 marks a 
significant change in the Greek foreign policy. 
262. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was born on 26 February 1954, is the leader of the Justice 
and Development Party [Adalet Ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP]. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 
appointment as Prime Minister was delayed after his party’s victory in the November 2002 
elections for legal reasons. Since the Prime Minister in Turkey must be a member of 
parliament and since the constitution excluded those with previous convictions from 
standing, Recep Tayyip Erdogan could not become Prime Minister. He was not member of 
parliament; moreover, he was tried and convicted of inciting religious hatred in 1998. A 
prominent supporter of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gül, became a substitute Prime 
Minister and pushed through a constitutional amendment that allowed Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan to win a freshly vacant seat in the province of Siirt in a by-election. Abdullah Gül 
resigned and Erdogan was appointed Prime Minister by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on 
14 March 2003. As for Abdullah Gül, he became Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
263. However, in its 2005 annual progress report on Turkey, the European commission 
emphasized Ankara’s difficulty to implement the EU’s legal order, particularly in the 
domain of human rights. 
264. A “permanent safeguard clause” on the key issue of the free movement of Turkish workers 
is notably foreseen. 
265. Turkey simultaneously issued a declaration explaining that the signing of the protocol is 
not tantamount to a recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Moreover, Turkey also refused to open its ports and airports to the Republic of Cyprus. 
266. Some neoconservatives outside the George W. Bush administration have however argued 
that it is not necessarily in the US interests to have a Turkey member of the EU, as Ankara 
could thereby get closer to Paris and Berlin over diverse issues, like for instance the 
Middle East.  
267. One has to note that Turkey has symbolically distant itself from the USA in the second 
Gulf War, as it refused to let the US troops pass its territory.  
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268. Germany used to be rather critical about Turkey EU membership, especially under the 
government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Christian Democrats were reluctant to 
Turkey’s EU bid in the name of the Christian Europe. The religion is not a criteria of 
appurtenance to Europe, one retorts. The EU is not a “Christian club”. Yet, the 1998 
election of a Social Democratic government was a turning point in the German attitude. In 
the former government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the Green Minister for Foreign 
Affairs – Joschka Fischer – proclaimed that the EU is no religious community, but based 
on values and interests.  
Yet, like most of the Christian Democrats, Angela Merkel – the current German 
Chancellor of the left-right grand coalition – regularly asserted, when she was leader of the 
opposition, to prefer granting privileged partnership status rather than full membership to 
Turkey. Shortly after coming into office, she reassured nevertheless Turkey that she will 
not stand in the way of Ankara’s membership talks with the EU.  
As for France, critics come from both the left – worried about human rights – and the 
right, evoking the defence of the European identity. 
269. Opponents believe in particular that Turkish EU membership would extend the Union’s 
borders to an extremely explosive region, cost EU taxpayers enormously and lead to 
massive immigration of poor Turks in search of jobs. It is also questioned if Turkey will 
ever fit in with the political values and traditions of the EU. In addition, some fear the 
dilution of the EU’s Christian values. Turkey’s EU membership would increase drastically 
the Muslim population within the EU, as more than 90% of its 63,5 million inhabitants are 
culturally Muslims. 
270. The grand coalition government is formed of the conservative Christian Democrats of the 
CDU/CSU [Christian Democrats/Christian Socials] on the one hand and of the Social 
Democrats of the SPD on the other hand. 
Since the outcomes of the federal elections in September 2005 proved very close, 
negotiations eventually resulted in a grand coalition of Christian and Social Democrats 
under Chancellor Angela Merkel. Angela Merkel was elected Chancellor on 22 November 
2005. 
271. These are all characteristics that induce some observers of world affairs to argue that 
France does in many ways have more in common with the United Kingdom than with 
Germany on foreign and security policy. (Sjursen, 1999: 8) 
272. The Berlin summit of September 2003 attended by Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and 
Gerhard Schröder has to be understood in this light. The leaders of the UK, France and 
Germany tried indeed to conciliate their views on the ESDP. 
273. We refer here to the chapter about the Turkish question: Part II. Chapter 3) The Turkish 
Question. 
274. The Anglo-American alliance was shattered with periods of tension or crisis. First, the 
“Mac Mahon Act” adopted by the US Congress in 1946 forbade any US nuclear 
collaboration with another state, not even the UK, thus provoking a tension between the 
USA and the UK, its principal European partner. This tension led to the British decision to 
have an independent nuclear capacity, with the first British atomic test performed in 1952. 
The Mac Mahon Act was however amended in 1954, allowing a limited nuclear 
collaboration. The Suez crisis, certainly the best known crisis in the Anglo-American 
relations, provoked in 1956 a new tension in the special relationship. The United 
Kingdom, however, sought to immediately renew friendship with the United States. In the 
1960’s, two main divergences appeared between Washington and London. There was first 
the US project to create a European ‘nuclear’ Multilateral Force under NATO 
commandment. This project was sharply criticized by the United Kingdom as useless and 
costly. The project did eventually not materialize, but provoked a tension between the two 
partners for some time. The other divergence concerned the Vietnam War, where the 
United Kingdom – although favouring also the South – did not completely approved the 
US policy and refused adamantly to send any contingent, even symbolically, to fight 
alongside the US troops as it did during the Korean War. The tension provoked this time 
lasted longer and the 1970s were again sprinkled with some crisis. New tension was 
notably caused in 1973 at the time of the Yom Kippur War, where the Europeans – the 
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British included – considered the US Americans as too much favouring Israel, while the 
US Americans did not understand the lack of solidarity showed by their European allies. 
Tension arose also concerning the burden sharing within NATO, in the 1970s already. 
275. Many events illustrate the very good relations between the two countries in this period. 
Amongst them, one can point out the agreement of 1980 to site US missiles on British soil, 
the British support of Ronal Reagan’s SDI project as well as its policy on East-West 
relations and towards Libya (with its bombardment in 1986), the withdrawal in 1986 of the 
United Kingdom from the UNESCO following the USA in 1985 (both countries re-entered 
UNESCO, respectively in 1997 and in 2003), the US intelligence services’ support of the 
British army during the Falklands War against Argentina in 1982.  
As for the frictions that occurred all the same, one should mention notably the British        
– and more generally European – dissatisfaction over the economic sanctions against the 
Soviet Union applied by the USA on behalf of itself and the Western European states after 
General Jaruzelski imposed the martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the official 
British government’s disapproval of the US invasion of Grenada, member of the 
Commonwealth, in 1983. 
276. One has to add that, while re-established a ‘functioning’ special relationship and 
confirming the priority of NATO in the security system (thus lying within the policy of the 
precedent conservator governments), the “New Labour” of Tony Blair undertook a review 
of the defence policy and means, in emphasizing the international and mobile character of 
the defence policy. The review thus stressed the rapidity of deployment, whilst relatively 
neglecting the “traditional” tasks accomplished by nuclear deterrence and heavy 
armaments. (Schnapper, 1999: 66-69) 
277. Yet, some observers of world politics believe that the “special relationship” is more a myth 
than a reality. Some argue indeed that the British created this myth to get over their 
economic and political decay and feign the illusion of continuity. «Mythe ou pas, il n’en 
reste pas moins qu’elle [la relation spéciale] imprègne toujours largement l’esprit des élites 
dirigeantes britanniques.» (Schnapper, 1999: 76-77) 
278. The United Kingdom wanted to prevent NATO weakening politically (by the 
establishment of an autonomous European defence outside the framework of NATO) and 
militarily (by extending recklessly the security guarantee). 
279. One has however to add that the UK is one of the countries which apply the most 
consequently the European legislation and transform its domestic law accordingly. Despite 
its recent efforts in launching some common initiatives notably with Paris and Berlin, the 
United Kingdom remains one of the most eurosceptic countries, being indeed more 
reluctant than the average of its EU partners when it comes to the European project as a 
whole. 
280. The St.Malo summit of 3 and 4 December 1998 is known to have been very much a ‘Blair 
initiative’. (Howórth, Autumn 2000: 383) 
281. The United Kingdom – wishing to avoid isolation that could cost UK influence in    
Europe – wanted to be part of the EU decision-making process, as it was excluded from 
important decisions taken at the EU level, notably in the Euro 12 Council and concerning 
the Schengen area. Foreign and security policy is one of the areas in which the United 
Kingdom can most easily take a lead in order to strengthen its own influence inside the 
EU. First, the Franco-German axis seems to be weaker in this area. Secondly, cooperation 
in this particular policy sector has become far less sensitive domestically in the UK than 
some aspects of economic integration, such as monetary union. (Gegout, Automne 2002: 
69-71; Sjursen, 1999: 8) 
282. London concluded from the Bosnian experience that at times British interests would differ 
from those of the United States and that reliance on the US military meant subservience to 
US diplomacy. (Treacher, Spring 2004: 61) 
283. One has to notice that the Bush junior administration – after taking office – only endorsed 
the ESDP after Tony Blair had convinced it that the ESDP would be limited to 
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humanitarian missions where NATO as a whole chose not to be involved; namely that 
ESDP would be ‘separable, but not separate’ from NATO. (Toje, Summer 2003: 67)  
284. Questioning France’s possession of the nuclear weapons would amount to challenging 
«the political system of the Fifth Republic, which overcame the internal political divisions 
that weakened France to external challenges in 1870-1871 and in 1940.» (Hodge, 2002: 
172) 
It is worthwhile to note that «in French thinking, the possession of nuclear weapons 
fortified France’s claim to being a global power, of having a voice that had to be respected 
worldwide.» (Brzezinski, 1997: 62)  
285. French President de Gaulle also believed that France had broken free of a structure which 
potentially threatened it to become involved into conflicts which had little or nothing to do 
with its national interests. (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 23) 
286. With the obvious exception of France, most of the West European states felt fairly 
comfortable with the US leadership in the 1960s and 1970s. 
287. France wanted to avoid a similar situation which occurred in Bosnia, when requests for 
authorization for strikes against Bosnian Serb positions were agreed by the Pentagon, then 
communicated to the US commander via SACEUR without being discussed beforehand 
with other NATO military or political authorities. 
288. The US-French controversy during the years 1995 to 1997 about the command of the 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces South Europe (CINCSOUTH) in Naples was in this 
sense revealing. The US Americans argued that CINCSOUTH was traditionally held by a 
US officer and should continue so due to the importance of the US 6th fleet in the 
Mediterranean region (and its connection with the Gulf and the Middle East). As for the 
French, President Chirac argued that instability in the Mediterranean region was of at least 
equal importance to Europe; therefore, in recognition of this and of the ESDI, the 
command of CINCSOUTH should be given to a European. Finally, Jacques Chirac           
– whom some accused to have clumsily handled this matter in trying to go too far to 
quickly – did not achieve anything, as the USA refused any compromise, thus keeping 
alone the command in Naples. (Bryant, Autumn 2000: 32-35) 
289. One should add at this point a psychological characteristic in France’s European security 
and defence policy. Much of the latter has been driven – despite the flamboyant rhetoric 
and gestures – by «a pervading sense of vulnerability since the defeat at the hands of 
Bismarck’s Prussia in 1870, by a fear of isolation and of domination by other powers. The 
country is going through an enormous struggle with itself in letting go its glorious past and 
facing up to the realities of its present position.» (Treacher, Spring 2001: 41) 
290. France seems indeed to neither have the resources nor the size to compete with those 
countries. 
291. Although Italy’s former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi – from May 2001 until May 
2006 – was one of the most loyal allies of the United States in its war against terrorism, 
Italy is historically a fairly “Europeanist” country. The same goes for Spain, where the 
non-re-elected José María Aznar – from the conservative Partido Popular (People’s Party) 
– used also to be in his time as President of the Government (Presidente del Gobierno), 
from May 1996 until March 2004, one of the most loyal allies of the George W. Bush 
administration. Spain’s current Presidente del Gobierno, the socialist José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero, has a far more Europeanist attitude than his predecessor, José María Aznar, 
against whom he won the election in March 2004. 
292. See Annexe 3: World and EU member states defence expenditures (2003). 
293. One has to notice however that FRG’s large conventional forces have enormously 
contributed to the territorial defence of Western Europe. 
294. Yet, one has to add that the professionalisation of the Bundeswehr has recently been 
discussed in Germany at a high political level and possibly envisaged for around 2006. 
295. See Annexe 3: World and EU member states defence expenditures (2003). 
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296. Germany’s loyalty towards the USA can be explained by a series of reasons. One is 
certainly the intense relationship between the two countries from the end of the Second 
World War onwards, marked by some passionate events as the air bridge in 1948-1949 or 
Germany’s reunification in 1990, which the US administration was the only one to support 
with genuine determination. (Boyer, 1999: 29-30) 
297. The issue of US-German relations will be more deeply analysed in the section about 
Germany’s Geopolitical Area: Part III. Chapter 2) Section a. Germany’s Geopolitical 
Area. 
298. German history and practice of international law makes it understandable. For more than 
40 years, Germany was the central front of the Cold War. During that time, Germany was 
prevented – initially by the Allies – from using military force except in a multilateral 
action of self-defence due to an attack on Germany or a NATO ally. This became part of 
both the German constitution and the conscience of the German people.  
Germany’s refusal to support a war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq can thus easily be 
understood. 
299. One has to note that most experts now refer to the posture of the neutral states as “non-
aligned” rather than as neutral. 
300. At this point, one has to add two remarks.  
First, principally due to the insistence of the non-aligned EU member states, any reference 
linking the EU to territorial defence has so far been neglected. (Treacher, Spring 2001: 37) 
Second, all but Ireland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace, giving them an opportunity 
to design a program of military cooperation with the allies. Their observer state status in 
NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council – except for Ireland – gives them the 
occasion to participate in a NATO debating forum but not in alliance decision-making.  
301. One has to notice that one could add both Malta and Cyprus to the non-aligned states. 
Indeed, in the case of Malta, a Declaration on Neutrality – obtained by the Mediterranean 
island on the basis of the Irish one – is annexed to Malta’s EU Accession Treaty. 
As for Cyprus, it was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Though joining 
the EU in 2004, a special provision – concerning its participation in WEU operations – 
was also applied to Cyprus. 
302. Thus, Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden take part in the 
ESDP, but are excluded from the “Berlin Plus arrangements” (which enable the EU to 
make use of NATO assets and capabilities for an EU-led military operation) and its 
implementation. However, it is clear that this fact does not affect the right of these 
countries to take part and vote in EU institutions and bodies, including the Political and 
Security Committee, with regard to decisions that do not concern the implementation of 
“Berlin Plus” operations. 
On has to note that – contrary to Cyprus and Malta – Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland 
and Sweden are observers in the WEU. 
See also Annexe 4: Structure of the European security and membership/participation in the 
institutions. 
303. The United Kingdom and France are the two only European countries – if one excepts 
Russia – having a seat as permanent members at the UN Security Council, possessing the 
nuclear capacity, overseas interests and power politics based tradition. As noticed in the 
introduction of this third part, all these characteristics have as a result to distinguish the 
UK and France – together with the United States – from the other Western countries. 
(Sjursen, 1999: 8) 
304. (Sjursen, 1999: 8) 
305. It is generally agreed that the US hegemony is directly dependent upon the maintenance of 
its effective preponderance in Eurasia. 
306. Some historians note that Otto von Bismarck did not only unite Germany by the sword, as 
often said. They argue indeed that Bismarck had already laid down the economic grounds 
for the German union with the Zollverein, even before the Danish, Austrian and French 
campaigns. 
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307. Friedrich Ratzel, born on 30 August 1844, is considered as a genuine precursor of 
geopolitics. He was a nationalistic German. His main contribution to geopolitics was his 
works on the biological conception of geography, without a static conception of borders. 
According to him, borders are not a static conception. States are instead organic and 
growing, with borders representing only a temporary stop in their movement. Moreover, 
he published several papers, notably the essay “Lebensraum” in 1901. He died on 9 
August 1904. 
308. Wilhelm II (Friedrich Wilhelm Viktor Albert von Hohenzollern), born on 27 January 
1859, became German Emperor (Kaiser) and King (König) of Prussia in 1888. But, as a 
result of the explosion of the German Revolution and the ongoing defeat in the First World 
War, Wilhelm II abdicated the throne on 9 November 1918. Wilhelm II fled into exile in 
the Netherlands. He died in the Netherlands on 4 June 1941. 
309. The other former German territories lost after the First World War (as provided for in the 
Treaty of Versailles concluded in June 1919) are the following: 
• Hlučinsko (Hulczyn) area (Hultschiner Ländchen) of Upper Silesia to Czechoslovakia, 
• East part of Upper Silesia, after plebiscite in 1921, to Poland, 
• the area of German cities Eupen and Malmedy, after a moot plebiscite, to Belgium, 
• Northern part of East Prussia (Memelgebiet) under control of France, then in 1923 
transferred to Lithuania (after Lithuanian troops attacked and forced withdrawal of the 
French garrison), 
• the area of Soldau in East Prussia, 
• few territories in eastern part of West Prussia and in southern part of East Prussia to 
Poland (after plebiscite in 1920), 
• the city of Danzig (together with the delta of the Vistula river) was made the Freistadt 
Danzig (Free City of Danzig) under the guarantee of the League of Nations, but within 
Polish customs frontiers. The Freistadt Danzig had also to concede facilities for Polish 
imports and exports. 
Moreover, the province Saarland came under the control of the League of Nations for a 
period of 15 years, at the end of which a plebiscite between France and Germany would be 
held. The plebiscite, held on 13 January 1935 (under the Third Reich), established that 
90,3% of those voting wished to remain part of Germany. 
310. Southeast Africa corresponds to the territory including today’s Tanzania, Rwanda and 
Burundi. 
311. Southwest Africa corresponds to current Namibia. 
312. The German Protectorates in the Pacific consisted of the German New Guinea (Kaiser-
Wilhelms-Land, the Bismarck-Archipelago, the German Solomon Islands with 
Bougainville, the Caroline Islands, Palau, the Mariana Islands and the Marshall Islands 
with Nauru) and Samoa. 
313. Besides the loss of German territories and colonies, Germany had notably to accept Allied 
occupation in the Rhineland of Rhine’s East bank, with bridgeheads in Cologne, Koblenz 
and Mainz, (as well as a bridgehead in Strasbourg) for 15 years with a fifty kilometres 
wide demilitarisation belt eastwards of the Rhine, heavy reductions of the German 
military, heavy reparations payments and the infamous “war guilt clause”. Adolf Hitler 
would later blame the Weimar Republic and its democracy for having signed the Treaty of 
Versailles. 
As for Rhineland’s occupation, the withdrawal of US troops occurred in 1923 (See 
Endnote n°314), of British and Belgian troops in 1926 and of French troops in 1930.  
314. Unable to meet the reparations payments, Germany’s currency collapsed and the German 
people suffered large financial losses. In January 1923, French and Belgian forces 
occupied the Ruhr, Germany’s main industrial region, claiming that Germany had stopped 
making reparation deliveries. The UK and the USA protested against this decision, the US 
even withdrawing their troops from the East bank of the Rhine. The occupation of the 
Ruhr ended up in 1925. 
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315. It seems however important to notice that Adolf Hitler did not create pan-Germanism. 
Pan-Germanism existed before, Hitler’s Germany marking only the very warlike and 
violent episode in the history of pan-Germanism.  
316. Kleindeutschland was the political idea postulating the objective of a unified Germany led 
by Prussia and excluding the Austrian Empire. It stands in contrast to the idea of a 
Großdeutschland (“Greater Germany”), including the Austrian Empire. Kleindeutschland 
was realised in 1871, under the leadership of Bismarck, after victories in the 1864 Danish-
Prussian war (also known as the second war of Schleswig), the Austro-Prussian war of 
1866 (thus ruling out the idea of a Großdeutschland) and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.  
After the Austro-Prussian war, Bismarck created the North German Confederation. At the 
Franco-Prussian war, the southern German states – viewing France as the aggressor – 
joined the North German Confederation to complete the German unification. 
317. From the 11th century onwards, Germans tend to “colonise” Central and Eastern Europe, 
the southern and eastern Baltic area as well as the western periphery of Russia. 
«Contrairement à l’idée reçue, le peuple allemande fut un peuple colonial, mais à la 
différence des peuples Anglais et Français, son espace de colonisation ne fut pas l’outre-
mer – sauf au moment de la Weltpolitik, il fut l’espace eurasien, jusqu’en Asie centrale.» 
(Chauprade, 2003: 832) One should note that both Austria-Hungary and Russia 
encouraged all along the 18th century the arrival in their respective countries of new 
German colons, which were placed on territories constituting the frontline facing the 
Turks. Yet, with the resurgence of nationalism and the establishment of clear-cut nation-
states, German colons had to face a large movement of decolonisation. Some of them 
however stayed in the eastern regions. Consequently, Pan-Germanism seems to stem from 
this willingness to gather into a German empire all the territories populated by Germans. 
(Chauprade, 2003: 818-822, 832-833) 
318. In 1919, after the peace Treaties, the German population living outside Germany is 
numerous (Austria not included): 7,6 million Germans, of which 3 million 
Sudetendeutsche were incorporated into Czechoslovakia and 1,1 million German into 
Poland.  
319. This explains largely why the German people outside the German Empire welcomed with 
relief the Hitlerian armies, coming to reunite them again to the Fatherland. (Chauprade, 
2003: 825) 
320. Gustav Stresemann, born on 10 May 1878, became German Chancellor in August 1923. 
After the collapse of his government in November of the same year, he became Minister 
for Foreign Affairs until his death on 3 October 1929. 
As Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gustav Stresemann had numerous achievements, as 
notably the signing of the Locarno Pact (See Endnote n°321) in 1925 – with France, 
Belgium, the UK and Italy – and the entry of Germany into the League of Nations in 1926. 
He received the Nobel Peace Prize together with Aristide Briand and Austen Chamberlain 
for 1925 and 1926. 
321. In the Locarno Pact, Germany reached a normalizing of its relations, while the Western 
European Allies of the First World War – France, Belgium, the UK and Italy – and the 
new Central and Eastern European states sought to secure the post-war territorial 
settlement. 
322. General Karl Haushofer, born on 27 August 1869, developed in particular the idea of 
panism, notably for German purposes. His ideas have certainly strongly influenced Hitler’s 
ideas of expansion. Some researchers think that the influence came especially through Karl 
Haushofer’s contact to his student Rudolf Heß, Adolf Hitler’s deputy as Nazi Party leader. 
Karl Haushofer will be blamed by the Second World War’s victors for having been the 
instigator of the Third Reich’s foreign policy. He denied strong influence on the Nazi 
regime and committed suicide on 13 March 1946 in the traditional Japanese manner. The 
accusations against him seem fairly unjustified. Approving the Anschluss and the 
incorporation of the Sudetenland and the Memelland into Germany, he disagreed on the 
colonisation of the Slavic people and rejected strongly the Hitlerian racism (all the more 
that he was married to a Jewish woman). Besides, his son – Albrecht – was killed by the 
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Nazis because of opposition to the government, after the assassination attempt on Hitler in 
July 1944. 
323. Adolf Hitler pulled Germany out of the League of Nations in 1933, very shortly after he 
came to power. Furthermore, he used the failure of the World Disarmament Conference as 
a pretext to agree to arms parity between France and Germany. 
324. It is worthwhile to add that although most Austrians were in favour of the Anschluss 
already in the wake of the First World War, they were not allowed to do so by the Treaty 
of Versailles of 1919. 
325. The young states Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia (both created with the Peace Treaties ending 
the First World War) and Romania (created at the Berlin Congress in 1878) formed a 
mutual defensive alliance, the Little Entente, also known as the Petite Entente, in 1920. 
The Little Entente had the support of France, which was behind the project of its 
establishment. In order to protect the member’s independence and territorial integrity, the 
Entente’s main purpose was the containment of Hungarian revisionism. It was however 
also directed against a restoration of the Habsburgs and against a German domination in 
the region. It was also the intention of the Allies that the Little Entente would constitute a 
buffer zone against a revival of Pan-Germanism and against a potential expansion of the 
Soviet Union towards the Balkans; in addition, for Yugoslavia, it was also meant to serve 
as a protection against Italian aspirations. The Little Entente collapsed in September 1938 
with the signing of the Munich Agreement. 
Similar to it, the Balkan Entente was an alliance created in 1934 by Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Greece and Turkey with the purpose to safeguard their territorial integrity against 
Bulgarian revisionism. The Balkan Entente, whose members met a last time in 
February1940, collapsed with the events of the Second World War. 
326. The Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1937 between the Third Reich and Japan was 
directed against the Communist International [Comintern] in general and the Soviet Union 
in particular. 
The Pact was extended in 1937 to Italy and in 1939 to Hungary and Spain. At its renewal 
in 1941, the Pact was further extended to Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, Denmark, 
Finland and the Nanking regime in China. 
327. Like the Third Reich, these countries – humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles – sought a 
geopolitical revenge. 
328. The Third Reich and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression treaty in August 1939, 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Also known as the Hitler-Stalin pact or Nazi-Soviet pact, 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939 by the German 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and its Soviet counterpart, 
Vyacheslav Molotov.  
The non-aggression treaty lasted until the Third Reich ended it by invading the Soviet 
Union in Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941 together with Romania, thus opening an 
eastern front that would ultimately turned out to be an important cause of Germany’s final 
defeat. 
329. In the early Second World War years, Germany gained control over most of Europe’s 
mainland. The Third Reich first conquered Poland and then moved swiftly in April 1940 to 
Denmark and Norway. In May 1940, Germany launched its western offensive through 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg into France. France capitulated by the end of 
June, letting Germany occupy the most important areas of France. One has to note that 
Italy entered the war on the side of Hitler’s Germany on 10 June 1940 at a time when the 
French defeat appeared to be imminent, with the intention to get a share of the winnings. 
In April 1941, Germany invaded the Balkans and conquered it rapidly. It also conquered 
Greece in April 1941, in order to prevent a disgrace of its ally Italy. In June 1941, 
Germany broke the non-aggression treaty of August 1939 with the Soviet Union by 
launching “Operation Barbarossa” which objective was to seize Moscow by the end of 
1941. Yet, Hitler’s Germany did not reach its objectives. Instead, with the onset of winter, 
the Soviets were able to counterattack, stopping the German Wehrmacht at the very 
outskirts of Moscow. In 1942, despite important setbacks at the end of 1941, Germany 
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launched a fresh offensive in the East which permitted it to reach – briefly – the Caucasus 
Mountains. 
330. Germany – through Admiral Karl Dönitz, who had been appointed by Hitler as his 
successor – unconditionally surrendered on 8 May 1945. 
331. One of the most horrifying examples is that of the Red Army decimating the civilian 
population in the area of Gumbinden, Nemmersdorf and Metgethen in East Prussia. The 
entire population of Nemmersdorf and of other cities had indeed been liquidated. 
332. The expulsion of the Germans from post-Second World War Poland is highly connected 
with the forced westwards movement of the latter. Between 1944 and 1948, more than two 
million Poles were expelled from former Eastern Poland and mostly settled in the former 
eastern territories of Germany. In other words, the Germans living in these eastern lost 
territories were quickly expelled to make room for the Poles who had been expelled from 
their homeland in the henceforth Soviet territories. 
333. In addition to the Germans, several million Poles, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Finns, 
Yugoslavs and other nationals and ethnic groups were also expelled from their homelands 
in the wake of the Second World War. It was the intention of the victorious Allies to build 
a post-Second World War order based on homogeneous nation-states. 
334. Romania and Albania were the two only countries of the Warsaw Pact that did not 
participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. After the invasion, Albania even 
formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, although Tirana had already stopped supporting 
the Pact Albania had stopped supporting the alliance in 1961, as a result of the Sino-Soviet 
schism in which the hard-line Stalinist regime in Albania sided with the People’s Republic 
of China. As for Romania, its leader Nicolae Ceauşescu denounced the invasion as a 
violation of both international law and Warsaw Pact’s principle of mutual non-interference 
in internal affairs. 
335. A few Czech and East German divisions stood in a state of readiness on Polish frontiers, 
alongside Soviet troops, until July 1982. They exerted thus pressure on the Polish regime 
to solve the Solidarność problem. Faced with the threat of military intervention, the Polish 
government instituted martial law and suppressed Solidarność, the Polish Solidarity 
Union. 
336. See Endnote n°33 in fine. 
337. In 1952, the Soviet Union set the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent 
boundary to be one of the conditions for the Soviet Union to agree to a reunified and 
neutral Germany. But, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the Soviet leaders 
could not agree on the conditions and the nature of the reunified Germany. The recognition 
of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent boundary was for long regarded as unacceptable in 
West Germany. Moreover, the FRG – which, according to the Hallstein doctrine (see 
Endnote n°33), would not establish nor maintain diplomatic relations with any state that 
recognized East Germany, with the notable exception of the Soviet Union – did not 
recognize Poland. A fortiori, West Germany’s Hallstein doctrine impeded it to recognize 
East Germany. 
338. One refers especially to the Germans living in Central and Eastern Europe. Today, the 
remaining German minorities consist of about 150’000 people in Poland, 50’000 in the 
Czech Republic, 300’000 in Hungary, 100’000 in Romania and 1 million in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
339. The Two-Plus-Four Treaty is called as such because it was negotiated between the four 
occupying powers (USA, UK, France and the Soviet Union) and the two Germanys (the 
FRG and the GDR). 
340. Article 23 stated: «For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the territory of the 
Länder of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden, 
and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. In other parts of Germany it shall be put into force on 
their accession.» (Grundgesetz, 1988: Article 23) Article 23 has already been the 
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procedure for accession of the Saarland in 1956. The other procedure would have been to 
follow article 146 of the Basic Law. Article 146, which underscored the provisional 
character of the Basic Law, stated that the latter was to be replaced as soon as all German 
people were free to determine their own future. The unification proceeded under article 23 
because it did not require – contrary to article 146 – the adoption of a new Basic Law to 
achieve reunification. Article 146 was amended as follows: «This Basic Law, which is 
valid for the entire German people following the achievement of the unity and freedom of 
Germany, shall cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free 
decision of the German people comes into force.» (Grundgesetz, 2002: Article 146) The 
article 23 used for the reunification was repealed in 1990 (after the reunification) and 
replaced by an article on the European Union. 
341. These Bundesländer are Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. They are often referred to as the Neue Bundesländer, in 
opposition to the former Bundesländer, called Alte Bundesländer. 
342. In this context, one should emphasize that the danger of seeing German foreign policy 
again succumbing to militarism is extremely remote. But the expectation that Germany 
will embrace the “responsible power politics” is altogether greatly realistic. (Hodge, 2002: 
156) 
343. See Annexe 6: Germany’s new Ostpolitik (Chauprade et Thual, 1998: 441)  
The independences of the Baltic states, Croatia and Slovenia are widely considered as 
offering Baltic and Adriatic shores to Berlin. (Chauprade, 2003: 161) 
344. This is mainly explained by the fact that, while the Germans expelled from current Polish 
territories have been spread all over the territory of former West Germany (with a few 
remaining also on the territory of former East Germany), the great majority of the 
Sudetendeutsche found refuge in Bavaria, where they formed influential organizations. 
345. These are most notably the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft and the Verband der 
Sudetendeutschen (Sudeten-German Federation). 
346. As far as the Sudeten question is concerned, one thinks about the Czech-German 
declaration of 1997. 
347. We have already mentioned this issue in the previous section about the process of 
enlargement of the Union: Part II. Chapter1) Section a. The Process of Enlargement of the 
European Union. 
348. See also Endnote n°200. 
349. It is worth mentioning that NATO has appeared to be more popular in the CEECs (with 
the possible exception of Slovenia) than the EU. This was certainly also in part explained 
by the fact that the domestic costs and administrative hurdles of preparing for NATO 
membership have been (and still are) disproportionately lower than those of preparing the 
EU. (Missiroli, March 2003: 9-10) 
350. See Annexe 7: France’s and Germany’s Geopolitical Orbits of Special Interest. 
(Brzezinski, 1997: 64) 
351. It is in that perspective that both the close link between Germany and the United States 
and NATO membership of the CEECs are important. Both elements permit Berlin to more 
openly take up a leadership role in Central and Eastern Europe without at the same time 
threatening the CEECs. The latter are indeed reassured and do not fear to have close 
relations with Germany, since NATO and the USA provide security guarantees. 
352. Besides, the double standard that Moscow applies to Berlin and Washington is remarkable. 
Germany and the United States were both advocates of an expanded NATO that excluded 
Russia; yet, Berlin «has been exempt from most of the accusations of geopolitical 
calculation that Moscow has periodically flung to Washington.» (Hodge, 2002: 156) 
353. The strategic changes were however already initiated – though rather vaguely and only 
slightly – under the administration of George Bush Senior. Nevertheless, one observes – in 
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the current foreign policy of the United States – a contrast to the US foreign policy of the 
second half of the twentieth century.  
354. Germany’s Iraq policy has certainly been influenced by the election politics, but it was 
more fundamentally influenced by the population’s general pacifistic attitude and by its 
restlessness with Germany’s new role as a military power within NATO. 
355. The Treaty of Paris ended the war between France and the Sixth Coalition of Prussia, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, Russia and Austria. It provided for no more than little 
punitive action against France, whose borders were restored to those of 1792. France did 
thus not lose territory in relation to pre-war France. 
As for the greater territorial reshaping of Europe, it was reserved for the Congress of 
Vienna, which purpose was to redraw the continent’s political map after the defeat of 
Napoleonic France. 
356. Following the end of the First French Empire in 1814, the Allies restored the Bourbon 
Dynasty to the French throne, giving way to the period called the Restauration. This 
period came to an end in 1830 due to the July Revolution, which saw Louis-Philippe 
accede to the throne as the King of the French in the period called the July Monarchy. He 
remained on the throne until the 1848 Revolution permitted the creation of the Second 
Republic after the election of Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as President. The latter 
then had himself declared Emperor Napoleon III of the Second Empire lasting from 1852 
until its deposition in 1871 following the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. The 
Third Republic which ensued lasted until the invasion of France by the Hitlerian Germany 
in 1940. 
357. The United Kingdom had as an initial interest to colonise Egypt and South Africa due to 
interest in securing communication lines to India. Then, London was seeking to connect its 
North African to its South African colonial Empire and establish a railway from Cape 
town to Cairo. 
358. It was in Fashoda that in 1898 France and the UK were brought to the point of war in their 
scramble for colonial territories, most notably in Africa. 
A French force headed to the area around Fashoda to secure it as a protectorate in order to 
have an interrupted link between Dakar and Djibouti and to reopen the Egyptian question 
(over the legality of the occupation of Egypt by the UK). It arrived in July 1898 after a 14-
months march from Congo. In September of the same year, London – in the process of 
establishing a contiguously empire from Cairo to Cape Town – sent a British force in the 
same area. The crisis between Paris and London – climaxing with preparation of war on 
both sides – lasted until 3 November, when the French government ordered its troops to 
withdraw, thus ending in a diplomatic victory for the UK. France – inferior both in 
numbers and technology (especially concerning the marine forces) – was certainly more 
eager to find a peaceful resolution of the crisis; all the more that France had again been 
plunged into the Dreyfus Affair. 
The town of Fashoda in south-eastern Sudan is known today as Kodok, after the British 
changed the name in 1904 at the onset of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale. 
359. Louis Philippe’s constitutional monarchy was overthrown in the 1848 Revolution which 
permitted the creation of the Second Republic. Shortly after its setting up, the government 
of the Second Republic ended Algeria’s status as a colony and declared it an integral part 
of France. Algeria would remain an integral part of France until the collapse of the Fourth 
Republic in 1958. 
360. Concluded in 1975 in the capital of Togo, the Lomé Convention is a treaty regulating trade 
between the EU and at the beginning 71 (later 77) ACP countries. It is mainly based on a 
system of tariff preferences giving the ACP countries access to the EU market and special 
funds maintaining price stability in agricultural and mining products. It was renewed on a 
regular basis, before being succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement at its coming into force 
in 2002. 
Signed in Benin in 2000, the Cotonou Agreement regulates trade, foreign aid, investments, 
human rights and governance between the EU and 77 ACP countries. Thus, unlike the 
Lomé Convention, the Cotonou Agreement also addresses human rights and governance 
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issues. Moreover, it provides for replacing the unilateral trade preferences of the Lomé 
Convention with Economic Partnership Agreements involving reciprocal obligations. 
361. It is worthwhile to note that Algeria, one of the most important French-speaking countries, 
is not member of that organization. 
362. The territories under French sovereignty situated outside the Metropolitan France 
(commonly referred to as Département d’outre-mer-Territroire d’outre-mer [DOM-
TOM]) are the following: Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and the Réunion Island 
are the Overseas Departments [DOM], each of them being a département and a région at 
the same time; French Polynesia (being referred to as an Overseas Country), Mayotte 
(being referred to as an Overseas Departmental Collectivity), Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon 
and Wallis-and-Futuna (the two latter being referred to as Overseas Territorial 
Collectivities) are Overseas Collectivities; New Caledonia is a Collectivity with a special 
status, that is, a Collectivity sui generis; as for French Southern and Antarctic Territories 
(Terres australes et antarctiques françaises [TAAF]), the Scattered Islands in the Indian 
Ocean and the Clipperton Island, they are overseas territories without permanent 
population. 
363. One should note that the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale is not equivalent to an alliance. 
364. The crisis was provoked by the visit of the German Emperor Wilhelm II to Tangier in 
Morocco in March 1905. Having spoken about the possibility of Moroccan independence, 
he openly challenged French influence in Morocco. The German provocation can be 
explained by its willingness to test the strength of the recently agreed Entente Cordiale. 
The crisis lasted until January 1906, when a conference in the Spanish Algeciras was 
opened. An agreement was eventually reached in March 1906. Germany – that was only 
supported by Austria-Hungary – accepted at last an agreement largely in favour of France 
that was backed by the UK, Russia, the USA, Spain and Italy: France yielded some 
domestic changes in Morocco in exchange for retaining control of the key areas in the 
country.  
365. The Agadir Crisis, also known as the Second Moroccan Crisis, was the international 
tension – particularly between France and Germany – provoked in 1911 by the deployment 
of a German warship in Agadir. Germany was seeking to reinforce its claims for 
compensation for its acceptance of French pre-eminence in Morocco, as agreed at the 1906 
Algeciras conference. After French-German negotiations, held from July to November 
1911, a convention was agreed between the two countries. According to it, Germany         
– internationally more and more isolated – accepted France’s full protectorate over 
Morocco; in compensation, Germany’s colony, Cameroon, would be widened at the 
expense of the French Equatorial African colony of Middle Congo (today part of the 
Republic of Congo). 
366. The French geographer Vidal de la Blache was born in 1845 and died in 1918. 
367. The French geographer Jacques Ancel was born in 1879 and died in 1943. 
368. The Triple-Entente was completed in 1907, thanks to the Anglo-Russian entente of that 
year. The Dual Alliance between Russia and France existed already since 1894. As for the 
Entente cordiale between France and the United Kingdom, it was embraced in 1904. 
369. Anyway, together with Russia, France is commonly considered as being the country 
having – in geopolitical terms – lost the most from Germany’s reunification.  
370. Richard Norman Perle, born on 16 September 1941, is an US neoconservative political 
advisor. From 1981 to 1987, he served the Reagan administration as an assistant Secretary 
of Defence for international security policy. From 2001 to 2003, under the George W. 
Bush administration, he was chairman of the Defence Policy Board Advisory Committee, 
which he served form 1987 to 2004. Working currently for a neoconservative think tank, 
he is also very active in business.  
Richard Norman Perle, advocating pre-emptive attacks on Syria, Iran, Libya and other 
countries, is commonly said to be the person behind the US policy on Iraq. 
371. (Gordon, Fall 2000: 57). 
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372. The key idea of constructivism – whose leading theorists are Friedrich Kratochvil and 
Alexander Wendt – is that the social and political world including international relations is 
a human construction, since it is created and constituted entirely by people. Constructivism 
emphasizes the role of ideas, of shared knowledge and is preoccupied with the “other” and 
the perception one has of the “other”. Accordingly, a security dilemma is not merely made 
up by a comparison of forces. It depends also – and even more – on how states view each 
other. For example, the stronger military force of the United Kingdom is less threatening 
to the United States than the weaker one of Syria, because the UK is a friend of the USA, 
whereas Syria is not. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 238-240) 
373. We refer here to the section about the position of France towards the European security 
architecture: Part III. Chapter 1) Section b. The Motivations of the “Europeanist” France. 
374. As Zbigniew Brzezinski puts it in his book The great Chessboard. (Brzezinski, 1997: 61) 
375. For further details about that particular point, we refer here to the section about the 
position of France towards the European security architecture: Part III. Chapter 1) Section 
b. The Motivations of the “Europeanist” France. 
376. Edouard Balladur, born on 2 May 1929, was French Prime Minister from March 1993 
until May 1995. He resigned as Prime Minister, after having been unsuccessful in the run 
for President in the 1995 Presidential elections. He was eliminated after the first round of 
voting. Eventually, Jacques Chirac, beating Lionel Jospin in the second run of voting, was 
elected President. 
377. See Endnote n°66. 
378. Romania, Bulgaria, but also Moldova (since 1995), are member states of the international 
organization of French-speaking countries and governments, namely l’Organisation 
internationale de la Francophonie. As for Armenia, it applied for membership. 
Moreover, there are nearly 30% French speakers in Romania; in Bulgaria, the percentage 
is much smaller – about 5% –, but there is a really existing French-speaking tradition in 
the country. (Chauprade, 2003: 278) 
379. At this point, one has however to remind the faux pas made by France in its relations with 
Poland, during its EU presidency at the European Council of Nice in December 2000. 
Concerning the weighting of votes in the Council, one of the proposals made by the 
French Presidency suggested to give a vote less to Poland vis-à-vis Spain, notwithstanding 
the nearly same size of their population. This had as a result to greatly irritate the Polish 
and its then Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, considering the French Presidency disloyal to the 
Polish. As Poland was backed by most of the EU and soon-to-become EU member states, 
most essentially Germany and Spain itself, this proposal had no chance to be accepted, but 
had as a consequence to bring for some time uneasiness in the Franco-Polish relations. 
380. France also hopes to include in the middle-term Serbia-Montenegro – which is a historical 
and traditional ally, but still in the process of trying to break out of its international 
isolation – into its Eastern European geopolitical scheme.  
Besides, one has to note that a referendum will be held in Montenegro about its potential 
independence from Serbia. 
381. We refer here to the section about the position of France towards the EU enlargement: Part 
II. Chapter 2) Section b. The Attitude of France. 
382. In the post-Cold War era, «la France voyait dans l’organisation d’une politique euro-
méditerranéenne, l’opportunité de poursuivre une politique française par d’autres moyens. 
Celle-ci commençait de comprendre que le pathos désormais propre aux relations qu’elle 
entretenait avec de nombreux pays méditerranéens devenait un handicap. L’Union 
européenne était en revanche un vecteur “neutre” par le truchement duquel il était possible 
de faire passer beaucoup d’idées et de projets de coopération et d’exercer une nouvelle 
influence, en des termes meilleurs, peut-être, que par le passé.» (Daguzan, 1999: 65) For a 
long time considered as constraining its freedom of action, the EU is now seen by France 
as providing it with an excellent framework in order to effectively assert itself in the 
southern Mediterranean. 
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383. One has to note that France is not the only European country very eager on seeking to 
promote a great Mediterranean project. The other Mediterranean countries, especially Italy 
and Spain, also play a considerable role in the promotion of that project, notably when – in 
the mid- and late-1990s – they convinced the Northern European states of its importance. 
As for Germany, it is not only aware of the threat a Mediterranean area in crisis would 
pose to the European stability, but is also willing to rebalance an eastwards enlarged EU 
with further ties with the South. It thus also devoted itself to convincing the reluctant 
Northern European states of the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean project. (Daguzan, 
1999: 65-66) 
384. See Annexe 7: France and Germany’s Geopolitical Orbits of Special Interest. (Brzezinski, 
1997: 64)  
385. As noted by Marie-Claude Plantin, «the opportunities for the French to play the leading 
role to which they aspire in the international arena are very limited – unless of course they 
succeed in assuming a role within a strengthened collective diplomacy operating within 
the EU.» (Plantin, 1999: 107)  
386. One thinks especially about the Berlin summit of September 2003, where Tony Blair, 
Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder tried to conciliate their views on the ESDP. 
387. The ideal of European unification, with Germany playing a central and quasi messianic 
role in its achievement, has very early marked German thinking. (Chauprade, 2003: 822) 
«Le pan-germanisme n’a cessé de s’identifier au panisme européen. La vision unitaire de 
l’Europe est développée par les géopoliticiens allemands de la première moitié du XXe 
siècle. Ratzel comme Haushofer se sont élevés contre la politique d’équilibre des Etats 
défendue traditionnellement par la France et l’Angleterre, qu’ils concevaient comme une 
politique d’affaiblissement progressif de l’ensemble des Européens et qui devait rendre 
possible l’émergence des Etats-Unis.» (Chauprade, 2003: 496)  
388. This objective was close to prevail notably as a result of the German-Soviet Pact of August 
1939. Moreover, it seems interesting to note that the Hitlerian Germany has been among 
the first to develop the idea of a European economic community, of course centred on 
Germany. (Chauprade, 2003: 36) Another symbol of the Third Reich’s objective of a 
construction of Europe formed around a German leadership was the formation of the 
Germanic-SS made up of volunteers from other European countries. 
389. One has to note that traditionally for German geopoliticians, as for instance Karl 
Haushofer, the unity of Europe is based on two fundamental dynamics: in the West, it is 
the Franco-German axis (permitting Germany to reach the Atlantic) and in the East an 
alliance with Russia (permitting Germany to reach the Pacific). For them, «la France, du 
fait de sa situation géographique, jouit d’une liberté d’action que n’eurent jamais ni 
l’Espagne, ni l’Italie, ni l’Allemagne. (…) La France, elle, eut la liberté de choisir 
réellement sa politique, de proclamer les Croisades et les Droits de l’Homme. L’union 
avec la France donnerait donc à l’Allemagne une liberté de choix géopolitique dont elle ne 
dispose pas dans l’espace étroit de ses frontières.» (Chauprade, 2003: 497) Thus, from 
their point of view, thanks to a continental alliance with both Russia eastwards and France 
westwards, the Eurasian unification – centred naturally (at least economically) on 
Germany – would be possible. This Eurasian unification would in turn put an end to the 
Anglo-Saxon maritime domination. (Chauprade, 2003: 497-498) 
390. There is no doubt that on key issues France was a loyal, devoted and resolute ally of the 
USA. For instance, Paris fully backed Washington during the 1948-1949 Berlin blockade 
and also during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 
391. France’s rapprochement with NATO was greatly favoured by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the reunification of Germany. Yet, as analysed in the section about France’s 
position towards the European security architecture, it was also a response to the 
intransigence of France’s West European partners refusing any European security and 
defence structure that was not inclusive of NATO. (Treacher, Spring 2001: 41) One has to 
add that France did however not reintegrate the military command structure (thus 
remaining outside the hierarchical structure), but got back its seat at the Military 
Committee. (Walch, Avril-Juin 2001: 350) 
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For further details about that particular point, we refer here to the section about the 
position of France towards the European security architecture: Part III. Chapter 1) Section 
b. The Motivations of the “Europeanist” France. 
392. One can easily imagine the “pacifistic” Germany accepting a military leadership of France 
in the ESDP, independent from the USA, but only if it effectively believes that France 
could provide the necessary security to Germany and Europe. 
393. See Endnote n°351. 
394. Germany and France, as well as the Benelux States, compose the core of very tightly 
integrated countries. Italy could eventually also become part of the core, depending on its 
developments. One has to add that the core of the hard core is composed by France and 
Germany.  
395. See Endnote n°239. 
396. It came indeed neither from the Chancellery nor from the Foreign Office, but from two 
parliamentarians who were simply interested in foreign policy. 
397. We refer to Joschka Fischer’s speech on 12 Mai 2000 at the Humboldt University: Joschka 
Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European 
integration, Speech by Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University in Berlin. in: 
Auswärtiges-Amt (Berlin, 12 May 2000), 12 pp. 
[http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/redene/r000512b-r1008e.pdf] 
Joschka Fischer’s speech followed contributions to the European debate made by well-
known persons in the political circles as former European Commission President Jacques 
Delors, former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and former German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt. 
398. It is worthwhile to note that Germany acts sometimes as a model for the EU, notably when 
it comes to the question of federalism.  
In this respect, one should note that the Minister-President of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber, 
who was the unsuccessful CDU/CSU Chancellor candidate in the 2002 Bundestag 
election, insists on a vision of European integration which is more decentralized, less 
interventionist and more respectful of national and regional autonomy. Seeking a 
rebalanced European federalism, he calls for further competences to be transferred to the 
European level and even for a strengthening of supranational institutions, while willing at 
the same time to more tightly circumscribe those institutions by legal-constitutional limits 
to their scope of action and European interventionism by stronger national competences. 
(Jeffery and Paterson, 2003: 72-73) 
399. What Joschka Fischer calls “centre of gravity”, Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble 
called it “hard core”, Jacques Chirac “groupe pionnier” and some others “avant-garde”. 
400. According to Fischer’s vision, the creation of the centre of gravity would constitute only 
an intermediate step. The former Green Minister for Foreign Affairs supposes the future 
development of Europe in two or three stages. Firstly, there would be the development of 
enhanced cooperation between countries willing and able to cooperate more closely than 
others. Then, the second stage would be the creation of a centre of gravity. Finally, the 
final step would be the completion of integration in a European Federation. 
401. This centre of gravity would in any case include Germany and France, because without a 
close French-German cooperation, none of the European projects will succeed in the 
future. The former President of the European Commission – Romano Prodi – presumed 
that initiatives developed in the centre of gravity would easily gather the six founding 
states, but as well other countries like Portugal or Greece. 
402. This idea of a Federation of Nation-States was originally developed in January 2000 by the 
former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors. (Delors, 19.01.2000) 
403. It is interesting to note that while he mentioned the term “groupe pionnier” in 2000, 
Jacques Chirac spoke recently of the term “groupes pionniers”, which is not exactly the 
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same and comes close to the notion of “enhanced cooperation”. (Lefebvre, Mai 2004: 284-
285; Dumoulin, Juin 2004: 373) 
404. There have also been further European projects prepared by other current or former French 
policy makers. One should for instance mention the project of some socialist members 
around Dominique Strauss-Kahn, appealing for a hard core around the Euro-zone. 
405. Pascal Lamy, born on 8 April 1947, was chief of staff in the European Commission of 
Jacques Delors, from 1984 until 1994. In 1999, he was appointed European Commissioner 
for Trade in Romano Prodi’s European Commission until the end of term of the 
Commission in 2004. In May 2005, he was elected director-general of the World Trade 
Organization. 
406. See Endnote n°195. 
407. Dominique de Villepin, born on 14 November 1953, is the current Prime Minister of 
France. After having served as Minister for Foreign Affairs (2002-2004) and Minister of 
the Interior (2004-2005), he was appointed Prime Minister on 31 May 2005. 
408. Jürgen Rüttgers, born on 26 June 1951, is a German politician of the CDU and has been 
elected State President of North Rhine-Westphalia in May 2005. 
409. On that subject, one has noted several progresses since the 2000 European Council in 
Nice. It is worthwhile to mention that in October 2003 former Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder even let President Jacques Chirac stand in for him at a European summit. 
410. See Annexe 7: France and Germany’s Geopolitical Orbits of Special Interest. (Brzezinski, 
1997: 64) 
411. One should note that it is above all due to its insularity that the United Kingdom has not 
been invaded since the invasion of England in 1066 by William the Conqueror, formally 
known as William I. It was also its geopolitical situation as an island that permitted it to 
attain in the 19th and early 20th century a global domination on the seas, thus establishing 
its huge Empire.  
412. At its traditional height in 1921, the British Empire consisted of numerous territories in 
Africa, Asia and in the Pacific. Cyprus, Malta, Gibraltar and Helgoland in Europe as well 
as the British Antarctic Territory (in the Antarctica) were also part of the British Empire. 
413. UK’s overseas territories are the following: Bermuda, Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Gibraltar, Turks and Caicos Islands, Falkland Islands, Saint 
Helena (including also Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha), Pitcairn Islands, British 
Indian Ocean Territory, British Antarctic Territory, South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands. In addition, there are the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia in Cyprus. 
414. As already noticed, the United Kingdom consented the leading role in the EU to the 
Franco-German tandem, while focusing itself on its role in NATO.  
415. We refer to the following section: Part II. Chapter 2) Section a. The Incentives of the 
United Kingdom. 
416. As far as the military capabilities are concerned, one thinks especially about France and 
the UK. Yet, although one understandably excepts Germany, the geopolitical location of 
the latter makes it an extremely important country, especially with regard to any potential 
independent European foreign and defence policy. 
Moreover, if one considers the whole European continent, one has not to forget the strong 
military capabilities of Russia, Ukraine (operating Europe’s second-largest army) and 
Turkey. 
417. It is interesting to note that together with Italy, France, the UK and Germany are the only 
European states of the G7 (the United States, Canada, Japan and Russia being the other 
states belonging to this “club” of the leading industrialized countries). They were already 
amongst the sixth founding member states of the G6 in 1975, which changed its name to 
G7 when Canada joined the coalition in 1976 at the request of the then US President 
 364
                                                                                                                                 
Gerald Ford. The G7 continues to exist, although a G8 (including Russia) was created in 
1997 at the instigation of the then US President Bill Clinton as a thank you to the then 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin for pursuing economic reforms and for its neutrality 
concerning NATO’s eastwards expansion. Because the G7 is effectively constituted of the 
leading industrial democracies and the Russian economy is still unsteady, the G7 continues 
to meet regularly without the participation of Russia. 
Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that France, Germany and Italy together represent more 
than half of the GDP of the EU Twenty-Five. 
418. Germany has a population of 82,1 million, the UK of 59,1 million and France of 58,9 
million. However, if one considers the whole European continent, one has not to forget the 
population of Russia (146,9 million) and Turkey (63,5 million). 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that France, Germany and the UK together form almost 
half of the population of the EU Twenty-Five. 
419. To Germany’s population (82,1 million) and France’s one (58,9 million), one has to add 
the 38,7 Poles. 
420. The free economic zone – formally known as the “Common Economic Space” – would be 
consisted of a supranational commission on trade and tariffs that would be based in Kiev. 
This commission would however not be above the governments of the four states. The 
ultimate goal would be a regional organization that would eventually lead to a single 
currency. The Common Economic Space would be open for other countries to join. 
421. Viktor Yushchenko, born on 23 February 1954, is the current President of Ukraine. After 
having served as Prime Minister from 1999 until 2001, he became the leader of a political 
coalition “Our Ukraine” and simultaneously of the opposition to the then President Leonid 
Kuchma. Gaining the reputation of a pro-West and moderate Ukrainian nationalist 
believing in the privatisation of the economy, Viktor Yushchenko ran against the then 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. After a bitter campaign – during which Viktor 
Yushchenko was poisoned, but treated in time – and subsequent reported irregularities and 
election abuses, massive popular protests, known as the Orange Revolution, led to a re-run 
election won in December 2004 by Viktor Yushchenko. On 23 January 2005, he was then 
inaugurated President of Ukraine. 
422. During the EU-Ukraine summit on 1 December 2005 in Kiev, the European Union has 
granted Ukraine market economy status. Albeit the road is still long, this is seen as a 
primary step towards EU membership. 
Moreover, Ukraine is already taking part in the EU’s crisis management operations in 
Bosnia and Macedonia.  
One has to note that to promote its bid to join the EU, Ukraine notably emphasizes its 
abundant gas resources. Ukraine could provide vital energy supplies, thus permitting the 
EU to less depend on Russia’s gas.  
423. Yet, if one includes Turkey, Ukraine is the third largest country in Europe. 
424. It is consequently not a surprise that Ukraine has been the fourth largest partner in the 
Coalition forces in Iraq, after the UK, Poland and Italy. 
425. Germans are 82,1 million, French 58,9 million, Poles 38,7 million and Ukrainians 49,8 
million. Altogether they thus represent 229,5 million people. 
426. See Annexe 8: The Critical Core of Europe’s Security. (Brzezinski, 1997: 85) 
427. The Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], established in December 1991, is a 
confederation or alliance consisting of twelve of the fifteen former Soviet Republics. The 
exceptions are the three Baltic Republics. The eleven original members are Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Refusing initially to join because it considered – like the Baltic 
States – to have been illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union in the first place, 
Georgia joined eventually the CIS in 1993, in somewhat controversial circumstances 
(following the intervention of Russian troops during a civil war). 
As for Turkmenistan, it downgraded in August 2005 its CIS status to an associate member. 
Ashgabat cites its neutral status as the formal reason for its initiative. The country refuses 
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to join any organization because of its “status of permanent neutrality” which was 
accepted by the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1995. Many analysts also reckon 
that Ashgabat wants to be at a certain distance from the CIS, «where the voices of 
democratic Ukraine and Georgia are becoming stronger.» (Mite, August 2005: 1) 
428. The Eurasian Economic Community [EurAsEC] was created in October 2000 when 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and, Tajikistan signed the treaty. Uzbekistan 
joined in January 2006 as full member state. 
EurAsEC grew out of the CIS Customs Union. All the members of EurAsEC are also 
members of the older CIS and the relationship between the two organizations is 
ambiguous.  
The EurAsEC is about to merge with the Central Asian Cooperation Organization which is 
composed of five member-states, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. That is the reason of Uzbekistan’s accession to the EurAsEC. 
429. One should however note that Georgia has no direct access to the Caspian Sea. 
430. Moldova seems still to be split between building ties with Romania and Russia. While 
seeming quietly to drift towards the West, the country faces the still unsolved problem of 
the Transnistria. Internationally considered as part of Moldova, the region of Transnistria 
has declared independence as the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic. After an armed 
conflict in 1990-1992, the Russian Federation (notably with its 14th Army) gained the role 
of protector of the region. 
431. GUAM, named after the initial letters of each of its member states, is a regional 
organization of four CIS states, namely Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Fully 
backed by the United States, the organization was created in October 1997 with the main 
objective to serve as a means to counter the influence of Russia in the area. Although the 
organization was generally considered to stagnate at some point, the renewed increased 
cooperation between the counties – following the colour revolutions in Georgia and 
Ukraine as well as the apparent pro-Western shift of the Moldovan governing party – has 
led to speculations about its possible revival. 
One has to note that the name of the organization was changed to GUUAM when 
Uzbekistan joined in April 1999. But with the withdrawal of Uzbekistan in May 2005, the 
organization recovered its initial name, GUAM. 
432. From the twelve member states of the CIS, two countries have in the last years 
experienced a “colour revolution” leading to the overthrown of their leaders. First, there 
has been Georgia where Eduard Shevardnadze was overthrown and replaced by the 
government of Mikhail Saakashvili which takes a pro-Western stance. Second, there has 
been Ukraine, where the new government takes likewise a pro-Western stance (See 
Endnote n°421). 
433. In April 1997, Belarus President Lukashenko and the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
meet in Moscow to sign the treaty establishing a “Community of Sovereign Republics” 
that is not yet supplemented by any substance, but might eventually result in common 
citizenship and a currency union. 
434. One can however believe that Armenia would not set aside, if its Caucasian neighbours     
– Georgia and Azerbaijan – become one day member of NATO. One has to note that both 
countries already signalled their interest in eventually joining the alliance. 
435. The main reason is that Armenia searches, in the region, for a counterbalance to the 
Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance. We refer here to the section about Turkey’s Geostrategic 
position: Part II. Chapter 3) Section a. The Geostrategic Position of Turkey. 
436. The predecessor of the CSTO, the CIS Collective Security Treaty [CST], was signed in 
Tashkent in May 1992 by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan in September 1993, Georgia and Belarus both in December 1993, 
signed the treaty likewise. The treaty came into effect in April 1994. The treaty reaffirmed 
the desire of all participating states to abstain from the use or threat of force, stated that the 
signatories would not be able to join other military alliances and asserted that an 
aggression against any signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. 
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The CST, lasting for five years, was renewed in April 1999 for another five-years period, 
but without Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan which decided instead to withdraw from 
the treaty. 
In October 2002, the six remaining member states of the CST, signed a charter in 
Chisinau, expanding it and changing its name into the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization [CSTO].  
437. It is worthwhile to note that the Russian inclination towards the West, in particular towards 
the United States, predates the 11 September 2001, even though the latter made it easier 
for Moscow to justify. Facing to its East the rise of China and to its South the increasing 
hostility of ca. 300 million Muslims, Russia – economically weak and demographically in 
crisis – had literally no choice. (Brzezinski, 2004: 101) 
438. It is also worthwhile to note that Germany and France reacted positively to an invitation 
made by Moscow to establish a trilateral relation Paris-Berlin-Moscow. Thus, in addition 
to the EU-Russia biannual summit meetings, this French-German-Russian Troika meets 
regularly since March 1998, on the model of the Weimar Triangle. 
439. One tries to explain that lack of substance notably by the fact that for both Europeans and 
Russians the primary security relationship is the one with the United States. (Forsberg, 
Summer 2004: 256-258) 
440. The ENP’s three main objectives are enhancing cooperation in the political field as well as 
in security matters and promoting social-economic development in a way that is distinct 
from EU membership. 
The ENP is a programme of cooperation based upon three principles: 
- conditionality: it means that the depth and intensity of EU cooperation with any of its 
partners will depend upon latter’s progress in the field of political, market and institutional 
reforms. In exchange, the EU notably proposes access to the Internal market. 
- differentiation: it implies that the depth of relations with the partner states will depend on 
their respective progress in the above-mentioned reforms. 
- graduation: in case of progress, there are possibilities for the partner states to get offered 
wider cooperation. 
441. The ENP encompasses the following South Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, as well as the Palestinian Authority. 
Amongst the countries involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, only Turkey is not 
included in the ENP. 
442. The Stabilisation and Association Process – which entails bilateral Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements as well as the Stability Pact (See Endnote n°66) – is actually 
considered to be a path leading towards membership of the European Union. 
443. Ukraine and Moldova have both declared their aspiration to accede to the EU in the long-
term. Moreover, at least since 1998, the Ukrainian and Moldovan leaderships have 
regularly insisted that the EU has send a clear and unambiguous signal to them (this seems 
to be somewhat exaggerated) about the possibility of their eventual accession to the EU. 
(Lynch, September 2003: 38; Missiroli, 2003: 26)  
One is generally more reserved about eventual EU accession of the Caucasian countries, 
even though Georgia has already made membership in the EU and NATO priorities. The 
EU has so far not been very active in the Caucasus; it were rather the OSCE and the UN 
which have been at the forefront of conflict resolution efforts in the region. (K. Smith, 
2005: 287) 
444. Although there has been a digression with the Atlanticist stance of the government of José 
María Aznar from May 1996 until March 2004, Spain got back into its more traditional 
Europeanist attitude with the government of the socialist José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. 
445. One has to note that Italy is amongst the four most important European economic powers 
together with Germany, France and the UK.  
Besides, those countries are the only European countries of the G7. (See Endnote n°417) 
446. The Nordic Council has been established in June 1952 between Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark. Iceland joined in December 1952, and Finland later in October 1956. Besides 
 367
                                                                                                                                 
the Nordic Council concentrating on inter-parliamentary cooperation, the Nordic Council 
of Ministers responsible for inter-governmental cooperation was created in 1971. One has 
to note that it is due to existing integration between these countries in the field of free 
movement of people, that the two extra-EU countries – namely Norway and Iceland – have 
been allowed to participate in the EU Schengen Agreement. 
447. See Annexe 3: World and EU member states defence expenditures (2003). 
448. Amongst EU’s traditional sphere of influence, one has obviously also to include Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland and the other Western micro-states. Their participation in the 
Schengen Agreement (while Norway and Iceland are already part, Switzerland will soon 
join) and the European Economic Area [EEA] (except for Switzerland) as well as the 
transposition of most of the acquis communautaire into their domestic law is indicative in 
that sense. 
449. Moreover, the little progress achieved on human rights issues reveals the existence of 
several authoritarian regimes in the region. (Beurdeley, Octobre-Novembre 2005: 575) 
450. The Central European states which have been former Soviet satellites (that is, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), are since May 2004 part of the EU and 
consequently not considered anymore as being part of EU’s sphere of influence. The same 
remark goes for Slovenia. 
451. It was under the lobbying of Eastern EU member states and of the Caucasian republics 
themselves that the ENP has been expanded to include the Caucasian countries. (Grazulis, 
2005: 311; K. Smith, 2005: 287) 
452. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] was formed in 1967. Its founding 
countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Later, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, Burma (also known as Myanmar) and Vietnam joined. 
453. The Asia-Europe Meeting [ASEM] was officially established in 1996. ASEM is an 
interregional forum which consists of the European Commission and the 25 EU member 
on the one hand and of thirteen Asian countries (Brunei, Burma (Also known as 
Myanmar), China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Laos, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
454. This was mainly due to the Monroe Doctrine. 
The Monroe Doctrine, issued in 1823 by the then US President James Monroe, proclaimed 
the United States’ opinion that European powers should no longer colonise any part of the 
whole American continent or interfere with the affairs of sovereign nations located on the 
continent. The doctrine, conceived mainly as a proclamation by the United States of moral 
opposition to colonialism, has subsequently been reinterpreted in a wide variety of ways. 
Former US President Theodore Jr. Roosevelt – US President form 1901 to 1909 – notably 
reinterpreted the doctrine as a license for the United States to practice its own form of 
colonialism on the American continent. 
Under these circumstances it has been very difficult for Spain and Portugal, the two former 
colonizing countries in Latin America, to keep some kind of privileged relations with the 
Latin American countries. 
455. In general, economic issues take priority in relations between the EU and the Andean 
Community. 
456. The key objective is now to contribute to the strengthening of the still weak democracies. 
457. The Rio Group includes the countries of the Andean Community, all the Central American 
states (except Belize), the Mercosur countries as well as Mexico, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic and a representative from the Caribbean Community. 
458. Mercosur or Mercosul (for Mercado Común del Sur in Spanish and Mercado Comum do 
Sul in Portuguese) is a trading zone between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
founded in 1991. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, 
peoples, and currency. The organization has a South and Central America integration 
vocation. 
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In December 2005, Venezuela was accepted as a new member (but it will be officialized in 
late 2006) and it was announced that Bolivia would next be invited to join as a full 
member.  
459. The article we refer to states precisely the following: «Where (…) [the European 
Constitution in its Part III] provides for the Council to act by unanimity in a given area or 
case, the European Council may adopt a European decision authorising the Council to act 
by a qualified majority in that area or in that case. This paragraph shall [however] not 
apply to decisions with military implications or those in the area of defence.» (Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004: Art.IV-444 (1)) 
460. One has to note however that these two new figures – that is, the President of the European 
Council and the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs – «may add yet another discordant note to 
the policy-making process.» (Hill and Smith, 2005: 401) 
461. Yet, one has to note that, in contrast to what had been proposed by the Convention, «the 
system of twice-yearly rotation among the Member States of the presidency of the 
different Council formations (with the exception of the External Relations Council) will be 
maintained, although within a “team presidency” of three countries. This system will be 
able to evolve in the future since it can be altered by the European Council acting by 
qualified majority.» (European Union, 28 June 2004: 3) 
462. For the details about the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, we refer to the pages 89-90 and 
to the Endnote n°111. 
463. Despite the rejection of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands (through 
a referendum, respectively in May and June 2005) and the subsequent European crisis, one 
can consider that the European Constitution will eventually be approved, even if it will 
take longer as initially foreseen. The progresses provided by the European Constitution 
being in the national interest of both the Netherlands and (especially) France, one can 
consider that from a neo-realist point of view both countries will eventually in a form or 
another ratify the European Constitution. 
464. See Annexe 9: Ratification Process of the European Constitution. 
[http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm] 
465. According to Robert Kagan, «the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial 
ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on 
multilateralism over unilateralism (…) are a product of more recent European history. The 
modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a 
rejection of the evils of European Machtpolitik. It is a reflection of Europeans’ ardent and 
understandable desire never to return to that past.» (Kagan, June/July 2002: 10) 
466. In the opinion of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a «Europe that seeks political unity by defining 
itself explicitly as a (de facto anti-American) “counterweight” to the United States would 
be a Europe that destroys the Atlantic Alliance.» (Brzezinski, 2004: 95) 
467. It seems as many of the problems of the CFSP derive not necessarily from the rules and 
institutions alone, but from the member states’ reluctance to commit themselves to the 
rules they fixed themselves. 
468. Even though – as we already have noticed in the introduction – there is no complete 
consensus among defensive neo-realists about the independent role played by institutions 
to facilitate cooperation, there is a broad compromise that institutions provide for the states 
important fora for cooperation. (Gibbs, September 2000: 12, 35) 
469. One obviously refers to all the 25 EU member states, be it the founding member states or 
those having joined in later.  
470. Poland can be mentioned, because of its tight ties with the United States. As we already 
noticed, many CEECs, and especially Poland, do indeed fundamentally – primarily and 
essentially – look to the United States and NATO to ensure their security. 
471. Europeanising is taken here in its broadest sense and means «a process of identity and 
interest convergence so that ‘European’ interests and a European identity begin to take 
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root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to inform and shape them.» (Wong, 
2005: 141) 
472. Some think that the Franco-British defence understanding has emerged partly to offset 
German dominance in Europe, dressing a parallel to France’s proposition of a European 
Defence Community [EDC] in the early 1950 as an attempt to thwart German national 
rearmament and steer the FRG towards a West European multilateralist path. (Hodge, 
2002: 163) 
473. Despite its rejection by France and the Netherlands (through a referendum, respectively in 
May and June 2005), the European Constitution is not dead. The process of ratification is 
going on, even though some countries (such as Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, 
Sweden and the UK) have suspended its ratification process for an undetermined period, 
and many European leaders – such as Angela Merkel – are willing to see the European 
Constitution eventually entering into force. (See Annexe 9: Ratification Process of the 
European Constitution) Moreover, as already noted, some of its provisions are (and will 
be) implemented anyway. 
474. One however fears that further development of the ESDP could lead to renewed tensions 
in NATO’s southern flank, «since an emergence of the EU as an independent political 
actor particularly on the security and defence stage, would have upgraded the role of 
Greece in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans at the expense of Turkey.» (Fouskas, 
Autumn 2001: 64) 
475. Only an EU enlargement to the remaining extra-EU Western countries (most notably 
Switzerland and Norway) would represent a relative enrichment of the Union.  
476. Although the EU has introduced flexibility into voting procedures on CFSP decisions by 
having introduced majority voting in some areas, by providing for enhanced cooperation 
and by allowing individual governments to abstain, unanimity is still required on decisions 
with military or defence implications. 
477. Further eastern enlargements of both organizations will in the long-term most probably 
include the remaining Balkan states as well as maybe Ukraine and Moldova. But, one can 
deem that only NATO would probably expand as far as the Caucasus. 
478. One has to note that the reunified Germany has no territorial claims. 
479. Turkey and Russia are however situated at the periphery of the old continent, while France 
and Germany belong to the very heart of Europe. 
480. As a reminder, the criteria are the following: population and territory; economic capability; 
political stability and competence; military strength (i.e. great military capabilities and a 
unified foreign policy). (Waltz, 1979: 131; Gibbs, September 2000: 1-3) 
481. The structure of the EU provides transparency and strategies of reciprocity; the gains from 
cheating are low; mutual cooperation is more beneficial than defection. Thus, the EU 
provides favourable circumstances for cooperation. 
482. Many realist and neo-realist theorists as well as International Relations theorists                
– especially US Americans – argue that the USA should remain in post-Cold War Europe 
to contain any potential future threat to European and US security interests. 
483. Germany considers United States’ role and presence in Europe as fundamental, at least as 
long as no independent ESDP can provide Europe with the security that Germany itself 
cannot. 
484. Jolyon Howórth says in a less “romantic” way that the UK and other Atlanticists accept 
the necessity of constructing ESDP as the price to save the transatlantic alliance. (Bono, 
February 2002: 8) 
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Annexe 1: Article 4 to 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
 
 
Article 4 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.  
Article 5 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the 
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security.  
Article 6
1
 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack:  
• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian 
Departments of France
2
, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of 
any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;  
• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories 
or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were 
stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or 
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.  
 
 
Footnotes: 
1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the 
North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.  
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments 
of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 
1962. 
 
 
 
 
Source: The North Atlantic Treaty, 04 April 1949: Art.4-6 
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Annexe 5: Eurobarometer (December 2003): Public opinion in the European Union: 
Support for enlargement 
 
 
 
 
Member state Support for enlargement  
AUSTRIA 41% 
BELGIUM 43% 
DENMARK 63% 
FINLAND  53% 
FRANCE  34% 
GERMANY  38% 
GREECE  65% 
IRELAND  59% 
ITALY  61% 
LUXEMBOURG  45% 
NETHERLANDS  50% 
PORTUGAL  52% 
SPAIN  62% 
SWEDEN  54% 
UNITED KINGDOM  38% 
EU 15 47% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, April 2002: 19 
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Annexe 9: Ratification Process of the European Constitution (as at May 2006) 
 
 
Member State Procedure Date scheduled 
AUSTRIA 
Parliamentary 
(Nationalrat and 
Bundesrat) 
Approval by the Nationalrat 11 May 2005. 
Approval by Bundesrat 25 May 2005  
BELGIUM 
Parliamentary 
(Chamber and 
Senate + 
Assemblies of 
Communities and 
Regions).  
Indicative 
referendum ruled 
out  
Approval by the Senate: 28 April 2005.  
Approval by the Chamber: 19 May 2005.  
Approval by the Brussels regional parliament: 17 
June 2005.  
Approval by the German Community Parliament of 
Belgium: 20 June 2005.  
Approval by the Walloon regional Parliament: 29 
June 2005.  
Approval by the French Community Parliament: 19 
July 2005.  
Approval by the Flemish regional Parliament: 8 
February 2006.  
CYPRUS Parliamentary Approval by the House on 30 June 2005  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Referendum.  
But no final 
decision so far  
Referendum postponed to end of 2006 - beginning of 
2007  
DENMARK Referendum  Referendum postponed (no new date has been set)  
ESTONIA  Parliamentary Approval by Parliament on 9 May 2006 
FINLAND  Parliamentary 
Presentation by the Government of a report to the 
parliament on 25 November 2005. Ratification 
expected during the presidency of the Council in the 
second half of 2006. 
FRANCE  Referendum 
Referendum 29 May 2005 negative (NO: 54,68%; 
turn out: 69,34%) 
GERMANY  
Parliamentary ( 
Bundestag and 
Bundesrat) 
Approval by Bundestag: 12 May 2005.  
Adoption by Bundesrat: 27 May 2005.  
GREECE  
Parliamentary 
But the Left 
parties submitted 
a joint proposal 
for a referendum 
Approval by Parliament: 19 April 2005 
HUNGARY  Parliamentary Approval by Parliament: 20 December 2004   
 380 
IRELAND  
Parliamentary + 
Referendum 
Referendum postponed (no date has been set). 
A White paper has been presented to the parliament 
on 13 October 2005.  
ITALY  
Parliamentary 
(Chamber and 
Senate) 
Approval by the Chamber on 25 January 2005 and by 
the Senate on April 6th. 
LATVIA  Parliamentary Approval by the chamber on 2 June 2005  
LITHUANIA  Parliamentary Approval by Parliament: 11 November 2004 
LUXEMBOURG  
Parliamentary 
(two votes) + 
consultative 
referendum 
Approval by the Chamber (first reading) on 28 June 
2005. 
Positive Referendum on 10 July 2005: 56,52% in 
favour, 43,48% against. 
Final approval by the Chamber on 25 October 2005 
(57 votes in favour, 1 against). 
MALTA  Parliamentary Approval by Parliament: 6 July 2005 
NETHERLANDS 
Parliamentary 
(First and second 
Chambers)+ 
consultative 
referendum  
Referendum 1 June 2005 negative (NO: 61,6%, turn 
out: 62,8%) 
POLAND  No decision so far 
The Parliament failed on 5 July to vote on the 
ratification procedure. Ratification postponed (no 
date has been set).  
PORTUGAL  Referendum Referendum postponed (no date has been set)  
SLOVAKIA  Parliamentary Approval by Parliament: 11 May 2005  
SLOVENIA  Parliamentary Approval by Parliament: 1 February 2005:  
SPAIN  
Parliamentary 
(Congress and 
Senate) + 
consultative 
referendum 
Positive Referendum on 20 February 2005: 76,7% in 
favour. 
Turnout: 42,3%.  
Approval of the Congress on 28 April.  
Approval of the Senate on 18 May 2005 
SWEDEN  
Parliamentary 
No referendum 
envisaged at this 
stage  
Ratification postponed (no date has been set). 
UNITED 
KINGDOM  
Parliamentary 
(House of 
Commons and 
House of Lords). 
+ referendum 
Parliamentary ratification process suspended 
(suspension announced by UK government on 6 June 
2005)  
 
 
 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm 
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